Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.

Ukrainian Lighthouses & Landmarks

Little more than a month after becoming Ukrainian Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, seems poised to break his pledge to president Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine's continued western integration. Visiting Brussels on Thursday, Yanukovich put a moratorium on Ukraine's plans to join Nato, saying that: "Because of the political situation in Ukraine, we will now have to take a pause," according to International Herald Tribune.

However, what should be clear by now is that NATO and EU accession has become a parallel process in the integration of former Eastern bloc countries. Therefore, Yanukovich "pause" effectively means a halt - or at least a severe delay - for Ukraine's western integration.

That NATO and the EU are different organisations and deal with different issues should not disguise the fact that a majority of EU-members are also members of NATO. Combined with the backlash of the Orange revolution, Yanukovich statement is likely to further put off western leaders from any real association with Ukraine. Trust in Ukraine is at a low and the only real motivation for western efforts is to keep the country out of Moscow's orbit.

Still, Yanukovich's decision on NATO is logical. Popular support for NATO-membership has never reached any substantial levels, so his excuse to "play it safe" rather than to rush into something that Ukrainians will not accept is natural. This has tacitly been accepted by NATO-officials as a statement of facts rather than intent. At the same time, questions are raised what role Russia might have had in the decision. Yanukovich has previously declared that he would like Ukraine to be a "reliable bridge" between Europe and Russia, and NATO-membership seems incompatible with such a role. Russia has adamanttly opposed Ukrainian rapprochement to the Atlantic alliance.

Relations with Russia continue to be strained. Only yesterday, a Ukrainian court ordered that authorities should take control over 22 lighthouses in the Crimea that have been leased to Russia's Black Sea Fleet, BBC reports. As late as in June, Russia and Ukraine failed to reach agreement on settling the Kerch strait border dispute, which has been going on since 2003, according to RIA Novosti.

Ukraine's relations with Russia on the one hand and the West on the other have often been simplistically depicted as balancing between East and West. A similar balance accordingly applies to Ukraine's domestic scene - between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. As anyone who has dealt with Ukraine knows, realities are much more complex.

Still, the image of a Ukraine split between East and West lingers on in the minds of international leaders and is also exploited by a variety of actors. At a time when there are great doubts in the West as for Ukraine's willingness and ability to integrate, there is little room for a more straightforward public policy.

Yanukovich might have pursued a declaratory policy on NATO and EU membership at the same time as deepening relations with Russia. As long as no real steps towards NATO-integration were to be taken, such a situation might have been acceptable both to Russia and the West. That would have kept doors open for Kiev - both towards Brussels and Moscow.

Now, Yanukovich is closing the NATO-door and thereby - in a longer perspective - also the EU-door. This might however not open the door to Russia any wider, simply because the Kremlin has never accepted its loss of influence over Ukraine. A loss that one has not accepted is not regarded a real victory once it is regained.

Public postponement of NATO-integration is thus simply not a good idea at a time like this, when Ukraine needs the best of both worlds. The paradox is that what would probably serve Kiev's interests best at this point would be to say one thing and do the other, that is pledge western integration and cooperate more closely with Russia. In that way, Ukraine might have maintained safeguarded by the West at the same time as it could have remained part of the East. Now instead, Yanukovich has set a landmark in Ukraine's modern political history by giving away an important foreign policy instrument for no obvious reason. Cui bono? What does Ukraine or Yanukovich stand to gain from self-imposed alienation when one needs all the help one can get?

Ukrainian Election Results

According to Russian news agency Interfax, the results in Sunday's parliamentary elections in Ukraine are now next to ready with 99.4% of votes counted by the Central Election Commission. Thus, only five parties out of 46 have passed the 3% parliamentary threshold, leaving 22,32% of the voters without parliamnentary representation. The results are as follow:

• Party of Regions of Ukraine - 32.07%
• Yulia Timoshenko Bloc - 22.27%
• Our Ukraine - 13.99%
• Socialist Party - 5.69%
• Communist Party - 3.66%

Major parties not represented in parliament are: Natalya Vitrenko Bloc (2.91%), Popular Bloc - Lytvyn (2.43%), Kostenko-Plyushch Popular Bloc (1.88%), Viche party (1.74%), and the Pora-PRP bloc (1.47%).

The division of the 450 parliamentary seats would be as follows:

• Party of Regions - 186 seats
• Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc - 129 seats
• Our Ukraine - 81 seats
• Socialist Party - 33 seats
• Communist Party - 21 seats

As for regional division of votes, the pattern is as expected (cf. map). Thus, Yanukovich's Party of Regions won in Eastern Ukraine (blue), the Yulia Timoshenko Bloc in Central Ukraine (red) , and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine (orange) in the West.

Yanukovich Party of Regions won in the following regions of mainly Eastern Ukraine:

• Donetsk
• Luhansk
• Zaporizhzhya
• Kharkiv
• Mykolayiv
• Odesa
• Dnipropetrovsk
• Kherson
• Sevastopol
• Crimea

The Yulia Timoshenko Bloc won 14 regions mainly in central Ukraine:

• Kyiv
• City of Kyiv
• Volyn
• Cherkasy
• Khmelnytsky
• Ternopil
• Chernihiv
• Vinnytsya
• Sumy
• Rivne
• Chernivtsi
• Kirovohrad
• Poltava
• Zhytomyr regions andin the

Yushchenko's Our Ukraine won mainly in the western regions:

• Ivano-Frankivsk
• Lviv
• Trans-Carpathian

The tendencies previously accounted for here, thus seem to strengthen and government negotiations will prove interesting. However, we will see how long Yanukovich - Ukraine's comeback kid - will have reason to cheer. Most severe, however, is the big voter fallout due to the 3% parliamentary threshold. With 22,32% of the voters without parliamentary representation, Ukraine faces an enormous democratic deficit threatening the legitimacy and stability of the political system. This, the OSCE and the international community cannot compensate, no matter how much Ukraine is praised and commended for free and fair elections. After all, losing a fifth of the plebiscite must be taken seriously, for nobody knows where they will turn next time.

Ukraine, elections, results

Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis: Profits vs Politics

The recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine has raised fears - not least in the EU - that Moscow is increasingly using energy as a political weapon. Such fears may be correct from a general perspective, when reviewing the political will of the Kremlin. An opposite case must, however, also be made for economics - that the crisis was more a case of profit than of politics.

