Direct democracy or digital mob?

A spectre is haunting Eurasia - the spectre of activism. As cyberage sets in, the mentality of old Eurasia grapples to grasp the power of the people when politics enters a new age and arena. Is this truly the case or are we but suffering from the same delusions as we tend to when lured by novelties, choosing the complex over simplicity, iPhone and 3G over pencil and paper?

Paraphrasing the 1848 Communist Manifesto may seem out of place addressing the dramatic changes that our Eurasian continent has undergone over the last decades. In essence though, it illustrates the difficulties of the old political and economic establishment to come to terms with new rules of the game, where citizens enjoy and use ever expanding tools of empowerment, where the Great Communicator is not necessarily the President, but the People. It is a transformation from "we are the people" to "who are the people?".

What this people is, still remains to be determined. Is it a demos - people - without krateion - rule? An unruly crowd with its own heterogeneous interests that only seldom forms into a concrete political agenda, but still looms large influencing and potentially discapacitating policy goals and implementation of elected officials? Is it an anonymous and shrouded rule that manages both people and politicians with no saying who is in charge?

198 methods of nonviolent action is a "dummies' guide to revolution," applied to all popular uprisings forming a tattered trace of coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last decade: Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine... Today, such approaches for achieving peaceful change are so integrated in our mindset of popular action, that we seldom stop to reflect upon if they are righteous or represent the will of the people. Furthermore, the very same mechanisms have found their way into Internet activism, as Gandhi goes web 2.0, as the Mandelas and Sakharovs of our age increasingly turn up from out of cyberspace.

We take these thruths to be self-evident and hail the principles and mechanisms of coloured revolution as singularly in the service of democracy. However, if we think revolution, we must also think reaction. Confronted by external change, Russia by no means was or could be ignorant of this, as stability was the name of the game both to preserve power and protect people from a return to the upheavals and chaos of the 1990s. Nashi became the recipe for reaction, to support and not subvert an authoritarian regime. As also Gargantua went web 2.0, we witnessed cyberwars waged against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. This Russian experiment has now come to an end, and Nashi put in mothballs, as Kremlin seeks new venues of state-directed instead of state-inspired web activism.

Why? What have the Russians realized that the west fails to understand? The answer may be the difficulty of controlling the digital mob. As each and everyone can turn a cyberwarrior or warmonger on one's own, such spontaneity is destined to conflict with the interests of authoritarian government. Directing the webcrowds in the spirit of Gustave Le Bon has proven an overwhelming task in the 21st century, as rulers realize the risk of spiralling into new nights of broken glass. Whereas methods may work in concrete operative and tactical contexts - by blogs, twitter, and other social media - it has proven much more complex and difficult to achieve any strategic and tenuous goals.

The Georgian example also illustrates a paradox if regarded from the perspective of information operations, viz. info warfare. Whereas aerial superiority is deemed the key to victory in modern warfare, the winner may quickly turn loser in the information battlefield. The cyberattacks on Georgia in 2008 gave Russia near total dominance in the information field. However, it also raised the temperature of the Russian information flow for it to boil over into increasingly unreasonable and uncorroborated accusations of Georgian war crimes and even genocide on South Ossetians. In one blow, Russia lost its credibility. At the same time, it gave the Georgian government an information monopoly to send its message, its truth, and its propaganda, as most alternative information sources had been taken out. The exception was bloggers, acting eyewitnesses directly from the hotbeds of battle.

So, have all the powers of old media and politics entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre? Realising its potential, will social media be seen as a friend or foe by forces of traditional society? What it takes to turn the tide and surf the waves of Internet activism is a combination of factors: Understanding of areas, countries, or regions of concern with comprehension of mechanisms such as Gandhi goes web 2.0 and the digital mob. A growing but still too small number of journalists and politicians are getting the message and have started developing such competence, but in the heat of battle, during drastic developments, the question is if this competence may be applied to account for what goes on in the online political arena - with direct or indirect influence on the flow of events - and act or report accordingly.

As trivial a statement as it may seem, the Internet is what you make of it. Friend or foe dichotomies lead nowhere, and seeing Internet as a threat by repetitious rantings about cybercrime and pornography degrade the very thought of human interaction - whether on the web or in real life. Statements saying cybercrime exceeds international drugs' trade, or that a majority of Internet usage relates to pornography (in reality 10-25%), just bring out hysteria about something that for most people has no connection whatsoever to either crime or sex, but for whom interaction by social media has become a part of everyday life, including the potential to actively influence one's life and society by the use of the web.

For people, raising their voices and exerting influence, is not essentially a matter of being online or not. It is true, that social media facilitate social and political interaction, when applied to that purpose. Still, it is the same logics and tactics that are seen IRL political and societal interaction. Age-old methods of political action - whether Gandhi's application of ahimsa to non-violent change or Hitlerite seduction of the crowd inspired by Le Bon - are as integrated into web activism as they are into general political action. The choice - as always with phenomena rightly or wrongly deemed as new - stands between embracing or vilifying web activism. Is standing apart, studiously neutral, the road ahead when cyberspace - for good or evil - becomes but another arena for government of the people, by the people, for the people? Is it a choice between greater direct democracy or the digital mob, or will we simply have to live with both?

Photo award for Georgia coverage

Earlier this week, the Swedish Dagens Nyheter news photographer Lars Lindqvist won second price in the World Press Photo competition for his photo coverage of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. His pictures, in my view, give a face to human conflict that accounts for war - ancient and modern: tragedy and drama, waiting and action.

World Press Photo was founded in the Netherlands in 1955 as a non-commercial organization with the purpose of supporting and forwarding the cause of professional news' photographers with the world as their field of work. The organization arranges an annual photo competition, which has formed a basis for the encouragement of photo journalism. Lindqvist won second prize in the General News Stories cathegory.

The Caucasian Test Case

Today, the first more comprehensive analysis of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 was published, less than a month after hostilities ended. In its report Det kaukasiska lackmustestet (The Caucasian Test Case), the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) summarises its findings.

