Saturday May Show the Way for Russia's Spring

For Newsmill.se: The political landscape is characterized by an uncertainty without comparison during the Putin era. How the Russian leaders will handle continued mass protests, they probably do not know themselves. We are heading towards an uncertain spring.   


It was said about Hilding Hagberg, the Swedish 1950s communist leader, that he used to unfold his umbrella when it was raining in Moscow. Kremlin interest in the powers of weather has seldom been as great as now, for the Saturday 4 February opposition protests. Weather might decide the size of demonstrations and thereby the power in demands for Putin's dismissal. On Christmas eve, 100,000 gathered for the largest protests since the fall of the Soviet Union - an unwelcome reminder for the country's leadership that power is not a given.

A prognosis for continued developments up until the 4 March presidential elections is something few want to make today. The political landscape is still characterized by an uncertainty without comparison during the Putin era. How the Russian leaders will handle continued mass protests, they probably do not know themselves. We are heading towards an uncertain spring.

The Russian "tandemocracy" - with Putin at the handlebar and Medvedev as navigator - is swaying precariously when the map does not match reality. The roadmap has been thwarted and where things are heading, nobody knows. No wonder the passengers protest.

Russia during Putin may be read as a success story for a country in chaos and disarray after the collapse of the Soviet empire. A political mess and economic crisis turned into stability and growth, with the emergence of a thriwing middle class - although under increasing authoritarian rule. However, the Russian power paradox remains: The more formal state power, the less ability to exercise it. With the exception of political stability and some recent improvements in the rule of law, state governance capabilities have deteriorated since 2004. In Russian everyday life, this means constant encounters with corruption and wrongs without limitations or end. With falling energy incomes, power may no longer compensatre for discontent, at the same time as an increasingly affluent people demands more from those in power. Stagnation is seen in a system and confidence crisis.

When Putin's presidential candidacy became clear last year, to many it was a sloping road without end. With twelve years in the rear mirror, six year terms and two terms, the perspective of Putin as president was 2024 - half a lifetime for many Russians. The temperature in public opinion - the state of the nation - fell under zero in late summer, with some mild weather during autumn, to turn to new winter cold  after the botched December parliamentary elections, with Putin's support for "the party of crooks and thieves" - United Russia. The voter barometets of the polling institutes are uncertain and at times inflated. Still, approval ratings for Putin have been halved over the last year from 60% to 27%. All the same, he would - lacking alternatives - get half the votes. 

It is thus the lack of alternatives that Putin now attacks. He puts stability, prosperity and national unity against the opposition's chaos, crisis, nationalism and disarray. Is that enough for a victory or must he rely on the system - aimed at fighting "coloured revolutions" - that he has built? The answer is uncertain. On the other hand, crisis is not Putin's greatest talent, with a record of bad judgement, bad information processing, hasty decisions, and sometimes ruthless brutality. Caution and apprehension thus signify regime reactions in the hope of improved sentiments. At the same time, the threat of confrontation is in the air. The question is if the system trusts itself anymore.

For many, an end of the Putin era would be dangerous and unrealistic wishful thinking. However, the power of wishful thinking should not be underestimated, when feelings replace the rationality Putin appeals to. The opposition is no realistic alternative, but the Putinist regime's lack of openness, new thinking, and perspective, carries as little allure. Eventually, one may simply rely on the gut-feeling, as Russians have always done - putting trust in yourself instead of those in power, who only offer more of the same.

Feelings are like weather. No one controls them, not even in a managed democracy. Dark clouds are piling up, but perhaps a ray of hope glimmers out of the dark skies of Russian democracy. Are we heading towards a Russian spring, or will there be a new front of Russian cold? The answer will be given after the 4 March presidential elections, but perhaps we will get an advance glimpse already on Saturday 4 February, as people gather in protest against corruption and misrule in Russian streets and squares. The Kremlin can no longer simply unfold its umbrella and pretend it is raining. Can we?

