Russia - a sovereign democracy?

In recent years, sovereign democracy has become a key ideological tenet in Russian politics and society. As the ideology for the party in power - United Russia - sovereignty is perceived as a precondition for democracy. In my recent report on the state of democracy in Russia, Ryssland - en suverän demokrati? (Russia - a sovereign democracy?), this theme is addressed from the perspective of constitutionality and funtionality, to ascertain whether Russia's specific model of democracy has any essence.

In current Russia, the political elite has chosen the path of sovereign democracy. The argument goes as follows: The precondition for democracy is sovereignty in terms of state capacity. Without the capacity to rule oneself, no real democracy can exist. Democratic decisions can be made, but if they cannot be implemented, democracy only becomes a game with words. To become truly democratic, Russia first needs to become master in its own house.

Russia's choice is perhaps not as simple as between a United Russia and Another Russia. In the longer perspective, the question must perhaps instead be reformulated in terms of functionality and governance capacity, at least if accepting the Russian elite's own points of departure. Despite diverging views, there are certain general preconditions for a working democracy. It is a question of whether democracy fulfills its purpose, regardless of the actual form in which it is enacted. The question is whether "sovereign democracy" can fulfill this role.

For those of you, who do not master the Swedish language (in which the report regrettably is written), or do not have the time or the inclination to read some 100 pages, you may instead read the following abstract on my findings.

Abstract
Sovereign democracy is the ideological and political basis for elite consensus in current Russia. Sovereign democracy holds that sovereignty logically precedes democracy. Sovereignty – as state capacity or function – is regarded a precondition for democracy. In order for democracy to evolve, the constitutional order must be upheld. In accordance with the Russian constitution, the president is the guarantor of the constitutional order. It is the president’s – or sovereign’s – prerogative to decide on the rule of the exception, in his obligation to safeguard the constitutional order. Consequently, constitution and function of the political system are fundamental to Russian perceptions of democracy and democratisation.

Accepting these postulations, the study departs from the concepts of constitutionalism and functionalism – viz. state capacity in terms of sovereignty – as fundamental prerequisites for democracy, and accordingly analyses the results of Russia’s sovereign democracy policy. It illustrates how the rule of the exception has been applied, by complementary legislation, to limit the basic political rights and freedoms of the Russian constitution. In functional terms, the study indicates a decline in governance – i.e. state capacity. This decline comprises most vital and mutually dependent areas of governance such as government effectiveness; regulatory quality; control of corruption; rule of law; and voice and accountability. A positive trend is discernable in terms of, on the one hand, political stability and absence of violence and, on the other hand, economic development. In combination, the study finds that Russia’s constitutional and functional decline coincides in time, forming a consistent downturn since 2003-2004.

Having completed its initial bureaucratic stage in attaining political stability, the policy of sovereign democracy is now entering the phase of modernisation. By means of the so called Putin plan, Russia is to re-conquer its position as a political and economic great power in the world. The goal of modernisation is to be achieved by expansive economic policies to stimulate the economic incentives of the middle class and attain the structural development necessary for long-term growth. Russian economy is to become more dynamic, diversified and sustainable. A nationally-minded elite is to activate the potential of the country, in terms of people and resources, and develop civil society and local self-government to redress system deficiencies in state and society. By a policy of stability and growth the elite seeks to rely on the expansion of a conservative middle class as a means to preserve the social and political order. By providing opportunity of wealth to the middle class, modernisation without democratisation in the liberal sense is to be achieved. The strategy of sovereign democracy thus challenges the theoretical argument that a growing middle class will lead to democratic development. By introducing alternative consultative mechanisms to traditional forms of representation and deliberation, liberal democracy is to be substituted by democracy by rule of consent. However, modernisation rests on the assumption of continued economic growth and political stability. It relies heavily on continued high oil and raw material revenues to diversify Russian economy and make it less dependent on these resources. The policy also faces the potential pitfall of inflationary setbacks. Simultaneously, political stability is threatened by decline in other sectors of governance underpinning it.

The results of the study – even if far from conclusive – imply that democratic decline might lead to a decline in governance. They indicate that the greater formal control by government the less actual control it has. This is a paradox of control beyond control. It would thus seem that sovereign democracy policy instead of increasing sovereignty – viz. state capacity – might actually reduce it.

Referrals:
Svenska Dagbladet, editorial blog, 6 May 2008.
Press statement, Swedish Defence Research Establishment, 7 May 2008.
Svenska Dagbladet, editorial, 8 May 2008.
Hudiksvalls Tidning, editorial, 8 May 2008.

