A Disgruntled Middle Class May Cause Putin's Fall

For Newsmill.se: Putin's inability to deliver on his promises sows the seeds to the civil society thay may cause his downfall. It does not suffice anymore to throw out bones to the middle class.


Yesterday, Russia headed to the polls with no real choice. The winner was predetermined. Putin moves in to the Kremlin again, this time with a six year mandate and an option for another presidential term until 2024. A quarter of a century with Putin however appears increasingly unthinkable. The reason is not popular protest, but because Putin's policy is passé. The soviet structural legacy has caught up with Russia and plans to solve problems turned into idle talk. Russians want what Putin cannot do. Instead, people choose their own solutions. Personal interest is turned into societal interest, and the seeds of civil society are sown. 

Largely, Russian challenges reflect western, in terms of an aging population, deficient infrastructure, environmental problems, health and education, but on a much deeper level. Consequences of decades of lacking investment become all the more intrusive into Russian everyday life. Politics turns into an arena of what one must do, and not what one wants. When what one must is not possible, power turns irrelevant for the citizens.

Few things in Russian societal discourse has been discussed with such obsession in recent years as all the plana that necessarily must be realized to meet the challenges of the future. Plan succeeds plan, but results are lacking and the country is sliding deeper and deeper into stagnation. Plans have made politics a prisoner of its own rhetorics, and reality has overtaken Putin in his zeal to catch up. The result is threading on in the same old tracks until running in circles. In practise, there has been a single political priority - stability - that has crowded out all plans for change. Putin's political stability thus paradoxically leads to the opposite - political instability. 

Some events define a regime regardless of whether perceptions are real or not. For Putin, it was terrorism and coloured revolutions. Thus, the play of circumstances set preconditions for an entire political era. Thus, a pathological obsession with internal and external enemies has turned Russian politics insane. Thus, fears of a flawed perception of reality arise. Because when threat turns into norm, the desire for normality rises. The western threat appears as paranoia. Terror becomes all the more tragic when authorities fail - as in Beslan and at the Dubrovka theatre - to deal with it, with an increasing sense of powerlessness as a result. The power of habit is great and the mantra of threat makes realities unreal when rhetorics turn danger into myth. Everyday threats become more real than those of the world, when causes of accident, unhealth, and insecurity are found in the inactivity of a state that self-centredly reflects itself in its own greatness instead of creating a better society for its citizens. 

Because it is a state that grows and grows but is capable to do less and less. When urgency is growing, it is not the state that puts down the fire. This realization grew during the great wildfires that ravaged central Russia during summer 2010. The state not only stood idly by faced by catastrophe, but withheld information that in too many cases could determine life or death to the public. The silence from authorities in connection to major accidents and disasters previously experienced now assumed massive proportions. However, people refused to passively stand by and watch their homes burn to the ground, and instead voluntarily joined together to fight approaching danger, e.g. with the use of social media. Information about the fires was gathered, fire-fighting coordinated and fighting equipment purchased - all on the initiative of ordinary people. The inactivity and incapability of the state forced people to voluntarily help each other. Society turned out to be greater than the state. 

The 2010 fires have ignited a flame that glows brighter and brighter in Russian sosciety by various big and small efforts. Many small and inconspicuous initiatives have been made previously. It may e.g. be policemen and security servants, who informally try to fight corruption and flaws within their own professions. It may be motorists, who inform each other about the corruption of traffic-police. Examples are growing in numbers, and so far it is more a matter about disclosing than fix the flaws and failures of society. What is decisive is that this type of citizen initiatives are not fundamentally political, or at least not perceived as such by participants and surroundings. You simply wants to solve the concrete problems that sorrounds you in everyday life. However, the effect is political in a way are difficult to master by state and authorities, because how does one accuse peole who merely want to improve their country. Many are patriots and honest people. Many also support Putin and his regime.

Here, the Internet has become both a tool to find likeminded people and to build platforms for information and action. It is this type of ideas and initiatives that the famous oppositional blogger Navalny has collected and built his fame on. Thereby, he has made the apolitical political, and turned apathy into sympathy for a spontaneous movement, first with the aim to achieve free and just elections, and then to depose of Putin. The same type of Internet platforms that previously were used to report fires are now used to coordinate voluntary election observation and to report irregularities and fraud at the ballots of Sunday's presidential elections. 

This is a development, which is hard to curb. To crack down on the opposition in the aftermath of elections is one thing. To crack down on those who only wants to do good is a completely different matter. As logics and mechanisms of citizen initiatives are the same, it is next to impossible for the regime to distinguish friend from foe. Already the protests planned for Monday may put the loyalty of police and security service to its test. Opposition demonstrations have gradually turned into festivals. To meet people with violence and brutality is something one for good reason hesitates to do, and it is probably seen as a last way out, both because of the message it would send and for fear of losing control over developments. Even if the opposition gathers masses in the tens or hundreds of thousands, demonstrations only affects relatively few. Many simply do not understand or care what it is all about.

Sunday's elections may not change Russia on the surface, but at its dephts it is a society that gradually is changing at its core. We are witnessing the growth of Russian civil society. Its significance should not be exaggerated, but neither should it be underestimated as both the plan and the rules of the game are changing. The discontent of a growing middle class must be taken seriously and the forms and contents of politics change when people organize. It does not suffice to throw bones around every now and then. Citizens want to sit at the tables of power in a way Russian politics do not understand. It is a question of power over everyday life, about close and concrete problems. Who is in the Kremlin is less important, but power must understand that the needs of the people must be reckoned with. The people deserves to be taken seriously and the needs of society cannot constantly come last in turn. 

Are we then witnessing the end of the Putin era? The truth is that there are no good answers. Still, the Kremlin's communicative disaster in relation to a discontent and protesting middle class cannot go on, as it is now increasingly assuming the forms of political schizophrenia. The middle class mania of power is a constant theme of societal discourse. Now, the middle class is regarded as preservers of society and a self-interested guarantee for continued stability. Now, it is seen as movers of society and a source of Russian reform policies. Now, it is portrayed as subverters of society and traitors, when it demonstratively makes reasonable and righteous demands on politics. At length, the effect is that power turns the middle class away from itself, adds to uncertainty and insecurity, and makes the unthinkable thinkable - a Russia without Putin. Because the more the Kremlin fear propaganda adds to the image that Putin is the only alternative to chaos, crisis, and war, the less serious and credible will he appear as a politician. Propaganda risks turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the personalization of Putin into an icon of a Russia in decay.