Why Putin Receives Popular Support

For Newsmill.se: If not Putin - then who? The bitter truth is that twelve years with Putin have eradicated next to all viable alternatives in Russian politics.

"Resign Putin!" has been the primary popular demand of the protests that have shaken Russia ever since the country's farsical parliamentary elections at the beginning of December. An increasingly clear dividing line is now drawn between constructive and destructive interests in Russian politics, where the power's mudslinging of the opposition is a double-edged sword in the political battle that is now underway before open curtain in Moscow, but where the question also is whether the opposition can and wants to shoulder the responsibility that a revolution would involve. Here an open letter from Boris Berezovsky - an exiled oligarch - risks setting the tune to portray the opposition as irresponsible western lackeys with the single aim of causing chaos and set fire to Russia.

When one of Russia's most hated men, Boris Berezovsky, in an open letter to Putin appeals to him that he should resign, the question is whether the purpose is that he should meet popular demands or if the oligarch simply wants to throw a torch at the powder keg that Russian politics have evolved into over the last one and a half month.

Abandoned by both friends and enemies, Putin soon has only the Russian Orthodox left to turn to for protection, as Berezovsky portrays it, and the oligarch turns to the Russian leader in a prayer that he will save the country from a bloody revolution. The reply from the Moscow patriarchate was swift: "All the previous doings of this man prompts a single thought. Listen attentively to this gentleman and do exactly the opposite of what he proposes."

As is so often the case in Russian politics, it is at the same time a both skilled and primitive game that is played out and, of course, this may be viewed merely as yet another cynical ouverture from an exiled oligarch, who seizes every opportunity to sow conflict among the Russian elite from which he himself has become an outcast and now has no influence over.

Berezovsky's ouverture puts the finger on a crucial point in the pre-election debate: "If not Putin, then who?" The bitter truth is that 12 years with Putin have eradicated next to all alternatives in Russian politics. Both history and the present show that opposition leaders either are those who have not been able to get along with Putin or they are marginalised and compromised politicians from both left and right, who have long been thought obsolete.

On two points, Berezovsky is right. The first is that the party in power, United Russia, stands on the brink of disaster. Several of the party's most prominent representatives have been forced to resign and the internal conflicts of interest, that Putin for so long has either skilfully balanced or swept under the carpet, are now out into the open. The second is how the Orthodox church is a power that stands above politics. If the United Russia power coalition collapses under internal and external pressure, then it is possible that the church will stand out as the single unifying force, which may act with sufficient moral weight to avoid chaotic and potentially violent developments.

With the December protests, bottled up discontent has been unscrewed and the spirit has been let out. The current critical media coverage - even on television - would not have been possible or even conceivable a mere month ago. There is discussion about a second glasnost - openness. People in common welcome a lustration and weathering of the stale smell of power, which for so long has lain like a wet blanket of corruption over Russian everyday life. At the same time, Putin and his forces have begun to mobilize a counterattack. The further course of the battle and its final outcome remain uncertain.

When Berezovsky from his western exile pleads with Putin to save Russia by sacrificing himself, he does not only play with a Putinist system on an increasingly loose foundation, but he also plays into the hands of the Russian leader's attempts at blackening the opposition. The motive for an otherwise impotent Berezovsky wants to add to the confrontation of Russian society in order for it to collapse under its own weight.

That the fallen oligarch's, Berezovsky, letter to Putin has been published by the independent radio station Echo of Moscow, has opened the watergates for a crackdown on this leading alternative news outlet. Recently, Putin accused the radio station for "pouring diarrhoea on him all day long" and to b on a western leash. Also other opposition leaders have come in for their shares after a meeting with the new US ambassador to Russia. A picture of the well-known blogger and opposition activist with the (Jewish-born) Berezovsky was also recently published later to be found photoshopped with. The theme is familiar and alludes to the foundations of the Putinist system, namely that oligachs in association with western interests want to plunder and weaken Russia by usurping state power. From the oligarch rule of the Yeltsin era to the coloured revolutions of Eastern Europe, the western threat - often with an anti-semitic undertone - has been drummed into public consciousness in order to legitimize an increasingly corrupt regime. When the backwash of the Arab spring and popular protests in other parts of the world now rolls in over Russian shores, it is a short step to pull off some old tricks.

