Poland's Political Purgatory

This week, Polish president Lech Kaczyński called for early parliamentary polls this autumn. However, it is unlikely that elections will put a stop to Poland's political crisis. Instead, early polls may propel Poland into a prolonged political purgatory - further polarising positions between parties and political generations.

For long, there was unity to avoid early elections within the ruling coalition government. The dominant party in cabinet, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), led by the Kaczyński twins, has shunned the option of early elections, while going to the polls this autumn, would cause the next elections to coincide with Poland's 2011 EU presidency. For remaining coalition partners, the Self-Defence Party and the League of Polish Families, early elections hold the prospects of potential political annihilation.

Therefore, it is only after months of cabinet turmoil that the Polish president has finally concluded that there was no other way out than to take the drastic step in calling for early elections. Still, having sacked Self-Defence Party leader, Andrzej Lepper, from government earlier this summer, the for long put off outcome seems unavoidable. What long-term consequences early elections will bring is still unclear, but one might suppose Polish politics will see further crisis and upheaval in coming years. What is at stake is how the generation shift in Polish society will be managed - either purging the communist legacy or leaving history behind.

Poland's transition from communist rule was established by the 1989 Round Table Agreement between the outgoing communist regime and the ascending Solidarność movement. The Round Table resulted in a "contract" for social unity in the face of Poland's democratisation and economic liberalisation. In essence, the communists traded immunity in exchange for ceding power to Solidarność. The Round Table agreement has, over the years, been heavily criticised, but must still be regarded an instrument for the peaceful transition of power in Poland, which in effect meant the end of a divided Europe by the 1945 Yalta agreement.

How to deal with the past, has become the central issue in Polish politics with the rise to power of the Kaczyński twins. Their policy of lustracja represents the wrath of the malcontents - a revanchist policy for all those former dissidents, members of Solidarity, or ordinary people, who never got a slice of the pie during the 1990s' privatisation. Their populist target is the "Salon" - communists, apparatchiks, bureaucrats, and collaborateurs, who were able to benefit from the privatisation schemes as only the very top echelons of the communist system were removed from power. However, having not previously dealt with history, has made most politicans potential victims of persecution, as more or less fabricated scandals about a communist past have often come in handy when populists or others have wanted to permanently discredit next to any public figure. Being able to taint leading personalities of the Solidarity generation, has become a method for young and aspiring politicians to make careers and gain power by removing their seniors by rumours and allegations.

Lustracja also illustrates the generation gap in Polish politics. Today, the Kaczyńskis' PiS is probably the party in Poland with the largest proportion of young people among its ranks. Most other parties represent "have-beens" like former president Aleksander Kwasniewski's Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD), the intellectual Unia Wolności (UW), or Platforma Obywatelska (PO). It is true, opinion polls often give PO high figures as the main opposition party, but come election day, voters may well turn their backs to this market-oriented liberal party.

The simple truth is most likely that few of the opposition's potential activists or voters among the young generation either do not care or have found a future abroad instead. If you want to do a fast political career in Poland today, PiS' populist policies - and not the opposition parties - offer the best chances for advancement. Ignoring politics seems to be the mindset of many Poles. In the 2005 parliamentary polls, PiS gained 28% of the merely 40% of the electorate participating in the elections, and has in effect been running Poland on this weak basis ever since.

For many young Poles, they see their future in the European Union. Still, that does not mean that they equal Poland's future with that of the EU. Instead, many educated Poles in this generation seek a future abroad, in Ireland or Great Britain, producing at least a temporary brain-drain, as in the case of the Baltic States. Domestic opinion about the Union has, to the contrary, for long been skeptic, and the Kaczyński twins are no exception to this rule. In the EU, Poland has thus come to be associated with extreme partisanship, to the point that the country has even been willing to jeopardise the future of the Union. Until recently, playing the nationalist card towards the EU has been both popular and accepted by the Polish people, which has seen little in return for its membership. However, recent EU support to Poland in the meat-war with Russia may be a first sign for swaying opinion more in favour of the Union. Still, with parliamentary elections coinciding with the Polish EU presidency, many European politicians may have reason to fear what Poland might come up with in 2011.

To conclude, with populists in power, an opposition representing the past, and an increasing institutionalisation of political purges, Poland seems set for a prolonged political purgatory in the coming four years. The only remedy would be if the country's voters would use the ballot box to oust the Kaczyński twins from power in the upcoming autumn elections, but then the question is if the opposition might have a viable future to offer the Poles, nationally and as a truly integrated part of the European Union. Regrettably, the odds seem to be on the side of continued political turmoil.

Poland & Ukraine Win UEFA 2012 Bid

Poland and Ukraine today won the bid to host the UEFA EURO 2012 Soccer Championship. The decision by the UEFA Executive Committee came as a most welcome surprise for two nations currently mared by political crisis. Beating the odds against favourite contender Italy, UEFA in a seminal decision opted for development instead of profit. By this brave and strategic decision, UEFA clearly showed that soccer is a concern for all or Europe, and not merely a concern of mighty nations of the EU.

