CIS: Halfling Joins While Giants Leave?

Last Thursday 4 May, breakaway Georgian republic of Abkhazia declared its intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, Interfax reports. Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev were quick. Both Georgia and Ukraine now seriously consider leaving the CIS.

Abkhazi leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that: "Abkhazia's priorities are membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States and further rapprochement with Russia." Last August, Bagapsh openly confirmed his ambition of "Abkhazia's secession from Georgia and de facto merger with Russia." Now he sets the goal to join the CIS by the end of the year, but "Abkhazia's further political and economic rapprochement with Russia is the central issue. We remain adherent to our proposals on Abkhazia's associated membership of Russia," Bagapsh concluded, according to Interfax.

Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev
Bagapsh's declaration was immediately met with stern reaction from Georgia and Ukraine. Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his government to assess whether "it is worth remaining in the CIS," Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. He went on to say that the conflict in Abkhazia back in 1993 had "forced Georgia to sign the declaration of joining the CIS." Now Georgia is seriously contemplating to leave the CIS.

On Friday, Ukraine also for the first time officially declared that the country might leave the CIS. Kiyev has for long been disappointed with how the organisation works. Thus, speaking about a Ukrainian withdrawal from the CIS, Yushchenko's foreign policy advisor, Kostyantyn Tymoshenko, said that "if there are no results, the question arises." During last week's Vilnius Forum, president Yushchenko also characterised integration with the EU and NATO his main foreign policy objective, according to NG. Such ambtions might prove incompatible with remaining a CIS-member.

A future for the CIS?
This puts the future of the CIS even more in question than previously has been the case. Today, few of its members - not even Russia - have any great hope in the organisation. The original split in perceptions of its purpose, viz. political as opposed to economic cooperation, remains. The political aim is epitomised by the CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed by six countries - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. Turning to CIS economic cooperation, it can only be characterised as a resounding failure. Thus, demands were raised to find alternative to the CIS in lieu of its defunct economic record.

GUUAM instead of CIS?
In 1997, GUUAM was founded by the CIS-members not party to the Collective Security Treaty, with the single exception of Turkmenistan. GUUAM comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (1999), Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Its aim was to fulfil the original purpose of the CIS by economic cooperation and free trade. Excluding Russia, GUUAM has remained on the second echelon of post-soviet foreign policy, and the organisation has been careful not to portray itself as a counterbalance to members of the Collective Security Treaty, although it seems evident that so is the case. Georgia and Ukraine have also been GUUAM's most eager members in pursuing a regional policy independent from Russian influence.

Borjomi - a way forward?
To take the matter further, Saakashvili and Yushchenko, last August, issued the Borjomi Declaration, calling on their neighbours to unite "efforts to turn the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region into a sea of democracy, stability and security, to make it a fully integrated region of Europe and of the Democratic and Atlantic community." In Moscow's eyes, Borjomi's outright western orientation was seen as yet another attempt to insulate Russia and curve its influence over the near abroad. Whereas there may be some truth to Moscow's contentions on this point, one should however not shy away from the paramount fact of the matter: Russia and the CIS have little to offer in comparison to the fruits of western integration. That Georgia and Ukraine are the first to publicly raise their concerns whether to remain CIS-members should therefore come as no surprise, as they have seized the opportunity of western integration offered to them by their coloured revolutions.

The Abkhazi question
All in all, one must conclude that there is more to the issue than simply a statement by a renegade republic leader. As for Abkhazia, the region broke away from Georgia already in 1992. This separatist republic remains unrecognised by the international community, and there is no secret that Abkhazia would not survive long without Russia's backing. For long, Moscow has remained ambivalent on how to deal with the issue. As the UN, the EU and the OSCE insist that Abkhazia is part of Georgia, Russia has been reluctant to recognise its de facto independence. Instead, Abkhazia has oscillated between outright independence and associate membership in the Russian Federation. Today, most Abkhazis hold Russian citizenship, facilitating a potential future incorporation into Russia. This is also what Georgia claims is Moscow's long-term ambition, making the issue an international bilateral conflict instead of an internal secessionist conflict. So, is it a mere coincidence that a statement by some half-wit chieftain of a secessionist region would seem to shake the foundations of the entire CIS? Why should Abkhazia's wholly unrealistic ambitions to join the CIS spark off such stern reactions from both Georgia and Ukraine?

A pretext for divorce?

First, it is beyond doubt that the Abkhazi CIS-ambition is utterly senseless. It would presuppose Abkhazi independence, and even then CIS-members Georgia and Ukraine might still easily bar Abkhazia from membership. Second, one should ask why such a ridiculous statement is made specifically at this point in time, when the dividends of post-soviet space are are about to be paid to either Russia or the West. That Abkhaz leader Bagapsh's statement coincided with US vice president Cheney's critique of Russia at the Vilnius conference last week, shows that there is more to this than first expected. Third, the declared western orientation of Georgia and Ukraine - reiterated in Vilnius - serves only to underline the basic contradiction in clinging on to an imagined union by a post-soviet Commonwealth. From Moscow's point of view, the CIS is to little avail as long as the organisation cannot be used as an instrument for Russia's de facto power and influence over most CIS-countries. So, both parties want out. Georgia and Ukraine want to go west. Russia wants to rid itself of difficult CIS-members to better control the organisation. Fourth, were Ukraine and Georgia to leave the CIS, remaining members would, in the process, be left to the best of their abilities to deal with Russian dominance over the CIS.

To conclude, it is remarkable how willingly Georgia and Ukraine swallowed Russia's bait - hook, line and sinker. Provided that considerations to other CIS-members do not prevail, it appears that Ukraine and Georgia will go west while the rest are left to their own devices. Going separate ways in concord is no loss. What such a split of the CIS may constitute, however, is part of a division of the spoils between Russian and US influence over post-soviet space, at a time when their strategic partnership seems to have come to the end of the road. Then, one might ask how much the sovereign choice of the nations and peoples of Central Asia is worth to the great powers of global politics. Would a halfling state join and make the giants leave, it might also well constitute the moral choice of halflings and not of the great giants. That is perhaps also the lesson of our times, that when power talks morale steps aside: "Erst kommt das Freßen, dann kommt die Moral." It remains to be seen how Great the Game will be played, and with what appetite.