The system to exercise power that Putin constructed during his presidential reign departed from the role of the office as guarantor of the constitutional order in a very thwarted interpretation. To safeguard the internal and external sovereignty, the constitution was interpreted in a way that gave the president a constant and pragmatic right to declare a state of emergency in both small and big matters. This interpretation was accompanied by systematic legislative work, where basic civic rights and freedoms were limited to the point that they were under constant threat of being repealed in practical legal application. The motive was to prevent illegitimate interests from usurping state power, because without sovereignty - the capacity to self-rule - there could be no talk of civic rights and freedoms. This meant centralization of power and intolerance towards dissent. The result is evident today in a system with both the right and resources to repression, ready to nip any negative manifestation of views in the bud.

What recent events have illustrated is a disorientation and a faltering will to exercise this power. When police and security services stand idle in front of mass protests the fears and apprehensions of repression and retaliation have faltered. It is an inner struggle of popular conscience, filled with undecisiveness to stability or change, where questions of courage, morale, and conviction are put to the test not only among those in power or in opposition, but also to a greater extent among ordinary people. It is simply difficult to picture a future without Putin - to thread into the unknown. One knows what one does not want, but not what one wants. This uncertainty is now used by Putin by urging, in his recently published electoral platform, for reform instead of a repetition of the mistakes committed in the wake of the country's previous revolutionary convulsions. How successful this tested formula will be this time is yet to be determined, as an increasing number of people associate continued stability with increasing stagnation.

Putin's credibility as a reformer is limited, as twelve years in power have shown little result despite recurrent plans and persistent attempts at reform. The division of powers between an executive Prime Minister and a reformatory President, which would have driven change, has moreover led to an increasingly marginalised Medvedev, despite the latter's attempts at forming a higher profile and greater independence during the last four years' "tandemocracy".

With the December events, Putin's popularity figures have reached a low. From a persistent support of some 70% of Russians, figures now oscillate around 50%. Additionally, in the latest opinion poll - from a state-directed institute - a quarter of respondents state that they have lost confidence in him. Much thus indicates that the results of the 4 March presidential vote will determine whether Russians will consider the elections as legitimate or not. If Putin receives more than 50% of votes and the election is decided by a single ballot, people are likely to question its validity. Being forced to a second round might however also be construed as a sign of weakness, which could strengthen the opposition in the runup to the final ballot. The temptation to tamper with the vote to gain a appropriate result may therefore increase in the eyes of power.

Putin's leadership will be put to a hard test in the coming months. Previous experiences have shown that he has difficulties in coping with crisis situations, which either have caused passivity or rash decisions. There is good ground to assume that Putin under such circumstances has trouble to reconsider and act in changing and unclear situations. The Russian leadership currently appears fumbling to grasp various ways of handling popular protests, with both concession and confrontation. The overarching tendency though seems to be to tighten the screws on the opposition. Several representatives of the opposition and their relatives have become subject to direct or indirect threats and reprisals. The great protest manifestation planned for February 4 has also been banned by Moscow authorities.

As Russia now is likely to meet with continued popular protest, it constitutes a balance act for Putin and his power apparatus. If he chooses to be too tough in quelling the opposition, the popular reaction may lead to greater protest to the extent that it threatens the regime. The risk is then that loyalty to power will collapse like a house of cards. At the same time, it is hard for Putin to allow continued public critique of how Russia is ruled, as it may lead to the same result in an avalanche of discontent over social evils disclosed. The question is if he will be capable of balancing between confrontation and tolerance.

