Direct democracy or digital mob?

A spectre is haunting Eurasia - the spectre of activism. As cyberage sets in, the mentality of old Eurasia grapples to grasp the power of the people when politics enters a new age and arena. Is this truly the case or are we but suffering from the same delusions as we tend to when lured by novelties, choosing the complex over simplicity, iPhone and 3G over pencil and paper?

Paraphrasing the 1848 Communist Manifesto may seem out of place addressing the dramatic changes that our Eurasian continent has undergone over the last decades. In essence though, it illustrates the difficulties of the old political and economic establishment to come to terms with new rules of the game, where citizens enjoy and use ever expanding tools of empowerment, where the Great Communicator is not necessarily the President, but the People. It is a transformation from "we are the people" to "who are the people?".

What this people is, still remains to be determined. Is it a demos - people - without krateion - rule? An unruly crowd with its own heterogeneous interests that only seldom forms into a concrete political agenda, but still looms large influencing and potentially discapacitating policy goals and implementation of elected officials? Is it an anonymous and shrouded rule that manages both people and politicians with no saying who is in charge?

198 methods of nonviolent action is a "dummies' guide to revolution," applied to all popular uprisings forming a tattered trace of coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last decade: Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine... Today, such approaches for achieving peaceful change are so integrated in our mindset of popular action, that we seldom stop to reflect upon if they are righteous or represent the will of the people. Furthermore, the very same mechanisms have found their way into Internet activism, as Gandhi goes web 2.0, as the Mandelas and Sakharovs of our age increasingly turn up from out of cyberspace.

We take these thruths to be self-evident and hail the principles and mechanisms of coloured revolution as singularly in the service of democracy. However, if we think revolution, we must also think reaction. Confronted by external change, Russia by no means was or could be ignorant of this, as stability was the name of the game both to preserve power and protect people from a return to the upheavals and chaos of the 1990s. Nashi became the recipe for reaction, to support and not subvert an authoritarian regime. As also Gargantua went web 2.0, we witnessed cyberwars waged against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. This Russian experiment has now come to an end, and Nashi put in mothballs, as Kremlin seeks new venues of state-directed instead of state-inspired web activism.

Why? What have the Russians realized that the west fails to understand? The answer may be the difficulty of controlling the digital mob. As each and everyone can turn a cyberwarrior or warmonger on one's own, such spontaneity is destined to conflict with the interests of authoritarian government. Directing the webcrowds in the spirit of Gustave Le Bon has proven an overwhelming task in the 21st century, as rulers realize the risk of spiralling into new nights of broken glass. Whereas methods may work in concrete operative and tactical contexts - by blogs, twitter, and other social media - it has proven much more complex and difficult to achieve any strategic and tenuous goals.

The Georgian example also illustrates a paradox if regarded from the perspective of information operations, viz. info warfare. Whereas aerial superiority is deemed the key to victory in modern warfare, the winner may quickly turn loser in the information battlefield. The cyberattacks on Georgia in 2008 gave Russia near total dominance in the information field. However, it also raised the temperature of the Russian information flow for it to boil over into increasingly unreasonable and uncorroborated accusations of Georgian war crimes and even genocide on South Ossetians. In one blow, Russia lost its credibility. At the same time, it gave the Georgian government an information monopoly to send its message, its truth, and its propaganda, as most alternative information sources had been taken out. The exception was bloggers, acting eyewitnesses directly from the hotbeds of battle.

So, have all the powers of old media and politics entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre? Realising its potential, will social media be seen as a friend or foe by forces of traditional society? What it takes to turn the tide and surf the waves of Internet activism is a combination of factors: Understanding of areas, countries, or regions of concern with comprehension of mechanisms such as Gandhi goes web 2.0 and the digital mob. A growing but still too small number of journalists and politicians are getting the message and have started developing such competence, but in the heat of battle, during drastic developments, the question is if this competence may be applied to account for what goes on in the online political arena - with direct or indirect influence on the flow of events - and act or report accordingly.

As trivial a statement as it may seem, the Internet is what you make of it. Friend or foe dichotomies lead nowhere, and seeing Internet as a threat by repetitious rantings about cybercrime and pornography degrade the very thought of human interaction - whether on the web or in real life. Statements saying cybercrime exceeds international drugs' trade, or that a majority of Internet usage relates to pornography (in reality 10-25%), just bring out hysteria about something that for most people has no connection whatsoever to either crime or sex, but for whom interaction by social media has become a part of everyday life, including the potential to actively influence one's life and society by the use of the web.

For people, raising their voices and exerting influence, is not essentially a matter of being online or not. It is true, that social media facilitate social and political interaction, when applied to that purpose. Still, it is the same logics and tactics that are seen IRL political and societal interaction. Age-old methods of political action - whether Gandhi's application of ahimsa to non-violent change or Hitlerite seduction of the crowd inspired by Le Bon - are as integrated into web activism as they are into general political action. The choice - as always with phenomena rightly or wrongly deemed as new - stands between embracing or vilifying web activism. Is standing apart, studiously neutral, the road ahead when cyberspace - for good or evil - becomes but another arena for government of the people, by the people, for the people? Is it a choice between greater direct democracy or the digital mob, or will we simply have to live with both?

Prometheus Unbound?

A Ukraine eternally condemned to be split between east and west is the image that persistently lingers on the retina of imagery as historical, cultural, lingual, and religious differences are allowed to dominate over unifying forces in world perceptions of the country's national identity. The image of a country fettered to its historic fate is today however confronted by a contrasting picture with roots in regional and national myths, linking together nations reunited in freedom at the shores of the Black Sea. Less known is that its origins are to be found in the ancient myth of Prometheus - the titan who stole the fire from the gods and gave it to man.