Blekinge Läns Tidning, editorial, 10 May 2008.

Dagens Nyheter, editorial column, 19 June 2008.

Kristdemokratiskt Internationellt Center, 2008.

Blekinge Läns Tidning, editorial, 18 February 2009.

Ukraine Right or Wrong

Was Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko right to call for parliamentary elections? This is a question that in recent days has been the subject of intense debate. Constitutionally, he seems to be on the slippery slope. Still, his argument that "it is not only my right, it is my obligation" might prove valid if he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron. The core question is though how advisable it is for state to have a constitution, which allows for such a situation to occur.

Imagine, for a moment, that the US Congress would act not only to impeach the president, but also actively prepare to abolish the office of the president itself.

For an American this would be absurd, as the fundamental idea of the founding fathers was a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judical powers, as inspired by Montesquieu. This separation of powers' system is also the foundation of most modern democracies, and usually there are elaborate mechanisms to avoid situations that risk jeopardising the stability provided by the checks and balances of independent centres of power. Paradoxically, this seems not to be the case in the Ukraine, as recent developments demonstrate.

The 8 December 2004 deal ending the Orange revolution involved changes to the Ukrainian constitution to limit the great powers of the presidential office, previously enjoyed by Leonid Kuchma. This was the price the leaders of the Orange revolution paid to get the fraudulent presidential 23 November elections invalidated. However, the changes did not enter into force until 1 January 2006.

As the Ukrainian constitution now works, the parliament has the right to override presidential vetoes if a qualified majority of 300 out of 450 deputies so decides. Such a majority also has the option to make constitutional changes, and even abolish the office of the president itself. Thus, article 155 of the Constitution reads:

Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted, if at the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have voted in favour thereof.

Still, the provision of decisions by two separate parliamentary sessions with elections in between, seems somewhat obscure, as the changes made in December 2004 appear to have entered into force before the March 2006 elections. It is therefore possible that the Verkhovna Rada may change the constitution by a single decision of a two-third's majority.

A further mechanism to counter quick and unpredictable changes between elections may be § 83 of the constitution, which can be interpreted as preventing deputies to change loyalties between parliamentary fractions, as a coalition is to be formed by fractions and not individual deputies. This reasoning seems both obscure and ambiguous, but has been a key argument for the president to protest against the fact that an increasing number of MPs from his party, Our Ukraine, have changed allegiances in favour of the Party of Regions. As votes were thus added to the anti-presidential coalition in parliament, the situation eventually became desperate, as Yushchenko's enemies were closing in on the 300 deputies margin. If this was allowed to happen, a qualified parliamentary majority could deal with the president as they saw fit, and eventually even depose of him.

Then, in which situations is the President actually allowed to call for new parliamentary elections? The answer given by constitutional article 90 set three provisions:

1. If the parliament cannot reach a majority (coalition) to form a government within thirty days after the first meeting of a newly elected parliament.
2. If a coalition cannot reach a majority to form a new government within 60 days after the resignation of a prior government.
3. If parliament during session has not met for a period of 30 days.

It is quite obvious that Yushchenko did not fulfill any of the above criteria when signing the decree to disband parliament and call for new elections. Consequently, if reading the Constitution to its letter, Yushchenko had no right to do this. So, does that mean that he was completely off his rocker when he decided to make this move? Not necessarily. The argument that he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron is certainly valid. As president, Yushchenko may perceivably have "the right and the obligation" to act if a situtation occurs, which threatens the constitutional order.

When such a case is applicable is however unclear. One prerequisite might be if parliament had a clear and expressed intent to jeopardise the constitutional order. The requirements to be fulfilled in meeting the prerequisite of intent is however very obscure. Thus, the matter has been referred by parliament to the Constitutional Court for a ruling.

Until recently, it was very uncertain whether the Constitutional Court would choose to address the matter. According to its statutes, it has 15 days to decide whether it at all will deliberate on an issue raised by parliament. Then it was declared that the Court would make its ruling on Wednesday this week. However, today five of the 18 judges said that they considered resigning due to public threats against them, and asked for police protection. Now, the court ruling has been delayed until 17 April.