CIS, Georgia, Abkhazia, Ukraine, Russia, GUUAM, Borjomi

Georgia's Always On My Mind

Is the current xenophobic campaign against Georgians in Russia run by Putin and the Kremlin? Much indicates that this is actually the case. Since Moscow launched its sanctionist policy towards Georgia earlier this year, living conditions have become next to unbearable for many Georgians living in Russia, making them the new "Jews" of Russia.

Police harassment and controls of Georgians have become commonplace during the last month. Even people with work and residence permits, who have lived for decades in Russia, are now experiencing the repercussions of the current Russian-Georgian crisis. A growing number of Georgians are also forcibly expelled from Russia. Popular sentiments about Georgia unavoidably also reflect upon its nationals living in Russia. So, how does Kremlin's attitude influence the Russian people?

Putin and several leading politicians consistently treat Georgia with great rancour. Recently, Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov said: "banditry in Georgia has taken on a nationwide scale." Following up on this statement, the state run All Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies asked Russians whether they agreed with Ivanov.

The result was a devastating 61% positive replies - that "Georgia is a bandit state." Only 29% disagreed. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, attitudes against Georgians were even worse with 78% agreeing with Ivanov. In the rest of Russia, results spanned from 55-61% among respondents. Also, 40% advocated "an economic blockade against Georgia and taking other tough measures in response to the Georgian authorities' unfriendly policy toward Russia." Additionally, 37% backed expulsion of Georgians without residence permit from Russia, 20% advocated a break in transports and postal services, and 20% thought that Russia should severe diplomatic relations with Tbilisi. In contrast, only 30% wanted to normalise bilateral relations and de-escalate the belligerent emotions now running high. A minuscule 5% held that no measures at all should be taken against Georgia.

There are, regrettably, no prior figures to compare with, but popular sentiments against Georgians have never seemed very negative in the past. However, over the last half year, Georgia and Georgians have suddenly become the pariah of Russia, almost on the level of Chechens when hearing Putin and other politicians talking on the subject. That an opinion poll thus takes a statement of a vice Premier as its starting-point is probably no coincidence. The Kremlin both wants to demonstrate that it leads the way and that it has the support of the people in this policy. Admittedly, the particular poll is on Georgia and not Georgians. However, it is quite evident, that these negative attitudes are reflected also on Georgian nationals - assumably to almost the same negative levels - when leading politicians practically portray Russia and Georgia on the verge of war.

The development of Moscow's policy towards the "near abroad" over the last 2-3 years - since the coloured revolutions - contrasts to Russia's prior policy. Previous policy was based on the understanding that the costs for an active policy in post-soviet space were too great in comparison to what could be achieved in other areas. It was a policy of droit de regard and not a droit de suite for an empire creating states by oppression. As Russia is again claiming real influence over post-soviet space, one must ask if we are heading back in the USSR. Surprisingly, it is not difficult to imagine Putin telling the 'ignorant peoples' now back in the fold: "Hey, You don't know how lucky you are, boy."

Russia-Georgia: Turning Wine into Water

Moscow is now turning from wine to water in Russia's ongoing trade war with Georgia. As of today, Saturday 7 May, Georgia's flagship mineral water - Borjomi - is banned from the Russian market, BBC reports. Borjomi mineral water is Georgia's largest export commodity, and - as with wine - some 80% goes to Russia. A little more than a month ago, Russia banned the imports of Georgian wines. It has now become apparent, that Moscow is waging a trade war against Tbilisi to stifle the weak Georgian economy.

As with the wine ban a month ago, Russia's chief epidemiologist, Gennady Onishchenko, blames it on failing purity standards. This comes as somewhat of a surprise to Russian consumers, as the Borjomi trademark has been one of purity ever since tsarist times. For some reason, Borjomi is for long renowned among Russians as the best bottled water on the market, although most western customers would shed it due to its high salinity.

Since Georgia's rose revolution, the city of Borjomi has become somewhat of a symbol internationally of the new and independent Georgia. Thus, last August, the leaders of the coloured revolutions - Georgia's Saakashvili and Ukraine's Yushchenko - signed the Borjomi declaration aiming at European and Euro-Atlantic integration to the entire "Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian" area. To the Kremlin, the declaration was seen as anti-Russian and a challenge to Moscow's influence over post-soviet space. Furthermore, Borjomi is also a candidate for the 2014 Winter Olympics, which but a few years back would have been next to impossible. That the Borjomi mineral water has become the next victim in Russia's trade war on Georgia should therefore come as no surprise.

Since Moscow's campaign against Georgian products began, the government in Tbilisi has accused Russia of waging economic warfare against Georgia. Despite Russian assurances that this is not the case, a trade war must now be regarded as a fact to Russians and international observers alike. As for Borjomi's faithful Russian consumers, they might well conclude that "maybe it’s time to send it all to the devil and go to Kislovodsk."

Russia, Georgia, conflict, trade, water, Borjomi

2008 Press Review

To what extent does mainstream media take into account what bloggers say about developments in Central and Eastern Europe? This is the question one has to put to oneself as one threads the thin line between blogging and expertise. Is the blogosphere but a shortcut for covering issues too complex to write about facing a deadline or is there a true desire to present a second opinion beyond the everyday chores of public policy-media discourse?

A couple of examples of what hopefully is the latter concern my own writings and analyses. Thus, in June this year I was interviewed by Aleks Tapinsh, Baltic correspondent of Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) for the upcoming Riga Summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The story - "Baltic States Want Energy Cooperation Despite Pipeline Row" - covered the same theme as has been the case over the course of the Council's existence, viz. environmental issues and economic development, with the recent addition of energy and pipeline disputes in the Baltic. Still, amidst the course of yawnful meetings and press conferences, the DPA succeeded in posing the crucial question: What role for Baltic Sea cooperation and the CBSS now that an overwhelming majority of its members are also part of the European Union? My reply was the following:

Without the EU the CBSS would be naught, but also the EU needs this sort of regional cooperation. In this sense, organizations like the CBSS or the European Dialogue in the Mediterranean are essential for making EU policies work.