Sport is politics. This has been evident ever since the 1933 Berlin Olympics. Who gets to host a major international sports' event has enormous profits to gain economically and in terms of goodwill. However, it is also a big gamble, as the opposite is equally true if organisers fail to successfully go trough with the event. Then, it involves great losses in both profit and prestige for the states concerned.

Faced by such considerations, the UEFA Executive Committee still decided for the Poland-Ukraine joint candidacy. The main contender and favourite was Italy, which already has the necessary infrastructure in terms of arenas, airports, roads, etc. However, what in the end seems to have turned the tide against Italy, are the recent bribery scandals and hooligan riots that so has tarred the image of Italian soccer internationally. This was not the case with with Poland and Ukraine, but this positive image may also prove an unwelcome blessing for Warzaw and Kiev.

Without the necessary infrasctructure, Poland and Ukraine now face the gigantic task of forming the preconditions for a successful event, e.g. building eight new UEFA standard soccer arenas. The championship finals are intended to take place on the Kiev Olympic Stadium, which now has to undergo fundamental renovations in upcoming years. All these efforts will, of course, take enormous amounts of money, and it is exactly here the entire project may backfire on both Warzaw and Kiev. Without an extremely transparent tender process for the fat contracts to build arenas, develop infrastructure or sell Championship paraphernalia, organisers may face a constant media nightmare in founded or unfounded allegations of foul play and bribery in the process up till the 2012 UEFA Championships.

If this would become the case, two states with already politically tarred reputations, might end up with an irrepairable loss of status in European affairs. If, to the contrary, Ukraine and Poland would use the Championships as a vehicle to rid themselves of corruption and power abuse, they could both stand to win not only the laurels of sportmanship, but also the benefits of societal fair play. Consequently, the 2012 UEFA Championships may prove if Poland may fully assume its role as a major European power and if Ukraine will become a full-fledged member of the European Union family. Today, sport truly is politics, and who skilfully manages to exploit sports, will also win at politics.

What Prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

Over the past decade, regionalism has resurfaced on the international political agenda. The demise of bipolar division, globalisation, and rekindled cultural affiliation are but a few causes for such development. In a European context, there is reason to question whether the new regions will prove viable constructions, or if some are but transient phenomena in an overall evolution towards a Europe of the regions. Therefore, even advocates of Baltic Sea regionalism must ask –What are the prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

To prove cohesive, regions should be endowed with political dynamics of their own, driven by distinctive agendas, patterns of interaction and governed by regimes. They may be based on identification, institutionalism or functionalism, driven by subjective factors such as history, culture and identity, or by objective factors such as geography, geo-economics and geopolitics.

The rise of regional co-operation
The idea of Baltic co-operation arose in the late 1960’s out of concern for marine pollution in the Baltic Sea. Environmental protection proved an uncontroversial area for co-operation even for states divided by the Iron Curtain. In 1974 the Helsinki Commission was formed to monitor Baltic marine environment. All the same, it was not until the 1990 Ronneby Summit that environmental issues became a nucleus for extended co-operation. The Summit gathered regional heads of government, and for the first time the – then soviet – Baltic republics were allowed high level international representation. Ronneby led to the foundation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, forming the hub of regional co-operation for the decade since. The CBSS was perceived as ”an overall regional forum to focus on needs for intensified cooperation and coordination among the Baltic Sea States” and set as its goal to ”strengthen the cohesion among these countries, leading to greater political and economic stability as well as a regional identity.” The Council comprises the Nordic and Baltic States, Russia, Poland, Germany and the European Commission. The bulk of co-operation has taken place in the large network of issue-specific organisations that developed in the 1990’s. Success or failure for these organisations may determine if the region will gain a common political agenda or be subject to interaction between individual state interests.

A region in the making?
A region of some 70 million people, the Baltic Sea area comprises major population centres of Northern and Central Europe. It looks back on a long tradition of trade and migration dating to the origins of recorded history. Whether dealing with Viking relations with ancient Rus’ or medieval trade within the Hanseatic League, one may find factors of commonality transcending the shores of the Baltic. History may be used as a symbol of unity in the pursuit of a common cultural heritage. In modern times, the Nordic as well as the Baltic States have often been perceived as geographic entities by the outside world. Larger nations, such as Germany, Poland and Russia, have used the region as a gate to either east or west.

If today, a regional identity is to be constructed, substantial development is needed, beside common frameworks and measures facilitating interaction. This includes improving both material conditions for trade and economy, transport and communication, and conditions for social sustainability in fields such as environment and health, democracy and justice. In both areas, directions of overall European integration will prove decisive for further development.