The war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 has fundamentally changed the playing field of international relations and the aftermath of the war will have profound consequences.

The purpose of this study is to analyze some central issues and implications of the war. The aim is to, shortly after the war and based on open sources material, draw some tentative conclusions regarding the consequences for the region and the world.

The primary conclusion is that Russia’s actions have triggered a far-reachingreassessment of the present world order. This will in turn lead to extensive policy changes at different levels as the actors adapt and try to influence the formation of the new world order. The war has laid bare the challenges and problems of the present international system. Responses to Russia’s actions will give an early
indication of the character and modus operandi of the coming world order.

My own contribution is a chapter on the information and cyberwar aspects (pp. 45-52).

Bibliographical information is as follows:

Det kaukasiska lackmustestet: Konsekvenser och lärdomar av det rysk-georgiska kriget i augusti 2008

[The Caucasian Test Case: Consequences and lessons Learned of the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008].

Robert L. Larsson (ed.), Alexander Atarodi, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jakob Hedenskog, Jerker Hellström, Jan Knoph, Vilhelm Konnander, Jan Leijonhielm, David Lindahl, Fredrik Lindvall, Johannes Malminen, Ingmar Oldberg, Fredrik Westerlund, Mike Winnerstig

The report in full [SWE] is available for download or purchase at the FOI website.

Referrals:

"Ryssen valde väg i Georgien. Fel väg!", Svenska Dagbladet, 15 September 2008.
"Analysts Call Russia-Georgia Conflict a 'Litmus Test'", Deutsche Welle, 16 September 2008.

"Ryssland ett växande hot mot sina grannar", Hufvudstadsbladet, 16 september 2008.

"Ny FOI-rapport speglar säkerhetspolitiska läget", Västerbottenskuriren, 17 september 2008.

"Säkerhetspolitiken i Europa är försämrad", Världen idag, 17 september 2008.

"Израилский след - Шведские военспецы выяснили, кто оказывал наибольшую военную помощь Грузии ", Новые Известия, 23 сентября 2008 г.

Sex & the City Dizz Putin

Has Putin - Time Magazine Man of the Year 2007 - been dethroned? Has virile Volodya finally lost his powerful sex appeal and magic with the ladies? So it would seem, judging from a recent toplist of the sexiest politicians in Russia, made by Russian Sex & the City magazine. Moreover, Putin was beaten by a has-been liberal politician, vegetating on the sidelines of Russia's weak and squeamish democratic opposition.

So, is this really the time for such jibberish and nonsense as the power and sex pendulum, when the world is set ablaze and sales of books declaring "The New Cold War" soar to become bestsellers overnight? Actually, it obviously is, because it tells a lot of how primitive our emotions may be when confronted with realities we do not want to face - and in some cases have spent years running away from.

Why is it that an article in a rather obscure Russian ladies' magazine - with a blog rather than a website fronting its business - gets such attention by international media at this very point in time? Good journalism? A story with potential Pullitzer prize qualities? I think not...

The simple reason is probably the psychological need for negative power projection - a primitive urge to make Putin look impotent at a time when "barbarious Russia" stands at the gates of our "imaginary western world of values." One need not be Freudian to understand both how deeply set and closely related power and sexuality are in the human psyche. Paradoxically, portraying Putin this way may simply be a projection of one's own feelings of impotence.

Still, Putin is an easy target. Examples are plenty. Only the other week, the victorious warrior saved a terrified TV-team out of the jaws of a ferocious Siberian tiger, thus hitting the headlines both in Russia and internationally for subduing this pinnacle of virility - the tiger. Even The Washington Post ran an article, linking it to no other story than - yes, Putin's precious potence in peril, when illustrious Russian Sex & the City magazine gets over and done with him. In power and sex, there can only be one first person, seems to be the message that media wants to get across. When did we stoop to such levels? Did we ever stop to think of where we were heading?

At a time when the world grasps for simplified truths, one should perhaps stop to think for a moment whether this is a story worthy the victims of a war with no meaning - hitting Georgians, Ossetians, and Russians alike. Values are vital for western society, they tell us. Our intrinsic values set us apart from authoritarianism and dictatorship - civilization and culture instead of brutish force. So, when portraying "an enemy leader" - as Putin is increasingly made out to be - is it the differences and divides of values that come to the forefront? Hopefully, but this story shows a small piece of the opposite - when the calamity of conflict is reduced to primal power and sex.

What does it tell us about ourselves and the world we live in? That is perhaps a question we should ask ourselves when we look to our politicians - presidents and prime ministers - for wise and enlightened leadership at a time when the tide of history is turning. Let us but hope that theirs is the wisdom to be guided by the values and ideals of western society rather than the primitive logics of power politics.

Analysing the Russo-Georgian War

What have we learnt from the war in Georgia? That is the question addressed in one of the first more comprehensive reports of the recent war between Russia and Georgia. As the war gives credibility to those claiming that we are on the verge of a New Cold War, there is also a time for analysis. The pursuit of knowledge is preferrable to a mere show of arms and empty rhetorics. The stakes may simply be too high to risk such a gamble at this point.

On Monday morning, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) will present one of the first more comprehensive analyses of the recent war in Georgia at a press seminar in Stockholm. With contributions from 14 analysts of different specialities, the report offers a variety of approaches to the conflict, and how it affects the European security order.

To what extent does the war set the framework for future security policy? What are the challenges for the EU? To what extent will it cause changes in the European security structure? What effects on world economy can we expect? Which are the lessons learnt from the Russian military offensive? These are but a few questions addressed by the study.

As a contributor myself, I deal with - what is loosely called - the information war or rather "cyberwar", viz. the alleged coincidence of an armed conflict with a massive attack over the Internet. Some of the views presented in this part, will hopefully be interesting to and put things in a wider perspective for prospective readers. I thus welcome any feedback, though access is limited to a Swedish readership.