That most people seem to take it for granted that Russia's next president will be called Vladimir Putin is also rather a curse than a blessing, as it creates unclarities as to which voter groups will be activated or become passive - regime supporters or opponents. The question here is if the mere threat of instability may drive the people to the ballots in support of the prevailing order. Will Putin be able to portray his policies as constructive and that of the opposition as destructive, there is still a chance that he may conquer a positive agenda in relation to the electorate. Here, it appears that the letter of the widely hated Berezovsky comes as a godsend, but at the same time sows a seed for a dirty election campaign, which may eventually be a curse to Putin.

What the outcome will be may be indicated at the 4 February opposition protests - already the next weekend.The final say will however be made only by the 4 March presidential elections. The question then is if fears for a white revolution and instability or the wish for free and fair elections will emerge victorious. Because, regardless of how one judges the Russian regime's ability to weather the storm, the recent protests mean that Russia stands at a crossroads between repression, revolution, or reforms.

Baku Blues

"Shut up! Parliament is not for debate!" Make no mistake: These are the words of authoritarian statehood, words of utter arrogance to an open society of freedom and democracy. These are no heady opinions fired off in the heat of debate. They are the words of a speaker of parliament - the key guardian to freedom of speech in any nation that lays claim to democracy. The country is Azerbaijan, the situation a travesty of all values dear to the Western world.

Some 100 days have passed since Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli were arrested by police in an apparent case of regime provocation. Their true crime was exercising their constitutional right to freedom of expression and conscience, with social media and the web as their venue. Freedom for freedom - its exercise in exchange for its loss - was the price the two young bloggers and student activists had to pay for something taken for granted as norms of civilized society. Despite fraudulent and fabricated criminal allegations, their true "crime" was making fun of realities known to all but raised by few. Did they speak the unspeakable, call for chaos and upheaval? No, Hajizade and Milli simply posted a parody of politics on the web, coming too close to realities of government in current Azerbaijan: A video of a mock press conference with a donkey commenting on the country's repressive NGO-legislation.

However, comedy turned tragedy, as government decided to set an example to deter others from even the most harmless forms of regime critique. With a unique display of foolhardedness, the Azeri police and legislature staged a travesty of justice, by prosecuting Hajizade and Milli for a crime they had been victims of, adding allegation to allegation, charge to charge. In the dark gulfs of government conscience, fears inspired by the role of social media during the green revolution in nearby Iran, may have been one reason why Azeri officials all of a sudden reacted so sternly against the bloggers. Any more concrete reasons are obscure, but for the normal workings of an authoritarian system.

In its 2009 "Freedom in the World" report, Freedom House ranks Azerbaijan as "not free" and provides the following analysis on the development up till 2008:

Azerbaijan received a downward trend arrow due to the increasing monopolization of power by President Ilham Aliyev and the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, as reflected in a flawed presidential election in October and measures to eliminate presidential term limits. [---] President Ilham Aliyev and the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party further marginalized the political opposition and other institutions of democratic accountability in 2008. The government’s fierce suppression of media freedom was integral to Aliyev’s victory in a controlled presidential election in October. In December, the parliament approved a constitutional change that would eliminate presidential term limits, clearing the way for a referendum on the issue. Meanwhile, the country’s energy wealth continued to swell state coffers, stunting other sectors of the economy and permitting the government to postpone meaningful institutional reforms.

In its 2008 "Press Freedom Barometer" Reporters Without Borders ranks Azerbaijan as number 150 out of 173 countries worldwide, and points to the "difficult situation" of media in the country:

Ilham Aliyev’s relations with the very few independent media in Azerbaijan are tinged with authoritarianism and terror. Journalists who dare to speak out about the evils of the regime including corruption and high unemployment expose themselves to real danger. [---] And exposing crime in the country can be as dangerous as exposing corruption. [---] Several journalists are currently in prison in the country. [---] This hounding of the press also extends beyond the country’s borders as far as foreign media. [---] The BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America can no longer be picked up [in] Azerbaijan. There is a lack of pluralism in the country’s media landscape. Energy policy has taken precedence over democratisation as Aliyev prefers to boast of his country’s oil and gas riches. Moreover the president secured the constitutional right in a March 2009 referendum to unlimited runs at the presidency.