In the early 1990’s, countries of the region fought to grasp the new reality evolving around them. A number of alternatives were considered: formation of a neutral bloc in Central Europe, Baltic States’ admission to the Nordic Council, to mention but a few. Russia’s October 1993 events – the shelling of the White House – combined with Swedish and Finnish 1994 EU accession turned focus towards NATO and EU rapprochement among former Eastern bloc countries. Enlargement became the dominant issue on the agenda. Thus, Baltic Sea co-operation increasingly turned towards the EU, manifested by the 1996 Baltic Sea region initiative. The 1997 Northern dimension emphasised this overall direction. Today, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all entered the European Union. As the map of Europe has once more been redrawn, how will it affect the Baltic Sea region?

Most Baltic Sea states are small countries, which individually have little leverage in an enlarged Union. Forming EU-policies on the basis of regional interests would offer greater influence on the development of the Union. Polish and Baltic membership in the EU has carried prospects for regional policy co-ordination, which - thus far - have been poorly exploited. However, to form a region, Baltic Sea states must realise that success is achieved as much out of common values as out of common interests. Progress towards this aim has gradually been made by regional co-operation, laying a material foundation for a social sense of regional commonality. To assure long-term regional concord, peoples of the Baltic must develop a feeling of shared destiny – a regional identity.

Dividing lines?
It is argued that international co-operation is best pursued among states of comparable size and power. When larger and smaller states interact, co-operation risks either dominance or neglect from the large. In the Baltic Sea region, Germany, Poland and Russia are giants in comparison to other CBSS-members. While German participation in regional co-operation has been stable, EU-membership has extended Poland’s choice of partners in Union affairs. A country of some 40 million, Poland may regard unilateral action, temporary alliance-building or issue-specific agreement with other actors more attractive than Baltic Sea co-operation. Sharing a common Union framework, the Baltic Sea region may still offer sufficient synergy for both Germany and Poland to find regionalism an attractive alternative. Instead, Russia remains the great outstanding issue.

Inclusion versus exclusion was at the top of the 1990’s European agenda. Among CBSS-states, all but Russia are members of either NATO or the EU. Neither is an option for Moscow. Instead, a socio-economic gap is widening between Russia and the rest of Europe. The old debate whether Russia is part of Europe has also resurfaced. Social and material exclusion of the country from European affairs is evolving. Having conceded to NATO enlargement, Moscow’s main concern is access to the European market. Russian WTO accession may prove a means in relations with Europe. If EU-enlargement to the Baltic Sea region excludes Russia from equal terms of trade with other CBSS-states, Moscow may co-operate only as far as it serves her own interests. This would hamper regional integration. The Baltic Sea region may become the major playground for Europe’s Russian dilemma. In all, if the larger CBSS-states start pulling in different directions, the Baltic Sea region will be a concern only for the small. Such development risks endangering long-term regional stability.

What prospects for a Baltic Sea region?
Hopes are as great as misgivings for a Baltic Sea region. What it all winds down to in the end is if the area actually makes for a region. Functionally, the area may form a region in geographic, economic and political terms. Institutionally, regional co-operation has a distinctive agenda and specific patterns of interaction governed by the CBSS-regime. Whether the region will carry its own political dynamics or simply has served as an antechamber to the EU is, however, too early to say. The future of Baltic Sea regionalism will largely depend on the evolution of a regional identity. It is especially encouraging that business and finance increasingly perceive a single Baltic Sea market. Thus, material conditions would form the social basis for regional development. For over a decade now, we have crossed old borders of political and economic division to interact in the pursuit of a common good. In review of some 15 years’ co-operative development, great progress has been made in the formation of a Baltic Sea region, but its realisation is still too early to predict.

Baltic Sea, region, regionalism, prospects, future

Poles Take Russia to Court Over Katyn

Families of the 1940 Katyn massacre victims have brought charges against Russia to the European Court of Human Rights, due to Moscow's denial to further investigate the soviet executions of some 22,000 Polish officers during WWII. Their demand is full Russian disclosure of the truth about the massacre. Katyn to this day remains a sore in Polish-Russian relations, and the subject of recurrent quarrels between Warzaw and Moscow. Now Katyn once more brings the two countries at loggerheads.

Earlier this Spring, Russian president Putin condemned the soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czeckoslovakia in 1968, during official visits to Budapest and Prague. This display of statesmanship raised Polish expectations that Putin would be the man to eventually rid Russia of this sour grape in relations to Poland, by disclosure of all facts on Katyn. Instead, the Poles were once more let down, which now has made them bring matters to a head.

Moscow assumed responsibility for the Katyn massacre already in 1990, and initiated an investigation into the matter, which was concluded at the end of 2004. As documentation was to be handed over to Polish authorities earlier this year, it turned out that only half the papers would be available to the Poles. The rest was Russian "state secrets" - effectively classifying all records on the people that carried out the massacre. As a consequence, any chances for Poles to obtain justice in the case were eradicated.

As opportunities for legal redress by the Russian judicial system then were further explored, this was rebuffed by the Russian Chief Military Prosecutor. He claimed the case had been closed as there was no evidence of genocide in the Katyn killings, why the normal statute of limitation for murder had precluded any further investigation on the responsible for the killings. This really made things heat up.