The report in full will be accessible for purchase or download from the FOI website as of noon (GMT+1) on Monday. I hope it will contribute to a nuanced picture of the war and present perspectives that may guide political decision-makers, the media, and an interested general public in their views of the war and its real and potential consequences.

Coverage on Conflict in South Ossetia

Whoever wants to follow the ongoing conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia may find up-to-date coverage on Global Voices Online. Whereas I have not myself the time to blog on this very serious issue, I contribute as much as I can with blogger reactions to ongoing events, not least as I am experiencing that traditional media coverage of the conflict tends to be both late and on occasions erroneous.

Referrals:

Svenska Dagbladet, Editorial Blog, 12 August 2008, "Bra bloggbevakning av kriget i Georgien" (Good blog coverage of the war in Georgia).

Prometheus Unbound?

A Ukraine eternally condemned to be split between east and west is the image that persistently lingers on the retina of imagery as historical, cultural, lingual, and religious differences are allowed to dominate over unifying forces in world perceptions of the country's national identity. The image of a country fettered to its historic fate is today however confronted by a contrasting picture with roots in regional and national myths, linking together nations reunited in freedom at the shores of the Black Sea. Less known is that its origins are to be found in the ancient myth of Prometheus - the titan who stole the fire from the gods and gave it to man.

Prometheus (Gr. he who thinks ahead) brought man the enlightenment - fire and knowledge - denied to her by higher powers. In eternal punishment, Zeus had him chained to a rock on mount Kaukasos, where an eagle was set to feast on his liver. His self-sacrificial torment was eventually ended by Hercules, who killed the eagle and set the titan free. Freed from his strains, Zeus still deemed the titan forever to carry the burden of a Caucasian cliff in the remains of his chains. In memory of Prometheus' suffering, man to this day bear stones in their rings.

The appealing Prometheus myth became the theme for the Ukrainian national poet's, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), epos Kavkaz (1845). The father of Ukrainian literature wrote the work in memory of a close friend - Yakiv de Balman - who had fallen in Russian service in the Caucasus that year. Its edge is however not directed against the Chechens, who had killed his friend, but against the injustices of the Russian empire in denying oppressed peoples their freedom. What today is perceived as expressions of budding Ukrainian nationalism and a strive for independence from Russia, to the contrary encompasses a more general vision of liberty and justice to all nationalities set to carry the burden of the Tsarist yoke.

The Prometheus myth was a recurrent theme in both revolutionary and other liberation movements. It is for example found in the nationalist and socialist struggles against Tsarist rule; on the Balkans in the fight against the Osman empire as well as subsequently in attempts by the Crimmean Tatars to receive support from the new Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s. However, it was foremost by the inception of the Promethean movement that the myth gained greater fame as a symbol in the struggle against Russian and Soviet imperialism, why Prometheism at times also has been interpreted as a form of Russophobia.

For posterity, the Promethen movement has mainly come to be associated with Poland and the authoritarian nationalism of Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935). The Polish leader's ambition to contain Russian expansionism got its ideological inspiration from Promethean freedom ideals and its geopolitical expression in Intermarum - a projected federation of states between the Baltic and Black seas to counteract first Russian imperialism then the Bolshevik threat and to quell the power of the soviets. The image that - with some justification - portrays Piłsudski both as the founder and the front figure of Prometheism however also serves to obscure a more nuanced picture of a once nascent regional movement. In reality, the Promethean movement once gathered leading politicians and diplomats exiled from many of the countries, which had barely experienced a short interregnum of independence between Tsarist rule and Soviet power.

With the Paris magazine Promethée (1926) as a hub, exile circles created an ever-growing think-tank "in defence of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus and Ukraine". Gradually, this task was expanded geographically also to encompass all the peoples, who had fallen under the tyranny of soviet power, and thus the movement gained an overall eurasian expansion. The Prometheans engaged into intense lobbying to direct the attention of European government to the destinies of the oppressed peoples in the decades leading up to the Second World War. By public seminars and culture festivals, attempts were made not only to draw attention to nations erased from world maps, but also build an image of a common historical and cultural destiny, where trade and oceans united the peoples. Consequently, the Prometheans linked their ideas to the era's geopolitical division between dynamic sea power - talassocracy - and rigid land power - tellurocracy - where Russia naturally was referred to as the main example of the latter. To the contrary, the free trade of the oceans was related to free and independent states. That the maritime freedom theme was expanded to cover also old trade routes, such as between the Baltic and the Black seas - along predominantly Russian river systems - as well as the caravan routes along the Silk Road, only comes out as natural as the diminishing significance of exile communities demanded a broader basis. Focus was thus expanded from the Baltic-Black Sea-Caucasus axis to also cover Central Asia.

At the same time, ideas arose in the 1930s to found a political and economic alliance between Black Sea states such as Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as well as Ukraine and Georgia once the latter had regained independence. For the Prometheans, this appeared a greater task than Piłsudski's Intermarum vision. The Black Sea question was essentially considered the final solution to the Eastern Question. However, history wanted differently. Ukraine and the Caucasus remained under soviet rule, Romania's borders were revised, and Bulgaria became the Soviet Union's most loyal ally in the Balkans during the Cold War.

After the Second World War, the Promethean ideals appeared as antiquated as history had made them obsolete. They lived on in the memories of exile communities in the west, but found little ground in the realities of the time. The centre of the movement was moved to the US, but dwindled into oblivion already in the early 1950s.

After the end of the Cold War, the return of history has seen a - conscious or unconscious - renaissance for the ideas of Prometheism. Already in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Council was founded. After the coloured revolutions, Ukraine and Georgia deepened their relations by the 2005 Borjomi declaration. This was followed in 2006 with the CIS-sceptics Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM), setting up the regional Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, with its goal to "strengthen democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and security and stability". No great imagination is needed to realise that closer regional cooperation was aimed at reducing Russian influence over these countries.