Prometheus (Gr. he who thinks ahead) brought man the enlightenment - fire and knowledge - denied to her by higher powers. In eternal punishment, Zeus had him chained to a rock on mount Kaukasos, where an eagle was set to feast on his liver. His self-sacrificial torment was eventually ended by Hercules, who killed the eagle and set the titan free. Freed from his strains, Zeus still deemed the titan forever to carry the burden of a Caucasian cliff in the remains of his chains. In memory of Prometheus' suffering, man to this day bear stones in their rings.

The appealing Prometheus myth became the theme for the Ukrainian national poet's, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), epos Kavkaz (1845). The father of Ukrainian literature wrote the work in memory of a close friend - Yakiv de Balman - who had fallen in Russian service in the Caucasus that year. Its edge is however not directed against the Chechens, who had killed his friend, but against the injustices of the Russian empire in denying oppressed peoples their freedom. What today is perceived as expressions of budding Ukrainian nationalism and a strive for independence from Russia, to the contrary encompasses a more general vision of liberty and justice to all nationalities set to carry the burden of the Tsarist yoke.

The Prometheus myth was a recurrent theme in both revolutionary and other liberation movements. It is for example found in the nationalist and socialist struggles against Tsarist rule; on the Balkans in the fight against the Osman empire as well as subsequently in attempts by the Crimmean Tatars to receive support from the new Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s. However, it was foremost by the inception of the Promethean movement that the myth gained greater fame as a symbol in the struggle against Russian and Soviet imperialism, why Prometheism at times also has been interpreted as a form of Russophobia.

For posterity, the Promethen movement has mainly come to be associated with Poland and the authoritarian nationalism of Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935). The Polish leader's ambition to contain Russian expansionism got its ideological inspiration from Promethean freedom ideals and its geopolitical expression in Intermarum - a projected federation of states between the Baltic and Black seas to counteract first Russian imperialism then the Bolshevik threat and to quell the power of the soviets. The image that - with some justification - portrays Piłsudski both as the founder and the front figure of Prometheism however also serves to obscure a more nuanced picture of a once nascent regional movement. In reality, the Promethean movement once gathered leading politicians and diplomats exiled from many of the countries, which had barely experienced a short interregnum of independence between Tsarist rule and Soviet power.

With the Paris magazine Promethée (1926) as a hub, exile circles created an ever-growing think-tank "in defence of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus and Ukraine". Gradually, this task was expanded geographically also to encompass all the peoples, who had fallen under the tyranny of soviet power, and thus the movement gained an overall eurasian expansion. The Prometheans engaged into intense lobbying to direct the attention of European government to the destinies of the oppressed peoples in the decades leading up to the Second World War. By public seminars and culture festivals, attempts were made not only to draw attention to nations erased from world maps, but also build an image of a common historical and cultural destiny, where trade and oceans united the peoples. Consequently, the Prometheans linked their ideas to the era's geopolitical division between dynamic sea power - talassocracy - and rigid land power - tellurocracy - where Russia naturally was referred to as the main example of the latter. To the contrary, the free trade of the oceans was related to free and independent states. That the maritime freedom theme was expanded to cover also old trade routes, such as between the Baltic and the Black seas - along predominantly Russian river systems - as well as the caravan routes along the Silk Road, only comes out as natural as the diminishing significance of exile communities demanded a broader basis. Focus was thus expanded from the Baltic-Black Sea-Caucasus axis to also cover Central Asia.

At the same time, ideas arose in the 1930s to found a political and economic alliance between Black Sea states such as Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as well as Ukraine and Georgia once the latter had regained independence. For the Prometheans, this appeared a greater task than Piłsudski's Intermarum vision. The Black Sea question was essentially considered the final solution to the Eastern Question. However, history wanted differently. Ukraine and the Caucasus remained under soviet rule, Romania's borders were revised, and Bulgaria became the Soviet Union's most loyal ally in the Balkans during the Cold War.

After the Second World War, the Promethean ideals appeared as antiquated as history had made them obsolete. They lived on in the memories of exile communities in the west, but found little ground in the realities of the time. The centre of the movement was moved to the US, but dwindled into oblivion already in the early 1950s.

After the end of the Cold War, the return of history has seen a - conscious or unconscious - renaissance for the ideas of Prometheism. Already in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Council was founded. After the coloured revolutions, Ukraine and Georgia deepened their relations by the 2005 Borjomi declaration. This was followed in 2006 with the CIS-sceptics Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM), setting up the regional Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, with its goal to "strengthen democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and security and stability". No great imagination is needed to realise that closer regional cooperation was aimed at reducing Russian influence over these countries.

Also, the project of creating an Intermarum between the Baltic and Black Seas seems, to some extent, to have been revived. Thus, it was the Polish and Lithuanian presidents - Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus - who served as mediator in the Ukrainian orange revolution and committed the EU to the country's continued reform process. That the inheritors of the mediaeval Polish-Lithuanian Union, once reaching the shores of the Black Sea, engaged themselves to Ukraine's political fate, undeniably brings out echoes of history. Warzaw and Vilnius are also Kiev's and Tbilisi's most ardent protagonists for continued euro-atlantic integration. Regional and bilateral cooperation in various constellations continues to evolve between the four countries. At the same time, the relation of them all to Russia, today are put on strain.

It is thus in terms of aims and ambitions that this "neo-Prometheism" evoke apprehensions. As these ideas now are brought out of the dustbin of history, one should not forget that - for good or evil - they are a creation of their time. Is the goal once more to contain Russia - to form a cordon sanitaire against Moscow's power projections? Apparently, it seems as if the tide is turning in that direction, even though a majority of EU and NATO capitals still pay great consideration to Russia.

From the US horizon, a coalition against Russia may be considered an option if relations to Moscow continue to deteriorate. In the event of a Democratic takeover in Washington, "neo-Promethean" ambitions may gain increased American support. The foreign policy nestor of the US Democratic Party - Zbigniew Brzezinski - is a long-time fan of such visions and was also the architect to the US policy of undermining the Eastern Bloc and demolishing the Soviet Union. Such a turn of events would, however, transform Prometheism from a positive to a negative mission - from integration to exclusion.