One may easily conjure up predisposed images of Oriental despotism - of "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet", but reality is starker than cultural prejudice. A country couched at the shores of the Caspian, Azerbaijan with its cosmopolitan metropolis Baku, has always been at the crossroads of cultures, trade and human encounters - whether conflict or cooperation. After soviet demise, Baku has looked westward, profited from its oil resources, and been embraced by the West, if for no other reasons than its still large energy reserves. Western sponsorship is however not unconditional. Despite projects such as the BTC oil pipeline and plans for the Nabucco gas pipeline, there is a limit to European and US indulgence with human rights' violations, which no dependency on oil may compensate for. Patience and tolerance is one thing, but even the greatest realist would realize that this kind of negative domestic developments eventually may amplify tendencies towards the entire region turning completely into a geopolitical and geoeconomic hotchpotch. That even the usually so market-conscious BP has reacted against the jailing of Hajizade and Milli shows that there is no turning a blind eye to Azeri human rights' violations anymore, especially if put in a larger context.

As the sun sets over the capital on the Caspian, the dusk of democratic disability descends on the people of Azerbaijan. Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli have now been jailed for a hundred days. It is a hundred days too many. Enough is enough. Free Adnan and Emin!

Direct democracy or digital mob?

A spectre is haunting Eurasia - the spectre of activism. As cyberage sets in, the mentality of old Eurasia grapples to grasp the power of the people when politics enters a new age and arena. Is this truly the case or are we but suffering from the same delusions as we tend to when lured by novelties, choosing the complex over simplicity, iPhone and 3G over pencil and paper?

Paraphrasing the 1848 Communist Manifesto may seem out of place addressing the dramatic changes that our Eurasian continent has undergone over the last decades. In essence though, it illustrates the difficulties of the old political and economic establishment to come to terms with new rules of the game, where citizens enjoy and use ever expanding tools of empowerment, where the Great Communicator is not necessarily the President, but the People. It is a transformation from "we are the people" to "who are the people?".

What this people is, still remains to be determined. Is it a demos - people - without krateion - rule? An unruly crowd with its own heterogeneous interests that only seldom forms into a concrete political agenda, but still looms large influencing and potentially discapacitating policy goals and implementation of elected officials? Is it an anonymous and shrouded rule that manages both people and politicians with no saying who is in charge?

198 methods of nonviolent action is a "dummies' guide to revolution," applied to all popular uprisings forming a tattered trace of coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last decade: Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine... Today, such approaches for achieving peaceful change are so integrated in our mindset of popular action, that we seldom stop to reflect upon if they are righteous or represent the will of the people. Furthermore, the very same mechanisms have found their way into Internet activism, as Gandhi goes web 2.0, as the Mandelas and Sakharovs of our age increasingly turn up from out of cyberspace.

We take these thruths to be self-evident and hail the principles and mechanisms of coloured revolution as singularly in the service of democracy. However, if we think revolution, we must also think reaction. Confronted by external change, Russia by no means was or could be ignorant of this, as stability was the name of the game both to preserve power and protect people from a return to the upheavals and chaos of the 1990s. Nashi became the recipe for reaction, to support and not subvert an authoritarian regime. As also Gargantua went web 2.0, we witnessed cyberwars waged against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. This Russian experiment has now come to an end, and Nashi put in mothballs, as Kremlin seeks new venues of state-directed instead of state-inspired web activism.

Why? What have the Russians realized that the west fails to understand? The answer may be the difficulty of controlling the digital mob. As each and everyone can turn a cyberwarrior or warmonger on one's own, such spontaneity is destined to conflict with the interests of authoritarian government. Directing the webcrowds in the spirit of Gustave Le Bon has proven an overwhelming task in the 21st century, as rulers realize the risk of spiralling into new nights of broken glass. Whereas methods may work in concrete operative and tactical contexts - by blogs, twitter, and other social media - it has proven much more complex and difficult to achieve any strategic and tenuous goals.