Also, the project of creating an Intermarum between the Baltic and Black Seas seems, to some extent, to have been revived. Thus, it was the Polish and Lithuanian presidents - Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus - who served as mediator in the Ukrainian orange revolution and committed the EU to the country's continued reform process. That the inheritors of the mediaeval Polish-Lithuanian Union, once reaching the shores of the Black Sea, engaged themselves to Ukraine's political fate, undeniably brings out echoes of history. Warzaw and Vilnius are also Kiev's and Tbilisi's most ardent protagonists for continued euro-atlantic integration. Regional and bilateral cooperation in various constellations continues to evolve between the four countries. At the same time, the relation of them all to Russia, today are put on strain.

It is thus in terms of aims and ambitions that this "neo-Prometheism" evoke apprehensions. As these ideas now are brought out of the dustbin of history, one should not forget that - for good or evil - they are a creation of their time. Is the goal once more to contain Russia - to form a cordon sanitaire against Moscow's power projections? Apparently, it seems as if the tide is turning in that direction, even though a majority of EU and NATO capitals still pay great consideration to Russia.

From the US horizon, a coalition against Russia may be considered an option if relations to Moscow continue to deteriorate. In the event of a Democratic takeover in Washington, "neo-Promethean" ambitions may gain increased American support. The foreign policy nestor of the US Democratic Party - Zbigniew Brzezinski - is a long-time fan of such visions and was also the architect to the US policy of undermining the Eastern Bloc and demolishing the Soviet Union. Such a turn of events would, however, transform Prometheism from a positive to a negative mission - from integration to exclusion.

From the perspective of the European Union, the bad relations between the Soviet-Russian empire's former colonies and vassal states and current Russia, is a constant element of irritation in the capitals of old Europe. Hesitance and protraction in Ukrainian EU-integration may be interpreted as an expression of apprehension that if Europe's Eastern border would run from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it might topple a precarious balance in already strained relations to Moscow. Moreover, if the Caucasian card would be played out, EU may fear to be dealt a bad hand in a game played out between Moscow and Washington. Still, Ukrainan - as well as Turkish - accession to the Union is a natural and unavoidable development if Brussels is to remain faithful to the ideas of Europe. The dynamics this would bring may also return some of the vitality to the EU, in contrast to the prospects of Eurosclerosis.

As the Ukraine today is the geographical and polictical hub for a neo-Promethean movement, its positive sides may well prove a way ahead for both the Ukraine as the region in its entirety. If regional and western integration is allowed to walk hand in hand, the historical, cultural, lingual, and religious rifts characterising current Ukraine might perhaps be mended. A regional vision would tranform into a national vision, which might better reflect the complex nature of Ukrainian statehood. Here, European integration is an example for co-existence in multinational states.

What originally set Prometheism apart from other national liberation movements was a vision beyond narrow national interests. It waw the rights of small states to independently determine their destinies and the self-evidence in attaining development in cooperation with other nations as well as by regional integration and free trade, that gave the movement its special dynamics. In this sense, Prometheism was way ahead of its time and anachronic to the historical environment in which it existed. Its negative side was the tendency to let the legitimate strive for independence from Russian hegemony turn into outright Russophobia.

As the wings of history once more hover over the fettered Prometheus, hopes are set for Herculean liberation out of the claws of the Russian two-headed eagle. Will the chains thus be broken or will the American white-headed eagle simply take its place. Free or fettered, is Prometheus - the enlightener - destined to eternally live in the shadow of eagles? However, if the burden of freedom is merely to carry a stone in the bond of faithfulness to the ideals he has taught, this would seem a small sacrifice for the European titans of our times.

Georgia shoots down Russian plane?

According to Georgian TV-channel Rustavi 2, Georgian interior ministry forces today shot down a Russian fighter over the Kodori gorge of breakaway region of Abkhazia. The interior ministry tonight confirms that its forces has indeed shot down a Russian plane in a remote part of Georgia. Russia, on its part, emphatically denies any such incidence and representatives of both the Foreign and Defence Ministries speak of Georgian provocations. Pending furhter information, contradictory statements cease the day. Still, it seems that the conflict between Russia and Georgia is about to heat up even more, though hopefully not in armed confrontation.

Kars at Cultural Crossroads?

Kars, at Turkey's border to the Caucasus, is today mostly known as the place where Pamuk's novel Snow takes place, among raging snowstorms and conflicts between the modern and the tradtional. Kars is a contrast and a crossroads - a natural anomaly in current Turkey, where it roughly symbolises "the back of beyond." Pamuk's hero Ka obviously alludes to Kafka's Joseph K - the lonely male hero entwined in a chaos of events beyond his control, which rules his life and actions. The Turkish name of the novel Kar (snow) carries that reference as well as a pun of the city name.

The real Kars lies beyond the rapid development and increasing growth of modern Turkey, but is also at the centre of its historical identity crisis and rolling borders. Pamuk's Kars bears an important likeness to reality: The situation for women appears depressing. Despite the open-minded girls that address you in English in the streets, women's organisations active in the region speak about staying customs that makes one think of the historical and mythical Caucasian bride robberies. That the city has received a university, in Turkish called the "Caucasian," naturally instills much hope for the future, regardless of evident poverty and barren highlands.

Citizens themselves speak about how local economy would benefit from opening up the border to Armenia, with an injection to local businesses as an expected effect – a northeastern parallel to Gaziantep's rise to the position of industrial hub of southern Turkey, focussing on border trade with Syria and beyond. The border to Armenia has only been kept open during 1991-93, viz. after the fall of the Soviet Union but before the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabağ conflict. Turkish-Armenian relations are infected by the echoes of history. Attempts made at regional integration, e.g. within the area of infrastructure, containing both railway lines and pipelines common between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, are apparently formed to circumvent Armenia. That it is easier to step closer to Georgia is illustrated by the fact that Turkish Airlines this year opens a domestic route to Batumi, whose new airport has been constructed by a Turkish company, in order to serve the northeastern provinces of Turkey.