An overarching question of the Russian élite since the late 1980's has been how to maximise ones own profits. The driving-force has been the individual desire for wealth. During Yeltsin's privatisation, such desires resulted in unharnessed "bandit-capitalism." Enormous fortunes were made by more or less doubtful means. Although president Putin seems to be trying to redistribute some of this wealth to his own political and private benefit, most oligarchs have been left alone as long as they don't meddle into politics. From the perspective of the mega-rich and major enterprise, trying to leave politics aside of making money has become a goal in itself, regardless of whether you are within or outside the walls of the Kremlin. To make profit in real money and to avoid being forced into economically worthless political deals should appear the obvious choice in rational terms for enterprise. Private interest comes before state interest. This, initially, may have been the motive of Gazprom - the Russian gas monopoly - in connection to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. Still, many Western analysts claim that the crisis was politically motivated. Such analysis, however, leaves out the first logical step of analysis, namely that of making real money.

As the crisis arose in late December, Russian gas monopoly Gazprom demanded that Ukraine paid a price roughly equivalent to that, which Western European customers pay (some 230$ per cubic metre compared to the Ukrainian price of 50$). Raising revenues from exports to Ukraine almost fivefold, was - needless to say - tempting to Gazprom in order to boost the company's stock price. In June 2005, the Russian government became majority shareholder in Gazprom, which opened up possibilities to lift the state-imposed 20% limit of foreign investment in the company by year's end. This would also be in line with the liberalisation schemes of Gazprom and its aim to expand in the oil-market, creating - all in all - the basis for a shooting stock price and compensation for the failed merger with oil-producer Rosneft. This would indicate that the main reason for Gazprom's action against Ukraine was to attain higher profits.

In contrast to this, one may instead argue that the political side of Gazprom's action was too obvious to be ignored. Accordingly, Russia would - by means of Gazprom - want to put further pressure on Ukraine - possibly to destabilise or topple its pro-Western government - before the country's parliamentary elections in March. Furthermore, the mere fact that Gazprom's chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, is also Russia's vice Premier, would make for a strong case that Gazprom's action was politically motivated. This may well be the case, but judging from Medvedev's surprised reaction when confronted with the stern reaction of the EU, as Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine, he obviously was ignorant of the full consequences of Gazprom's action. Is it really possible that the Kremlin was ignorant of the possibility that cutting Ukraine's gas supply might also mean cutting down gas supplies to the West? Didn't Medvedev or someone in the Kremlin think of the fact that gas to Europe first goes through Ukrainian pipelines, thus making it easy for Ukraine to compensate a cut in their supplies with those that would have gone to Europe. This, evidently, was how Ukraine acted with the consequence that gas supplies to Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and other EU countries were heavily reduced, creating a crisis as much with the EU as with Ukraine. Russia was portrayed as an unreliable business-partner by international media, and European politicians called for reviewing and diversifying energy supplies. Even worse, Russia again became a source of threat to Europe. Gazprom's action thus heavily damaged confidence in Russia in political as much as economic terms. Trust between Russia and Europe was dealt a heavy blow.

So, the question arises: Are the masters of the Kremlin really so crude in their political thinking as not to foresee the consequences of their actions? Did they really not consider that the issue could develop into something more than a bilateral crisis between Russia and Ukraine. I, for one, would like to think that this is not the case if regarding Gazprom's action as a political issue. It is true that the Kremlin has made a series of serious political misjudgements and mistakes in recent years, but despite all blunders, I do hope that Putin and his entourage are not so much of political novices as to be outright stupid. Therefore, to the extent that the Kremlin was involved in Gazprom's action against Ukraine, some other factor than politics would appear to have blurred their judgement. This factor might be that profits preceded politics. The prospects of increased profit by raising the price of gas to Ukraine might explain why the Kremlin oversaw the possibility of negative side-effects for Russian credibility in relation to the EU. Thus, the economic analysis might have crowded out thinking in political terms.

The alternative - that Russian action was deliberate and informed - would truly be tantalising. This would mean that Russia has reached such a level of confidence and self-sufficiency in foreign policy terms, as to be willing to risk relations with Europe and to signal that the country has the power to put a threat to the EU by cutting energy supplies. It is true, that energy is increasingly seen as an intrument of Russian security policy, but it is as much true that this instrument so far has been used with some caution and only in relation to former soviet republics. Would it, however, be true that the Kremlin - having gained control of Gazprom - rationally foresaw the political consequences of the company's action, European calls to review Russia as energy-supplier should be taken very seriously. As long as this has not been proved, however, it might be more plausible to assume that Russian judgement was blurred for financial reasons. Thus, it appears that profit preceded politics and private interest came before state interest. Another unintended consequence is, of course, that keeping politics and economics aside failed, and that Gazprom - in contrast to its aim to liberalise - is now looking at much greater political involvement in and direction from the Kremlin. To conclude, how likely is it - all things considered - that the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis was the effect of a Russian rational political decision?

Ukraine: New Government in the Making

On Wednesday, news broke that a new orange coalition government is forming in Ukraine. Both president Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko bloc (BYuT) confirmed that an agreement had been reached. The news comes amid rumours that Yushchenko was teaming up with orange revolution enemy Yanukovich and his Party of Regions.

If the deal goes through, Yulia Timoshenko will once more become Prime Minister, which has been her primary goal since she was sacked from the post last September. The coalition will be between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, which has been the main negotiating approach all along.

Indeed, negotiations to form a coalition between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, have been underway ever since the 26 March parliamentary elections. At the beginning of April, Our Ukraine announced that unity had been reached. Then, nothing happened. In mid-May, it was Timoshenko's turn to declare that a new government had been agreed on. Once again, nothing happened. So, one might well perceive news from Kiev on a new cabinet with sound skepticism, were it not for a constitutional deadline on forming a government. Therefore, it now appears that Ukraine will eventually get out of its post-election political deadlock. However, as BBC's Kiev correspondent states, "The deal will not be certain until it is signed."

If the deal goes through, BYuT is said to receive a dominant 11 cabinet posts, including the Premiership. Our Ukraine will get the post as speaker of the Parliament, and has already nominated Petro Poroshenko. The Socialist Party will appoint the vice-Premier.

By all appearances, Ukraine will be in for a tough political ride with its new cabinet. Neither president Yushchenko nor Poroshenko stand Timoshenko, since the fall-out and scandals leading to Timoshenko's dismissal as Premier last September.