In December, Gabriela Ioniţă of Romanian policy journal Cadran politic interviewed me on Russian domestic and foreign policy, sovereign democracy, the 2020 policy plan, and consequences of the war with Georgia. Quoting me, in titling the article "Russia’s strive for recognition as an equal in international affairs is ---the greatest flaw in Moscow policy,” very much reflects a basic argument, that the high politics of the Kremlin leaves too little room for actively pursuing Russian interests. Russia's foreign policy simply is too much a matter of existence and recognition, and too little one of strategy and action. In military terms, one would say that the linkage between strategic, tactical and operative levels is too weak. Still, attention should be given to the fundamentally more strategic thinking, which has developed in recent years - currently labelled sovereign democracy.

Coverage in Swedish media has largely revolved around a couple of reports I have written or participated in. Thus, following the publication of my 2008 report on Russian democracy, Russia - a sovereign democracy: a study of popular rule and state power in demise, Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet wrote:

Konnander also puts the finger on a more unexpected consequence of developments under Putin. Normally, one associates political stability and centralization with a strong exercise of state power. But Konnander shows, using e.g. the World Bank governance indicators, that so has not become the case in Russia in ecent years. Instead, "the state capacity to exercise power has been significantly reduced, why the political system becomes all the more susceptible to crises. --- Democracy in Russia has decline, but so has also the capacity to sustain an authoritarian rule in the long run. Russia's political future thus becomes increasingly uncertain."

Commenting on Russia's tense relations with Georgia, Dagens Nyheter quotes the study in extenso:

For Moscow the loss of Ukraine as political friend - the historical Little Russia - became a rude awakening from the illusion that Russia's rising political stability could also encompass its near abroad - the country's vital sphere of interest. The Kosovo 1999 intervention, Serbia's 2000 bulldozer revolution, Georgia's 2003 rose revolution - in the same year as the US-led invasion of Iraq - Ukraine's 2004-2005 orange revolution, and Kyrgyzstan's 2005 tulip revolution, in all formed a pattern, which the Russian élite interpreted as a ever-growing threat against Russia itself.

Hudiksvall's Tidning also reflects on my results:

Also during the Yeltsin era, one freedom or another could be somewhat arbitrarily limited. The difference is that now the limitations have been written down in a number of fluffy laws, which more or less give a carte blanche for authorities to intervene against about anything that they think is annoying.

Blekinge Läns Tidning directs attention to similarities between the old Soviet élite and its current Russian epitomisation:

Even though Konnander does not explicitly say so, similarities with Marxist thinking are striking - a very élitist perception of society. He also illustrates by many examples how the regions and the media have lost their power, and how Russians turn to the European Court of Human Rights instead of seeking redress in their own court system, as this is nowadays considered too fundamentally biased.

Whereas my contribution to another study, The Caucasian Test case, on the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, largely questioned generally accepted truths, the overall media reaction was one of portraying Russia as a growing threat to international security. Thus, Svenska Dagbladet wrote that "Russia chose its path in Georgia - the wrong path". Deutsche Welle wrote that "The Russian lesson was that the international community was not prepared, willing or able to add any costs to the Russian actions".

Finnish daily Hufvudstadsbladet reasoned along similar lines of thought: "Russia's actions now compels a reassessment of the prevailing world order". Västerbottenskuriren adds to this argumentation: "It is not the conflict per se - known for long - that has triggered the deterioration, but the fact that Russia has chosen to lower its threshold barring the use of violence and thus has chosen to change the rules of international relations. The Russian position constitutes a direct challenge to the current world order and signifies a new phase in Russian foreign policy." Världen idag concludes: "Due to Russian action in Georgia the security situation in Europe has deteriorated. And when Russia challenges the world, the mechanisms of the world community are paralyzed." Finally, Russian Novye Izvestiya has its own angle on the report, claiming that it supports the notion that Israeli military advisors took active part in the war on Georgia's side.

It is indeed peculiar how the media spins different stories, but also how security interests get their story across - here the Russian menace. That my own contribution to the Georgia report got minimal attention may perhaps point to the fallacies of mainstream media. Fundamentally questioning the extent and significance of the so-called Russian cyberwar against Georgia, it should really have attracted more notice than it did, since the general image portrayed by international media was that of a massive cyber attack.

Still, it is often not the stories that challenge assumptions, but the ones that confirm bias which conquer the day. Once the media beat has been set, even a potential scoop would have great difficulty to overcome a consensual media agenda. So, by the end of the day, there is little room for deviance as the public policy-media discourse evolves. When one, to the contrary, gets one's message across, there is no saying how it will be processed by its recipients, given the fundamental predisposition to interpret Russia in very simplified terms. That is the basic dilemma of policy-media interaction - a dilemma that may or may not be averted by the workings of a global and independent blog discourse. At least, blogs give each and everyone the opportunity to have his or her say, even though alternative facts and hypotheses risk getting lost in cyberspace.

Swedish blogs on "Eastern Europe"

It is safe to say that the blog scene reflecting "Eastern European" events is quite limited as compared to "hotter" regions such as the Middle East. True to its ambition of commenting and promoting quality blogs, Global voices makes efforts to introduce its readers to most aspects of the blogosphere and also to Eastern Europe, Russia, Caucasus & Central Asia. As for the many country-specific blogs on "Eastern Europe," there is, however, little information to be found. Therefore, I here try to account for Swedish blogs on the region.

One of the most frequently visited blogs is Tobias Ljungvall on Belarus. Ljungvall, a liberal with a deep commitment to freedom and democracy in Belarus, here makes his "observations of political developments in and around the Republic of Belarus." The blog also advertises Ljungvall's book Kontoll - Rapport från Vitryssland (Control - Report from Belarus). The blog is updated every Sunday. Needless to say, Ljungvall is not welcome any longer in Belarus under the current Lukashenka regime. All the same, he is probably one of the most well-informed people in Sweden on the situation in Belarus.