Beyond Kars – literally on the border to Armenia – is Ani, a medieval city in ruins of magnificent proportions, which previously was an Armenian capital and a trade centre of importance along the Silk road. The city, during its height, was challenged only by Constantinople in power and splendour. Here the name of the princely family Bagrationi – so familiar in Russian history – still echoes, even though Ani in the course of history changed hands between Armenian, Georgian, and Seljuk rule, before the hordes of Timerlane finally laid the city in ruins at the end of the 14th century. Ever since, Kars has been the regional hub. Today, the main threat to Ani paradoxically emanates from Armenia. The quakes and splinters from a quarry on the Armenian side of the border allegedly threaten to damage and destroy remaining cathedrals, with Turkish protests as a consequence.

The architecture, culture, history, and art of Kars are characterised from having been molded over the centuries at the crossroads of three empires – the Russian, the Turkish, and the Persian – which in different ways are still present. Georgian, Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish influences are visible in the underlayer of these. Carpets and rugs bear resemblance to the Caucasian, and the Tula samovars still simmer in the cafés. The modern city plan is clearly Russian, as the city belonged to the Russian empire during 1878-1921, when there was an ambition to build a "petit Peterbourg" at the foot of the Caucasus. Straight boulevards lined with proportionate Russian 19th century architecture still remains an emblem of Kars. Above the city, the castle dating back to the Bagrationi era hovers. Beneath it, the mossy Armenian cathedral of the Apostles soars aloft, saved for posterity as a mosque, with iconostasis remaining and the addition of wall-to-wall prayer carpeting.

With Russian rule from 1878, the modern history of Kars was begun. Having been a century old bone of contention between the Ottoman and Russian empires, with recurrent Russian sieges and conquests in 1807, 1828, and 1855, Kars eventually was awarded Russia due to the San Stefano peace agreement concluding the 1877-78 Turco-Russian war. Thus, the Turks were driven out of the region until the Russian revolution.

In 1892, the population of the Kars region consisted of 24% Turks, 21.5% Armenians, 15% Kurds, 14% Azeris, 13.5% Greek, 7% Russians, and 5% Turkmen. After the 1918 peace of Brest-Litovsk, Kars faced turbulent years. At first, the region befell the Southwest-Caucasian Republic, only to be occupied by the Democratic Republic of Armenia in 1919. By the 1920 Turko-Armenian war and the Alexandropol agreement, Kars was returned to Turkey. Still, before the ink had dried, the Bolsheviks conquered Armenia and the Kars issue was yet again unresolved.

It was only by the 1921 Kars agreement, between the RSFSR and the even younger Turkish Republic, that the border was finally regulated and Turkey regained its reign over the region. In the light of history, it was an agreement between two in many ways strikingly similar new regimes that had been made: Revolutionary Russia and Republican Turkey – both infant states after the imperial downfalls caused by WW I. That this legacy is still cherished is evident by the fact that the train wagon, in which the Kars agreement was signed, still remains in the city, as a memorial to the imperial struggle over the region. A question of interest in this context is how Turkeys' and Soviet Russia's obvious ability to enter into international agreements (for Turkey this might actually have been the first as the Republic was formally proclaimed several years later) influenced world perceptions of the growing capacities of these new states.

The loss of Kars for long remained an open wound in Soviet self-image. After WW II, Stalin thus prepared to reconquer the region. He was prevented in this ambition only by the determined veto of Churchill.

Kars forms part of current Turkey, but still remains in its periphery. Gradually, the city sets its imprints on the mental map even beyond the literary legacy of Pamuk. Last autumn, it hosted an international film festival on a European theme. The city takes part in cross-border cooperation activities in the Caucasus and within the Black Sea cooperation. In today's dynamic Turkey, Kars might perhaps find its own way to link its multi-faceted historical heritage to the challenges that future brings.

Text: Vilhelm Konnander & Josa Kärre
Pictures: Josa Kärre

Горькая чаша?

During his recent visit to Sweden, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was obliged to drink a cup of malice, literally and in terms of Russian foreign policy implementation. Attending a dinner of CBSS-ministers, the wine on the menu was Georgian. It thus seems that Lavrov took this opportunity to enjoy something banned in Russia, in a parallel to US politicians smoking Cuban cigars.

The source is none other than Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, who mentions this on his blog. Apparently, Georgian wine was served for dinner during a boat trip with foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea region, within the context of the CBSS. What Lavrov thought about this, Bildt does not tell, but at least the Swedish schnapps was a hit.

The Swedish wine monopoly, Systembolaget, recently introduced its first Georgian wine - a 2005 Teliani Valley Saperavi, which evidently was the wine enjoyed by the Russian foreign minister. The Saperavi grape is the most common in Georgian wines, which is used for brands like Kindzmarauli and Mukuzani from the Kakheti region of Eastern Georgia. The Saperavi grape - often associated with one-year wines - is sweet in taste and often produces high alcohol levels. Besides Georgia, Saperavi is also nowadays to be found in Australian vineyards. Except the Saperavi, other popular grape varieties in Georgian wines are Alexandrouli and Mudzhuretuli, to be found in the famous Khvanchkara wines of Western Georgia.

Which type of Georgian wine Lavrov prefers is unknown, but it is safe to say that he did not - as generations of Russians - venture into any deeper discussion about the qualities of various Georgian wines. Probably he was wise not to, as some Stockholm malice might be better than Moscow's bitter cup, would it be known of Lavrov's wine consumption when abroad.

Give Peace a Dance?

Who would not agree that a night at the disco is better than a night with a Kalashnikov? Hence, "the supply of discotheques in conflict resolution is often underrated. The loudest music wins." That is what Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt said during a seminar with the presidents of Georgia and Estonia - Mikheil Saakashvili and Toomas Hendrik Ilves - at the German Marshall Fund's Brussels seminar on the Caucasus this Monday.

President Saakashvili was quick to agree with Bildt, proposing to build "lots of discotecques" to contribute to peace in the Caucasus. "There is a lot to be won if you can get people to dance instead of running around the streets with weapons," the two statesmen argued.