Moreover, constitutional changes this year weaken the presidential powers to the benefit of parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. The Rada has a long tradition of relative independence, playing its role in the political balance of power, and party allegiance is far from granted. With fiery and controversial Yulia Timoshenko as Premier, parliament may decide to get in the way of her plans at leisure.

However, there is one strong binding-force uniting the new government. The political forces of the Orange Revolution has failed once. This time they have to succeed or face total political discredit for the foreseeable future. Thus, as Ukrainian political analyst, Volodymyr Fesenko, put it to AFP: "It's a second chance and if they fail, they'll all go down together."

Turning to Ukraine's international relations, with Timoshenko as Prime Minister, relations with Russia are in obvious jeopardy. Already the same day that the new coalition was announced, Timoshenko called for a review of the Russian-Ukrainian gas deal that ended the New Year's gas crisis earlier this year, BBC reports.

In addition to this, the US Marine Corps participated in exercises on the Crimean peninsula a few weeks ago, which sparked fears in Moscow of Ukrainian ambitions to join Nato. Thus, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine that such a move would seriously hurt relations Moscow and Kiev.

The majority of Crimeans are ehtnic Russians, and the Black Sea peninsula was transferred from Russia to Ukraine as late as in 1954 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Therefore, the presence of US troops in a disputed Ukrainian region does not serve to improve Ukrainian relations with Russia. Indeed, the government that is now being formed will inevitably have to meet major challenges in its relations with the Kremlin.

CIS: Halfling Joins While Giants Leave?

Last Thursday 4 May, breakaway Georgian republic of Abkhazia declared its intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, Interfax reports. Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev were quick. Both Georgia and Ukraine now seriously consider leaving the CIS.

Abkhazi leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that: "Abkhazia's priorities are membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States and further rapprochement with Russia." Last August, Bagapsh openly confirmed his ambition of "Abkhazia's secession from Georgia and de facto merger with Russia." Now he sets the goal to join the CIS by the end of the year, but "Abkhazia's further political and economic rapprochement with Russia is the central issue. We remain adherent to our proposals on Abkhazia's associated membership of Russia," Bagapsh concluded, according to Interfax.

Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev
Bagapsh's declaration was immediately met with stern reaction from Georgia and Ukraine. Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his government to assess whether "it is worth remaining in the CIS," Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. He went on to say that the conflict in Abkhazia back in 1993 had "forced Georgia to sign the declaration of joining the CIS." Now Georgia is seriously contemplating to leave the CIS.

On Friday, Ukraine also for the first time officially declared that the country might leave the CIS. Kiyev has for long been disappointed with how the organisation works. Thus, speaking about a Ukrainian withdrawal from the CIS, Yushchenko's foreign policy advisor, Kostyantyn Tymoshenko, said that "if there are no results, the question arises." During last week's Vilnius Forum, president Yushchenko also characterised integration with the EU and NATO his main foreign policy objective, according to NG. Such ambtions might prove incompatible with remaining a CIS-member.

A future for the CIS?
This puts the future of the CIS even more in question than previously has been the case. Today, few of its members - not even Russia - have any great hope in the organisation. The original split in perceptions of its purpose, viz. political as opposed to economic cooperation, remains. The political aim is epitomised by the CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed by six countries - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. Turning to CIS economic cooperation, it can only be characterised as a resounding failure. Thus, demands were raised to find alternative to the CIS in lieu of its defunct economic record.

GUUAM instead of CIS?
In 1997, GUUAM was founded by the CIS-members not party to the Collective Security Treaty, with the single exception of Turkmenistan. GUUAM comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (1999), Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Its aim was to fulfil the original purpose of the CIS by economic cooperation and free trade. Excluding Russia, GUUAM has remained on the second echelon of post-soviet foreign policy, and the organisation has been careful not to portray itself as a counterbalance to members of the Collective Security Treaty, although it seems evident that so is the case. Georgia and Ukraine have also been GUUAM's most eager members in pursuing a regional policy independent from Russian influence.

Borjomi - a way forward?
To take the matter further, Saakashvili and Yushchenko, last August, issued the Borjomi Declaration, calling on their neighbours to unite "efforts to turn the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region into a sea of democracy, stability and security, to make it a fully integrated region of Europe and of the Democratic and Atlantic community." In Moscow's eyes, Borjomi's outright western orientation was seen as yet another attempt to insulate Russia and curve its influence over the near abroad. Whereas there may be some truth to Moscow's contentions on this point, one should however not shy away from the paramount fact of the matter: Russia and the CIS have little to offer in comparison to the fruits of western integration. That Georgia and Ukraine are the first to publicly raise their concerns whether to remain CIS-members should therefore come as no surprise, as they have seized the opportunity of western integration offered to them by their coloured revolutions.

The Abkhazi question
All in all, one must conclude that there is more to the issue than simply a statement by a renegade republic leader. As for Abkhazia, the region broke away from Georgia already in 1992. This separatist republic remains unrecognised by the international community, and there is no secret that Abkhazia would not survive long without Russia's backing. For long, Moscow has remained ambivalent on how to deal with the issue. As the UN, the EU and the OSCE insist that Abkhazia is part of Georgia, Russia has been reluctant to recognise its de facto independence. Instead, Abkhazia has oscillated between outright independence and associate membership in the Russian Federation. Today, most Abkhazis hold Russian citizenship, facilitating a potential future incorporation into Russia. This is also what Georgia claims is Moscow's long-term ambition, making the issue an international bilateral conflict instead of an internal secessionist conflict. So, is it a mere coincidence that a statement by some half-wit chieftain of a secessionist region would seem to shake the foundations of the entire CIS? Why should Abkhazia's wholly unrealistic ambitions to join the CIS spark off such stern reactions from both Georgia and Ukraine?

A pretext for divorce?

First, it is beyond doubt that the Abkhazi CIS-ambition is utterly senseless. It would presuppose Abkhazi independence, and even then CIS-members Georgia and Ukraine might still easily bar Abkhazia from membership. Second, one should ask why such a ridiculous statement is made specifically at this point in time, when the dividends of post-soviet space are are about to be paid to either Russia or the West. That Abkhaz leader Bagapsh's statement coincided with US vice president Cheney's critique of Russia at the Vilnius conference last week, shows that there is more to this than first expected. Third, the declared western orientation of Georgia and Ukraine - reiterated in Vilnius - serves only to underline the basic contradiction in clinging on to an imagined union by a post-soviet Commonwealth. From Moscow's point of view, the CIS is to little avail as long as the organisation cannot be used as an instrument for Russia's de facto power and influence over most CIS-countries. So, both parties want out. Georgia and Ukraine want to go west. Russia wants to rid itself of difficult CIS-members to better control the organisation. Fourth, were Ukraine and Georgia to leave the CIS, remaining members would, in the process, be left to the best of their abilities to deal with Russian dominance over the CIS.

