The Caucasian Test Case

Today, the first more comprehensive analysis of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 was published, less than a month after hostilities ended. In its report Det kaukasiska lackmustestet (The Caucasian Test Case), the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) summarises its findings.

The war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 has fundamentally changed the playing field of international relations and the aftermath of the war will have profound consequences.

The purpose of this study is to analyze some central issues and implications of the war. The aim is to, shortly after the war and based on open sources material, draw some tentative conclusions regarding the consequences for the region and the world.

The primary conclusion is that Russia’s actions have triggered a far-reachingreassessment of the present world order. This will in turn lead to extensive policy changes at different levels as the actors adapt and try to influence the formation of the new world order. The war has laid bare the challenges and problems of the present international system. Responses to Russia’s actions will give an early
indication of the character and modus operandi of the coming world order.

My own contribution is a chapter on the information and cyberwar aspects (pp. 45-52).

Bibliographical information is as follows:

Det kaukasiska lackmustestet: Konsekvenser och lärdomar av det rysk-georgiska kriget i augusti 2008

[The Caucasian Test Case: Consequences and lessons Learned of the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008].

Robert L. Larsson (ed.), Alexander Atarodi, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jakob Hedenskog, Jerker Hellström, Jan Knoph, Vilhelm Konnander, Jan Leijonhielm, David Lindahl, Fredrik Lindvall, Johannes Malminen, Ingmar Oldberg, Fredrik Westerlund, Mike Winnerstig

The report in full [SWE] is available for download or purchase at the FOI website.

Referrals:

"Ryssen valde väg i Georgien. Fel väg!", Svenska Dagbladet, 15 September 2008.
"Analysts Call Russia-Georgia Conflict a 'Litmus Test'", Deutsche Welle, 16 September 2008.

"Ryssland ett växande hot mot sina grannar", Hufvudstadsbladet, 16 september 2008.

"Ny FOI-rapport speglar säkerhetspolitiska läget", Västerbottenskuriren, 17 september 2008.

"Säkerhetspolitiken i Europa är försämrad", Världen idag, 17 september 2008.

"Израилский след - Шведские военспецы выяснили, кто оказывал наибольшую военную помощь Грузии ", Новые Известия, 23 сентября 2008 г.

Analysing the Russo-Georgian War

What have we learnt from the war in Georgia? That is the question addressed in one of the first more comprehensive reports of the recent war between Russia and Georgia. As the war gives credibility to those claiming that we are on the verge of a New Cold War, there is also a time for analysis. The pursuit of knowledge is preferrable to a mere show of arms and empty rhetorics. The stakes may simply be too high to risk such a gamble at this point.

On Monday morning, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) will present one of the first more comprehensive analyses of the recent war in Georgia at a press seminar in Stockholm. With contributions from 14 analysts of different specialities, the report offers a variety of approaches to the conflict, and how it affects the European security order.

To what extent does the war set the framework for future security policy? What are the challenges for the EU? To what extent will it cause changes in the European security structure? What effects on world economy can we expect? Which are the lessons learnt from the Russian military offensive? These are but a few questions addressed by the study.

As a contributor myself, I deal with - what is loosely called - the information war or rather "cyberwar", viz. the alleged coincidence of an armed conflict with a massive attack over the Internet. Some of the views presented in this part, will hopefully be interesting to and put things in a wider perspective for prospective readers. I thus welcome any feedback, though access is limited to a Swedish readership.

The report in full will be accessible for purchase or download from the FOI website as of noon (GMT+1) on Monday. I hope it will contribute to a nuanced picture of the war and present perspectives that may guide political decision-makers, the media, and an interested general public in their views of the war and its real and potential consequences.

The Economist Debate on Russia vs. the West

"The West must be bolder in its response to a newly assertive Russia." This is the proposition made for the upcoming The Economist debate series, setting off on 9 September. The opposite argument holds that this position erroneous by Western misperceptions of Russia, based on renewed reminiscences of an increasingly distant Cold War era.

Speaking for the pro side is Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Representing the con argument is Dmitri V. Trenin, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment Moscow Centre.

Thus, Slaughter initiates the debate by the following argument:

The West should be bolder in confronting a newly assertive Russia, but bolder in a way that understands and manipulates the realities of 21st-century politics rather than plunging us back into a 20th-century stalemate.

In his rebuttal, Trenin starts out opposing this statement accordingly:

Those who argue that the West should be bolder in its response to a newly assertive Russia are trying to use their memories of the past to deal with a very different present and a highly uncertain future.

The debate will span over the period 9-19 September with rebuttals on the 12th and closing arguments on the 17th. The winner will be announced on the 19th, and topics covered be open for discussion and comments until 26 September.