The rifts in Putin's coulisses grow and it becomes increasingly difficult just to patch up. Through the growing holes nothing and no-one is seen. The future scenery is dark and gloomy, against a towering warfare backdrop. Many also remember how Putin once sprung out of nothing onto the scene to play the lead role in more than a decade's Russian politics. A new cast for the play may by extension not be excluded, even if it is improbable that the curtain will drop for Putin. Still, it is a changed country that now emerges. We may not trust Russia, but does that mean that we do not trust the Russians when people now rely on their own abilities instead of state stagnation. When Russians are not given any choice, they make their own choices.

State is Greatest Enemy to Russian Economy

For Veckans Affärer: In 2010, business paper Euromoney Magazine awarded Russia's Alexei Kudrin finance minister of the year in the world. Less than a year later, he was sacked by president Medvedev and joined a fragmented Russian opposition. This is just one example of how state and politics become Russian economy's greatest enemies. Growing political unrest in the runup to Sunday's presidential elections emanates from middle class discontent with failing governance, corruption, and political parasitism. "Stability, stagnation, and then what?" is what an increasing number of Russians ask themselves. Uncertainty about the future has suddenly increased the political risks with Russian economy.

Russian economy is in good shape. With a budget in balance, one of the lowest state debts among major countries, just over 4% growth and 5% inflation in 2011, the country's prospects seem bright. Threats are the usual: Falling oil prices and turbulence in the financial markets. Despite positive signs, we now see a lapse in recent years' dynamic developments. A temporary "wait and see" in the runup to Sunday's elections may lead to a more permanent economic slow-down because of political inability to cater for long-term economic needs.

January witnessed the greatest financial outflow from Russia since the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Growth was at zero and inflation is expected to rise during 2012. Where political analysts are silent, the market speaks out clearly. Trust in state and politics plummets, as the failed December parliamentary elections have dislodged the power and interest balance within United Russia - the country's ruling politico-economic cartel.

Even if fears prove exaggerated, it will take much time before the system reaches equilibrium again. The effects of prominent politicians' resignations become increasingly clear. Above all, Kudrin's sound financial policy has been replaced by overbid policies and pork-barrelling. Increased state expenditures is like throwing money into a black hole, believing it is a wishing-well. The flow of money instead runs from the oil wells, where energy constitutes a third of state income. Outside the energy sector, only middle class consumption drives the economy.

Putinism's political strategy - to promote the middle class in exchange for power - has failed. Instead, they have to bear the burden of a bureaucracy, which has grown by 40% since 2000. State efficiency has constantly fallen since 2003, with a corruption that affects everyday life of an increasing number of Russians. Only during 2011, the level of bribes tripled, accordning to the Interior Ministry. Bureaucracy and corruption are poisoning the flexible and dynamic business climate, where everything was forbidden, but everything also possible. Opportunities have decreased and hopes for the future changed to skepticism and discontent. Recent popular protests have thus greater depth than ordinary political opposition, as the state obstructs basic preconditions to earn money and make a decent living.

Except for the country's dependence on oil prices, Russian society is confronting fundamental structural challenges, which demand an increase in economic diversity. Declining demography reduces the number of Russians of productive age. Mounting flaws in infrastructure, health, environment, and education threaten to shrink productivity. Politics has not only failed to address these flaws. It has also reduced the economic incentives of the middle classes to contribute to diversification. 

What worries most, is the increase in political polarization that Putin now propels. The protesting middle class, with reasonable demands on those in power, is portrayed as traitors. This is a dangerous message and illustrates a contempt for those, who until recently were seen as Russia's future. As derision turns into threats against protesters, Putin alienates and provokes the very groups that have greatest potential to contribute to the country's further development and shows that material more than human resources are seen as the source of Russian growth. The economy may be sound, but as long as political malaise is spreading in the social body, risks will grow for Russian economy as people now have had enough of Putin.

Saturday May Show the Way for Russia's Spring

For Newsmill.se: The political landscape is characterized by an uncertainty without comparison during the Putin era. How the Russian leaders will handle continued mass protests, they probably do not know themselves. We are heading towards an uncertain spring.   


It was said about Hilding Hagberg, the Swedish 1950s communist leader, that he used to unfold his umbrella when it was raining in Moscow. Kremlin interest in the powers of weather has seldom been as great as now, for the Saturday 4 February opposition protests. Weather might decide the size of demonstrations and thereby the power in demands for Putin's dismissal. On Christmas eve, 100,000 gathered for the largest protests since the fall of the Soviet Union - an unwelcome reminder for the country's leadership that power is not a given.

A prognosis for continued developments up until the 4 March presidential elections is something few want to make today. The political landscape is still characterized by an uncertainty without comparison during the Putin era. How the Russian leaders will handle continued mass protests, they probably do not know themselves. We are heading towards an uncertain spring.

The Russian "tandemocracy" - with Putin at the handlebar and Medvedev as navigator - is swaying precariously when the map does not match reality. The roadmap has been thwarted and where things are heading, nobody knows. No wonder the passengers protest.

Russia during Putin may be read as a success story for a country in chaos and disarray after the collapse of the Soviet empire. A political mess and economic crisis turned into stability and growth, with the emergence of a thriwing middle class - although under increasing authoritarian rule. However, the Russian power paradox remains: The more formal state power, the less ability to exercise it. With the exception of political stability and some recent improvements in the rule of law, state governance capabilities have deteriorated since 2004. In Russian everyday life, this means constant encounters with corruption and wrongs without limitations or end. With falling energy incomes, power may no longer compensatre for discontent, at the same time as an increasingly affluent people demands more from those in power. Stagnation is seen in a system and confidence crisis.