To conclude, it is remarkable how willingly Georgia and Ukraine swallowed Russia's bait - hook, line and sinker. Provided that considerations to other CIS-members do not prevail, it appears that Ukraine and Georgia will go west while the rest are left to their own devices. Going separate ways in concord is no loss. What such a split of the CIS may constitute, however, is part of a division of the spoils between Russian and US influence over post-soviet space, at a time when their strategic partnership seems to have come to the end of the road. Then, one might ask how much the sovereign choice of the nations and peoples of Central Asia is worth to the great powers of global politics. Would a halfling state join and make the giants leave, it might also well constitute the moral choice of halflings and not of the great giants. That is perhaps also the lesson of our times, that when power talks morale steps aside: "Erst kommt das Freßen, dann kommt die Moral." It remains to be seen how Great the Game will be played, and with what appetite.

CIS, Georgia, Abkhazia, Ukraine, Russia, GUUAM, Borjomi

Ukraine: New Government Underway?

Ukraine may eventually get a new government this week. Seven weeks after the March 26 parliamentary elections, Timoshenko again declares that she stands as victor and new Prime Minister.

Thus, Timoshenko would reconquer the position she lost last year, by forming a coalition with Yushchenko's Our Ukraine, and Moroz' Socialist Party. In combination, the three parties control 243 out of the 450 seat in the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, as opposed to the 186 seat of Yanukovich's Party of Regions.

Whereas such a coalition seems more natural than e.g. an unlikely government between Timoshenko and Yanukovich or Yushchenko and Yanukovich, it would not be an easy path to tread. Rivalries between Timoshenko, Yushchenko, and Moroz have previously led to politicial crises in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, and this may become a recurrent phenomenon also with a new orange government.

The road map that has led the way to, what could now become a new government, has created a common platform for political action between the three parties. Issues at stake are relations with Russia, WTO-membership, Ukraine's potential accession to Nato, as well as privatisations of state businesses and agriculture. Governemt talks have also been compared to reuniting a family after a lengthy and difficult divorce.

A wild card in negotiations is obviously also ramifications of the new constitution, which entered into force on January 1 this year. Limiting the powers of the president, parliamentary power increases, e.g. by the right to appoint Prime Minister.

According to the current coalition bid, Timoshenko's bloc will get half the ministerial posts, Our Ukraine a third, and the Socialists the remaining cabinet seats. It is also said that Moroz would become Parliament Speaker. How the actual division of the spoils will be in the end, however remains to be seen. Setbacks have been manifold up till now, so a repetition should not be ruled out, although the possibilities for renewed negotiations and solutions are quickly narrowing. According to the constitution, a government must be formed within 60 days of the elections. Today, 53 days have passed since 26 March, leaving a mere week to form a government. Time is simply running out, so the choice is to deal or die.

At the core, coalition talks reflect a struggle between mighty interests over profits from the Ukrainian economy. Despite the progress won by the Orange Revolution, corruption is still endemic to Ukrainian society and politics, and this also applies to the parties that now might form a new government. It is essentially a question of who will get the billions of dollars that end up in the pockets of private interests, not least from the transit of Russian gas to the EU - now controled by the RosUkrEnergo company.

As stakes are so high in getting a "fair" share of these proceeds, there is no wonder that the political struggle is so tough. Thus, forming a new government for these parties means to pay up or lose out on one's cut. To lose is not an option for either of the three parties, which perhaps is the main reason why a government eventually must form. The alternative would be to hand power and proceeds to Yanukovich, which definitely would leave the coalition partners with naught. Barring Yanukovich from power is thus what unites Timoshenko, Yushchenko, and Moroz.

However, there are still a few "buts" before a new government is in place. The greatest obstacle is still Yushchenko's opposition against accepting Timoshenko as Prime Minister. Thus, as news of a government deal became public on Monday, a spokesman of Our Ukraine was quick to declare that the party would suspend talks in response to Timoshenko's statement that she would become Prime Minister and Moroz Parliament Speaker. Instead, Our Ukraine launched an unexpected candidacy of the Socialist leader Moroz as Prime Minister. The rationale would be that parliament might not want to accept Timoshenko as Prime Minister, which then would severely complicate any further possibilities of reaching a common solution.

Our Ukraine's stern reaction was not unexpected. The party has repeatedly characterised Timoshenko's ambitions for the Premiership as an "ultimatum" in negotiations. Sooner or later, however, this is an argument that will not be taken seriously by anyone. The question now is, if the three potential partners have not reached a point of no return in negotiations. Having more or less struck a deal, Our Ukraine can no longer turn its back to agreeing on a solution. With almost two months since elections, the orange forces are reaching a decisive stage in negotiations when they must either unite or part. In the end, Yushchenko must most likely face realities and drink the bitter cup Timoshenko offers him, for the simple reason that he is running out of options. The alternative would be to part from power, if not from the presidency.

It is now becoming painstakingly clear that Yushchenko can no longer perform a play to the gallery, and must admit that he plays too high a game. Now it's do or die - neck or nothing, and Yushchenko must swallow his pride by accepting Timoshenko, while next week might be too late. It remains to see whether Yushchenko will rise to the challenge or extend his role as election loser to that of lame duck as president. It all lies in Yushchenko's hands and how he decides will seal his fate in the history of Ukraine. Time is running out for him to show that he believes in, knows how, and can make a change for his country.

Ukraine, government, Timoshenko, Yushchenko, Moroz

Ukraine from Orange to Blue?

Will Sunday 26 March 2006 go down in Ukrainian history as the end of the Orange Revolution? This is undeniably the impression one may get when half the votes of Sunday's parliamentary elections have been counted. Last year the Ukrainian people ousted Viktor Yanukovich for fraud in the presidential elections. Now, he stands as victor in the first parliamentary elections since the orange revolution. Is this - in line with Yanukovich's party colour - the blue counter-revolution?