The Georgian example also illustrates a paradox if regarded from the perspective of information operations, viz. info warfare. Whereas aerial superiority is deemed the key to victory in modern warfare, the winner may quickly turn loser in the information battlefield. The cyberattacks on Georgia in 2008 gave Russia near total dominance in the information field. However, it also raised the temperature of the Russian information flow for it to boil over into increasingly unreasonable and uncorroborated accusations of Georgian war crimes and even genocide on South Ossetians. In one blow, Russia lost its credibility. At the same time, it gave the Georgian government an information monopoly to send its message, its truth, and its propaganda, as most alternative information sources had been taken out. The exception was bloggers, acting eyewitnesses directly from the hotbeds of battle.

So, have all the powers of old media and politics entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre? Realising its potential, will social media be seen as a friend or foe by forces of traditional society? What it takes to turn the tide and surf the waves of Internet activism is a combination of factors: Understanding of areas, countries, or regions of concern with comprehension of mechanisms such as Gandhi goes web 2.0 and the digital mob. A growing but still too small number of journalists and politicians are getting the message and have started developing such competence, but in the heat of battle, during drastic developments, the question is if this competence may be applied to account for what goes on in the online political arena - with direct or indirect influence on the flow of events - and act or report accordingly.

As trivial a statement as it may seem, the Internet is what you make of it. Friend or foe dichotomies lead nowhere, and seeing Internet as a threat by repetitious rantings about cybercrime and pornography degrade the very thought of human interaction - whether on the web or in real life. Statements saying cybercrime exceeds international drugs' trade, or that a majority of Internet usage relates to pornography (in reality 10-25%), just bring out hysteria about something that for most people has no connection whatsoever to either crime or sex, but for whom interaction by social media has become a part of everyday life, including the potential to actively influence one's life and society by the use of the web.

For people, raising their voices and exerting influence, is not essentially a matter of being online or not. It is true, that social media facilitate social and political interaction, when applied to that purpose. Still, it is the same logics and tactics that are seen IRL political and societal interaction. Age-old methods of political action - whether Gandhi's application of ahimsa to non-violent change or Hitlerite seduction of the crowd inspired by Le Bon - are as integrated into web activism as they are into general political action. The choice - as always with phenomena rightly or wrongly deemed as new - stands between embracing or vilifying web activism. Is standing apart, studiously neutral, the road ahead when cyberspace - for good or evil - becomes but another arena for government of the people, by the people, for the people? Is it a choice between greater direct democracy or the digital mob, or will we simply have to live with both?

Russia - a sovereign democracy?

In recent years, sovereign democracy has become a key ideological tenet in Russian politics and society. As the ideology for the party in power - United Russia - sovereignty is perceived as a precondition for democracy. In my recent report on the state of democracy in Russia, Ryssland - en suverän demokrati? (Russia - a sovereign democracy?), this theme is addressed from the perspective of constitutionality and funtionality, to ascertain whether Russia's specific model of democracy has any essence.

In current Russia, the political elite has chosen the path of sovereign democracy. The argument goes as follows: The precondition for democracy is sovereignty in terms of state capacity. Without the capacity to rule oneself, no real democracy can exist. Democratic decisions can be made, but if they cannot be implemented, democracy only becomes a game with words. To become truly democratic, Russia first needs to become master in its own house.

Russia's choice is perhaps not as simple as between a United Russia and Another Russia. In the longer perspective, the question must perhaps instead be reformulated in terms of functionality and governance capacity, at least if accepting the Russian elite's own points of departure. Despite diverging views, there are certain general preconditions for a working democracy. It is a question of whether democracy fulfills its purpose, regardless of the actual form in which it is enacted. The question is whether "sovereign democracy" can fulfill this role.

For those of you, who do not master the Swedish language (in which the report regrettably is written), or do not have the time or the inclination to read some 100 pages, you may instead read the following abstract on my findings.