When Putin's presidential candidacy became clear last year, to many it was a sloping road without end. With twelve years in the rear mirror, six year terms and two terms, the perspective of Putin as president was 2024 - half a lifetime for many Russians. The temperature in public opinion - the state of the nation - fell under zero in late summer, with some mild weather during autumn, to turn to new winter cold  after the botched December parliamentary elections, with Putin's support for "the party of crooks and thieves" - United Russia. The voter barometets of the polling institutes are uncertain and at times inflated. Still, approval ratings for Putin have been halved over the last year from 60% to 27%. All the same, he would - lacking alternatives - get half the votes. 

It is thus the lack of alternatives that Putin now attacks. He puts stability, prosperity and national unity against the opposition's chaos, crisis, nationalism and disarray. Is that enough for a victory or must he rely on the system - aimed at fighting "coloured revolutions" - that he has built? The answer is uncertain. On the other hand, crisis is not Putin's greatest talent, with a record of bad judgement, bad information processing, hasty decisions, and sometimes ruthless brutality. Caution and apprehension thus signify regime reactions in the hope of improved sentiments. At the same time, the threat of confrontation is in the air. The question is if the system trusts itself anymore.

For many, an end of the Putin era would be dangerous and unrealistic wishful thinking. However, the power of wishful thinking should not be underestimated, when feelings replace the rationality Putin appeals to. The opposition is no realistic alternative, but the Putinist regime's lack of openness, new thinking, and perspective, carries as little allure. Eventually, one may simply rely on the gut-feeling, as Russians have always done - putting trust in yourself instead of those in power, who only offer more of the same.

Feelings are like weather. No one controls them, not even in a managed democracy. Dark clouds are piling up, but perhaps a ray of hope glimmers out of the dark skies of Russian democracy. Are we heading towards a Russian spring, or will there be a new front of Russian cold? The answer will be given after the 4 March presidential elections, but perhaps we will get an advance glimpse already on Saturday 4 February, as people gather in protest against corruption and misrule in Russian streets and squares. The Kremlin can no longer simply unfold its umbrella and pretend it is raining. Can we?

Why Putin Receives Popular Support

For Newsmill.se: If not Putin - then who? The bitter truth is that twelve years with Putin have eradicated next to all viable alternatives in Russian politics.

"Resign Putin!" has been the primary popular demand of the protests that have shaken Russia ever since the country's farsical parliamentary elections at the beginning of December. An increasingly clear dividing line is now drawn between constructive and destructive interests in Russian politics, where the power's mudslinging of the opposition is a double-edged sword in the political battle that is now underway before open curtain in Moscow, but where the question also is whether the opposition can and wants to shoulder the responsibility that a revolution would involve. Here an open letter from Boris Berezovsky - an exiled oligarch - risks setting the tune to portray the opposition as irresponsible western lackeys with the single aim of causing chaos and set fire to Russia.

When one of Russia's most hated men, Boris Berezovsky, in an open letter to Putin appeals to him that he should resign, the question is whether the purpose is that he should meet popular demands or if the oligarch simply wants to throw a torch at the powder keg that Russian politics have evolved into over the last one and a half month.

Abandoned by both friends and enemies, Putin soon has only the Russian Orthodox left to turn to for protection, as Berezovsky portrays it, and the oligarch turns to the Russian leader in a prayer that he will save the country from a bloody revolution. The reply from the Moscow patriarchate was swift: "All the previous doings of this man prompts a single thought. Listen attentively to this gentleman and do exactly the opposite of what he proposes."

As is so often the case in Russian politics, it is at the same time a both skilled and primitive game that is played out and, of course, this may be viewed merely as yet another cynical ouverture from an exiled oligarch, who seizes every opportunity to sow conflict among the Russian elite from which he himself has become an outcast and now has no influence over.

Berezovsky's ouverture puts the finger on a crucial point in the pre-election debate: "If not Putin, then who?" The bitter truth is that 12 years with Putin have eradicated next to all alternatives in Russian politics. Both history and the present show that opposition leaders either are those who have not been able to get along with Putin or they are marginalised and compromised politicians from both left and right, who have long been thought obsolete.

On two points, Berezovsky is right. The first is that the party in power, United Russia, stands on the brink of disaster. Several of the party's most prominent representatives have been forced to resign and the internal conflicts of interest, that Putin for so long has either skilfully balanced or swept under the carpet, are now out into the open. The second is how the Orthodox church is a power that stands above politics. If the United Russia power coalition collapses under internal and external pressure, then it is possible that the church will stand out as the single unifying force, which may act with sufficient moral weight to avoid chaotic and potentially violent developments.

With the December protests, bottled up discontent has been unscrewed and the spirit has been let out. The current critical media coverage - even on television - would not have been possible or even conceivable a mere month ago. There is discussion about a second glasnost - openness. People in common welcome a lustration and weathering of the stale smell of power, which for so long has lain like a wet blanket of corruption over Russian everyday life. At the same time, Putin and his forces have begun to mobilize a counterattack. The further course of the battle and its final outcome remain uncertain.

When Berezovsky from his western exile pleads with Putin to save Russia by sacrificing himself, he does not only play with a Putinist system on an increasingly loose foundation, but he also plays into the hands of the Russian leader's attempts at blackening the opposition. The motive for an otherwise impotent Berezovsky wants to add to the confrontation of Russian society in order for it to collapse under its own weight.

That the fallen oligarch's, Berezovsky, letter to Putin has been published by the independent radio station Echo of Moscow, has opened the watergates for a crackdown on this leading alternative news outlet. Recently, Putin accused the radio station for "pouring diarrhoea on him all day long" and to b on a western leash. Also other opposition leaders have come in for their shares after a meeting with the new US ambassador to Russia. A picture of the well-known blogger and opposition activist with the (Jewish-born) Berezovsky was also recently published later to be found photoshopped with. The theme is familiar and alludes to the foundations of the Putinist system, namely that oligachs in association with western interests want to plunder and weaken Russia by usurping state power. From the oligarch rule of the Yeltsin era to the coloured revolutions of Eastern Europe, the western threat - often with an anti-semitic undertone - has been drummed into public consciousness in order to legitimize an increasingly corrupt regime. When the backwash of the Arab spring and popular protests in other parts of the world now rolls in over Russian shores, it is a short step to pull off some old tricks.