Allt om Georgien (in Swedish) is an anonymous blog dedicated to tell "all about Georgia" - as its title indicates - to a Swedish audience. It thus informs about, comments on, and promotes current events in Georgia, and things related to Georgia in Sweden. As for its anonymity, it is no hard guess that Göran Dalin and his lovely Georgian wife Ekaterine are behind this blog. The couple seems to have formed the hub of Georgian community in Sweden during recent years - correct me if I am wrong - and this, I believe, is just another of their ventures. As for contents, the love and devotion to Georgia is quite apparent in the blog.

I think many of us may recognise familiar things and phenomena on Camilla Bondareva's blog Ad notam (in Swedish). She writes and reflects on everyday life in St. Petersburg and Russia, and many of her texts are illustrated by her own photos. Bondareva is a free-lance communication manager. In addition to the texts, the general layout and impression of the blog is very nice.

A Swedish expat in Tajikistan - Erik Petersson - actually has two photo blogs on the region. The reason is simple - he started up in Moscow and then moved on to Dushanbe. The Moscow blog (in Swedish) - Samtidigt, i Moskva - depicts Moscow life with Petersson's own pictures and accompanying comments. His Tajikistan blog (in English) - Dushanbe pictures - is so far simply a photo blog with few comments. The pictures themselves may, however, need no further comment. Some of the black-and-white pictures bear the hallmarks of a professional photographer.

Wictoria Majby - a Swedish Institute teacher in Murmansk - runs the blog Ryska Rövarhistorier (in Swedish). Its Swedish title means "Russian cock-and-bull stories" and that is perhaps more of an ironic ambition than reality. Majby simply writes and reflects on various phenomena of her daily life and chores as a foreigner in the Russian north. Those of us who know her, will find her frequent comments well in tune with her vibrant personality.

A UN intern in Abkhazia - Carl Gustaf Erixon - tells about his experiences during out-of-service time on CG Bloggin' (in Swedish). The blog mainly features his reflections from this conflict-ridden part of Georgia. He also runs a photo blog - cgerixon's photos - to post pictures, which there is not enough space for on his regular blog.

Then there is Fredrik Nejman's Ukraina-blogg (in Swedish), which forms part of the Swedish Union of Journalists' website. The aim of Nejman's blog is to inform about the union's ongoing cooperation with the Ukrainian journalist trade union. As such, it is somewhat particular to the ongoing project, but that is also its purpose and aim.

Under the pseudonym of "Annabengan," a Swedish woman serving with the IOM in Albania tells us about her experiences there and elsewhere on her blog Annasblog (part Swedish - part English). She is careful to point out that: "Everything on this website is purely my own thoughts and in no way reflects the policies or thoughts of the organization I'm working for."

Finally, there are a couple of blogs that are not specifically dedicated to "Eastern Europe" but where one might regularly find comments on the region. First, there is Andreas's blog, (part English - part Swedish) by Swedish liberal Andreas Ribbefjord. Last, but not least, mention must be made of former Swedish Prime Minister's, Carl Bildt, blog - Bildt comments. With his great interest in international affairs, liberal-conservative Bildt every once in a while writes something about Russia and other parts of "Eastern Europe." It may often be worthwhile to read his blogs on these issues.

As may have been gathered by now, the Swedish blogosphere on "Eastern Europe" is limited. This is somewhat strange, as there is quite a lot of people in Sweden with an interest in the region. It has apparently so far not resulted in any greater urge to blog on issues related to "Eastern Europe." A question, however, lingers on: Have I missed something? Is this really the case?

Sweden, blogs, Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia

Financial Times Special on Georgia

Financial Times deals with Georgia in its May 2006 World Report. It contains among others an interview with president Mikheil Saakashvili, and various pieces on essential political and economic issues. Great emphasis is thus put on reform versus corruption: "While liberal reforms and a drive against corruption have brought the former Soviet republic back from the brink, the country is still trying to fulfil its potential," FT writes. The full list of contents is:

• Young country looks to the west
• Interview: Mikheil Saakashvili
• Separatists: Conflicts undermine state’s integrity
• Aromaprodukt: Natural fruit yields organic growth
• Economics: Rooting out corruption is priority
• Privatisation: More trouble-free sales are required
• Bank of Georgia: London share offer to lead the way
• Winemaking: Birthplace of wine suffers from success
• Badri Japaridze: Banker battles with liquid assets

Georgia, politics, economy, Financial Times, Saakashvili

Russia Bans Georgian & Moldovan Wines

Russia has imposed a blockade on imports of wines from former soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova, New York Times reports in its Thursday issue. Russian authorities claim that the ban is due to high concentrations of heavy metals and pesticides in the wines, but there is little doubt that this blockade is politically motivated.

The story, brought to my attention by Caucasus analyst Svante Cornell, puts the finger on a number of delicate issues pertaining to Russia's policy towards its "near abroad".

Russia has had great difficulties to come to terms with its waning influence in its "soft underbelly". Setbacks have been many in the last few years, not least by the coloured revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.

Georgia's government under Mikheil Saakashvili has pursued a much more independent policy than was the case in the 1990's, to Moscow's great annoyance. Demands for a withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory, and some Georgian success in bringing Russia-supported secessionist regions back in line threaten to curve Russian influence in a region it traditionally sees as its "sphere of vital interests".

In Moldova, president Vladimir Voronin has also been negative to Russian influence and the stalemate Moscow has put on the matter of the secessionist Transnistria region. Due not least to Ukrainian and EU efforts over the past year, the smuggling that sustains Transnistria, has been put in relative cheque. The combination of a more critical Moldovan stance towards Russia with reduced possibilities of Transnistria sustaining itself by trafficking, has brought about today's hostile relationship between Moscow and Chisinau.

Consequently, nobody really believes in Moscow's explanation of unhealthy contents in Georgian and Moldovan wines as the real reason for Russia's wine ban. Instead, the ban obviously intends to put pressure on the two states' economies, which both rely heavily on wine production for export revenues.

Also, Russian measures put Moscow's will to integrate in the world economy as well as the country's dedication to free trade in question. This should be embarrasing to the "masters of the Kremlin" at a time when Russia holds the presidency of the G 8 - the prestigious group of industrialised nations to which Russia gained access just a few years back. Furthermore, if worse comes to worst, Russia's wine ban might impair the country's long-standing ambition to join the World Trade Organization.