Following up on this idea, Carl Bildt later wrote on his blog: "I suspect that we during the seminar introduced the idea of 'discotecques for peace.' It was about giving - with small means - young people in confrontation and conflict zones a possibility to naturally spend time with each other. A night at the disco is better than a night with a Kalashnikov. Especially in South Ossetia."

As much as this idea might seem daft, one should not underestimate the significance of a neutral meeting-ground during conflict. Giving people a chance to concentrate on something else for once except war and conflict, indulging in pleasure instead of shooting at each other might, at first glance, seem like a good idea. Also, bars and restaurants have in recent years become the target of terrorist attacks, much motivated by the fact that they represent values not tolerated by extremists and war-mongers.

However, when regarding the issue more closely, one wonders who would constitute the disco clientele. Who could really afford going to the discotecque in a conflict or war zone? The answer is obivous for all who have seen conflict: It is mainly the profiteers of war that can allow themselves such luxury during conflict. Ordinary people just would not even consider it when they can hardly win their daily bread, and for them establishments of this sort are only associated with criminality, prostitution, and possibly foreign soldiers and aid workers.

Still, the idea might seem novel and original. However, it is far from a new concept. Dancing for peace first came in vogue during the "flower-power" era in the late 1960s, and formed part of the expanding international peace movement. Peace dance festivals have since been a recurrent phenomenon to promote pacifism. For Carl Bildt, this is perhaps a sign that he is getting old, as his youth was much spent combatting exactly this sort of "leftist" ideas. But perhaps he has come to realise that with more discos "peace will guide the planets, and love will steer the stars."

As for the "discos for peace" proposal one cannot but wonder how distant and distraught political leaders are from the realities of war and conflict, thinking that such ideas might give peace a chance to dance. What is there then left to say but: "Send in the clowns!"

Armenia Railroaded on Train Line

Last Thursday, an agreement was signed between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the contruction of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad, further barring Armenia from infrastructural cooperation in the western Caucasus. Effectively, Armenia is increasingly isolated from regional developments of great consequence for the country's future. As a consequence, Armenia may be further driven into the arms of Russia, strengthening the delineation of spheres of interest in the Caucasus between Russia and the West.

The agreement, signed in Baku, by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, Azerbaijani president Aliyev and Georgian President Saakashvili, bypasses Armenia by opting for the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tblisi-Baku stretch, instead of the previously designated, and already existent, Kars-Gyumri rail line, going through Armenia. The Armenian-Turkish border, and along with it the Kars-Gyumri railway, has been closed since 1993, due to the 1988-1994 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabağ. Thus, the Kars-Gyumri alternative would have meant reopening the border - a matter too difficult for Turkey to deal with in view of the sensitive Armenian question and upcoming parliamentary elections. As the opposite now is the case, Thursday's Baku agreement, by excluding Armenia, only serves to prolong a stifling status quo in relations between Yerevan and Ankara, and furthermore risks regionally isolating Armenia to the benefit of Russia.

The idea of the railway project, popularly known as the Iron Silk Road, originates from the 1960s, when the first plans to form, what is now known as, the Trans-Asia Railway Network (TAR) were raised. From the original plan of uniting 14.000 kms railroad from Singapore to Turkey, the scheme has grown to fathom some 81.000 kms, spanning all over the Eurasian continent. Thus, in November last year an agreement was signed to this end, under the aegis of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), as reported by RFE/RL-Online.

On the regional level, the question has been how to unite the various railway systems, linking the countries in the Caucasus with Turkey, as part of the larger Iron Silk Road project. Thus, a corresponding agreement was reached, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), as early as in 2005. It stipulated that the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi-Baku railway should be considered the only viable option for uniting the regional railway network, while it would connect all countries in the region, not need any substantial investments, and avoid any potential dividing lines. However, keeping to these and similar committments has proven very difficult.

On a strategic level, the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku agreement further underlines how the delineation of spheres of interest in the Caucasus between Russia and the West is exacerbated. Leaving Armenia out of the dynamics of regional development in this way, poses the question of how far-reaching a tacit understanding there is, that "Armenia belongs to Moscow." Another factor for leaving Yerevan at the side of the road, might be that western interests want to avoid being exposed to the risks of relying on infrastructure that, in event of crisis, may be controlled by Russia. A 5,000 man strong Russian troop contingent is currently posted on Armenian territory.

The agreement also shows how both Russia and the West attach an increasing importance to control over strategic infrastructure. It is no secret that the West's most important regional infrastructure project in Eurasia, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, partly due to the ambition of strategic control. That Moscow has been negative to reopening the Kars-Gyumri railway, between Armenia and Turkey, serves as no surprise in this context.

As for Armenia's international position, Yerevan would like to regard itself as a "Finland of the Caucasus" in terms of dealing with Moscow. During the Cold War, the Finns succesfully defended their national sovereignty by a well-balanced policy towards Moscow, safeguarding their country against recurrent Soviet plans to bring Finland in under the umbrella of the Warzaw pact. The fears in the West of so called "finlandisation" thus in the end turned out to be exaggerated, although Helsinki at times was weighed down under the pressure of Moscow's interests.

While Finland could benefit from the Cold War balance-of-power system in Europe, as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, Armenia since the 1990s has had greater difficulty to gain a corresponding means of balance. A double-edged instrument has been to use the Armenian diaspora in the West, which could equally complicate as facilitate regional relations. In the context of the Kars-Gyumri railway, Armenia has used its Westen lobby-groups to bar the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku stretch favoured by Turkey. Thus, US Armenian groups last year succeeded in blocking American funding of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway by securing a decision of the US Congress. By Thursday's Baku agreement, such measures now seem to no avail, as construction of the new railway stretch - bypassing Armenia - now are to be realised. However, the final word has perhaps not been said yet, judging from how positions on the issue have slided back and forth in recent years.

On a national level, the Baku decision comes at a most inconvenient time, as Armenia is up for parliamentary elections on 12 May this year. Overshadowed by the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia is undergoing somewhat of a political refolution, as Ralf Dahrendorf so succinctly termed events in Central and Eastern Europe by the end of the Cold War. It remains to be seen whether Armenia will be able to carry through its process of change under the weight of various domestic and international pressures.