The system to exercise power that Putin constructed during his presidential reign departed from the role of the office as guarantor of the constitutional order in a very thwarted interpretation. To safeguard the internal and external sovereignty, the constitution was interpreted in a way that gave the president a constant and pragmatic right to declare a state of emergency in both small and big matters. This interpretation was accompanied by systematic legislative work, where basic civic rights and freedoms were limited to the point that they were under constant threat of being repealed in practical legal application. The motive was to prevent illegitimate interests from usurping state power, because without sovereignty - the capacity to self-rule - there could be no talk of civic rights and freedoms. This meant centralization of power and intolerance towards dissent. The result is evident today in a system with both the right and resources to repression, ready to nip any negative manifestation of views in the bud.

What recent events have illustrated is a disorientation and a faltering will to exercise this power. When police and security services stand idle in front of mass protests the fears and apprehensions of repression and retaliation have faltered. It is an inner struggle of popular conscience, filled with undecisiveness to stability or change, where questions of courage, morale, and conviction are put to the test not only among those in power or in opposition, but also to a greater extent among ordinary people. It is simply difficult to picture a future without Putin - to thread into the unknown. One knows what one does not want, but not what one wants. This uncertainty is now used by Putin by urging, in his recently published electoral platform, for reform instead of a repetition of the mistakes committed in the wake of the country's previous revolutionary convulsions. How successful this tested formula will be this time is yet to be determined, as an increasing number of people associate continued stability with increasing stagnation.

Putin's credibility as a reformer is limited, as twelve years in power have shown little result despite recurrent plans and persistent attempts at reform. The division of powers between an executive Prime Minister and a reformatory President, which would have driven change, has moreover led to an increasingly marginalised Medvedev, despite the latter's attempts at forming a higher profile and greater independence during the last four years' "tandemocracy".

With the December events, Putin's popularity figures have reached a low. From a persistent support of some 70% of Russians, figures now oscillate around 50%. Additionally, in the latest opinion poll - from a state-directed institute - a quarter of respondents state that they have lost confidence in him. Much thus indicates that the results of the 4 March presidential vote will determine whether Russians will consider the elections as legitimate or not. If Putin receives more than 50% of votes and the election is decided by a single ballot, people are likely to question its validity. Being forced to a second round might however also be construed as a sign of weakness, which could strengthen the opposition in the runup to the final ballot. The temptation to tamper with the vote to gain a appropriate result may therefore increase in the eyes of power.

Putin's leadership will be put to a hard test in the coming months. Previous experiences have shown that he has difficulties in coping with crisis situations, which either have caused passivity or rash decisions. There is good ground to assume that Putin under such circumstances has trouble to reconsider and act in changing and unclear situations. The Russian leadership currently appears fumbling to grasp various ways of handling popular protests, with both concession and confrontation. The overarching tendency though seems to be to tighten the screws on the opposition. Several representatives of the opposition and their relatives have become subject to direct or indirect threats and reprisals. The great protest manifestation planned for February 4 has also been banned by Moscow authorities.

As Russia now is likely to meet with continued popular protest, it constitutes a balance act for Putin and his power apparatus. If he chooses to be too tough in quelling the opposition, the popular reaction may lead to greater protest to the extent that it threatens the regime. The risk is then that loyalty to power will collapse like a house of cards. At the same time, it is hard for Putin to allow continued public critique of how Russia is ruled, as it may lead to the same result in an avalanche of discontent over social evils disclosed. The question is if he will be capable of balancing between confrontation and tolerance.

That most people seem to take it for granted that Russia's next president will be called Vladimir Putin is also rather a curse than a blessing, as it creates unclarities as to which voter groups will be activated or become passive - regime supporters or opponents. The question here is if the mere threat of instability may drive the people to the ballots in support of the prevailing order. Will Putin be able to portray his policies as constructive and that of the opposition as destructive, there is still a chance that he may conquer a positive agenda in relation to the electorate. Here, it appears that the letter of the widely hated Berezovsky comes as a godsend, but at the same time sows a seed for a dirty election campaign, which may eventually be a curse to Putin.

What the outcome will be may be indicated at the 4 February opposition protests - already the next weekend.The final say will however be made only by the 4 March presidential elections. The question then is if fears for a white revolution and instability or the wish for free and fair elections will emerge victorious. Because, regardless of how one judges the Russian regime's ability to weather the storm, the recent protests mean that Russia stands at a crossroads between repression, revolution, or reforms.

Putin World's Richest Man

An increasing number of surveys rate Russian president Vladimir Putin the richest man in Europe. Putin is allegedly to have amassed enormous wealth during his presidential reign and all the way back to the Petersburg days. At his annual press conference on 14 February, Putin for the first time commented on these rumours:

It is true. I am the richest man not only in Europe, but in the world: I amass emotions and am rich in the sense that the Russian people twice put the trust in me to rule such a great country as Russia. I count this as my biggest wealth.

What concerns various rumours concerning my financial situation, I have seen some documents on this issue. This is simply gossip, which there is no reason to discuss - mere nonsense.

In Russia, there is a tradition of denial whenever such accusations arise. Instead, Putin chose to make fun of the issue - or rather make himself out as honoured by the trust and responsibility the Russian people has put in him. Judging from his body language, the Russian president appeared somewhat ill at ease with the question. Not that it was unexpected, and the answer was certainly rehearsed. Still, one did not need more than a glance at Putin's reaction to gather that he would not have passed a polygraph test.

The question of rising wealth and power in Russia is destined to determine the future development and stability of the country. As long as the elites may share the dividends of growing wealth and power, they will remain loyal to the system. The day this situation will change - e.g. by falling international oil prices - there is nothing to hold the system together except mere repression. The question is but for how long the elites will accept such a system, if they no longer have anything to gain from it. The risk is that a lack of growth will eventually lead Russia into crisis and turmoil with little to keep the system together.