From the perspective of the European Union, the bad relations between the Soviet-Russian empire's former colonies and vassal states and current Russia, is a constant element of irritation in the capitals of old Europe. Hesitance and protraction in Ukrainian EU-integration may be interpreted as an expression of apprehension that if Europe's Eastern border would run from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it might topple a precarious balance in already strained relations to Moscow. Moreover, if the Caucasian card would be played out, EU may fear to be dealt a bad hand in a game played out between Moscow and Washington. Still, Ukrainan - as well as Turkish - accession to the Union is a natural and unavoidable development if Brussels is to remain faithful to the ideas of Europe. The dynamics this would bring may also return some of the vitality to the EU, in contrast to the prospects of Eurosclerosis.

As the Ukraine today is the geographical and polictical hub for a neo-Promethean movement, its positive sides may well prove a way ahead for both the Ukraine as the region in its entirety. If regional and western integration is allowed to walk hand in hand, the historical, cultural, lingual, and religious rifts characterising current Ukraine might perhaps be mended. A regional vision would tranform into a national vision, which might better reflect the complex nature of Ukrainian statehood. Here, European integration is an example for co-existence in multinational states.

What originally set Prometheism apart from other national liberation movements was a vision beyond narrow national interests. It waw the rights of small states to independently determine their destinies and the self-evidence in attaining development in cooperation with other nations as well as by regional integration and free trade, that gave the movement its special dynamics. In this sense, Prometheism was way ahead of its time and anachronic to the historical environment in which it existed. Its negative side was the tendency to let the legitimate strive for independence from Russian hegemony turn into outright Russophobia.

As the wings of history once more hover over the fettered Prometheus, hopes are set for Herculean liberation out of the claws of the Russian two-headed eagle. Will the chains thus be broken or will the American white-headed eagle simply take its place. Free or fettered, is Prometheus - the enlightener - destined to eternally live in the shadow of eagles? However, if the burden of freedom is merely to carry a stone in the bond of faithfulness to the ideals he has taught, this would seem a small sacrifice for the European titans of our times.

Poland & Ukraine Win UEFA 2012 Bid

Poland and Ukraine today won the bid to host the UEFA EURO 2012 Soccer Championship. The decision by the UEFA Executive Committee came as a most welcome surprise for two nations currently mared by political crisis. Beating the odds against favourite contender Italy, UEFA in a seminal decision opted for development instead of profit. By this brave and strategic decision, UEFA clearly showed that soccer is a concern for all or Europe, and not merely a concern of mighty nations of the EU.

Sport is politics. This has been evident ever since the 1933 Berlin Olympics. Who gets to host a major international sports' event has enormous profits to gain economically and in terms of goodwill. However, it is also a big gamble, as the opposite is equally true if organisers fail to successfully go trough with the event. Then, it involves great losses in both profit and prestige for the states concerned.

Faced by such considerations, the UEFA Executive Committee still decided for the Poland-Ukraine joint candidacy. The main contender and favourite was Italy, which already has the necessary infrastructure in terms of arenas, airports, roads, etc. However, what in the end seems to have turned the tide against Italy, are the recent bribery scandals and hooligan riots that so has tarred the image of Italian soccer internationally. This was not the case with with Poland and Ukraine, but this positive image may also prove an unwelcome blessing for Warzaw and Kiev.

Without the necessary infrasctructure, Poland and Ukraine now face the gigantic task of forming the preconditions for a successful event, e.g. building eight new UEFA standard soccer arenas. The championship finals are intended to take place on the Kiev Olympic Stadium, which now has to undergo fundamental renovations in upcoming years. All these efforts will, of course, take enormous amounts of money, and it is exactly here the entire project may backfire on both Warzaw and Kiev. Without an extremely transparent tender process for the fat contracts to build arenas, develop infrastructure or sell Championship paraphernalia, organisers may face a constant media nightmare in founded or unfounded allegations of foul play and bribery in the process up till the 2012 UEFA Championships.

If this would become the case, two states with already politically tarred reputations, might end up with an irrepairable loss of status in European affairs. If, to the contrary, Ukraine and Poland would use the Championships as a vehicle to rid themselves of corruption and power abuse, they could both stand to win not only the laurels of sportmanship, but also the benefits of societal fair play. Consequently, the 2012 UEFA Championships may prove if Poland may fully assume its role as a major European power and if Ukraine will become a full-fledged member of the European Union family. Today, sport truly is politics, and who skilfully manages to exploit sports, will also win at politics.

Ukraine Right or Wrong

Was Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko right to call for parliamentary elections? This is a question that in recent days has been the subject of intense debate. Constitutionally, he seems to be on the slippery slope. Still, his argument that "it is not only my right, it is my obligation" might prove valid if he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron. The core question is though how advisable it is for state to have a constitution, which allows for such a situation to occur.

Imagine, for a moment, that the US Congress would act not only to impeach the president, but also actively prepare to abolish the office of the president itself.

For an American this would be absurd, as the fundamental idea of the founding fathers was a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judical powers, as inspired by Montesquieu. This separation of powers' system is also the foundation of most modern democracies, and usually there are elaborate mechanisms to avoid situations that risk jeopardising the stability provided by the checks and balances of independent centres of power. Paradoxically, this seems not to be the case in the Ukraine, as recent developments demonstrate.

The 8 December 2004 deal ending the Orange revolution involved changes to the Ukrainian constitution to limit the great powers of the presidential office, previously enjoyed by Leonid Kuchma. This was the price the leaders of the Orange revolution paid to get the fraudulent presidential 23 November elections invalidated. However, the changes did not enter into force until 1 January 2006.