Abstract
Sovereign democracy is the ideological and political basis for elite consensus in current Russia. Sovereign democracy holds that sovereignty logically precedes democracy. Sovereignty – as state capacity or function – is regarded a precondition for democracy. In order for democracy to evolve, the constitutional order must be upheld. In accordance with the Russian constitution, the president is the guarantor of the constitutional order. It is the president’s – or sovereign’s – prerogative to decide on the rule of the exception, in his obligation to safeguard the constitutional order. Consequently, constitution and function of the political system are fundamental to Russian perceptions of democracy and democratisation.

Accepting these postulations, the study departs from the concepts of constitutionalism and functionalism – viz. state capacity in terms of sovereignty – as fundamental prerequisites for democracy, and accordingly analyses the results of Russia’s sovereign democracy policy. It illustrates how the rule of the exception has been applied, by complementary legislation, to limit the basic political rights and freedoms of the Russian constitution. In functional terms, the study indicates a decline in governance – i.e. state capacity. This decline comprises most vital and mutually dependent areas of governance such as government effectiveness; regulatory quality; control of corruption; rule of law; and voice and accountability. A positive trend is discernable in terms of, on the one hand, political stability and absence of violence and, on the other hand, economic development. In combination, the study finds that Russia’s constitutional and functional decline coincides in time, forming a consistent downturn since 2003-2004.

Having completed its initial bureaucratic stage in attaining political stability, the policy of sovereign democracy is now entering the phase of modernisation. By means of the so called Putin plan, Russia is to re-conquer its position as a political and economic great power in the world. The goal of modernisation is to be achieved by expansive economic policies to stimulate the economic incentives of the middle class and attain the structural development necessary for long-term growth. Russian economy is to become more dynamic, diversified and sustainable. A nationally-minded elite is to activate the potential of the country, in terms of people and resources, and develop civil society and local self-government to redress system deficiencies in state and society. By a policy of stability and growth the elite seeks to rely on the expansion of a conservative middle class as a means to preserve the social and political order. By providing opportunity of wealth to the middle class, modernisation without democratisation in the liberal sense is to be achieved. The strategy of sovereign democracy thus challenges the theoretical argument that a growing middle class will lead to democratic development. By introducing alternative consultative mechanisms to traditional forms of representation and deliberation, liberal democracy is to be substituted by democracy by rule of consent. However, modernisation rests on the assumption of continued economic growth and political stability. It relies heavily on continued high oil and raw material revenues to diversify Russian economy and make it less dependent on these resources. The policy also faces the potential pitfall of inflationary setbacks. Simultaneously, political stability is threatened by decline in other sectors of governance underpinning it.

The results of the study – even if far from conclusive – imply that democratic decline might lead to a decline in governance. They indicate that the greater formal control by government the less actual control it has. This is a paradox of control beyond control. It would thus seem that sovereign democracy policy instead of increasing sovereignty – viz. state capacity – might actually reduce it.

Referrals:
Svenska Dagbladet, editorial blog, 6 May 2008.
Press statement, Swedish Defence Research Establishment, 7 May 2008.
Svenska Dagbladet, editorial, 8 May 2008.
Hudiksvalls Tidning, editorial, 8 May 2008.

Blekinge Läns Tidning, editorial, 10 May 2008.

Dagens Nyheter, editorial column, 19 June 2008.

Kristdemokratiskt Internationellt Center, 2008.

Blekinge Läns Tidning, editorial, 18 February 2009.

Kazakh Crimes or Borat's Chimes?

As Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Washington last week, his meetings with top US officials - including president Bush - was overshadowed by the launch of British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen's upcoming movie: "Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan."

The British comedian - depicting the fictional Kazakh journalist Borat - has long been a nail in the eye for Kazakhstan's efforts to create a positive international image for the country. Cohen's character instead produces an image of a backward country on the verge of civilisation run by a comic dictator. Over the past years, Kazakh authorities have gone to great lengths to counter the "Borat image" of the country, and its foreign minister has even threatened to sue Cohen in Britain for smearing Kazakhstan. Also, Borat's official website in Kazakhstan has been closed down by authorities, provoking widespread protests internationally, from among others Reporters Without Borders. The issue has grown to such proportions that Kazakhstan chose to publish a four page ad in both The New York Times and Washington Post for Nazarbayev's visit in the US. The only problem was that the ads only served to emphasise the comic image of Kazakhstan by attributing the country's successes to Nazarbayev himself.