Russia, Georgia, Moldova, trade, wine, blockade, Saakashvili, Voronin

Горькая чаша?

During his recent visit to Sweden, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was obliged to drink a cup of malice, literally and in terms of Russian foreign policy implementation. Attending a dinner of CBSS-ministers, the wine on the menu was Georgian. It thus seems that Lavrov took this opportunity to enjoy something banned in Russia, in a parallel to US politicians smoking Cuban cigars.

The source is none other than Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, who mentions this on his blog. Apparently, Georgian wine was served for dinner during a boat trip with foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea region, within the context of the CBSS. What Lavrov thought about this, Bildt does not tell, but at least the Swedish schnapps was a hit.

The Swedish wine monopoly, Systembolaget, recently introduced its first Georgian wine - a 2005 Teliani Valley Saperavi, which evidently was the wine enjoyed by the Russian foreign minister. The Saperavi grape is the most common in Georgian wines, which is used for brands like Kindzmarauli and Mukuzani from the Kakheti region of Eastern Georgia. The Saperavi grape - often associated with one-year wines - is sweet in taste and often produces high alcohol levels. Besides Georgia, Saperavi is also nowadays to be found in Australian vineyards. Except the Saperavi, other popular grape varieties in Georgian wines are Alexandrouli and Mudzhuretuli, to be found in the famous Khvanchkara wines of Western Georgia.

Which type of Georgian wine Lavrov prefers is unknown, but it is safe to say that he did not - as generations of Russians - venture into any deeper discussion about the qualities of various Georgian wines. Probably he was wise not to, as some Stockholm malice might be better than Moscow's bitter cup, would it be known of Lavrov's wine consumption when abroad.

Direct democracy or digital mob?

A spectre is haunting Eurasia - the spectre of activism. As cyberage sets in, the mentality of old Eurasia grapples to grasp the power of the people when politics enters a new age and arena. Is this truly the case or are we but suffering from the same delusions as we tend to when lured by novelties, choosing the complex over simplicity, iPhone and 3G over pencil and paper?

Paraphrasing the 1848 Communist Manifesto may seem out of place addressing the dramatic changes that our Eurasian continent has undergone over the last decades. In essence though, it illustrates the difficulties of the old political and economic establishment to come to terms with new rules of the game, where citizens enjoy and use ever expanding tools of empowerment, where the Great Communicator is not necessarily the President, but the People. It is a transformation from "we are the people" to "who are the people?".

What this people is, still remains to be determined. Is it a demos - people - without krateion - rule? An unruly crowd with its own heterogeneous interests that only seldom forms into a concrete political agenda, but still looms large influencing and potentially discapacitating policy goals and implementation of elected officials? Is it an anonymous and shrouded rule that manages both people and politicians with no saying who is in charge?

198 methods of nonviolent action is a "dummies' guide to revolution," applied to all popular uprisings forming a tattered trace of coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last decade: Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine... Today, such approaches for achieving peaceful change are so integrated in our mindset of popular action, that we seldom stop to reflect upon if they are righteous or represent the will of the people. Furthermore, the very same mechanisms have found their way into Internet activism, as Gandhi goes web 2.0, as the Mandelas and Sakharovs of our age increasingly turn up from out of cyberspace.

We take these thruths to be self-evident and hail the principles and mechanisms of coloured revolution as singularly in the service of democracy. However, if we think revolution, we must also think reaction. Confronted by external change, Russia by no means was or could be ignorant of this, as stability was the name of the game both to preserve power and protect people from a return to the upheavals and chaos of the 1990s. Nashi became the recipe for reaction, to support and not subvert an authoritarian regime. As also Gargantua went web 2.0, we witnessed cyberwars waged against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. This Russian experiment has now come to an end, and Nashi put in mothballs, as Kremlin seeks new venues of state-directed instead of state-inspired web activism.

Why? What have the Russians realized that the west fails to understand? The answer may be the difficulty of controlling the digital mob. As each and everyone can turn a cyberwarrior or warmonger on one's own, such spontaneity is destined to conflict with the interests of authoritarian government. Directing the webcrowds in the spirit of Gustave Le Bon has proven an overwhelming task in the 21st century, as rulers realize the risk of spiralling into new nights of broken glass. Whereas methods may work in concrete operative and tactical contexts - by blogs, twitter, and other social media - it has proven much more complex and difficult to achieve any strategic and tenuous goals.

The Georgian example also illustrates a paradox if regarded from the perspective of information operations, viz. info warfare. Whereas aerial superiority is deemed the key to victory in modern warfare, the winner may quickly turn loser in the information battlefield. The cyberattacks on Georgia in 2008 gave Russia near total dominance in the information field. However, it also raised the temperature of the Russian information flow for it to boil over into increasingly unreasonable and uncorroborated accusations of Georgian war crimes and even genocide on South Ossetians. In one blow, Russia lost its credibility. At the same time, it gave the Georgian government an information monopoly to send its message, its truth, and its propaganda, as most alternative information sources had been taken out. The exception was bloggers, acting eyewitnesses directly from the hotbeds of battle.

So, have all the powers of old media and politics entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre? Realising its potential, will social media be seen as a friend or foe by forces of traditional society? What it takes to turn the tide and surf the waves of Internet activism is a combination of factors: Understanding of areas, countries, or regions of concern with comprehension of mechanisms such as Gandhi goes web 2.0 and the digital mob. A growing but still too small number of journalists and politicians are getting the message and have started developing such competence, but in the heat of battle, during drastic developments, the question is if this competence may be applied to account for what goes on in the online political arena - with direct or indirect influence on the flow of events - and act or report accordingly.

As trivial a statement as it may seem, the Internet is what you make of it. Friend or foe dichotomies lead nowhere, and seeing Internet as a threat by repetitious rantings about cybercrime and pornography degrade the very thought of human interaction - whether on the web or in real life. Statements saying cybercrime exceeds international drugs' trade, or that a majority of Internet usage relates to pornography (in reality 10-25%), just bring out hysteria about something that for most people has no connection whatsoever to either crime or sex, but for whom interaction by social media has become a part of everyday life, including the potential to actively influence one's life and society by the use of the web.