With some 27% of cast votes, Yanukovich's Party of Regions is currently in the lead ahead of Yulia Timoshenko's 23% and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine's 16%. That Yanukovich would win the elections comes as no surprise, with polls giving him some 30% support over the past months. What came as more of a surprise is that president Yushchenko stands out as the big loser in the elections at the same time as Timoshenko has strengthened her support by almost 10% more than was expected only a few weeks ago.

What now? Judging from the results, it is still no done deal which parties will form the new government. As of now, two other parties - the Communists and the Socialists - have crossed the 3% threshold to parliament. It thus seems as if we are in for a lot of negotiations over the next week to form some sort of a coalition government, and what options are possible will be clear only when we know how big each party's parliamentary representation will be.

What is by now quite clear, is that president Yushchenko may have great difficulty to exercise his power during the remainder of his time in office. The results are not only a humiliating blow to Yushchenko, who thereby is made a scapegoat of failed policies over the past year. Due to changes in the constitution, presidential power has also been reduced and now Yushchenko may lack parliamentary support to back his policies, potentially making him into a lame duck. The question is if he will accept the roles of both scapegoat and lame duck?

In an attempt to seize the initiatve, Yulia Timoshenko called for talks with president Yushchenko to form a new orange coalition between her party, Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party, headed by Moroz. The question is whether Yushchenko has much alternative to accepting this proposal, even if it might make him a puppet on a chain in the hands of Timoshenko. In September last year, former orange allies Yushchenko and Timoshenko had what seemed as a final fallout and Timoshenko was sacked from the post of prime minister. If an orange coalition is to rule Ukraine after the elections, Timoshenko's comeback to power is assured. The question is also whether the Socialists may be able to again join forces with their former orange allies in conforming to the government policies of Yushchenko and Timoshenko. This has proved complicated in the past.

The alternative to the Socialists would then be to join forces with Yanukovich's Party of Regions and Symonenko's Communist Party to govern Ukraine in an anti-Yushchenko coalition. Such a coalition would improve relations with Russia at the same time as Yanukovych might have greater diffuculty to develop relations with the European Union than he would really want to. Such a blue coalition might also be better in tune with popular sentiments than the orange alternative, which may prove a factor in coalition negotiations. A third option of forming a Yanukovich-led grand coalition with Our Ukraine and the Socialists must now be ruled out as it would include the loser - Our Ukraine - and exclude a winner - the Timoshenko bloc. This is not the message the voters sent and - in contrast to 2004 - Ukrainian politicians have learnt to listen a little more to the people.

What government alternative eventually evolves is still unclear, but Ukrainian politics certainly have taken a peculiar twist, which only will make it the more interesting in the coming years. What, to the contrary, is already clear is that Yushchenko no longer can rest on his laurels as the hero of the Orange revolution - regardless of whether he will turn out a scapegoat, a lame duck or a puppet on a chain. The big question, however, is what it would mean if Ukraine now turns from orange to blue with a comeback of Viktor Yanukovich as Prime Minister. Hopefully - if not altogether realistically - this day will never come. As for the future of the orange revolution, the people and not the politicians will be the better judges on that, and this was an election - not a revolution.

Ukraine, elections, orange, blue, revolution, Yushchenko, Timoshenko, Yanukovich, Moroz, Symonenko

Poland & Ukraine Win UEFA 2012 Bid

Poland and Ukraine today won the bid to host the UEFA EURO 2012 Soccer Championship. The decision by the UEFA Executive Committee came as a most welcome surprise for two nations currently mared by political crisis. Beating the odds against favourite contender Italy, UEFA in a seminal decision opted for development instead of profit. By this brave and strategic decision, UEFA clearly showed that soccer is a concern for all or Europe, and not merely a concern of mighty nations of the EU.

Sport is politics. This has been evident ever since the 1933 Berlin Olympics. Who gets to host a major international sports' event has enormous profits to gain economically and in terms of goodwill. However, it is also a big gamble, as the opposite is equally true if organisers fail to successfully go trough with the event. Then, it involves great losses in both profit and prestige for the states concerned.

Faced by such considerations, the UEFA Executive Committee still decided for the Poland-Ukraine joint candidacy. The main contender and favourite was Italy, which already has the necessary infrastructure in terms of arenas, airports, roads, etc. However, what in the end seems to have turned the tide against Italy, are the recent bribery scandals and hooligan riots that so has tarred the image of Italian soccer internationally. This was not the case with with Poland and Ukraine, but this positive image may also prove an unwelcome blessing for Warzaw and Kiev.

Without the necessary infrasctructure, Poland and Ukraine now face the gigantic task of forming the preconditions for a successful event, e.g. building eight new UEFA standard soccer arenas. The championship finals are intended to take place on the Kiev Olympic Stadium, which now has to undergo fundamental renovations in upcoming years. All these efforts will, of course, take enormous amounts of money, and it is exactly here the entire project may backfire on both Warzaw and Kiev. Without an extremely transparent tender process for the fat contracts to build arenas, develop infrastructure or sell Championship paraphernalia, organisers may face a constant media nightmare in founded or unfounded allegations of foul play and bribery in the process up till the 2012 UEFA Championships.

If this would become the case, two states with already politically tarred reputations, might end up with an irrepairable loss of status in European affairs. If, to the contrary, Ukraine and Poland would use the Championships as a vehicle to rid themselves of corruption and power abuse, they could both stand to win not only the laurels of sportmanship, but also the benefits of societal fair play. Consequently, the 2012 UEFA Championships may prove if Poland may fully assume its role as a major European power and if Ukraine will become a full-fledged member of the European Union family. Today, sport truly is politics, and who skilfully manages to exploit sports, will also win at politics.

Ukraine: Lazarenko Gets 9 Years Jail

Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment by a Federal Court in San Fransisco on Friday, Washington Post reports. Lazarenko was found guilty of corruption, money laundering, fraud and extortion, and also received a $10 million fine in addition to the jail sentence.

Pavel Lazarenko was Prime Minister of Ukraine from 1996 to 1997 and became infamous for using his office to serve his own economic interests. The bulk of his multimillion corruption proceeds ended up in Swiss, US and offshore bank accounts. The victim of Lazarenko's crimes was the Ukrainian people, who at the time struggled for daily survival after the post-soviet economic collapse.