On March 6, Polish presidential spokesman, Maciej Lopinski, characterised the Russian statement as "shocking" while it failed to recognise Katyn as genocide - devaluing the massacre to simple homicide. For Poles, this was tantamount to a renewed Russian denial that those killed in Katyn were victims of Stalinist repression. The presidential spokesman concluded by stating that: "Truth on Katyn is paramount to our relations."

The affair produced a public and political outcry in Poland. As the Polish parliament - the Sejm - commemorated the 65th anniversary of Katyn on 23 March, it passed a resolution demanding "that Russia recognize the 1940 Katyn massacre and publish the names of its surviving perpetrators." It further said that "only a full disclosure of the truth and a condemnation of the war criminals can lead to improved relations between Poland and Russia."

As little was heard from Moscow in response to this, 70 relatives of Katyn victims on Monday 24 April filed a law suit against the Russian state to the European Court of Human Rights. Even though the suit is obviously motivated by current circumstances, the plaintiffs are completely right in bringing the case to Strasbourg, as they now lack other means of legal redress. When the case eventually will be tried a few years from now, it will stir up even more commotion in relations between Warzaw and Moscow. In the meantime, little can be done to improve the situation, as Katyn once more has resurfaced as an outstanding issue.

As for Russia, this is yet another display of bad political judgement. Putin had an opportunity of the decade to demonstrate himself to the world as a true statesman by getting both the soviet invasions of Hungary and Czeckoslovakia, and the Katyn massacre off the agenda for all future. By failing to do the last, the impetus of the former was lost. Putin thus spoiled his chances of gaining a foreign policy triumph that would substantially have improved his tarnished image and authoritarian trackrecord in the eyes of the European public.

In effect, the political value of Russia's condemnation of Hungary '56 and Czeckoslovakia '68 was nullified by overlooking Poland and Katyn. So little was demanded - so much could have been gained. Putin did not seize this opportunity, but let it slip through his fingers. One almost feels sorry for him for this enormous blunder. Was it really so hard to understand, that getting a clean slate in relations to Central Europe demanded 3 out of 3, and that 2 out of 3 would only add up to failure? If not being able to clear up the Katyn mess, Putin obviously should have waited with Budapest and Prague, until the time was ripe also to settle affairs with Warzaw. This was not the case, and one cannot help wondering why. For Putin, it could have become a historical moment of great symbolic significance - something people would have remembered him for. And still, Putin lost his chance. Why choose defeat when triumph is at hand?

Poland, Russia, Katyn, European Court of Human Rights

Pride & Prejudice

Gay rights are human rights. It is a paradox that the same rights, that served as the moral basis of liberation from the communist yoke in Eastern Europe, are now denied a group most in need of them. Still, today this is the case in large tracts of our continent, remaining a stain on the very same shield of liberty set to protect the right of the individual.

During the last few weeks, events related to LGBT-rights have given rise to both concerns and hopes about the situation of homosexuals in Central and Eastern Europe. Developments have clearly shown that homophobia is still rampant in the region, but all the same there are promising tendencies in some countries that at least some authorities have started to respond to international critique against official homophobia. Reviewing recent events, gives a somewhat more hetereogeneous picture than was the case only a year ago.

Lithuania

A few weeks ago, a celebrity homosexual was beaten beyond recognition in Lithuanian capital Vilnius. The only reason was that he was openly gay. He might as well have had a pink triangle stitchted to his chest. Homosexuality is simply not socially accepted in this deeply Catholic country, and people and parliamentarians alike do not hesitate to openly condemn this "pariah to society."

Last week, Amnesty criticised Lithuania for not respecting gay rights, actively hindering an EU-sponsored campaign "For Diversity - Against Discrimination" - in celebration of the Europan Year for Equal Opportunities for All. Now, the campaign has had to be delayed in anticipation of permission from Lithuanian authorities. Last week, the Vilnius Rainbow festival was denied the right to assembly in the capital. In response to the exposed situation for the Lithuanian LGBT-community, the European section of the International Gay and Lesbian Association (ILGA) has decided to arrange its annual conference in Vilnius this autumn.

Russia

Turning East to Moscow, a group of LGBT-activists - including several western parliamentarians - were brutally beaten by anti-gay groups, when trying to hand over a petition to mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Their simple plea was to argue for the permission to march through central Moscow during the 2007 Moscow Pride festival. While being beaten by skinheads, Russian police stood idly by watching the "spectacle" afar, only to afterwards arrest some thirty gay rights' activists, including two members of the European Parliament.

Latvia

However, what might be considered a slight improvement was yesterday's Pride march in Latvian capital Riga, organised by the Mozaika network. With the experiences from last year's violent anti-gay protests in fresh memory, authorities now allowed some 1,000 activists to march the streets under heavy police protection. Still, the march has created a deep rift in the Latvian LGBT-community, and ILGA-Latvia has publicly denounced organisers as provocateurs and profiteers, whose actions will only worsen the situation in the country.