Regretfully, Thursday's railway agreement puts Yerevan at the crossroads between Russian influence and continued regional integration. It is thus fair to say that Armenia has been railroaded in making its independent and sovereign choice on its future forms of regional and international cooperation.

Georgia's Always On My Mind

Is the current xenophobic campaign against Georgians in Russia run by Putin and the Kremlin? Much indicates that this is actually the case. Since Moscow launched its sanctionist policy towards Georgia earlier this year, living conditions have become next to unbearable for many Georgians living in Russia, making them the new "Jews" of Russia.

Police harassment and controls of Georgians have become commonplace during the last month. Even people with work and residence permits, who have lived for decades in Russia, are now experiencing the repercussions of the current Russian-Georgian crisis. A growing number of Georgians are also forcibly expelled from Russia. Popular sentiments about Georgia unavoidably also reflect upon its nationals living in Russia. So, how does Kremlin's attitude influence the Russian people?

Putin and several leading politicians consistently treat Georgia with great rancour. Recently, Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov said: "banditry in Georgia has taken on a nationwide scale." Following up on this statement, the state run All Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies asked Russians whether they agreed with Ivanov.

The result was a devastating 61% positive replies - that "Georgia is a bandit state." Only 29% disagreed. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, attitudes against Georgians were even worse with 78% agreeing with Ivanov. In the rest of Russia, results spanned from 55-61% among respondents. Also, 40% advocated "an economic blockade against Georgia and taking other tough measures in response to the Georgian authorities' unfriendly policy toward Russia." Additionally, 37% backed expulsion of Georgians without residence permit from Russia, 20% advocated a break in transports and postal services, and 20% thought that Russia should severe diplomatic relations with Tbilisi. In contrast, only 30% wanted to normalise bilateral relations and de-escalate the belligerent emotions now running high. A minuscule 5% held that no measures at all should be taken against Georgia.

There are, regrettably, no prior figures to compare with, but popular sentiments against Georgians have never seemed very negative in the past. However, over the last half year, Georgia and Georgians have suddenly become the pariah of Russia, almost on the level of Chechens when hearing Putin and other politicians talking on the subject. That an opinion poll thus takes a statement of a vice Premier as its starting-point is probably no coincidence. The Kremlin both wants to demonstrate that it leads the way and that it has the support of the people in this policy. Admittedly, the particular poll is on Georgia and not Georgians. However, it is quite evident, that these negative attitudes are reflected also on Georgian nationals - assumably to almost the same negative levels - when leading politicians practically portray Russia and Georgia on the verge of war.

The development of Moscow's policy towards the "near abroad" over the last 2-3 years - since the coloured revolutions - contrasts to Russia's prior policy. Previous policy was based on the understanding that the costs for an active policy in post-soviet space were too great in comparison to what could be achieved in other areas. It was a policy of droit de regard and not a droit de suite for an empire creating states by oppression. As Russia is again claiming real influence over post-soviet space, one must ask if we are heading back in the USSR. Surprisingly, it is not difficult to imagine Putin telling the 'ignorant peoples' now back in the fold: "Hey, You don't know how lucky you are, boy."

Один день Владимира Владимировича

On this particular morning, October 7, Vladimir Vladimirovich woke at nine in his native city of St. Petersburg. He had had a good night's sleep, and felt relieved not to hear the bells of the Spassky tower, as he had become used to during his six years in the Kremlin. Today was his 54th birthday, and he had decided not to let the soft sound of his Swiss alarm clock wake him to the daily chores as president of Russia. All in all, it was a lovely day and he looked forward to dinner in the evening with a small set of his old friends from the Petersburg days. For once, the day was to be spent in leisure.

For long, he had been sick with the never-ending monotony of ruling his country. Most of all, he would like to be left alone, and during the past few years he had actually succeeded in getting more free-time. Still, there were papers to be signed, people to meet, and decisions to be made. Somehow, he never seemed to rid himself of the constant responsibilities that his associates burdened him with. Not on this day, though. Today, at least, he was not to be disturbed by such petty details. After all, it was his birthday.

Today, he was to be among friends, celebrating him on his achievements of the year passed. Friends? Well, that was perhaps bringing it too far. Vladimir Vladimirovich did not believe in friendship. Connections, contacts, and acquaintances - that was another thing. They were conditions for survival - a lesson he had been taught from early childhood. His experience was that friendship and betrayal go in pairs, so he understood that "friends" were simply people he could feel comfortable and at ease with. However, he would never allow anyone to deceive or betray him. If so, he would not blink for a second before putting down anyone posing a threat to him - friend of foe alike. This was simply the nature of things in the country where he had been brought up, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought.

Well, such problems were at least none of his concern today. He was determined to celebrate his birthday in relative peace and quiet. Sure, there were to be some official celebrations. This was good and proper. However, some were excessive and Vladimir Vladimirovich silently jeered at upcoming Chechen celebrations. Some 60,000 people had been ordered to the Akhmat Kadyrov Square in central Grozny to sing the Russian national anthem in his honour. This was really bringing matters too far, but Vladimir Vladimirovich also saw it as an act of desperation from Chechen Premier Ramzan Kadyrov.

Kadyrov knew how much the Kremlin despised him, and this was obviously his desperate way of paying his respects to power in Moscow - the same power that could bring him down if he would go too far in his more commercial activities. Kadyrov had just turned 30, and thus was now eligible for the Chechen presidency. That he had received a brand new Ferrari for his birthday said it all. Just imagine going about in a Ferrari in the ruins and rubble of Grozny. It was only a question of time now how long president Alkhanov would still serve as a front for Kadyrov's power. Still, it was quite a convenient arrangement, letting the Chechen war lord run his murky operations in exchange for relative stability in the renegade republic. It all resembled franchising, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought to himself. Kadyrov and his stooges got to use the "Russia brand" in exchange for calm in Russia's soft under-belly.