Lazarenko was appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine in May 1996, although his appointment was never considered by the Ukrainian parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. Controlling decisions on many lucrative business projects, Lazarenko is said to have demanded 50% of profits from businesses favoured by him. Lazarenko at the time had close political and economic ties with current Ukrainian politicians of prominence such as Yulia Timoshenko and Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz.

In 1999, Lazarenko fled the Ukraine, awaiting a parliamentary decision to waive his parliamentary immunity. Within days of his escape, he was arrested in the United States and spent four years in custody pending trial, until his release on a $68 million bail in 2003. A year later he was found guilty on 29 out of 53 charges concerning money laundering, fraud and extortion, but the judge eventually dropped a majority of them, reducing the list to 14 offences. Despite being released on bail, Lazarenko was subject to house arrest until his final verdict on Friday. The former Ukrainian PM has already declared that he intends to appeal the verdict.

Throughout the trial, Lazarenko's defence has maintained his innocence and challenged US legal authority to alleged crimes not committed in the United States. Lazarenko has argued that his business transactions were normal to the prevailing conditions in the Ukraine in the 1990s. He thus claims that it was generally accepted for a Ukrainian politician to earn millions on the side in these years, and that such business formed a natural part of the transformation from soviet command economy to a liberal market economy.

In 2000, Ukraine sought Lazarenko's extradition. The charges brought against him by the Ukrainain Prosecutor General included, beside economic crimes, the instigation of two murders and several assassination attempts on high-ranking officials. The US, however, denied extradition on the grounds that Lazarenko was tried for crimes in the United States.

US federal prosecutors are far from satisfied with Friday's verdict. They had initially sought an 18 year prison term and confiscation of and fines to a total of $66 million. US authorities have claimed that Lazarenko transferred $118 million to US banks alone. Still, the sentence constitutes a milestone in the US battle against international crime. Lazarenko becomes the first former state leader to receive a US prison sentence after Manuel Noriega of Panama. Also, the Ukrainian people may give up a sigh of relief that at least one of their corrupt leaders now is punished for his crimes although by the United States and not by Ukraine itself.

Prometheus Unbound?

A Ukraine eternally condemned to be split between east and west is the image that persistently lingers on the retina of imagery as historical, cultural, lingual, and religious differences are allowed to dominate over unifying forces in world perceptions of the country's national identity. The image of a country fettered to its historic fate is today however confronted by a contrasting picture with roots in regional and national myths, linking together nations reunited in freedom at the shores of the Black Sea. Less known is that its origins are to be found in the ancient myth of Prometheus - the titan who stole the fire from the gods and gave it to man.

Prometheus (Gr. he who thinks ahead) brought man the enlightenment - fire and knowledge - denied to her by higher powers. In eternal punishment, Zeus had him chained to a rock on mount Kaukasos, where an eagle was set to feast on his liver. His self-sacrificial torment was eventually ended by Hercules, who killed the eagle and set the titan free. Freed from his strains, Zeus still deemed the titan forever to carry the burden of a Caucasian cliff in the remains of his chains. In memory of Prometheus' suffering, man to this day bear stones in their rings.

The appealing Prometheus myth became the theme for the Ukrainian national poet's, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), epos Kavkaz (1845). The father of Ukrainian literature wrote the work in memory of a close friend - Yakiv de Balman - who had fallen in Russian service in the Caucasus that year. Its edge is however not directed against the Chechens, who had killed his friend, but against the injustices of the Russian empire in denying oppressed peoples their freedom. What today is perceived as expressions of budding Ukrainian nationalism and a strive for independence from Russia, to the contrary encompasses a more general vision of liberty and justice to all nationalities set to carry the burden of the Tsarist yoke.

The Prometheus myth was a recurrent theme in both revolutionary and other liberation movements. It is for example found in the nationalist and socialist struggles against Tsarist rule; on the Balkans in the fight against the Osman empire as well as subsequently in attempts by the Crimmean Tatars to receive support from the new Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s. However, it was foremost by the inception of the Promethean movement that the myth gained greater fame as a symbol in the struggle against Russian and Soviet imperialism, why Prometheism at times also has been interpreted as a form of Russophobia.

For posterity, the Promethen movement has mainly come to be associated with Poland and the authoritarian nationalism of Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935). The Polish leader's ambition to contain Russian expansionism got its ideological inspiration from Promethean freedom ideals and its geopolitical expression in Intermarum - a projected federation of states between the Baltic and Black seas to counteract first Russian imperialism then the Bolshevik threat and to quell the power of the soviets. The image that - with some justification - portrays Piłsudski both as the founder and the front figure of Prometheism however also serves to obscure a more nuanced picture of a once nascent regional movement. In reality, the Promethean movement once gathered leading politicians and diplomats exiled from many of the countries, which had barely experienced a short interregnum of independence between Tsarist rule and Soviet power.

With the Paris magazine Promethée (1926) as a hub, exile circles created an ever-growing think-tank "in defence of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus and Ukraine". Gradually, this task was expanded geographically also to encompass all the peoples, who had fallen under the tyranny of soviet power, and thus the movement gained an overall eurasian expansion. The Prometheans engaged into intense lobbying to direct the attention of European government to the destinies of the oppressed peoples in the decades leading up to the Second World War. By public seminars and culture festivals, attempts were made not only to draw attention to nations erased from world maps, but also build an image of a common historical and cultural destiny, where trade and oceans united the peoples. Consequently, the Prometheans linked their ideas to the era's geopolitical division between dynamic sea power - talassocracy - and rigid land power - tellurocracy - where Russia naturally was referred to as the main example of the latter. To the contrary, the free trade of the oceans was related to free and independent states. That the maritime freedom theme was expanded to cover also old trade routes, such as between the Baltic and the Black seas - along predominantly Russian river systems - as well as the caravan routes along the Silk Road, only comes out as natural as the diminishing significance of exile communities demanded a broader basis. Focus was thus expanded from the Baltic-Black Sea-Caucasus axis to also cover Central Asia.

At the same time, ideas arose in the 1930s to found a political and economic alliance between Black Sea states such as Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as well as Ukraine and Georgia once the latter had regained independence. For the Prometheans, this appeared a greater task than Piłsudski's Intermarum vision. The Black Sea question was essentially considered the final solution to the Eastern Question. However, history wanted differently. Ukraine and the Caucasus remained under soviet rule, Romania's borders were revised, and Bulgaria became the Soviet Union's most loyal ally in the Balkans during the Cold War.