A Slave to Power?

At his annual news conference, Russian president Vladimir Putin revealed that he had never been tempted to run for a third term. From the very outset, he decided never to violate the Russian constitution. The constitution stipulates a maximum of two consecutive presidential terms.

As usual this pseudo-news ran as the top story in international media's comments on the news conference. As previously reported, the Kremlin has succeeded to keep speculations on a potential third Putin presidential term alive for years, and media have only been to keen to swallow the bait. That journalists simply have not been able to take Putin's word for it, only testifies to the politechnologists' successful media coup in manipulating western and Russian news coverage alike. It should also send a warning to news audiences worldwide that they run the risk of deception due to international media's one-eyedness in Russia reporting.

At the news conference Putin said: "Throughout all these eight years I have toiled like a slave in the galleys, from morning till evening and, have done so with the full devotion of my strength." This is most probably a very sincere statement, and is also in line with what Putin has previously said repeatedly. Also, people working in the Kremlin has let it be no secret that the Russian president has been quite tired and weary of his duties in recent years. So, being a slave to power does not in Putin's case have to be a fixation to power, but an actual slavery of duties. Still, media have failed to see this.

At times, it is simply appauling to see how bad the knowledge is among western journalists covering Russia, when they repeatedly fail even to get the basic facts right. For instance, only this Tuesday the BBC covered Ukrainian president's Yushchenko meeeting with Putin in Moscow. With badly covered indignation, the reporter comments on Putin's upcoming attendance to the April NATO-conference in Bucharest: "Mr Putin will no longer be Russian president in April. Elections for his successor will be held next month." It is thus suggested that Putin and his croonies do not know when his presidential term ends or that they do not care, as things will anyway remain the same. Well, I have news for the BBC: Putin was inaugurated for his second term in May 2004, which means that he has the constitutional right to remain in office for the full four years of his term, viz. until May this year. That he has every intention to exercise his presidential powers to the maximum until the last minute is also clear from Putin's own statements. Still, one cannot but sigh when even the BBC cannot get such basics right.

What is at risk is good and objective reporting about developments in Russia. As the situation is becoming increasingly severe in many fields of politics and society, news coverage is increasingly tendentious and predisposed to prejudial perceptions. The worse the situation becomes, the greater is the need for journalistic integrity and professionalism. Or else, not only the general news audience will be misled but even world leaders might base their decisions on policies towards Russia on bad information and faulty images. Getting the basic facts right might actually change assessments of developments to better cope with challenges ahead. Those challenges are great, and the greatest is perhaps coping with the myth of Russia as a reemerging great power in the world. Still, we fail to see realities as they are, and as long as we do not challenge our own prejudice, we will go on living in a world of illusions about Russia.

Zyuganov steps up to step down?

According to Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Russian communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov considers withdrawing his candidacy for the March 2 Russian presidential elections. A withdrawal would be to protest against a similar negative PR-campaign that the Communist Party experienced during the December 2007 parliamentary elections.

According to recent opinion polls, Zyuganov receives surprisingly little popular support for his presidential candidacy, which would effectively force him to abandon his leadership of the communist party if they were to become official election results. Thus, even if withdrawing from the presidential race would open up to contenders to the leadership of the party, Zyuganov might consider this drastic option as preferential to a devastating election loss. According to a source in the presidential administration, the communists are currently seeking support in the Kremlin for receiving 15-20% of votes instead of the prognosticized 6%.

In the background, forces advocating a Russian two-party system seem to be at work. Hence, a discussion of merging the communist party and Fair Russia has been renewed, which would be considerably facilitated by the dethtronisation of Zyuganov. According to Nezavizimaya Gazeta, these are the same forces that want to undermine the position of Medvedev as future president of Russia. Zyuganov is very well aware of the fact that his candidacy legitimises the election of Medvedev. In the 2004 presidential elections, Zyuganov's role was much of a stage-hand in the act of reelecting Putin.

However, this time it seems to become the LDPR-leader, Vladimir Zhirinovski, who will conquer the second place in the presidential race. Such a result would further undermine Medvedev's legitimacy. Still, if Zyuganov would decide to step down, the effect is the same. Ending up in third place would be equal to his resignation as communist leader, why Zyuganov now seems to be playing out the legitimacy card against Medvedev to gain sufficient support in order to stay on as party leader. If Zyuganov would fail in these discussions and actually decide to withdraw, this has to happen no later than 27 January, as the communists otherwise will have to pay state election costs.

Even though Dmitry Medvedev seems sure to be elected the third president of Russia on 2 March, what goes on behind the scenes in Moscow at the moment is both interesting and confusing. It also provides further evidence that Putin and his aides are becoming increasingly dependent on the bureaucratic monster of political power that they have created during his era. What this will mean for Russia is still hard to say, but the evolving pattern bodes ill for the future.

Presidential Termination

In July 2010, some 2,000 researchers from all over the world will gather in Stockholm for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. For a week, issues related to Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia will be discussed at over 400 seminars and panels.

The International Council for East and Central European Studies (ICCEES) is the academic world organisation of analysts within this field. The ICCEES World Congress is a quintennial event, which last took place in Berlin in 2005. Since then, Germany and its national organisation - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde - hosts the ICCEES Information Centre, at University of Münster. Previous congresses have e.g. taken place in Helsinki in 2000, and in Warzaw in 1995.

The history of the organisation originates from 1974, when the International Committee for Soviet and East European Studies (ICSEES) was formed at a first congress in Banff, Canada. Due to the revolutionary political developments in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid 1980s, the name was altered in 1990 to International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) at its IV World Congress in Harrogate, England. Today, ICCEES consists of 20 national organisations, and an additional 4 associate members.

As ICCEES now has passed its third decade of existence, the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia is undertaking increasingly intense preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress in Stockholm in 2010. Reflecting an expanded regional scope, the congress theme will be “Eurasia: Prospects for Wider Cooperation”.