However, Vladimir Vladimirovich actively distrusted the Kadyrov family. Already the father had meant trouble to Moscow, and some people in the Kremlin had even talked about having him shot. However, this never proved necessary as the Chechens themselves solved this problem by blowing him to pieces. Vladmir Vladimirovich expected that also the son would eventually meet with a similar fate, so he had been opposed to getting rid of the mafioso-like son. Things would settle for the best in the end, and in the meantime those terrorist Chechens might as well be ruled by a pathologically insane mafioso. It only served them right, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought.

But why think of such dull things on one's birthday? After all, it had been a rather good week. At last, he had got the excuse he needed to really pull the thumbscrews on those difficult Georgians, and he knew that his people was behind him in throwing those abominable Caucasians out of mother Russia. Propaganda was really a marvellous thing. It is true, some protested against it. The ban on Georgian wines and mineral waters earlier in the year had not gone unnoticed, but now next to nobody reacted. Well, some of those half-crazed old soviet dissidents and intellectuals had called for demonstrations in support of Georgia and some writers had composed a rather hilarious protest letter that Vladmir Vladimirovich well knew would pass unnoticed. Who cared about those old people nowadays? Old-age pensioners in their seventies and eighties thinking that they made a difference. It was simply pathetic and of no greater consequence to power. By the way, who read those small newspapers that were still independent? He knew that 85% of the people had television as their main source of information on what was going on in the country, and as for the TV-stations, he controlled every last one of them.

Vladimir Vladimirovich spent the day doing as little as possible. How nice it was to be relieved of one's responsibilities, he thought. Then, as he turned on the four o'clock news, the breaking story was that a journalist had been killed in Moscow. Well, who was she anyway, this Anna Politkovskaya? A journalist of Novaya Gazeta - a paper with a circulation of little over 100,000 copies, sparsely distributed outside of Moscow. Still, she had been a nuisance to him abroad for the duration of his presidency, in fact ever since he initiated the second Chechen war in 1999. Who was she to meddle into the affairs of state? And besides, she was not even Russian. Typically, her parents had been Ukrainian, and as events had again demonstrated but a couple of years back, Ukrainians were not to be trusted. Anyway, the only thing this journalist had accomplished was to tarnish the image of Russia in the West - something the Kremlin had spent millions of dollars to improve just this year alone.

He realised that his long-coveted trip to Germany might be shadowed by this event, but still he was looking forward to visiting Dresden, where he had spent so many happy days of his youth. He knew that he would probably have to comment the murder somehow, but it was best to keep it to a minimum, not to be dragged into some discussion he could not control. As for the Russian public, he could simply keep quiet and let the whole affair pass by as unnoticed as possible. Something else would soon pop up, drawing the attention of domestic and international media away from the Politkovskaya murder. With a little luck, the murder might be pinned on that Kadyrov character, making him a little less cocky in relation to the Kremlin. It was best that such people never felt safe from Moscow's power to punish, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought.

His thoughts were interrupted by a soft knock on the door: Time for dinner. As he had suspected, the evening did not present any great surprises. Towards the early hours of the night, Vladimir Vladimirovich returned to his room in high spirits. A bit drowsy, he decided to go to bed. After all, it was a day tomorrow too. Putin fell asleep contentedly. How succesful a day had it not been. He really had not had to do anything. His birthday celebrations had been fine. Another annoying journalist was no more. Georgians were thrown out of the motherland. And best of all, that despicable Kadyrov character had been twice humiliated - by his pathetic show of faith to Putin and by having the journalist murder pinned on him. Next week, Putin was going to Germany. That would serve as a welcome pause from monotony. Another day had passed by, shadowed by nothing, an almost happy day. Three thousand four hundred and seventy two such days, from morning till evening. Those two extra days were on account of leap years... It had just been yet one day in the life of Vladimir Vladimirovich.

Russia Warns Ukraine & Georgia of NATO

On Wednesday, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine and Georgia of joining Nato. During a speech in the Russian State Duma, Lavrov argued that such a "colossal geopolitical" change would threaten relations with the two countries. "We assess all possible consequences primarily from the point of view of Russia's national interests," Lavrov said.

According to Ukrainian foregn minister, Anton Buteiko, a majority of Ukrainians support that Ukraine would join Nato. If Buteiko would be right, this would constitute an enormous change in Ukrainian public opinion. As late as last year, only some 10% of public opinion supported Nato-membership. Why public opinion may have turned is unclear, but it might be as a consequence of the New Year's Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. As for Georgia, Tbilisi has for long had the ambition to join Nato, but it has been regarded unrealistic as long as it is not accompanied by a Ukrainian application to enter the North Atlantic alliance.

That Russia, at this point, warns of the consequences primarily of Ukrainian Nato-membership, is due to regional political developments, not least with GUAM's recent formation of the Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, combined with increasing US openness to accepting the two countries as members of Nato. In Moscow eyes, such tendencies form part of a much greater geopolitical struggle between Russia and the US for influence over post-soviet space - Russia's traditional sphere of vital national interest.

Russian-Georgian Links Back on Track?

This is not exactly the news one might expect coming out of Moscow these days, but it is the impression that one may get by a passing glance at a recent Interfax telegramme. The story is that the railway link between Moscow and Tbilisi has been restored after a 13-year long disruption. However, with a little fantasy, it may also give a certain twist to current political relations between Russia and Georgia.

Evidently, trains will leave Tbilisi for Moscow three times a week, starting last Saturday, and passengers will have to go through the discomfort of a detour via Azerbaijan. This is so, because the direct line to Moscow has been out of service since the start of the Abkhaz conflict in 1992.

Even though the newly reopened Tbilisi-Moscow connection is not via Abkhazia, negotiations are underway between Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Abkhazia, to reopen also the line running through Abkhazia from Yerevan via Tbilisi to Moscow, possibly as soon as within two years time.

That the link between Moscow and Tbilisi now has to go by detour and not directly may be a mere coincidence, but can also serve to signify the general character of current political relations between Russia and Georgia.