For people, raising their voices and exerting influence, is not essentially a matter of being online or not. It is true, that social media facilitate social and political interaction, when applied to that purpose. Still, it is the same logics and tactics that are seen IRL political and societal interaction. Age-old methods of political action - whether Gandhi's application of ahimsa to non-violent change or Hitlerite seduction of the crowd inspired by Le Bon - are as integrated into web activism as they are into general political action. The choice - as always with phenomena rightly or wrongly deemed as new - stands between embracing or vilifying web activism. Is standing apart, studiously neutral, the road ahead when cyberspace - for good or evil - becomes but another arena for government of the people, by the people, for the people? Is it a choice between greater direct democracy or the digital mob, or will we simply have to live with both?

Analysing the Russo-Georgian War

What have we learnt from the war in Georgia? That is the question addressed in one of the first more comprehensive reports of the recent war between Russia and Georgia. As the war gives credibility to those claiming that we are on the verge of a New Cold War, there is also a time for analysis. The pursuit of knowledge is preferrable to a mere show of arms and empty rhetorics. The stakes may simply be too high to risk such a gamble at this point.

On Monday morning, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) will present one of the first more comprehensive analyses of the recent war in Georgia at a press seminar in Stockholm. With contributions from 14 analysts of different specialities, the report offers a variety of approaches to the conflict, and how it affects the European security order.

To what extent does the war set the framework for future security policy? What are the challenges for the EU? To what extent will it cause changes in the European security structure? What effects on world economy can we expect? Which are the lessons learnt from the Russian military offensive? These are but a few questions addressed by the study.

As a contributor myself, I deal with - what is loosely called - the information war or rather "cyberwar", viz. the alleged coincidence of an armed conflict with a massive attack over the Internet. Some of the views presented in this part, will hopefully be interesting to and put things in a wider perspective for prospective readers. I thus welcome any feedback, though access is limited to a Swedish readership.

The report in full will be accessible for purchase or download from the FOI website as of noon (GMT+1) on Monday. I hope it will contribute to a nuanced picture of the war and present perspectives that may guide political decision-makers, the media, and an interested general public in their views of the war and its real and potential consequences.

Georgia shoots down Russian plane?

According to Georgian TV-channel Rustavi 2, Georgian interior ministry forces today shot down a Russian fighter over the Kodori gorge of breakaway region of Abkhazia. The interior ministry tonight confirms that its forces has indeed shot down a Russian plane in a remote part of Georgia. Russia, on its part, emphatically denies any such incidence and representatives of both the Foreign and Defence Ministries speak of Georgian provocations. Pending furhter information, contradictory statements cease the day. Still, it seems that the conflict between Russia and Georgia is about to heat up even more, though hopefully not in armed confrontation.

Russia Warns Ukraine & Georgia of NATO

On Wednesday, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine and Georgia of joining Nato. During a speech in the Russian State Duma, Lavrov argued that such a "colossal geopolitical" change would threaten relations with the two countries. "We assess all possible consequences primarily from the point of view of Russia's national interests," Lavrov said.

According to Ukrainian foregn minister, Anton Buteiko, a majority of Ukrainians support that Ukraine would join Nato. If Buteiko would be right, this would constitute an enormous change in Ukrainian public opinion. As late as last year, only some 10% of public opinion supported Nato-membership. Why public opinion may have turned is unclear, but it might be as a consequence of the New Year's Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. As for Georgia, Tbilisi has for long had the ambition to join Nato, but it has been regarded unrealistic as long as it is not accompanied by a Ukrainian application to enter the North Atlantic alliance.

That Russia, at this point, warns of the consequences primarily of Ukrainian Nato-membership, is due to regional political developments, not least with GUAM's recent formation of the Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, combined with increasing US openness to accepting the two countries as members of Nato. In Moscow eyes, such tendencies form part of a much greater geopolitical struggle between Russia and the US for influence over post-soviet space - Russia's traditional sphere of vital national interest.

Russian-Georgian Links Back on Track?

This is not exactly the news one might expect coming out of Moscow these days, but it is the impression that one may get by a passing glance at a recent Interfax telegramme. The story is that the railway link between Moscow and Tbilisi has been restored after a 13-year long disruption. However, with a little fantasy, it may also give a certain twist to current political relations between Russia and Georgia.

Evidently, trains will leave Tbilisi for Moscow three times a week, starting last Saturday, and passengers will have to go through the discomfort of a detour via Azerbaijan. This is so, because the direct line to Moscow has been out of service since the start of the Abkhaz conflict in 1992.

Even though the newly reopened Tbilisi-Moscow connection is not via Abkhazia, negotiations are underway between Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Abkhazia, to reopen also the line running through Abkhazia from Yerevan via Tbilisi to Moscow, possibly as soon as within two years time.

That the link between Moscow and Tbilisi now has to go by detour and not directly may be a mere coincidence, but can also serve to signify the general character of current political relations between Russia and Georgia.

Armenia Railroaded on Train Line

Last Thursday, an agreement was signed between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the contruction of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad, further barring Armenia from infrastructural cooperation in the western Caucasus. Effectively, Armenia is increasingly isolated from regional developments of great consequence for the country's future. As a consequence, Armenia may be further driven into the arms of Russia, strengthening the delineation of spheres of interest in the Caucasus between Russia and the West.

The agreement, signed in Baku, by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, Azerbaijani president Aliyev and Georgian President Saakashvili, bypasses Armenia by opting for the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tblisi-Baku stretch, instead of the previously designated, and already existent, Kars-Gyumri rail line, going through Armenia. The Armenian-Turkish border, and along with it the Kars-Gyumri railway, has been closed since 1993, due to the 1988-1994 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabağ. Thus, the Kars-Gyumri alternative would have meant reopening the border - a matter too difficult for Turkey to deal with in view of the sensitive Armenian question and upcoming parliamentary elections. As the opposite now is the case, Thursday's Baku agreement, by excluding Armenia, only serves to prolong a stifling status quo in relations between Yerevan and Ankara, and furthermore risks regionally isolating Armenia to the benefit of Russia.