The decision to let Sweden and its CEE Society host the congress was made by the ICCEES Executive Committee at the 2005 Berlin Congress. However, since then, preparations have admittedly been complicated by a presidential change in the Swedish organisation briefly after the decision was made, a consequent loss of instutional belonging, and a protracted interim period.

In March 2006, I was elected president of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia. The task set before the board was tremendous, with high demands on forming the financial and institutional basis for the 2010 ICCEES Congress. Thus, the ensuing work was very tough on the board, and many of us at times doubted that we would succeed. Still, at year's end, we had managed to get the backing of the Swedish government, key academic instititutions and major research foundations. This very satisfying result was due to the dedicated and determined voluntary work of the board and individual members of the Society. Now, I think that belief is strong among our members and the academic community that we will be able to carry through with the 2010 ICCEES World Congress with the quality such an event deserves. This is a very gratifying result indeed, even if it also has taken a tremendous amount of hard work and a deep toll on the commitment and time of those involved.

Concerning my own role, leadership is the art of making oneself obsolete. As president, I had set the task before me to form the financial and organisational basis of the ICCEES Congress. Having succeeded with this, I realised that the next stage in the process was to start filling the congress with relevant and solid academic content. Here, I was simply not the right man for the job, not because I could not successfully solve the task, but because I understood that other people could do it even better. As a consequence I made it very clear that the next step in the process needed professional academics, who could formulate the tasks from their experience and work with the dedication that their trade motivates. This requires the commitment and concerted efforts of the academic community. My decision was therefore to step aside to let other people in and find a solution that would better serve the interests of the Society and further preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. Consequently, I recently left the presidency of the Society, confident that a very competent and professional new board will be successful in carrying on the work. So, with my mission completed, I can only say that it - despite all the hard work - has been a privilege and an honour to head the Swedish East European community and cooperate with the board and individual members in our joint efforts to further our interests and positions as an academic community nationally and internationally. I can now but wish the new board the best of luck in its further work.

Ukraine Right or Wrong

Was Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko right to call for parliamentary elections? This is a question that in recent days has been the subject of intense debate. Constitutionally, he seems to be on the slippery slope. Still, his argument that "it is not only my right, it is my obligation" might prove valid if he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron. The core question is though how advisable it is for state to have a constitution, which allows for such a situation to occur.

Imagine, for a moment, that the US Congress would act not only to impeach the president, but also actively prepare to abolish the office of the president itself.

For an American this would be absurd, as the fundamental idea of the founding fathers was a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judical powers, as inspired by Montesquieu. This separation of powers' system is also the foundation of most modern democracies, and usually there are elaborate mechanisms to avoid situations that risk jeopardising the stability provided by the checks and balances of independent centres of power. Paradoxically, this seems not to be the case in the Ukraine, as recent developments demonstrate.

The 8 December 2004 deal ending the Orange revolution involved changes to the Ukrainian constitution to limit the great powers of the presidential office, previously enjoyed by Leonid Kuchma. This was the price the leaders of the Orange revolution paid to get the fraudulent presidential 23 November elections invalidated. However, the changes did not enter into force until 1 January 2006.

As the Ukrainian constitution now works, the parliament has the right to override presidential vetoes if a qualified majority of 300 out of 450 deputies so decides. Such a majority also has the option to make constitutional changes, and even abolish the office of the president itself. Thus, article 155 of the Constitution reads:

Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted, if at the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have voted in favour thereof.

Still, the provision of decisions by two separate parliamentary sessions with elections in between, seems somewhat obscure, as the changes made in December 2004 appear to have entered into force before the March 2006 elections. It is therefore possible that the Verkhovna Rada may change the constitution by a single decision of a two-third's majority.

A further mechanism to counter quick and unpredictable changes between elections may be § 83 of the constitution, which can be interpreted as preventing deputies to change loyalties between parliamentary fractions, as a coalition is to be formed by fractions and not individual deputies. This reasoning seems both obscure and ambiguous, but has been a key argument for the president to protest against the fact that an increasing number of MPs from his party, Our Ukraine, have changed allegiances in favour of the Party of Regions. As votes were thus added to the anti-presidential coalition in parliament, the situation eventually became desperate, as Yushchenko's enemies were closing in on the 300 deputies margin. If this was allowed to happen, a qualified parliamentary majority could deal with the president as they saw fit, and eventually even depose of him.

Then, in which situations is the President actually allowed to call for new parliamentary elections? The answer given by constitutional article 90 set three provisions:

1. If the parliament cannot reach a majority (coalition) to form a government within thirty days after the first meeting of a newly elected parliament.
2. If a coalition cannot reach a majority to form a new government within 60 days after the resignation of a prior government.
3. If parliament during session has not met for a period of 30 days.

It is quite obvious that Yushchenko did not fulfill any of the above criteria when signing the decree to disband parliament and call for new elections. Consequently, if reading the Constitution to its letter, Yushchenko had no right to do this. So, does that mean that he was completely off his rocker when he decided to make this move? Not necessarily. The argument that he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron is certainly valid. As president, Yushchenko may perceivably have "the right and the obligation" to act if a situtation occurs, which threatens the constitutional order.

When such a case is applicable is however unclear. One prerequisite might be if parliament had a clear and expressed intent to jeopardise the constitutional order. The requirements to be fulfilled in meeting the prerequisite of intent is however very obscure. Thus, the matter has been referred by parliament to the Constitutional Court for a ruling.

Until recently, it was very uncertain whether the Constitutional Court would choose to address the matter. According to its statutes, it has 15 days to decide whether it at all will deliberate on an issue raised by parliament. Then it was declared that the Court would make its ruling on Wednesday this week. However, today five of the 18 judges said that they considered resigning due to public threats against them, and asked for police protection. Now, the court ruling has been delayed until 17 April.

Reviewing the composition of the Court, it consists of eigtheen members: 6 judges, 6 parliamentarians and 6 presidential appointees. The five now concerned represent all three groups. Still, the Court could also choose to make a ruling even without the participation of the five members, as it only needs 10 of its members to make a ruling. That the Court could get a majority decision in this way is still very unlikely. Essentially, the question is whether the Court will make a ruling at all. That is highly questionable, as the developing crisis may render its opinion obsolete even if it could finally reach a verdict.