After the Second World War, the Promethean ideals appeared as antiquated as history had made them obsolete. They lived on in the memories of exile communities in the west, but found little ground in the realities of the time. The centre of the movement was moved to the US, but dwindled into oblivion already in the early 1950s.

After the end of the Cold War, the return of history has seen a - conscious or unconscious - renaissance for the ideas of Prometheism. Already in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Council was founded. After the coloured revolutions, Ukraine and Georgia deepened their relations by the 2005 Borjomi declaration. This was followed in 2006 with the CIS-sceptics Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM), setting up the regional Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, with its goal to "strengthen democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and security and stability". No great imagination is needed to realise that closer regional cooperation was aimed at reducing Russian influence over these countries.

Also, the project of creating an Intermarum between the Baltic and Black Seas seems, to some extent, to have been revived. Thus, it was the Polish and Lithuanian presidents - Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus - who served as mediator in the Ukrainian orange revolution and committed the EU to the country's continued reform process. That the inheritors of the mediaeval Polish-Lithuanian Union, once reaching the shores of the Black Sea, engaged themselves to Ukraine's political fate, undeniably brings out echoes of history. Warzaw and Vilnius are also Kiev's and Tbilisi's most ardent protagonists for continued euro-atlantic integration. Regional and bilateral cooperation in various constellations continues to evolve between the four countries. At the same time, the relation of them all to Russia, today are put on strain.

It is thus in terms of aims and ambitions that this "neo-Prometheism" evoke apprehensions. As these ideas now are brought out of the dustbin of history, one should not forget that - for good or evil - they are a creation of their time. Is the goal once more to contain Russia - to form a cordon sanitaire against Moscow's power projections? Apparently, it seems as if the tide is turning in that direction, even though a majority of EU and NATO capitals still pay great consideration to Russia.

From the US horizon, a coalition against Russia may be considered an option if relations to Moscow continue to deteriorate. In the event of a Democratic takeover in Washington, "neo-Promethean" ambitions may gain increased American support. The foreign policy nestor of the US Democratic Party - Zbigniew Brzezinski - is a long-time fan of such visions and was also the architect to the US policy of undermining the Eastern Bloc and demolishing the Soviet Union. Such a turn of events would, however, transform Prometheism from a positive to a negative mission - from integration to exclusion.

From the perspective of the European Union, the bad relations between the Soviet-Russian empire's former colonies and vassal states and current Russia, is a constant element of irritation in the capitals of old Europe. Hesitance and protraction in Ukrainian EU-integration may be interpreted as an expression of apprehension that if Europe's Eastern border would run from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it might topple a precarious balance in already strained relations to Moscow. Moreover, if the Caucasian card would be played out, EU may fear to be dealt a bad hand in a game played out between Moscow and Washington. Still, Ukrainan - as well as Turkish - accession to the Union is a natural and unavoidable development if Brussels is to remain faithful to the ideas of Europe. The dynamics this would bring may also return some of the vitality to the EU, in contrast to the prospects of Eurosclerosis.

As the Ukraine today is the geographical and polictical hub for a neo-Promethean movement, its positive sides may well prove a way ahead for both the Ukraine as the region in its entirety. If regional and western integration is allowed to walk hand in hand, the historical, cultural, lingual, and religious rifts characterising current Ukraine might perhaps be mended. A regional vision would tranform into a national vision, which might better reflect the complex nature of Ukrainian statehood. Here, European integration is an example for co-existence in multinational states.

What originally set Prometheism apart from other national liberation movements was a vision beyond narrow national interests. It waw the rights of small states to independently determine their destinies and the self-evidence in attaining development in cooperation with other nations as well as by regional integration and free trade, that gave the movement its special dynamics. In this sense, Prometheism was way ahead of its time and anachronic to the historical environment in which it existed. Its negative side was the tendency to let the legitimate strive for independence from Russian hegemony turn into outright Russophobia.

As the wings of history once more hover over the fettered Prometheus, hopes are set for Herculean liberation out of the claws of the Russian two-headed eagle. Will the chains thus be broken or will the American white-headed eagle simply take its place. Free or fettered, is Prometheus - the enlightener - destined to eternally live in the shadow of eagles? However, if the burden of freedom is merely to carry a stone in the bond of faithfulness to the ideals he has taught, this would seem a small sacrifice for the European titans of our times.

Ukraine Right or Wrong

Was Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko right to call for parliamentary elections? This is a question that in recent days has been the subject of intense debate. Constitutionally, he seems to be on the slippery slope. Still, his argument that "it is not only my right, it is my obligation" might prove valid if he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron. The core question is though how advisable it is for state to have a constitution, which allows for such a situation to occur.

Imagine, for a moment, that the US Congress would act not only to impeach the president, but also actively prepare to abolish the office of the president itself.

For an American this would be absurd, as the fundamental idea of the founding fathers was a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judical powers, as inspired by Montesquieu. This separation of powers' system is also the foundation of most modern democracies, and usually there are elaborate mechanisms to avoid situations that risk jeopardising the stability provided by the checks and balances of independent centres of power. Paradoxically, this seems not to be the case in the Ukraine, as recent developments demonstrate.

The 8 December 2004 deal ending the Orange revolution involved changes to the Ukrainian constitution to limit the great powers of the presidential office, previously enjoyed by Leonid Kuchma. This was the price the leaders of the Orange revolution paid to get the fraudulent presidential 23 November elections invalidated. However, the changes did not enter into force until 1 January 2006.

As the Ukrainian constitution now works, the parliament has the right to override presidential vetoes if a qualified majority of 300 out of 450 deputies so decides. Such a majority also has the option to make constitutional changes, and even abolish the office of the president itself. Thus, article 155 of the Constitution reads:

Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted, if at the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have voted in favour thereof.

Still, the provision of decisions by two separate parliamentary sessions with elections in between, seems somewhat obscure, as the changes made in December 2004 appear to have entered into force before the March 2006 elections. It is therefore possible that the Verkhovna Rada may change the constitution by a single decision of a two-third's majority.

A further mechanism to counter quick and unpredictable changes between elections may be § 83 of the constitution, which can be interpreted as preventing deputies to change loyalties between parliamentary fractions, as a coalition is to be formed by fractions and not individual deputies. This reasoning seems both obscure and ambiguous, but has been a key argument for the president to protest against the fact that an increasing number of MPs from his party, Our Ukraine, have changed allegiances in favour of the Party of Regions. As votes were thus added to the anti-presidential coalition in parliament, the situation eventually became desperate, as Yushchenko's enemies were closing in on the 300 deputies margin. If this was allowed to happen, a qualified parliamentary majority could deal with the president as they saw fit, and eventually even depose of him.