Poland

Another partial success was the 19 May Warsaw Pride festival, where some 5,000 LGBT-activists were, for the first time, allowed to undertake the march. Despite massive anti-gay protests, the Pride parade went by without the extensive violence we have got used to see in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. However, Poland remains a fundamentally homophobic country, and the Kaczyński twins, ruling Poland as President and Prime Minister, are among the country's foremost opponents of gay rights. Polish homophobia is, to be quite frank, on the edge of the ludicrous. Thus, last week, Poland's Children's Ombudsman considered banning the kids' show Teletubbies. Why? The reason is laughable: Apparently, one of the "male" characters in the show carries a handbag. Such a role model might prove a negative influence on Polish children, the Polish Ombudsman argued, as it might indicate the small blue figure was - GAY! Lo and behold! It was only after widespread ridicule in international media, that the Ombudsman decided to reconsider her position.

Gay Rights are Human Rights

Protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has gradually become a self-evident part of international law over the decades. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has been judged applicable on sexual orientation, thus safeguarding the same political rights to the LGBT-community as any other social or political movement.

In a regional context, the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms nowadays covers protection against sexual orientation discrimination, and the European Social Charter safeguards the social and economic rights of homosexuals.

In the framework of the European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam enables the EU to fight sexual orientation discrimination as does the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The list is far from exhaustive, and serves only to illustrate how current international law protects the human rights of LGBT-individuals. Still, although many states of Central and Eastern Europe pride themselves with becoming part of Europe, prejudice prevails against homosexuals in large tracts of the region. It simply is not acceptable when politicians and people alike pursue a policy of public homophobia, as is the case in many of the abovementioned countries. Becoming part of Europe means becoming party to the humanistic social and cultural heritage of Europe. As long as this is not the case, the road to true integration remains long. The tragedy about sexual orientation discrimination in Central and Eastern Europe is however that it often is the same dissidents and democratisers who, during the soviet era, fought for human rights, that today deny one of the most exposed groups in society the very same rights they once held so dear. Obviously, the fruits of freedom are sown unequally.

Russia Goes Ballistic over Missiles

A recent US proposal to deploy a ballistic missile defence system to NATO-members Poland and the Czech Republic, has provoked stern reactions from Moscow and citizens of the concerned countries alike, Washington Post reports. The US motive is to create a missile defence shield for Eastern Europe, protecting the region from attacks of "rogue states" such as Iran or North Korea.

The US plans are to place 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar tracking station in the Czech Republic with the purpose to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It thus appears that this would add a strategic perspective to the sort of tactical theatre missile defence that is currently within technical reach. The Bush administration perceives the initiative primarily as part of its international war on terrorism rather than as an element of regional security.

In contrast to this, Moscow regards these plans as directed also against Russia. In response, the Russian MFA stated that "the creation of a U.S. European anti-missile base can only be regarded as a substantial reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe." It is "a mistaken step with negative consequences for international security."

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) - commonly known as Star Wars - was one of the driving forces for the Soviet Union's defeat in the international arms race. Moscow then neither had the technique nor the resources to compete in developing a corresponding system. Star Wars thus presented a new phase in the arms race that would potentially render the soviet strategic advantage obsolete at a time when the USSR already was at loggerheads with maintaining the existing balance of power. Ever since, any proposal of this sort has hit a sore spot in Moscow.

To counter further NATO initiatives, then Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, in 2001 proposed a common solution for a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, instead of a NATO national missile defence (NMD), aimed at protecting the alliance's European members. NATO reactions were lukewarm, portraying the Russian proposal as an attempt to "drive a wedge between the US and its European allies."

In this context, it is interesting to note that this time the US proposal is on a bilateral level, viz. between Washington and Warzaw and Prague respectively and not as part of the NATO collective defence system. The feelings in Bruxelles and among NATO-members are that such a US unilateralist approach would further threaten to undermine the Atlantic alliance, adding to Washington's tendency towards multilateralism à la carte.

Also, popular protests against the US plans have begun to mount in both Poland and the Czech Republic. Recent reminiscences of Soviet bases in these countries remain a mental obstacle for people to accept foreign military elements on their soil. Fears are also rising that hosting an anti-missile defence system would rather make the Poles and the Czechs targets for attack than act as a means of protection. Still, many observers on both sides of the Atlantic also regard this as yet another US test of allegiance for the European states with the greatest debt of gratitude for their independence and security.

What stands out as perhaps the most peculiar part of Washintgton's proposal is how the Republican administration has revived one of its pet projects of the 1980s. Since then, the Star Wars/SDI remains an extremely expensive and technically cumbersome project with little proof of relevance as to its efficiency in countering current threats. That Europe would form the primary target of a potential Iranian or North Korean ICBM-attack is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future for two obvious reasons. First, Europe poses no threat to either Iran or North Korea. Targeting Europe would thus only serve as a threat by proxy towards the United States. Secondly, if Iran or North Korea would indeed develop nuclear arms and ICBMs to carry them, the primary target would be the US and its regional allies in the vicinity of Teheran and Pyongyang - not a distant and inoffensive Europe.