All in all, President Yushchenko seems to stand on weak ground as for his decision to disband parliament and call for new elections. However, this does not mean that he may not stand his ground in the battle over its legitimacy. As events are evolving, new elections on 27 May seem to be the only sensible option to end the current conflict democratically. Consequently, the question whether his decision was right or wrong may never really be legally addressed. In terms of politics, his choice was a "catch 22" and whatever choice he made - be deposed by parliament or call for new elections - it was to come out bad for himself. The political verdict on Yushchenko may therefore be hard, as he for too long walked an increasingly thin line in exercisising his presidential duties. Still, whether Yushchenko was right or wrong is not the core issue. The important thing is whether his decision will eventually turn out to be right or wrong for Ukraine and its people. After all, that was what the Orange revolution was originally about - giving a voice to the people.

Update: According to the BBC, Yushchenko would now be "willing to suspend his decree dissolving parliament and ordering an early 27 May election." This would constitute a postponement of parliamentary elections, so that parties can prepare for an election campaign, and not a change of opinion in that elections should be held. Thus, it is a signal that Yushchenko might be willing to compromise on the date for elections, but still carry through with the process. How it all ends up is very uncertain and it remains to be seen how Yanukovich supporters and other parties will react to this feeler.

Chicken Kiev Race

Chicken race was a perilous game among youngsters in the US during the 1950s, said to originate from East European immigrants. The game models two car drivers, both headed towards each other at high speed. The first to swerve away yields to the other. If neither player swerves, the result is a potentially fatal head-on collision.

Chicken race is an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while each player prefers not to yield to the opponent, the outcome where neither player yields is the worst possible one for both players.

Chicken Kiev is a dish of boneless chicken breast pounded and rolled around cold unsalted butter, then breaded and fried.

Chicken Kiev is also the label used by the media for a speech made in Kiev in 1991 by then U.S. President George H.W. Bush. It was drafted by Condoleezza Rice and cautioned Ukrainians against "suicidal nationalism". A few months later, Ukrainians voted to withdraw from the Soviet Union.

Source: Wikipedia

As Ukraine's "Easter Crisis" continues, further comments seem superfluous. Instead, I wish all friends, colleagues, and readers out there a Happy Easter.

Shootout at the Ukraine Corral?

Will Viktor Yushchenko remain president of Ukraine? This is what is currently in the balance in the ongoing political crisis in Kiev. In what seems as a final showdown between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych, the president on Monday dissolved parliament and called for new elections on 27 May. By doing so, Yushchenko may well have signed his own political death warrant. There is little chance that his Our Ukraine will survive elections as a leading player in Ukrainian politics, making the president a lame duck for the remainder of his term.

The current shootout revolves around a battle over life and death for the presidency. Since last year, Yanukovych has won over an increasing number of parliament deputies to the point where he threatened to blow Yushchenko's position to smithereens. Yanukovych was quickly approaching the 300 out of 450 votes in parliament - Verkhovna Rada - necessary to change the constitution and override presidential vetoes. This might also have included abolishing the very office of the president.

Yushchenko's move now forces Yanukovych to take the fight to the high-street, instead of the back alleys where he until now has battled for parliamentary votes. The showdown has been underway since Saturday, when nearly 100,000 people demonstrated in central Kiev in support of the two combattants. As usual in Kiev, the orange forces took centre stage, gathering some 70,000 demonstrators calling for dissolving parliament and new parliamentary elections. Nearby, about 20,000 of Yanukovych's followers met in support of the current government. The stage was thus set for the country's biggest political duel since the 2004 Orange revolution.

Proclaiming elections by a televised speech on Monday evening, Yushchenko said: "My actions are dictated by the strict necessity to save the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not only my right, it is my obligation." Parliamentary elections would thus curve the "Deliberate efforts [that] are being made in parliament to worsen the political crisis, posing a threat to our country and people."

Crisis has become the hallmark of Ukrainian politics since last year's March parliamentary elections. Even though Yanukovych and his Party of Regions stood as the clear election victors, the Orange forces of Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko Bloc did their utmost to form a coalition government barring Yanukovych from power. After months of negotiations and under the threat of new elections, the Orange coalition was proclaimed dead and Yanukovych became Prime Minister. Ever since, President Yushchenko has fought a losing battle to balance an increasingly powerful Yanukovych government.

The question now is who will form the biggest posse for power in the upcoming 27 May fight between orange and blue forces in Ukraine. Yanukovych's power base is solid, with massive financial backing from several mighty oligarchs. In contrast, Yushchenko is badly armed for elections, with a party deemed to become the first victim of this political duel. In essence, Yulia Timoshenko will stand the most to gain from an election campaign, establishing her role as the undisputed leader of the orange forces and the only real alternative to Yanukovych.

For Yushchenko, the choice was between being removed as president or calling for new elections, where he is bound to become the first victim. His choice was to accept the challenge as he was called out into the street by the orange forces on Saturday. Thereby, the only thing left for Yushchenko is to witness his own political death struggle for the remainder of his presidency. Still, calling for new elections was not only his right - it was his obligation. This is perhaps also what will be written on his political tombstone: "He had the right and - finally - rose to his obligations."

Update: In response to Yushchenko's decree for parliamentary elections, Yanukovych's supporters have now called for presidential instead of parliamentary elections. They refer to Yushchenko's decision as an attempted coup d'état and have declared that parliament will not grant the financial means necessary to go through with parliamentary elections. It is not unlikely that Yushchenko's decision to dissolve parliament will serve Yanukovych's interests in winning over the remaining votes necessary to gain the qualified 300 out of 450 qualified majority to make constitutional changes and eventually depose the president. A parliament dissolved by the president would thus decide to remove Yushchenko from his office or abolish the presidency as a whole. The complications this would cause are immense, and it is diffcult to foresee what further ramifications it would involve. Furthermore, the conflict has been referred to the Constitutional Court, consisting of 18 members: 6 presidential representatives, 6 parliamentary, and 6 judicial. What will happen if the Court does not reach a decision within the stipulated five days is hard to determine at this point. It is also said that the Election Commission, which was so hated during the Orange revolution, will be reconvened.