As the Ukrainian constitution now works, the parliament has the right to override presidential vetoes if a qualified majority of 300 out of 450 deputies so decides. Such a majority also has the option to make constitutional changes, and even abolish the office of the president itself. Thus, article 155 of the Constitution reads:

Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted, if at the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have voted in favour thereof.

Still, the provision of decisions by two separate parliamentary sessions with elections in between, seems somewhat obscure, as the changes made in December 2004 appear to have entered into force before the March 2006 elections. It is therefore possible that the Verkhovna Rada may change the constitution by a single decision of a two-third's majority.

A further mechanism to counter quick and unpredictable changes between elections may be § 83 of the constitution, which can be interpreted as preventing deputies to change loyalties between parliamentary fractions, as a coalition is to be formed by fractions and not individual deputies. This reasoning seems both obscure and ambiguous, but has been a key argument for the president to protest against the fact that an increasing number of MPs from his party, Our Ukraine, have changed allegiances in favour of the Party of Regions. As votes were thus added to the anti-presidential coalition in parliament, the situation eventually became desperate, as Yushchenko's enemies were closing in on the 300 deputies margin. If this was allowed to happen, a qualified parliamentary majority could deal with the president as they saw fit, and eventually even depose of him.

Then, in which situations is the President actually allowed to call for new parliamentary elections? The answer given by constitutional article 90 set three provisions:

1. If the parliament cannot reach a majority (coalition) to form a government within thirty days after the first meeting of a newly elected parliament.
2. If a coalition cannot reach a majority to form a new government within 60 days after the resignation of a prior government.
3. If parliament during session has not met for a period of 30 days.

It is quite obvious that Yushchenko did not fulfill any of the above criteria when signing the decree to disband parliament and call for new elections. Consequently, if reading the Constitution to its letter, Yushchenko had no right to do this. So, does that mean that he was completely off his rocker when he decided to make this move? Not necessarily. The argument that he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron is certainly valid. As president, Yushchenko may perceivably have "the right and the obligation" to act if a situtation occurs, which threatens the constitutional order.

When such a case is applicable is however unclear. One prerequisite might be if parliament had a clear and expressed intent to jeopardise the constitutional order. The requirements to be fulfilled in meeting the prerequisite of intent is however very obscure. Thus, the matter has been referred by parliament to the Constitutional Court for a ruling.

Until recently, it was very uncertain whether the Constitutional Court would choose to address the matter. According to its statutes, it has 15 days to decide whether it at all will deliberate on an issue raised by parliament. Then it was declared that the Court would make its ruling on Wednesday this week. However, today five of the 18 judges said that they considered resigning due to public threats against them, and asked for police protection. Now, the court ruling has been delayed until 17 April.

Reviewing the composition of the Court, it consists of eigtheen members: 6 judges, 6 parliamentarians and 6 presidential appointees. The five now concerned represent all three groups. Still, the Court could also choose to make a ruling even without the participation of the five members, as it only needs 10 of its members to make a ruling. That the Court could get a majority decision in this way is still very unlikely. Essentially, the question is whether the Court will make a ruling at all. That is highly questionable, as the developing crisis may render its opinion obsolete even if it could finally reach a verdict.

All in all, President Yushchenko seems to stand on weak ground as for his decision to disband parliament and call for new elections. However, this does not mean that he may not stand his ground in the battle over its legitimacy. As events are evolving, new elections on 27 May seem to be the only sensible option to end the current conflict democratically. Consequently, the question whether his decision was right or wrong may never really be legally addressed. In terms of politics, his choice was a "catch 22" and whatever choice he made - be deposed by parliament or call for new elections - it was to come out bad for himself. The political verdict on Yushchenko may therefore be hard, as he for too long walked an increasingly thin line in exercisising his presidential duties. Still, whether Yushchenko was right or wrong is not the core issue. The important thing is whether his decision will eventually turn out to be right or wrong for Ukraine and its people. After all, that was what the Orange revolution was originally about - giving a voice to the people.

Update: According to the BBC, Yushchenko would now be "willing to suspend his decree dissolving parliament and ordering an early 27 May election." This would constitute a postponement of parliamentary elections, so that parties can prepare for an election campaign, and not a change of opinion in that elections should be held. Thus, it is a signal that Yushchenko might be willing to compromise on the date for elections, but still carry through with the process. How it all ends up is very uncertain and it remains to be seen how Yanukovich supporters and other parties will react to this feeler.

Chicken Kiev Race

Chicken race was a perilous game among youngsters in the US during the 1950s, said to originate from East European immigrants. The game models two car drivers, both headed towards each other at high speed. The first to swerve away yields to the other. If neither player swerves, the result is a potentially fatal head-on collision.

Chicken race is an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while each player prefers not to yield to the opponent, the outcome where neither player yields is the worst possible one for both players.

Chicken Kiev is a dish of boneless chicken breast pounded and rolled around cold unsalted butter, then breaded and fried.

Chicken Kiev is also the label used by the media for a speech made in Kiev in 1991 by then U.S. President George H.W. Bush. It was drafted by Condoleezza Rice and cautioned Ukrainians against "suicidal nationalism". A few months later, Ukrainians voted to withdraw from the Soviet Union.

Source: Wikipedia

As Ukraine's "Easter Crisis" continues, further comments seem superfluous. Instead, I wish all friends, colleagues, and readers out there a Happy Easter.

Shootout at the Ukraine Corral?

Will Viktor Yushchenko remain president of Ukraine? This is what is currently in the balance in the ongoing political crisis in Kiev. In what seems as a final showdown between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych, the president on Monday dissolved parliament and called for new elections on 27 May. By doing so, Yushchenko may well have signed his own political death warrant. There is little chance that his Our Ukraine will survive elections as a leading player in Ukrainian politics, making the president a lame duck for the remainder of his term.