Reviewing the composition of the Court, it consists of eigtheen members: 6 judges, 6 parliamentarians and 6 presidential appointees. The five now concerned represent all three groups. Still, the Court could also choose to make a ruling even without the participation of the five members, as it only needs 10 of its members to make a ruling. That the Court could get a majority decision in this way is still very unlikely. Essentially, the question is whether the Court will make a ruling at all. That is highly questionable, as the developing crisis may render its opinion obsolete even if it could finally reach a verdict.

All in all, President Yushchenko seems to stand on weak ground as for his decision to disband parliament and call for new elections. However, this does not mean that he may not stand his ground in the battle over its legitimacy. As events are evolving, new elections on 27 May seem to be the only sensible option to end the current conflict democratically. Consequently, the question whether his decision was right or wrong may never really be legally addressed. In terms of politics, his choice was a "catch 22" and whatever choice he made - be deposed by parliament or call for new elections - it was to come out bad for himself. The political verdict on Yushchenko may therefore be hard, as he for too long walked an increasingly thin line in exercisising his presidential duties. Still, whether Yushchenko was right or wrong is not the core issue. The important thing is whether his decision will eventually turn out to be right or wrong for Ukraine and its people. After all, that was what the Orange revolution was originally about - giving a voice to the people.

Update: According to the BBC, Yushchenko would now be "willing to suspend his decree dissolving parliament and ordering an early 27 May election." This would constitute a postponement of parliamentary elections, so that parties can prepare for an election campaign, and not a change of opinion in that elections should be held. Thus, it is a signal that Yushchenko might be willing to compromise on the date for elections, but still carry through with the process. How it all ends up is very uncertain and it remains to be seen how Yanukovich supporters and other parties will react to this feeler.

Ukraine: New Government in the Making

On Wednesday, news broke that a new orange coalition government is forming in Ukraine. Both president Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko bloc (BYuT) confirmed that an agreement had been reached. The news comes amid rumours that Yushchenko was teaming up with orange revolution enemy Yanukovich and his Party of Regions.

If the deal goes through, Yulia Timoshenko will once more become Prime Minister, which has been her primary goal since she was sacked from the post last September. The coalition will be between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, which has been the main negotiating approach all along.

Indeed, negotiations to form a coalition between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, have been underway ever since the 26 March parliamentary elections. At the beginning of April, Our Ukraine announced that unity had been reached. Then, nothing happened. In mid-May, it was Timoshenko's turn to declare that a new government had been agreed on. Once again, nothing happened. So, one might well perceive news from Kiev on a new cabinet with sound skepticism, were it not for a constitutional deadline on forming a government. Therefore, it now appears that Ukraine will eventually get out of its post-election political deadlock. However, as BBC's Kiev correspondent states, "The deal will not be certain until it is signed."

If the deal goes through, BYuT is said to receive a dominant 11 cabinet posts, including the Premiership. Our Ukraine will get the post as speaker of the Parliament, and has already nominated Petro Poroshenko. The Socialist Party will appoint the vice-Premier.

By all appearances, Ukraine will be in for a tough political ride with its new cabinet. Neither president Yushchenko nor Poroshenko stand Timoshenko, since the fall-out and scandals leading to Timoshenko's dismissal as Premier last September.

Moreover, constitutional changes this year weaken the presidential powers to the benefit of parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. The Rada has a long tradition of relative independence, playing its role in the political balance of power, and party allegiance is far from granted. With fiery and controversial Yulia Timoshenko as Premier, parliament may decide to get in the way of her plans at leisure.

However, there is one strong binding-force uniting the new government. The political forces of the Orange Revolution has failed once. This time they have to succeed or face total political discredit for the foreseeable future. Thus, as Ukrainian political analyst, Volodymyr Fesenko, put it to AFP: "It's a second chance and if they fail, they'll all go down together."

Turning to Ukraine's international relations, with Timoshenko as Prime Minister, relations with Russia are in obvious jeopardy. Already the same day that the new coalition was announced, Timoshenko called for a review of the Russian-Ukrainian gas deal that ended the New Year's gas crisis earlier this year, BBC reports.

In addition to this, the US Marine Corps participated in exercises on the Crimean peninsula a few weeks ago, which sparked fears in Moscow of Ukrainian ambitions to join Nato. Thus, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine that such a move would seriously hurt relations Moscow and Kiev.

The majority of Crimeans are ehtnic Russians, and the Black Sea peninsula was transferred from Russia to Ukraine as late as in 1954 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Therefore, the presence of US troops in a disputed Ukrainian region does not serve to improve Ukrainian relations with Russia. Indeed, the government that is now being formed will inevitably have to meet major challenges in its relations with the Kremlin.