Latvia: From President to Film Star?

With only a few months left in office, Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga might ponder upon her future career. Having failed to become UN Secretary General, she soon enters a new life - possibly as a movie star. Admittedly, this might be a grave exaggeration, as the film in question will be a documentary on Vīķe-Freiberga, and thus probably not a box-office hit.

As a new president will move into Riga castle on 1 July this year - possibly Foreign Minister Sandra Kalniete - Vīķe-Freiberga might reflect upon how to assume her rightful role in history books. However, she might not have to think for long, as a documentary film on her life has recently been put into production.

The documentary is to illustrate Vīķe-Freiberga's lifetime achievements against the backdrop of Latvian history from the 1920s. The director, Vilnis Kalnaellis, will have full access to the presidential film and video archives. The "Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga story" will not be opening at theatres before the end of the year, but the film is intended to be launched on the international as well as the domestic market.

However, public expectations might be higher for a potential sequel in four years' time - possibly starring Sandra Kalniete. The fact is that a "Sandra Kalniete story" might prove much more interesting for a movie audience than that of Vīķe-Freiberga.

In 2001, Kalniete published a book about the deportation of her family to Siberia during the Stalin era - With dancing shoes in Siberian snows (Ar balles kurpēm Sibīrijas sniegos). The story of her early life became an international bestseller and Kalniete was awarded several literary prizes for the book. So, one should perhaps keep one's fingers crossed for Kalniete to assume the Latvian presidency this spring - at least if you are a documentary film bum.

Putin's Presidential Pseudo-News

Putin will not run for a third presidential term in 2008. This is a message that he has been repeating every other month over the past years. Still, it was one of the top stories of international media today. Why is it that this is considered so important news as to reach the headlines of respected news sources throughout the globe next to every time that Putin says he will step down from power in 2008? The answer might be that this is the effect of a well-orchestrated media-coup by Putin's political spin-doctors - the political technologists.

News should always be considered critically by those who receive it. What essentially constitutes news should also be filtered by those whose profession it is - journalists and editors. As the mere term indicates, news should also present something new to its audience. How is it then that something which is news to nobody is repeatedly treated as such?

Should not any journalist in his sound mind defer from reporting what everyone already knows: That Putin does not want to remain Russia's president after 2008. On the contrary, if Putin would declare that he will run for a third presidential term and thus change the constitution, then it would be news of great significance. Until then, this is not the case.

Putin's repeated denial of furher presidential ambitions is perhaps - paradoxically - the main reason why journalists are so susceptible to this message. A climate has been created in which Putin's statement of facts becomes a crescendo of denials in anticipation of the orgiastic eruption when he finally comes out of the closet: "Yes, I will run for a third term! Yes, I will change the constitution! Yes, I cannot live without power! Yes, I am dizzy with success!" Putin's "No" becomes a resounding "Yes!!!" in the ears of media and the public.

That journalists and political analysts alike miss to comprehend Putin's "No" is partly explained by all the rumours that have reverberated throughout Moscow over the years. The question whether Putin will stay in power after 2008 has been a recurrent theme in all political discussions. Still, the answer has been the same all along, namely that the president respects the constitution and thus has no ambtion to change the fact that his tenure of power will end once his term runs out. So, rumours to the opposite must originate from somewhere else. One source might be the president himself by proxy of his "political technologists."

Why might this be the case? Putin has set before himself three tasks: to create and maintain political stability, produce economic growth, and gain control over strategic resources. Here, political stability is perceived a prerequisite for the latter two. In the political area, it is in the best interest of power that a climate of uncertainty prevails on whether Putin will continue in power. As long as this is the case, potential contenders will keep a low profile and nobody of significance will challenge Putin as long as he retains apparent popular support. Thus, Putin avoids running the risk of becoming a lame duck, and his political succession may be handled in an orderly manner by the Kremlin entourage that forms his basis of power. A measure of uncertainty for the public thus becomes an instrument of certainty for power, and thus the political tools for developing economic growth and gaining control over strategic resources is maintained.

Personally, it actually appears that Putin is weary with power and the constant obligations it involves. Associates at times describe him as disinterested with the chores of his office, allocating an increasing amount of time to activities normally not associated with the exercise of power. Also, Putin does not seem to be the sort of politician that thrives on power - to the opposite of what is often claimed in view of his extremely power-oriented policies.

Here also his KGB-background is regarded a reason why Putin would cling on to power, because KGB by essence epitomises power. To assume so may however be to miscomprehend the Chekist culture from which Putin originates. Chekist power tradition sets the system before the individual, and if Putin is true to these ideals he will also be loyal to the constitution as long as power to the system is ensured. His lack of ethics might also be construed in a Chekist context and not as evidence of self-perpetuating personalised authoritarian power.

Finally, why would Putin want to risk another period in office? His presidency has been more successful than what he himself might have imagined. Putin has restored the Russian state as an important actor both domestically and internationally. The country's economy thrives on the enormous incomes from oil, and a measure of stability has been restored to society. Why should Putin risk jeopardising an apparently favourable judgement as the great restorer of the Russian nation that the Russian people and history might pass on him, when the future is uncertain?

So, the question should perhaps be rephrased: "Why should Putin not step down from power in 2008?" So far, few substantial reasons have been presented why he should stay in power, so the assumption must naturally be that he will leave office.

Still, international media continues to report that Putin will leave power in 2008, in the anticipation that somewhere along the line he will change his mind. This does not only mean that the press runs the risk of a gigantic anticlimax once Putin actually leaves office. It above all serves the interests of Kremlin's perpetuation of authoritarian power while preventing democratic debate on the future of Russia. Wherever you turn, it seems that laughs will be on Putin in 2008, if he continues to pull off this game of ambiguities.



Comment: The full text of Putin's appearance is available at Financial Times.