Why is it then that the US wants these weapons in Europe? Using the terrorist threat as a pretext for toppling the nuclear balance in Europe, as Moscow holds, simply seems too far-fetched. Instead, the simple truth may be sought in the minds of Bush & co. Reviving Star Wars is like kissing the sleeping beauty. The beauty of it is that you know what to expect as long as she lies there sound asleep. What you do not know is who she will become when awoken. Still, it simply is too tempting to resist.

Update: See also Peter Finn's update on the issue in the February 21 issue of the Washington Post.

Russia: Motives & Misperceptions

As relations between Russia and the West deteriorate, a growing tendency to misperceive Russian motives is discerned. Russia is not a monolithic power, but analysts increasingly tend to give prominence to factors that themselves cannot wholly explain Moscow's actions. A recent example is the Russian-Estonian crisis.

The current crisis between Moscow and Tallinn has its specific origins, and should come as no surprise to most observers. The basic preconditions for crisis were set already in the early 1990s, and both parties are since stuck in a mutually detrimental relationship. The difference this time though is that there currently are no countervailing forces in Moscow to keep the conflict in check, as has previously been the case. This is matched by poor judgement on the Estonian side. Also, the conclusion by western analysts that Russia is using its energy weapon against Estonia by imposing an export blockade seems flawed and an example of mental bandwagoning among people prone to single factor explanations.

Public opinion in Russia about the Baltic states was forged from the disappointment of their determination to abandon the ailing Soviet empire. The Balts were considered part of the liberal and reform oriented forces in soviet society, why Russians felt betrayed by the Balts as Moscow perceivably strived towards the same political goals as the Balts were identified with. The realisation that the Baltics now were abroad took a long time for most Russians to come to terms with. That Russians had become subjects of a non-Slavic state in which they had to seek citizenship to enjoy the full rights of society was incomprehensible. That states like Kazakhstan might treat Russians badly was only to be expected, as they did not share the liberal heritage Russians associated with the Balts. A measure of double standards was thus introduced in comparing the situation of Russians in former soviet republics. As for the Baltics, Russians felt scorned in their identity as imperial civilisation carriers. An inferiority complex was thus the nucleus of the dispute over the situation of Russian "minorities" in the Baltic states.

As things have evolved in Russian-Estonian relations over the last month, the image conjured up by Russian media is that of Russians being wronged and bereft of their rights and heritage. The difference this time is that there are no countervailing forces in Moscow to keep too overt nationalist sentiments in check. Still, most analysts limit themselves to describe the conflict in either bilateral or Estonian terms, whereas Russian domestic factors are left out. This limits reporting to developments of the same Russian-Estonian themes covered over the last 15 years, and old articles might be taken out of the drawer to be rewritten or updated, simply filling in the new facts. In essence, however, they lack the proper contextualisation to explain why the conflict has taken a new turn for the worse. Action is not enough - as the removal of the Bronze Soldier and its consequences. Context must be added to analysis in order for us to understand the full extent of the problem.

Next year, Russia faces presidential elections. By all appearances it seems to be a runoff between Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev. The power struggle in the Kremlin is however already underway, and who eventually will get the upper hand sways back and forth between the two main contenders. Half a year ago, Medvedev was in the lead, but now Ivanov has made a comeback and seems to be in the best position to become master of the Kremlin in 2008. In this context, Ivanov has used the Estonian crisis to gather his forces in front of a common foe. Opinions on Estonia are by now so deeply set that they may be used as a vehicle to gather the Russian masses. Previously, Russian leaders have known where to draw the line in using the "Baltic question" but now president Putin cannot put the foot down as too great interests are at stake, in who will rule Russian politics in coming years, to risk anything just to preserve a working relationship with Tallinn. As for relations with the European Union and Nato, Putin walks a thin line in risking a multilateralisation of the Estonian issue.

However, Medvedev is also not left out in gaining the dividends of the Estonian crisis. Last week, Sergei Ivanov, during a meeting with governors in Murmansk, declared that the Russian oil and coal previously exported by transit through Estonia will now instead go through the port of St. Petersburg. Russia annually ships around 25 million tonnes of fuel oil, gas oil and petrol through Estonian ports. Imposing a Russian energy blockade on Estonia is regarded by many analysts as a way for Moscow to use its energy weapon. Such a conclusion, however, seems flawed as Estonia is relatively spared of any major consequences for its energy supply. Instead, it may prove a way for major Russian oil exporters - mainly Rosneft - to curve export competition by other Russian oil companies.