The current shootout revolves around a battle over life and death for the presidency. Since last year, Yanukovych has won over an increasing number of parliament deputies to the point where he threatened to blow Yushchenko's position to smithereens. Yanukovych was quickly approaching the 300 out of 450 votes in parliament - Verkhovna Rada - necessary to change the constitution and override presidential vetoes. This might also have included abolishing the very office of the president.

Yushchenko's move now forces Yanukovych to take the fight to the high-street, instead of the back alleys where he until now has battled for parliamentary votes. The showdown has been underway since Saturday, when nearly 100,000 people demonstrated in central Kiev in support of the two combattants. As usual in Kiev, the orange forces took centre stage, gathering some 70,000 demonstrators calling for dissolving parliament and new parliamentary elections. Nearby, about 20,000 of Yanukovych's followers met in support of the current government. The stage was thus set for the country's biggest political duel since the 2004 Orange revolution.

Proclaiming elections by a televised speech on Monday evening, Yushchenko said: "My actions are dictated by the strict necessity to save the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not only my right, it is my obligation." Parliamentary elections would thus curve the "Deliberate efforts [that] are being made in parliament to worsen the political crisis, posing a threat to our country and people."

Crisis has become the hallmark of Ukrainian politics since last year's March parliamentary elections. Even though Yanukovych and his Party of Regions stood as the clear election victors, the Orange forces of Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko Bloc did their utmost to form a coalition government barring Yanukovych from power. After months of negotiations and under the threat of new elections, the Orange coalition was proclaimed dead and Yanukovych became Prime Minister. Ever since, President Yushchenko has fought a losing battle to balance an increasingly powerful Yanukovych government.

The question now is who will form the biggest posse for power in the upcoming 27 May fight between orange and blue forces in Ukraine. Yanukovych's power base is solid, with massive financial backing from several mighty oligarchs. In contrast, Yushchenko is badly armed for elections, with a party deemed to become the first victim of this political duel. In essence, Yulia Timoshenko will stand the most to gain from an election campaign, establishing her role as the undisputed leader of the orange forces and the only real alternative to Yanukovych.

For Yushchenko, the choice was between being removed as president or calling for new elections, where he is bound to become the first victim. His choice was to accept the challenge as he was called out into the street by the orange forces on Saturday. Thereby, the only thing left for Yushchenko is to witness his own political death struggle for the remainder of his presidency. Still, calling for new elections was not only his right - it was his obligation. This is perhaps also what will be written on his political tombstone: "He had the right and - finally - rose to his obligations."

Update: In response to Yushchenko's decree for parliamentary elections, Yanukovych's supporters have now called for presidential instead of parliamentary elections. They refer to Yushchenko's decision as an attempted coup d'état and have declared that parliament will not grant the financial means necessary to go through with parliamentary elections. It is not unlikely that Yushchenko's decision to dissolve parliament will serve Yanukovych's interests in winning over the remaining votes necessary to gain the qualified 300 out of 450 qualified majority to make constitutional changes and eventually depose the president. A parliament dissolved by the president would thus decide to remove Yushchenko from his office or abolish the presidency as a whole. The complications this would cause are immense, and it is diffcult to foresee what further ramifications it would involve. Furthermore, the conflict has been referred to the Constitutional Court, consisting of 18 members: 6 presidential representatives, 6 parliamentary, and 6 judicial. What will happen if the Court does not reach a decision within the stipulated five days is hard to determine at this point. It is also said that the Election Commission, which was so hated during the Orange revolution, will be reconvened.

Five CIS Cities in Top Ten Polluted Places

Five out of the ten most polluted places in the world this year are to be found in the Former Soviet Union, according to a list published by the Blacksmith Institute. No, it's no beauty paget, even if the list is an annually recurrent event, shedding light upon some of the greatest man-made environmental disasters in history.

According to the UN, 20% of premature deaths in the world may be ascribed to environmental factors. "There are some towns where life expectancy approaches medieval rates, where birth defects are the norm not the exception. In other places children's asthma rates are measured above 90%, or mental retardation is endemic. In these places, life expectancy may be half that of the richest nations", the report states.

In Russian Dzerzhinsk, average life expectancy among men is 42 years and among women 47 years. This was one of the places where the USSR produced its chemical weapons during the Cold War. Norilsk houses the world's largest nickel producer, and life expectancy for factory workers is 10 years below the Russian average. In Rudnaya Pristan and Dalnegorsk, lead poisoning is endemic due to emissions from local lead mines. Levels of lead in children's blood are between 8 and 20 times higher than maximum allowable rates in the US.

Mailuu-Suu in Kyrgyzstan presents some of the highest figures of nuclear radiation in the world, due to the waste from soviet time uranium mining. The situation may also worsen as earthquakes threaten to negatively affect containment of radioactive waste in this area of high seismic activity. The situation sets the security of large tracts of Central Asia in peril, while the Mailuu-Suu river might carry great quantities of highly radioactive sediments to the Ferghana valley - the region's most densely populated area.

The most well-known place on the list is probably Chernobyl in Ukraine. Even 20 years after the accident, radioactivy is on such high levels to remain life hazardous during lengthy exposure. The 19 mile exclusion zone remains uninhabitable, and the number of thyroid cancer cases among people in exposed areas is on highly elevated. Even if efforts are made to improve the environmental situation, there are fears of a new disaster if the sarcophagus - the concrete inclosure of the reactor - collapses, or if nuclear waste leaks into the groundwater.

That the effects of soviet reign laid waste to large tracts of the Eurasian continent should be commonplace knowledge nowadays. There should thus be no wonder that five out of the ten most polluted places in the world are located in the former USSR. Still, have current rulers of these states learnt from historical mistakes? No, in many cases not. Recently, ideas of turning the rivers of Siberia are again becoming fashionable in both Russia and Kazakhstan. The last time this was tried - during the 1960s "Virgin Lands" project - it led to an environmental disaster of epic proportions. It seems that even the most obvious is beyond reach for these people to fathom. Perhaps, the truth of the matter is that too many political leaders in these countries simply do not care, come what come may.