Still, the question is if Borat's image of Kazakhstan is the one that an initiated Western audience would like to get across to the general public. It would seem that greater issues are at stake such as human rights and democracy. Several critical voices were raised before Nazarbayev's visit to the US, but they were later largely overshadowed by on the one hand the message the Bush administration wanted to send and on the other by Sascha "Borat" Cohen's media coup. Critical issues were thus largely left out.

One leading analyst, S. Frederick Starr of Johns Hopkins, though succeded in getting access to the media by a column in the Washington Post. The only problem was that Starr joined the crowd of those paying tribute to Kazakhstan's progress in recent years, thus furhter defusing a potentially embarassing situation for the White House wanting to avoid questions on the human rights and democracy situation. It is true that Starr was right in pointing to improvements on many levels, in contrast to a generally dark depiction in the West of post-soviet republics. However, this does not warrant leaving the difficult issues out. Also, Starr's article in the post stands in contrast to the negative story the Post published but little over a month ago.

Kazakhstan is, essentially, a country run as a corrupt company by one family, namely that of president Nazarbayev himself. In June, Nazarbayev's son-in-law became chief of the country's gas and oil company, whereas the presidential daughter is a key stake-holder in one of Kazakstan's largest banks. Another daughter is party leader and MP, with a husband serving as deputy foreign minister. It is in this autocratic climate that little room is left for democracy and human rights, and magnanimous ideas - such as turning the flow of Siberian rivers - are increasingly coming into vogue. This is perhaps no wonder as Nursultan Nazarbayev received 91% of votes in the rigged December 2005 presidential elections.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticised Kazakhstan for severe human rights violations, lack of democracy and persecution of political opposition groups and independent media. Furthermore, authorities keep a close check on all NGOs and registration is mandatory. The freedom of organisation is thus legally circumscribed. Moreover, Kazakshtan was rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International in its 2004 report. It is with such a country that the US has so cordial relations.

Then, what is the White House position on these issues? Meeting Nazarbayev last Friday, president Bush praised Kazakhstan for its "commitment to institutions that will enable liberty to flourish." Also, during his visit to Astana in May, vice-president Dick Cheney declared the country a "key strategic partner of the United States” in its war on terror. Besides the war on terror, oil is the main reason for the Bush administration's cordial relations with Kazakhstan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) is a key strategic asset for the West in the future access to oil from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the BTC is dependent on the inflow of Kazakh oil for long-term profitability.

Therefore, a new Great Game between Russia and the West over the energy resources of Central Asia is played by mighty international commercial interests, in which US companies have a high stake. Earlier this year, Russia won a small victory in this new Great Game over Central Asian resources by being promised increased oil exports by Nazarbayev. This poses a threat to the BTC pipeline, as the very same oil that was intended to flow westwards now instead may go to Russia. With increasingly scarce international oil reserves in the future, now is the time of determination of who will control what resources are left. Here, Kazakhstan plays a key role in Central Asia in view of political stability combined with relative accessability to resources. Consequently, it is very important for the Bush administration to get relations between the US and Kazakhstan back on track.

Then, does Kazakhstan matter? Is it not yet another far away country of which we know nothing? For now, the paradox remains that Kazakhstan matters greatly to the US provided that it stays such a far away country, which the US public cares little about in terms of the basic values forming the basis of American society. In the long run though, the question is if it is in the best interest of the US to end up on the side of the rats of international politics in contrast to supporting the people in its strive for democracy and human rights? As the story goes, "Qui vivra verra" - Who lives shall see. In the meantime, the comedian Sascha "Borat" Cohen may paradoxically be doing Nazarbayev a favour by distracting the American public from the real issues at stake. Following Borat's chimes hides Kazakh crimes.