Transferring exports to St. Petersburg will indirectly give Rosneft greater control over who will be able to export Russian oil. St. Petersburg port is already today gravely undersized - not to mention corrupt - and much effort has been made in recent years to construct new harbours in the Gulf of Finland - Primorsk for oil and Ust Luga for bulk. Opting for Petersburg therefore means that companies that previously have exported by way of Estonia now are at the mercy of Rosneft to meet their deliveries to western customers. In essence, the energy blockade against Estonia gives Medvedev's interests a way to hit at remaining independent competitors within the oil industry. Consequently, Ivanov reaps the political and Medvedev the economic rewards of the Estonian crisis.

So, should all explanations based on the actual situation in Estonia and relations with Russia be discarded? Of course not. However, it is equally important to analyse the conflict on its own merits as it is to contextualise it, striking a balance on the domestic-foreign frontier. An obvious example is the risk that the conflict may spread also to Latvia. Most observers would say that situations differ too much for something similar to happen in Riga, but still Latvian authorities are apprehensive. From both a political and economic perspective, Ivanov and Medvedev may gain from sparking a crisis also with Latvia for the very same reasons why they have let the crisis with Estonia get so much out of hand. There simply is too much to gain and too little to lose domestically at the moment, that a Russian-Latvian crisis should not be ruled out just because situations in Estonia and Latvia are not similar enough. Giving the crisis a Russian domestic political contextualisation shows this.

Still, is the Kremlin willing to risk its relations with the West - EU, Nato and the US - over such an insignificant issue as the Baltic question? Actually, such an assumption should not be ruled out. Already, Moscow is at loggerheads with Washington, and the US understands that it now has to be tough on Russia in order to have a working relationship. The European Union, however, takes a much weaker stand when it comes to Russia, and when it does confront Moscow it is on negotiation issues such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the European Energy Charter. Until now, Russia has never had anything to lose in real terms in relations with the EU, and the Union consistently avoids putting its foot down in relations with Moscow. That Poland and other member states, in this context, may hamper EU-Russia negotiations is officially treated with resignation in Bruxelles, while most unofficially sigh with relief. Thus, Russia rationally calculates that the EU will never truly make a stand in their relations, why Moscow really risks nothing by a confrontational policy.

Developments in Russia are met with growing concern in Europe, and there is an understanding that sooner or later the European Union will have to confront the issue, as many of its members are already experiencing the realities of a more assertive Russia on the world stage. Doing so, however, sets out from, on the one hand, foreign relations and, on the other hand, Russia's domestic political situation. The latter is mainly directed at the crisis for democracy and human rights and far too seldom at the factors that Russian rulers themselves would deem of political importance. Foreign and domestic factors are increasingly treated as monolithic and attempts at joint analysis are often superficial or aim at the wrong factors.

The result is that it is becoming all the more of a mystery in the West why Russia acts as it does. The West is once again allowing Russia to become "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" for the evident reason that Europeans are too subsumed by their own values, norms, perceptions, and prejudice to follow the simple logics of current Russian politics and society. Then it is much easier to produce an image of a state that once more might pose a threat to Europe - an alien entity accepted by its mere existence but doomed to remain foreign to Europe. Here, the Russian-Estonian crisis serves as a striking example of how the West fails to account for important factors in its perceptions of Russia. As European public opinion turns increasingly against Russia, the risk of misperceptions may become an even greater danger than a revived Russian threat in the eyes of Europe. Russian motives are not always what they seem.

Swedish East European Blog Update 2007

Should a foreign minister be allowed to blog? This has been a burning issue in the Swedish media and blogosphere this year. The blog in question, Carl Bildt's Alla dessa dagar, is a personal weblog, describing the daily chores and reflections of his life as foreign minister. His critics, mostly representing traditional media, hold that this sort of one-way-communication belittles the critical role of media, and that Bildt runs Sweden's foreign policy through a blog.

That Bildt is next to the only prominent Swedish blogger, who regularly writes about Eastern Europe, is a little recognised fact. With a life-long commitment to regional issues, support for the independence of the Baltic States in the early 1990s, and role as EU mediator in former Yugoslavia, Bildt has insights and knowledge in this area unique to Swedish politics. Regrettably, and in contrast to his dormant Bildt Comments, his current Swedish-language blogging efforts at Alla dessa dagar are but daily notes dotted down in the margins of a life as a travelling salesman in foreign policy, and lack the clear views and analysis that he previously provided his readers with. It would probably have been much more interesting if Bildt's critics had been proven right, viz. that he would actually run Swedish foreign policy through a blog. Instead, it might seem that Bildt has fallen victim to the noblesse oblige of his office, by self-imposed censorship. The truth of the matter may, however, be much closer at hand: As foreign minister, life is simply too demanding to write analytically in the precious little spare time available.

In comparison to the 2006 review of Swedish blogs on Eastern Europe, Bildt is one of the few bloggers remaining. Only about half of the blogs in the 2006 survey are still active. On the positive side though, the number of Swedish East Europe bloggers has expanded, including some very promising new blogs, forming potential nuclea of blog clusters. The evolving pattern is thus a division into media, politcal, Slavophile, organisational, and expat blogs.