The idea of the railway project, popularly known as the Iron Silk Road, originates from the 1960s, when the first plans to form, what is now known as, the Trans-Asia Railway Network (TAR) were raised. From the original plan of uniting 14.000 kms railroad from Singapore to Turkey, the scheme has grown to fathom some 81.000 kms, spanning all over the Eurasian continent. Thus, in November last year an agreement was signed to this end, under the aegis of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), as reported by RFE/RL-Online.

On the regional level, the question has been how to unite the various railway systems, linking the countries in the Caucasus with Turkey, as part of the larger Iron Silk Road project. Thus, a corresponding agreement was reached, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), as early as in 2005. It stipulated that the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi-Baku railway should be considered the only viable option for uniting the regional railway network, while it would connect all countries in the region, not need any substantial investments, and avoid any potential dividing lines. However, keeping to these and similar committments has proven very difficult.

On a strategic level, the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku agreement further underlines how the delineation of spheres of interest in the Caucasus between Russia and the West is exacerbated. Leaving Armenia out of the dynamics of regional development in this way, poses the question of how far-reaching a tacit understanding there is, that "Armenia belongs to Moscow." Another factor for leaving Yerevan at the side of the road, might be that western interests want to avoid being exposed to the risks of relying on infrastructure that, in event of crisis, may be controlled by Russia. A 5,000 man strong Russian troop contingent is currently posted on Armenian territory.

The agreement also shows how both Russia and the West attach an increasing importance to control over strategic infrastructure. It is no secret that the West's most important regional infrastructure project in Eurasia, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, partly due to the ambition of strategic control. That Moscow has been negative to reopening the Kars-Gyumri railway, between Armenia and Turkey, serves as no surprise in this context.

As for Armenia's international position, Yerevan would like to regard itself as a "Finland of the Caucasus" in terms of dealing with Moscow. During the Cold War, the Finns succesfully defended their national sovereignty by a well-balanced policy towards Moscow, safeguarding their country against recurrent Soviet plans to bring Finland in under the umbrella of the Warzaw pact. The fears in the West of so called "finlandisation" thus in the end turned out to be exaggerated, although Helsinki at times was weighed down under the pressure of Moscow's interests.

While Finland could benefit from the Cold War balance-of-power system in Europe, as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, Armenia since the 1990s has had greater difficulty to gain a corresponding means of balance. A double-edged instrument has been to use the Armenian diaspora in the West, which could equally complicate as facilitate regional relations. In the context of the Kars-Gyumri railway, Armenia has used its Westen lobby-groups to bar the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku stretch favoured by Turkey. Thus, US Armenian groups last year succeeded in blocking American funding of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway by securing a decision of the US Congress. By Thursday's Baku agreement, such measures now seem to no avail, as construction of the new railway stretch - bypassing Armenia - now are to be realised. However, the final word has perhaps not been said yet, judging from how positions on the issue have slided back and forth in recent years.

On a national level, the Baku decision comes at a most inconvenient time, as Armenia is up for parliamentary elections on 12 May this year. Overshadowed by the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia is undergoing somewhat of a political refolution, as Ralf Dahrendorf so succinctly termed events in Central and Eastern Europe by the end of the Cold War. It remains to be seen whether Armenia will be able to carry through its process of change under the weight of various domestic and international pressures.

Regretfully, Thursday's railway agreement puts Yerevan at the crossroads between Russian influence and continued regional integration. It is thus fair to say that Armenia has been railroaded in making its independent and sovereign choice on its future forms of regional and international cooperation.

Prometheus Unbound?

A Ukraine eternally condemned to be split between east and west is the image that persistently lingers on the retina of imagery as historical, cultural, lingual, and religious differences are allowed to dominate over unifying forces in world perceptions of the country's national identity. The image of a country fettered to its historic fate is today however confronted by a contrasting picture with roots in regional and national myths, linking together nations reunited in freedom at the shores of the Black Sea. Less known is that its origins are to be found in the ancient myth of Prometheus - the titan who stole the fire from the gods and gave it to man.

Prometheus (Gr. he who thinks ahead) brought man the enlightenment - fire and knowledge - denied to her by higher powers. In eternal punishment, Zeus had him chained to a rock on mount Kaukasos, where an eagle was set to feast on his liver. His self-sacrificial torment was eventually ended by Hercules, who killed the eagle and set the titan free. Freed from his strains, Zeus still deemed the titan forever to carry the burden of a Caucasian cliff in the remains of his chains. In memory of Prometheus' suffering, man to this day bear stones in their rings.

The appealing Prometheus myth became the theme for the Ukrainian national poet's, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), epos Kavkaz (1845). The father of Ukrainian literature wrote the work in memory of a close friend - Yakiv de Balman - who had fallen in Russian service in the Caucasus that year. Its edge is however not directed against the Chechens, who had killed his friend, but against the injustices of the Russian empire in denying oppressed peoples their freedom. What today is perceived as expressions of budding Ukrainian nationalism and a strive for independence from Russia, to the contrary encompasses a more general vision of liberty and justice to all nationalities set to carry the burden of the Tsarist yoke.

The Prometheus myth was a recurrent theme in both revolutionary and other liberation movements. It is for example found in the nationalist and socialist struggles against Tsarist rule; on the Balkans in the fight against the Osman empire as well as subsequently in attempts by the Crimmean Tatars to receive support from the new Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s. However, it was foremost by the inception of the Promethean movement that the myth gained greater fame as a symbol in the struggle against Russian and Soviet imperialism, why Prometheism at times also has been interpreted as a form of Russophobia.

For posterity, the Promethen movement has mainly come to be associated with Poland and the authoritarian nationalism of Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935). The Polish leader's ambition to contain Russian expansionism got its ideological inspiration from Promethean freedom ideals and its geopolitical expression in Intermarum - a projected federation of states between the Baltic and Black seas to counteract first Russian imperialism then the Bolshevik threat and to quell the power of the soviets. The image that - with some justification - portrays Piłsudski both as the founder and the front figure of Prometheism however also serves to obscure a more nuanced picture of a once nascent regional movement. In reality, the Promethean movement once gathered leading politicians and diplomats exiled from many of the countries, which had barely experienced a short interregnum of independence between Tsarist rule and Soviet power.