Ukrainian Lighthouses & Landmarks

Little more than a month after becoming Ukrainian Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, seems poised to break his pledge to president Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine's continued western integration. Visiting Brussels on Thursday, Yanukovich put a moratorium on Ukraine's plans to join Nato, saying that: "Because of the political situation in Ukraine, we will now have to take a pause," according to International Herald Tribune.

However, what should be clear by now is that NATO and EU accession has become a parallel process in the integration of former Eastern bloc countries. Therefore, Yanukovich "pause" effectively means a halt - or at least a severe delay - for Ukraine's western integration.

That NATO and the EU are different organisations and deal with different issues should not disguise the fact that a majority of EU-members are also members of NATO. Combined with the backlash of the Orange revolution, Yanukovich statement is likely to further put off western leaders from any real association with Ukraine. Trust in Ukraine is at a low and the only real motivation for western efforts is to keep the country out of Moscow's orbit.

Still, Yanukovich's decision on NATO is logical. Popular support for NATO-membership has never reached any substantial levels, so his excuse to "play it safe" rather than to rush into something that Ukrainians will not accept is natural. This has tacitly been accepted by NATO-officials as a statement of facts rather than intent. At the same time, questions are raised what role Russia might have had in the decision. Yanukovich has previously declared that he would like Ukraine to be a "reliable bridge" between Europe and Russia, and NATO-membership seems incompatible with such a role. Russia has adamanttly opposed Ukrainian rapprochement to the Atlantic alliance.

Relations with Russia continue to be strained. Only yesterday, a Ukrainian court ordered that authorities should take control over 22 lighthouses in the Crimea that have been leased to Russia's Black Sea Fleet, BBC reports. As late as in June, Russia and Ukraine failed to reach agreement on settling the Kerch strait border dispute, which has been going on since 2003, according to RIA Novosti.

Ukraine's relations with Russia on the one hand and the West on the other have often been simplistically depicted as balancing between East and West. A similar balance accordingly applies to Ukraine's domestic scene - between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. As anyone who has dealt with Ukraine knows, realities are much more complex.

Still, the image of a Ukraine split between East and West lingers on in the minds of international leaders and is also exploited by a variety of actors. At a time when there are great doubts in the West as for Ukraine's willingness and ability to integrate, there is little room for a more straightforward public policy.

Yanukovich might have pursued a declaratory policy on NATO and EU membership at the same time as deepening relations with Russia. As long as no real steps towards NATO-integration were to be taken, such a situation might have been acceptable both to Russia and the West. That would have kept doors open for Kiev - both towards Brussels and Moscow.

Now, Yanukovich is closing the NATO-door and thereby - in a longer perspective - also the EU-door. This might however not open the door to Russia any wider, simply because the Kremlin has never accepted its loss of influence over Ukraine. A loss that one has not accepted is not regarded a real victory once it is regained.

Public postponement of NATO-integration is thus simply not a good idea at a time like this, when Ukraine needs the best of both worlds. The paradox is that what would probably serve Kiev's interests best at this point would be to say one thing and do the other, that is pledge western integration and cooperate more closely with Russia. In that way, Ukraine might have maintained safeguarded by the West at the same time as it could have remained part of the East. Now instead, Yanukovich has set a landmark in Ukraine's modern political history by giving away an important foreign policy instrument for no obvious reason. Cui bono? What does Ukraine or Yanukovich stand to gain from self-imposed alienation when one needs all the help one can get?

Ukraine: Lazarenko Gets 9 Years Jail

Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment by a Federal Court in San Fransisco on Friday, Washington Post reports. Lazarenko was found guilty of corruption, money laundering, fraud and extortion, and also received a $10 million fine in addition to the jail sentence.

Pavel Lazarenko was Prime Minister of Ukraine from 1996 to 1997 and became infamous for using his office to serve his own economic interests. The bulk of his multimillion corruption proceeds ended up in Swiss, US and offshore bank accounts. The victim of Lazarenko's crimes was the Ukrainian people, who at the time struggled for daily survival after the post-soviet economic collapse.

Lazarenko was appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine in May 1996, although his appointment was never considered by the Ukrainian parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. Controlling decisions on many lucrative business projects, Lazarenko is said to have demanded 50% of profits from businesses favoured by him. Lazarenko at the time had close political and economic ties with current Ukrainian politicians of prominence such as Yulia Timoshenko and Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz.

In 1999, Lazarenko fled the Ukraine, awaiting a parliamentary decision to waive his parliamentary immunity. Within days of his escape, he was arrested in the United States and spent four years in custody pending trial, until his release on a $68 million bail in 2003. A year later he was found guilty on 29 out of 53 charges concerning money laundering, fraud and extortion, but the judge eventually dropped a majority of them, reducing the list to 14 offences. Despite being released on bail, Lazarenko was subject to house arrest until his final verdict on Friday. The former Ukrainian PM has already declared that he intends to appeal the verdict.

Throughout the trial, Lazarenko's defence has maintained his innocence and challenged US legal authority to alleged crimes not committed in the United States. Lazarenko has argued that his business transactions were normal to the prevailing conditions in the Ukraine in the 1990s. He thus claims that it was generally accepted for a Ukrainian politician to earn millions on the side in these years, and that such business formed a natural part of the transformation from soviet command economy to a liberal market economy.

In 2000, Ukraine sought Lazarenko's extradition. The charges brought against him by the Ukrainain Prosecutor General included, beside economic crimes, the instigation of two murders and several assassination attempts on high-ranking officials. The US, however, denied extradition on the grounds that Lazarenko was tried for crimes in the United States.