Registered users will be able to vote surrepetisiously for either alternative during the ten day debate. Following the Oxonian tradition, "members of the House will be thus allowed to "cross the floor" by such vote if arguments are convinving enough to turn their opinion. Questions to the contrahents may be sent in via the Chairman, viz. moderator, who will act as arbiter in selecting those of relevance for further dissection in debate.

The Economist presents the following background for the debate:

Russia’s incursion into neighboring Georgia has Western governments worried about renewed Russian assertiveness. The diplomatic frost between America and Russia remains at a level not seen since the cold war, leading to predictable results: Russian/NATO joint military exercises cancelled, private energy co-operation agreements withdrawn, foreign ministers returned home. Is Russia’s intention to upset the current international order, or is it responding directly to the widening sphere of American influence in former Soviet countries (for example, the promise of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia)? Can the European Union speak with one voice and take the diplomatic lead? Or must America protect the world order by standing up to Russia to prove that any form of aggression comes at a cost? Finally, are we witnessing the dawn of a second cold war, in which the West should resist the lure of appeasement?

So, are we in for a heated debate, as East and West seem juxtaposed in a renewed wrestle for right and wrong, power and glory, or simply for the petty interests of their own pockets in a fight for survival spanning ever greater tracts of the world?

That is certainly one purpose of debate, in attracting interest to a sensitive and precarious situation in world affairs. Still, choosing a softy like dear Dmitri to stand for the Russian side and not a heavy-hitter better representative of currrent moods in Moscow may not be the best approach in the pursuit of any profounder realities. Still, it warrants for an interesting and nuanced debate of a character not widely found in these days. I for one will certainly follow the debate with great interest and also invite others to join in the conversation.

Kazakh Crimes or Borat's Chimes?

As Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Washington last week, his meetings with top US officials - including president Bush - was overshadowed by the launch of British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen's upcoming movie: "Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan."

The British comedian - depicting the fictional Kazakh journalist Borat - has long been a nail in the eye for Kazakhstan's efforts to create a positive international image for the country. Cohen's character instead produces an image of a backward country on the verge of civilisation run by a comic dictator. Over the past years, Kazakh authorities have gone to great lengths to counter the "Borat image" of the country, and its foreign minister has even threatened to sue Cohen in Britain for smearing Kazakhstan. Also, Borat's official website in Kazakhstan has been closed down by authorities, provoking widespread protests internationally, from among others Reporters Without Borders. The issue has grown to such proportions that Kazakhstan chose to publish a four page ad in both The New York Times and Washington Post for Nazarbayev's visit in the US. The only problem was that the ads only served to emphasise the comic image of Kazakhstan by attributing the country's successes to Nazarbayev himself.

Still, the question is if Borat's image of Kazakhstan is the one that an initiated Western audience would like to get across to the general public. It would seem that greater issues are at stake such as human rights and democracy. Several critical voices were raised before Nazarbayev's visit to the US, but they were later largely overshadowed by on the one hand the message the Bush administration wanted to send and on the other by Sascha "Borat" Cohen's media coup. Critical issues were thus largely left out.

One leading analyst, S. Frederick Starr of Johns Hopkins, though succeded in getting access to the media by a column in the Washington Post. The only problem was that Starr joined the crowd of those paying tribute to Kazakhstan's progress in recent years, thus furhter defusing a potentially embarassing situation for the White House wanting to avoid questions on the human rights and democracy situation. It is true that Starr was right in pointing to improvements on many levels, in contrast to a generally dark depiction in the West of post-soviet republics. However, this does not warrant leaving the difficult issues out. Also, Starr's article in the post stands in contrast to the negative story the Post published but little over a month ago.

Kazakhstan is, essentially, a country run as a corrupt company by one family, namely that of president Nazarbayev himself. In June, Nazarbayev's son-in-law became chief of the country's gas and oil company, whereas the presidential daughter is a key stake-holder in one of Kazakstan's largest banks. Another daughter is party leader and MP, with a husband serving as deputy foreign minister. It is in this autocratic climate that little room is left for democracy and human rights, and magnanimous ideas - such as turning the flow of Siberian rivers - are increasingly coming into vogue. This is perhaps no wonder as Nursultan Nazarbayev received 91% of votes in the rigged December 2005 presidential elections.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticised Kazakhstan for severe human rights violations, lack of democracy and persecution of political opposition groups and independent media. Furthermore, authorities keep a close check on all NGOs and registration is mandatory. The freedom of organisation is thus legally circumscribed. Moreover, Kazakshtan was rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International in its 2004 report. It is with such a country that the US has so cordial relations.