Then, in which situations is the President actually allowed to call for new parliamentary elections? The answer given by constitutional article 90 set three provisions:

1. If the parliament cannot reach a majority (coalition) to form a government within thirty days after the first meeting of a newly elected parliament.
2. If a coalition cannot reach a majority to form a new government within 60 days after the resignation of a prior government.
3. If parliament during session has not met for a period of 30 days.

It is quite obvious that Yushchenko did not fulfill any of the above criteria when signing the decree to disband parliament and call for new elections. Consequently, if reading the Constitution to its letter, Yushchenko had no right to do this. So, does that mean that he was completely off his rocker when he decided to make this move? Not necessarily. The argument that he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron is certainly valid. As president, Yushchenko may perceivably have "the right and the obligation" to act if a situtation occurs, which threatens the constitutional order.

When such a case is applicable is however unclear. One prerequisite might be if parliament had a clear and expressed intent to jeopardise the constitutional order. The requirements to be fulfilled in meeting the prerequisite of intent is however very obscure. Thus, the matter has been referred by parliament to the Constitutional Court for a ruling.

Until recently, it was very uncertain whether the Constitutional Court would choose to address the matter. According to its statutes, it has 15 days to decide whether it at all will deliberate on an issue raised by parliament. Then it was declared that the Court would make its ruling on Wednesday this week. However, today five of the 18 judges said that they considered resigning due to public threats against them, and asked for police protection. Now, the court ruling has been delayed until 17 April.

Reviewing the composition of the Court, it consists of eigtheen members: 6 judges, 6 parliamentarians and 6 presidential appointees. The five now concerned represent all three groups. Still, the Court could also choose to make a ruling even without the participation of the five members, as it only needs 10 of its members to make a ruling. That the Court could get a majority decision in this way is still very unlikely. Essentially, the question is whether the Court will make a ruling at all. That is highly questionable, as the developing crisis may render its opinion obsolete even if it could finally reach a verdict.

All in all, President Yushchenko seems to stand on weak ground as for his decision to disband parliament and call for new elections. However, this does not mean that he may not stand his ground in the battle over its legitimacy. As events are evolving, new elections on 27 May seem to be the only sensible option to end the current conflict democratically. Consequently, the question whether his decision was right or wrong may never really be legally addressed. In terms of politics, his choice was a "catch 22" and whatever choice he made - be deposed by parliament or call for new elections - it was to come out bad for himself. The political verdict on Yushchenko may therefore be hard, as he for too long walked an increasingly thin line in exercisising his presidential duties. Still, whether Yushchenko was right or wrong is not the core issue. The important thing is whether his decision will eventually turn out to be right or wrong for Ukraine and its people. After all, that was what the Orange revolution was originally about - giving a voice to the people.

Update: According to the BBC, Yushchenko would now be "willing to suspend his decree dissolving parliament and ordering an early 27 May election." This would constitute a postponement of parliamentary elections, so that parties can prepare for an election campaign, and not a change of opinion in that elections should be held. Thus, it is a signal that Yushchenko might be willing to compromise on the date for elections, but still carry through with the process. How it all ends up is very uncertain and it remains to be seen how Yanukovich supporters and other parties will react to this feeler.

Moldova: Transnistria Blast Kills Eight

On Thursday, at least eight people were killed in an explosion in Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, BBC reports. Local authorities believe the blast, hitting a city minibus in early morning, might have been caused by a bomb, triggered by accidence. If so, this only adds to the picture of Transnistria as a region tarnished by violence and criminality.

Transnistria constitutes an ignored and absurd anachronism in contemporary Europe. It is still, officially, a part of Moldova, although the region de facto seceded as early as in 1990. Then Transnistria declared independence with assistance of the Russian 14th Army, making its commander, Aleksandr Lebed, a folk hero in Russia. This was followed by low intensity warfare, until a ceasefire was reached in 1992, putting an end to hostilities. Since then, the Transnistrian question is considered a frozen conflict by the international community.

During its roughly 15 years of independence, Transnistria has become a centre of organised crime and trafficking in people, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, weapons and whatever contraband one might imagine. The region is led by Igor Smirnov, who won a landslide victory in the 2001 presidential elections - even to the extent that he reportedly gained over 100% of votes in some districts. Smirnov's eldest son runs Sheriff, one of Transnistria's biggest and most lucrative businesses. As the dedicated football fan he is, he has founded his own professional football team and constructed an international standard football stadium in the capital of Tiraspol - a city numbering a mere 150,000 inhabitants. Such extravagance contrasts to the average income of some 100 USD a month for Transnistrians, which is roughly half that of Moldova - Europe's poorest country.

For long, Transnistria has been able to go about its business relatively undisturbed, not least because of massive backing from Moscow. In 1999, Russia however agreed to withdraw its troops from the region by the OSCE-negotiated Istanbul agreement. To this day, Russia remains reluctant to honour these commitments. During the last year, the tide all the same seems to have turned for Transnistria.

One of the key factors of Transnistrian subsistence has been smuggling. For this, the region was dependent on Kuchma's Ukraine turning a blind eye to such activities, especially as the Ukrainian port of Odessa served as a great outlet of contraband. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has - with international assistance - made great efforts to curve smuggling, why the Transnistrian regime may slowly be approaching the brink of ruin. Also, in December 2005, the EU launched a monitoring mission to supervise the border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

This was followed in March 2006 by Ukraine imposing new customs regulations, demanding all imports from Transnistria to be processed by Moldovan authorities. The new regulations were an effect of the enforcement of a joint customs protocol between Ukraine and Moldova. In effect, this constituted a Ukrainian-Moldovan economic blockade, which both Transnistria and Russia were quick to point out. However, from an international law perspective, Ukraine and Moldova were in the right for the simple reason that Transnistria is still regarded part of Moldova by the international community.

As things now stand, the Transnistrian economy increasingly seems to lose out on its incomes from smuggling. This puts the very existence of Transnistrian independence in peril, which in the end might trigger the change that is so long overdue. It remains to be seen whether Russia will accept such change or if the country will step in to support the breakaway region to avoid yet another coloured revolution in its sphere of vital interests. Until then, Transnistria tragically remains an Absurdistan of Europe.