With the Paris magazine Promethée (1926) as a hub, exile circles created an ever-growing think-tank "in defence of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus and Ukraine". Gradually, this task was expanded geographically also to encompass all the peoples, who had fallen under the tyranny of soviet power, and thus the movement gained an overall eurasian expansion. The Prometheans engaged into intense lobbying to direct the attention of European government to the destinies of the oppressed peoples in the decades leading up to the Second World War. By public seminars and culture festivals, attempts were made not only to draw attention to nations erased from world maps, but also build an image of a common historical and cultural destiny, where trade and oceans united the peoples. Consequently, the Prometheans linked their ideas to the era's geopolitical division between dynamic sea power - talassocracy - and rigid land power - tellurocracy - where Russia naturally was referred to as the main example of the latter. To the contrary, the free trade of the oceans was related to free and independent states. That the maritime freedom theme was expanded to cover also old trade routes, such as between the Baltic and the Black seas - along predominantly Russian river systems - as well as the caravan routes along the Silk Road, only comes out as natural as the diminishing significance of exile communities demanded a broader basis. Focus was thus expanded from the Baltic-Black Sea-Caucasus axis to also cover Central Asia.

At the same time, ideas arose in the 1930s to found a political and economic alliance between Black Sea states such as Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as well as Ukraine and Georgia once the latter had regained independence. For the Prometheans, this appeared a greater task than Piłsudski's Intermarum vision. The Black Sea question was essentially considered the final solution to the Eastern Question. However, history wanted differently. Ukraine and the Caucasus remained under soviet rule, Romania's borders were revised, and Bulgaria became the Soviet Union's most loyal ally in the Balkans during the Cold War.

After the Second World War, the Promethean ideals appeared as antiquated as history had made them obsolete. They lived on in the memories of exile communities in the west, but found little ground in the realities of the time. The centre of the movement was moved to the US, but dwindled into oblivion already in the early 1950s.

After the end of the Cold War, the return of history has seen a - conscious or unconscious - renaissance for the ideas of Prometheism. Already in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Council was founded. After the coloured revolutions, Ukraine and Georgia deepened their relations by the 2005 Borjomi declaration. This was followed in 2006 with the CIS-sceptics Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM), setting up the regional Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, with its goal to "strengthen democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and security and stability". No great imagination is needed to realise that closer regional cooperation was aimed at reducing Russian influence over these countries.

Also, the project of creating an Intermarum between the Baltic and Black Seas seems, to some extent, to have been revived. Thus, it was the Polish and Lithuanian presidents - Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus - who served as mediator in the Ukrainian orange revolution and committed the EU to the country's continued reform process. That the inheritors of the mediaeval Polish-Lithuanian Union, once reaching the shores of the Black Sea, engaged themselves to Ukraine's political fate, undeniably brings out echoes of history. Warzaw and Vilnius are also Kiev's and Tbilisi's most ardent protagonists for continued euro-atlantic integration. Regional and bilateral cooperation in various constellations continues to evolve between the four countries. At the same time, the relation of them all to Russia, today are put on strain.

It is thus in terms of aims and ambitions that this "neo-Prometheism" evoke apprehensions. As these ideas now are brought out of the dustbin of history, one should not forget that - for good or evil - they are a creation of their time. Is the goal once more to contain Russia - to form a cordon sanitaire against Moscow's power projections? Apparently, it seems as if the tide is turning in that direction, even though a majority of EU and NATO capitals still pay great consideration to Russia.

From the US horizon, a coalition against Russia may be considered an option if relations to Moscow continue to deteriorate. In the event of a Democratic takeover in Washington, "neo-Promethean" ambitions may gain increased American support. The foreign policy nestor of the US Democratic Party - Zbigniew Brzezinski - is a long-time fan of such visions and was also the architect to the US policy of undermining the Eastern Bloc and demolishing the Soviet Union. Such a turn of events would, however, transform Prometheism from a positive to a negative mission - from integration to exclusion.

From the perspective of the European Union, the bad relations between the Soviet-Russian empire's former colonies and vassal states and current Russia, is a constant element of irritation in the capitals of old Europe. Hesitance and protraction in Ukrainian EU-integration may be interpreted as an expression of apprehension that if Europe's Eastern border would run from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it might topple a precarious balance in already strained relations to Moscow. Moreover, if the Caucasian card would be played out, EU may fear to be dealt a bad hand in a game played out between Moscow and Washington. Still, Ukrainan - as well as Turkish - accession to the Union is a natural and unavoidable development if Brussels is to remain faithful to the ideas of Europe. The dynamics this would bring may also return some of the vitality to the EU, in contrast to the prospects of Eurosclerosis.

As the Ukraine today is the geographical and polictical hub for a neo-Promethean movement, its positive sides may well prove a way ahead for both the Ukraine as the region in its entirety. If regional and western integration is allowed to walk hand in hand, the historical, cultural, lingual, and religious rifts characterising current Ukraine might perhaps be mended. A regional vision would tranform into a national vision, which might better reflect the complex nature of Ukrainian statehood. Here, European integration is an example for co-existence in multinational states.

What originally set Prometheism apart from other national liberation movements was a vision beyond narrow national interests. It waw the rights of small states to independently determine their destinies and the self-evidence in attaining development in cooperation with other nations as well as by regional integration and free trade, that gave the movement its special dynamics. In this sense, Prometheism was way ahead of its time and anachronic to the historical environment in which it existed. Its negative side was the tendency to let the legitimate strive for independence from Russian hegemony turn into outright Russophobia.

As the wings of history once more hover over the fettered Prometheus, hopes are set for Herculean liberation out of the claws of the Russian two-headed eagle. Will the chains thus be broken or will the American white-headed eagle simply take its place. Free or fettered, is Prometheus - the enlightener - destined to eternally live in the shadow of eagles? However, if the burden of freedom is merely to carry a stone in the bond of faithfulness to the ideals he has taught, this would seem a small sacrifice for the European titans of our times.