Then, what is the White House position on these issues? Meeting Nazarbayev last Friday, president Bush praised Kazakhstan for its "commitment to institutions that will enable liberty to flourish." Also, during his visit to Astana in May, vice-president Dick Cheney declared the country a "key strategic partner of the United States” in its war on terror. Besides the war on terror, oil is the main reason for the Bush administration's cordial relations with Kazakhstan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) is a key strategic asset for the West in the future access to oil from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the BTC is dependent on the inflow of Kazakh oil for long-term profitability.

Therefore, a new Great Game between Russia and the West over the energy resources of Central Asia is played by mighty international commercial interests, in which US companies have a high stake. Earlier this year, Russia won a small victory in this new Great Game over Central Asian resources by being promised increased oil exports by Nazarbayev. This poses a threat to the BTC pipeline, as the very same oil that was intended to flow westwards now instead may go to Russia. With increasingly scarce international oil reserves in the future, now is the time of determination of who will control what resources are left. Here, Kazakhstan plays a key role in Central Asia in view of political stability combined with relative accessability to resources. Consequently, it is very important for the Bush administration to get relations between the US and Kazakhstan back on track.

Then, does Kazakhstan matter? Is it not yet another far away country of which we know nothing? For now, the paradox remains that Kazakhstan matters greatly to the US provided that it stays such a far away country, which the US public cares little about in terms of the basic values forming the basis of American society. In the long run though, the question is if it is in the best interest of the US to end up on the side of the rats of international politics in contrast to supporting the people in its strive for democracy and human rights? As the story goes, "Qui vivra verra" - Who lives shall see. In the meantime, the comedian Sascha "Borat" Cohen may paradoxically be doing Nazarbayev a favour by distracting the American public from the real issues at stake. Following Borat's chimes hides Kazakh crimes.

Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.

Russia Opposes Rivals in Central Asia

Russia opposes the emergence of new organisations in Central Asia that could rival Russian influence in the region, Interfax reported on Tuesday. Instead, Moscow refers to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the sole instrument to combat terrorism in Central Asia.

This statement by Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian Duma, indicates Moscow's fears that the US might have a card up its sleeve for a new design to Central Asia. At an SCO parliamentary meeting on Tuesday, Gryzlov reportedly said:

We can tackle the tasks of resisting and fighting terrorism together in the framework of SCO and Russia does not support the establishment of organizations comparable to the SCO in Central Asia. --- The establishment of a parallel entity would be a barrier to cooperation. We don't need pressure or compulsion wherever they may come from.

When asked about the meaning of this, Gryzlov pointed at the US, which he accused of having plans to set up a parallel organisation to the SCO in Central Asia. Apparently, Moscow fears increased US interest in the region, whereas perhaps Washington would not see anything wrong in a little bit of sound competition. However, it is becoming painstakingly clear that the two old partners in the fight against terrorism are rapidly drifting apart in what is becoming a new Great Game in Central Asia.

Russia restrains West on Iran's nuclear programme

As reported by international media, US and EU relations with Iran have recently turned for the worse because of Iran's unilateral decision to resume its nuclear programme. Iran thus becomes in breech of an EU-brokered agreement on a moratorium on its nuclear programme. As the US and EU - in fear that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons - now consider turning to the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran, Russia is actively trying to hold back the West. What is Russia's interest in this?

At his recent summit with German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, president Putin urged the EU to go easy on Iran, as concerns the country's resumption of its nuclear programme. However, there is no great disagreement between Russia and "the West" on the issue at hand - a critical stance on Iran's action. Still, Russian attempts to hold the West back continue. Only today, Russian foreign minister, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, heavily criticised any attempts to impose sanctions on Iran.

The reason for Russia's position on Iran is not mainly political but economic. Russia and previously the Soviet Union have been instrumental in the construction of Iran's nuclear programme. Russian nuclear exports to Iran has been a great source of income for a domestically faltering nuclear industry. Russian nuclear industry, headed by the nuclear ministry (Minatom), have seen exports as a way to survive the economic turmoil of the 1990's. Heavily oversized, Russian nuclear energy is, however, a sector which breathes a certain extent of optimism.

The reason for this is the same as the reason for Russia's position on the Iranian nuclear programme: Russia's nuclear industry is one of the few technically advanced sectors where Russia can still compete for shares on the international market with other technically developed states. Russia's ability to compete relates to a combination of low costs and high technical skills that no other actor on the arena may offer. Nuclear exports is thus of strategic interest for Russia. International action against Iran's nuclear programme would, consequently, hit Russia's position on the international nuclear energy market.

One may, of course, seek other reasons for Russian restraints on sanctions against Iran such as balance of power and preventing further US power in the Greater Middle East. At the end of the day, economic reasons are the most important. In Moscow, money talks and politics comply.