US federal prosecutors are far from satisfied with Friday's verdict. They had initially sought an 18 year prison term and confiscation of and fines to a total of $66 million. US authorities have claimed that Lazarenko transferred $118 million to US banks alone. Still, the sentence constitutes a milestone in the US battle against international crime. Lazarenko becomes the first former state leader to receive a US prison sentence after Manuel Noriega of Panama. Also, the Ukrainian people may give up a sigh of relief that at least one of their corrupt leaders now is punished for his crimes although by the United States and not by Ukraine itself.

Ukraine: No Juice in Orange Coalition

Earlier this week, Ukrainian Socialist leader Moroz again proclaimed the death of the Orange Coalition and the formation of a new coalition between the Socialist, the Communists and the Party of Regions. Together, the three parties control 239 out of the total of 450 seats in the Ukrainian parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. Thereby, it now definitely seems as if the last juice has been squeezed out of the orange coalition.

By his action, Moroz has abandoned his allies of the Orange Revolution and turned to the inheritants of the old regime. On Tuesday, the so called anti-crisis coalition nominated Yanukovich for Prime Minister, and the parliamentary committee chairmanships were divivded between the parties in the Rada.

The political turmoil in Ukraine since the March parliamentary elections have left the leaders of the 2004 Orange Revolution totally discredited. A recent poll, by the the Kyiv International Sociology Institute and the Kyiv Political and Conflict Studies Center, shows that Ukrainians now have more confidence in Viktor Yanukovych, leader of the Party of Regions, than they have in President Viktor Yushchenko and political bloc leader Yulia Tymoshenko.

Thus, since February, the confidence for the president has shrunk from 37% to 20% in July, whereas the support for his opponents has increased from 35% to 43% during the same period. Being previously portrayed as a scoundrel during the Orange Revolution, opposition against Party of Regions' leader Yanukovich has shrunk from 42% to a mere 35%.

Due to the political crisis in the country, there have been widespread speculations that president Yushchenko would use his constitutional right to proclaim new elections. However, support for such a measure is low among the population. Thus, 54% of Ukrainians oppose such an option whereas new elections are supported by not more than 26%.

What is evident is that the ideals of the orange revolution now have been permanently buried in Ukrainian politics. Events during spring instead show how cynic realist politics once again stands as victor over the will of the people for democratic change. The heroes from Maidan are now pilloried and exposed to a public ridicule they certainly deserve. Still, politics is distant from popular sentiment.

Then, were the Ukrainians too naïve in their belief in change and reforms? The answer must be an unequivocal no. The people rose to the challenge. It was their leaders who were not equal to the task of transformning Ukraine. Thus, the people has been robbed of its beliefs - if not by its ideals - due to the petty self-interest of its leaders. Still, for the children of the Orange Revolution something has fundamentally changed. Even though there is little trust in their erstwhile leaders, they have experienced that they may take their destiny into their own hands and form a new Ukraine. This will take time, but the time will also come when a new generation with new ideals will reach power to conquer Ukraine's rightful place in European politics.

Moldova: Transnistria Blast Kills Eight

On Thursday, at least eight people were killed in an explosion in Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, BBC reports. Local authorities believe the blast, hitting a city minibus in early morning, might have been caused by a bomb, triggered by accidence. If so, this only adds to the picture of Transnistria as a region tarnished by violence and criminality.

Transnistria constitutes an ignored and absurd anachronism in contemporary Europe. It is still, officially, a part of Moldova, although the region de facto seceded as early as in 1990. Then Transnistria declared independence with assistance of the Russian 14th Army, making its commander, Aleksandr Lebed, a folk hero in Russia. This was followed by low intensity warfare, until a ceasefire was reached in 1992, putting an end to hostilities. Since then, the Transnistrian question is considered a frozen conflict by the international community.

During its roughly 15 years of independence, Transnistria has become a centre of organised crime and trafficking in people, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, weapons and whatever contraband one might imagine. The region is led by Igor Smirnov, who won a landslide victory in the 2001 presidential elections - even to the extent that he reportedly gained over 100% of votes in some districts. Smirnov's eldest son runs Sheriff, one of Transnistria's biggest and most lucrative businesses. As the dedicated football fan he is, he has founded his own professional football team and constructed an international standard football stadium in the capital of Tiraspol - a city numbering a mere 150,000 inhabitants. Such extravagance contrasts to the average income of some 100 USD a month for Transnistrians, which is roughly half that of Moldova - Europe's poorest country.

For long, Transnistria has been able to go about its business relatively undisturbed, not least because of massive backing from Moscow. In 1999, Russia however agreed to withdraw its troops from the region by the OSCE-negotiated Istanbul agreement. To this day, Russia remains reluctant to honour these commitments. During the last year, the tide all the same seems to have turned for Transnistria.

One of the key factors of Transnistrian subsistence has been smuggling. For this, the region was dependent on Kuchma's Ukraine turning a blind eye to such activities, especially as the Ukrainian port of Odessa served as a great outlet of contraband. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has - with international assistance - made great efforts to curve smuggling, why the Transnistrian regime may slowly be approaching the brink of ruin. Also, in December 2005, the EU launched a monitoring mission to supervise the border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

This was followed in March 2006 by Ukraine imposing new customs regulations, demanding all imports from Transnistria to be processed by Moldovan authorities. The new regulations were an effect of the enforcement of a joint customs protocol between Ukraine and Moldova. In effect, this constituted a Ukrainian-Moldovan economic blockade, which both Transnistria and Russia were quick to point out. However, from an international law perspective, Ukraine and Moldova were in the right for the simple reason that Transnistria is still regarded part of Moldova by the international community.

As things now stand, the Transnistrian economy increasingly seems to lose out on its incomes from smuggling. This puts the very existence of Transnistrian independence in peril, which in the end might trigger the change that is so long overdue. It remains to be seen whether Russia will accept such change or if the country will step in to support the breakaway region to avoid yet another coloured revolution in its sphere of vital interests. Until then, Transnistria tragically remains an Absurdistan of Europe.

Ukraine: New Government in the Making

On Wednesday, news broke that a new orange coalition government is forming in Ukraine. Both president Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko bloc (BYuT) confirmed that an agreement had been reached. The news comes amid rumours that Yushchenko was teaming up with orange revolution enemy Yanukovich and his Party of Regions.

If the deal goes through, Yulia Timoshenko will once more become Prime Minister, which has been her primary goal since she was sacked from the post last September. The coalition will be between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, which has been the main negotiating approach all along.

Indeed, negotiations to form a coalition between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, have been underway ever since the 26 March parliamentary elections. At the beginning of April, Our Ukraine announced that unity had been reached. Then, nothing happened. In mid-May, it was Timoshenko's turn to declare that a new government had been agreed on. Once again, nothing happened. So, one might well perceive news from Kiev on a new cabinet with sound skepticism, were it not for a constitutional deadline on forming a government. Therefore, it now appears that Ukraine will eventually get out of its post-election political deadlock. However, as BBC's Kiev correspondent states, "The deal will not be certain until it is signed."

If the deal goes through, BYuT is said to receive a dominant 11 cabinet posts, including the Premiership. Our Ukraine will get the post as speaker of the Parliament, and has already nominated Petro Poroshenko. The Socialist Party will appoint the vice-Premier.

By all appearances, Ukraine will be in for a tough political ride with its new cabinet. Neither president Yushchenko nor Poroshenko stand Timoshenko, since the fall-out and scandals leading to Timoshenko's dismissal as Premier last September.

Moreover, constitutional changes this year weaken the presidential powers to the benefit of parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. The Rada has a long tradition of relative independence, playing its role in the political balance of power, and party allegiance is far from granted. With fiery and controversial Yulia Timoshenko as Premier, parliament may decide to get in the way of her plans at leisure.

However, there is one strong binding-force uniting the new government. The political forces of the Orange Revolution has failed once. This time they have to succeed or face total political discredit for the foreseeable future. Thus, as Ukrainian political analyst, Volodymyr Fesenko, put it to AFP: "It's a second chance and if they fail, they'll all go down together."

Turning to Ukraine's international relations, with Timoshenko as Prime Minister, relations with Russia are in obvious jeopardy. Already the same day that the new coalition was announced, Timoshenko called for a review of the Russian-Ukrainian gas deal that ended the New Year's gas crisis earlier this year, BBC reports.

In addition to this, the US Marine Corps participated in exercises on the Crimean peninsula a few weeks ago, which sparked fears in Moscow of Ukrainian ambitions to join Nato. Thus, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine that such a move would seriously hurt relations Moscow and Kiev.

The majority of Crimeans are ehtnic Russians, and the Black Sea peninsula was transferred from Russia to Ukraine as late as in 1954 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Therefore, the presence of US troops in a disputed Ukrainian region does not serve to improve Ukrainian relations with Russia. Indeed, the government that is now being formed will inevitably have to meet major challenges in its relations with the Kremlin.

Russia Warns Ukraine & Georgia of NATO

On Wednesday, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine and Georgia of joining Nato. During a speech in the Russian State Duma, Lavrov argued that such a "colossal geopolitical" change would threaten relations with the two countries. "We assess all possible consequences primarily from the point of view of Russia's national interests," Lavrov said.

According to Ukrainian foregn minister, Anton Buteiko, a majority of Ukrainians support that Ukraine would join Nato. If Buteiko would be right, this would constitute an enormous change in Ukrainian public opinion. As late as last year, only some 10% of public opinion supported Nato-membership. Why public opinion may have turned is unclear, but it might be as a consequence of the New Year's Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. As for Georgia, Tbilisi has for long had the ambition to join Nato, but it has been regarded unrealistic as long as it is not accompanied by a Ukrainian application to enter the North Atlantic alliance.

That Russia, at this point, warns of the consequences primarily of Ukrainian Nato-membership, is due to regional political developments, not least with GUAM's recent formation of the Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, combined with increasing US openness to accepting the two countries as members of Nato. In Moscow eyes, such tendencies form part of a much greater geopolitical struggle between Russia and the US for influence over post-soviet space - Russia's traditional sphere of vital national interest.

Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.

Ukraine: Football to the People

On Monday, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov appealed to the country's business leaders to let employees watch World Cup football matches, Ukrayinska Pravda reports. After two near misses since independence, this is the first time Ukraine's national team has qualified for the World Cup.

Football fever has struck Ukraine with full force. To avoid a full-out epidemic, Yekhanurov now pleads with the country's chief industrialists, to let people watch the matches. Otherwise, he fears a considerable decrease in production. His recipe is to adjust working hours to avoid collisions with matches. Another viable alternative would be to put TV-sets at workplaces. Why? Yekhanurov explains: "We can expect an epidemic of various diseases. People will simply report sick in multitudes." Is the similarity between "support" and be "ill" in Russian a mere coincidence, one wonders.

Yekhanurov's appeal may seem peculiar. However, there is some precedence. When the American soap opera "Santa Barbara" hit Russia in the early 1990's, production is said to have halted in factories throughout the country. Being the first American TV-show broadcast after soviet demise, many Russians were spellbound by the wealth and careless life of a family presenting a would-be version of the American dream. However, Russians were far from the only Santa Barbara addicts. US president Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy is said to have been next-to fanatic viewers. So, Yekhanurov might not be so wrong after all. World Cup wins or visions of wealth - one has to let the people nurture some dreams.

Note: In Russian, support is болеть whereas ill is болен. However, in Ukrainian, supporter is прибічник, and ill is хворий.