A decisive point for the expansion of the issue specific blogosphere was probably the October 2006 murder of Anna Politkovskaya. The leading Swedish evening paper, Aftonbladet, intensified coverage on Russia, and started cooperating with Novaya Gazeta. Recently, some experiments have also been made with blogging, by Johanna Melén's Moskva direkt, and one might expect this to become a recurrent feature of reporting.

The most regionally initiated blogger among Swedish journalists is indisputably Kalle Kniivilä of the Sydsvenska Dagbladet daily. He regularly posts stories, mainly about politics, in Swedish, Finnish, Esperanto, and Russian at his blog diVERse. Kniivilä's enthusiasm for his subject clearly shines through, and despite clear and strong views, he delivers a reasonably balanced coverage. The only downside of it is that you never know which language to expect, potentially discouraging regular reading. Still, it is definitely worth the effort.

Another journalist blogging about Russia is Sylvia Asklöf of Barometern-OT daily. She regularly blogs in Swedish at Sylvanien - a title obviously alluding to both her own name and the subjects she covers. The intention is to deliver her own reactions to our time, developments in Russia, and some tidbits about Swedish politics. By blogging, she shares her reflections and experiences of some 15 years as a russophile.

An infant Swedish East European blog cluster is the political, totally dominated by liberals. With the Swedish International Liberal Forum (SILC) as a base, a number of blogs about the region have been started. The first was Tobias Ljungvall's blog on Belarus, which regrettably closed down about a year ago. Instead, SILC activities have given rise to e.g. Amanda Lövkvist's blog Lindrig huliganism (Swedish), which main focus is on the situation of the Russian liberal opposition. Lövkvist - as was the case with Ljungvall - had also a book published by SILC on the topic of her blog. It also seems Amanda is running a blog in Russian called olydiagron, with views from Stockholm and St. Petersburg.

Another liberal in the blogosphere is Andreas Ribbefjord, with Andreas's Blog on Russian and Swedish foreign policy and current affairs. Coverage on Russia is, to a great extent, based on experiences from cooperation between the Swedish liberal party and its Russian counterpart Yabloko and the dissenters' movement.

Similar to both the political and media blogs are a few Slavophile blogs, which often offer interesting views and insights. Mi Lennhag at demo.se provides really good coverage of Eastern Europe with a focus on Russia. Anna-Maria Norman posts various pieces on the Ukraine at en salig blandning, and currently also runs a summer 2007 Ukrainian travelogue - ukraina 2007 - with her friend Hanna Söderbaum. Norman has both commitment to and insight into the Ukraine, which hopefully will encourage her further publishing efforts. A recent Slavophile addition is blogger Bjolso, who writes about politics and society at Ett annat Ryssland and about music at Russian music video blog.

The third tendency is that organisations and institutions dealing with the region are beginning to discover the blog media. Already last year, the Swedish Union of Journalists used Fredrik Nejman's Ukraina-blogg to cover a cooperation project with its Ukrainian counterpart. Now, as this cooperation seems finalised, its blog will probably go into hiatus. An NGO-activist, Swedish Amnesty Russia coordinator, is Johanna Lärken, who runs Med blicken mot öster, which regularly presents views and reflections on Russian politics and civil society. Also, Gunilla Lindberg - a member of the Swedish-Polish Association - publishes Bulletinenbloggen, as a complement to a Swedish-Polish online journal. A nascent Polish exile blogger community is also discernible, revolving around the foremost Swedish expert on Polish politics, Jakub Święcicki. At the Święcicki blog, he writes about politics and society - currently Poland under the reign of the Kaczyński twins. Politics, culture, and society are also the subjects of choice for other bloggers in this promising group of Polish exile kulturnye and intellectuals. Furthermore, the special Swedish system of adult education - the Folk High Schools - leaves its imprints on the blogosphere by Ove R. Eriksson's blog Eurasia Studies, reflecting on the experiences of East European studies at Österlens folkhögskola. The organisational category may also include Göran Dalin's Allt om Georgien - a hub for the Georgian diaspora community in Sweden - covered already in last year's review.

Then, there are the expat blogs. A blogger already known to many interested in the area is Erik Petersson's Dushanbe Pictures, which is still going strong in contrast to his Moscow blog Samtidigt i Moskva that seems to have gone into indefinite hiatus. With Dushanbe Pictures, Petersson regularly posts pictures from Tajikistan, and his photos are really worth seeing. The Central Asian perspective is complemented by a Caucasian, with C-G Erixon's CG Bloggin' - until recently based in Abkhazia.

Among the seniors of Swedish East European bloggers is Murmansk-based Wictoria Majby's Ryska Rövarhistorier, which after a period of hiatus, has recently resumed posting Russian cock-and-bull stories. A welcome addition is A Russia of my own, by Josefina - an aspiring writer based in Yekaterinburg. Writing in English, she posts stories and reflections from a provincial perspective of the Russian Urals, with the motto "Ambition mixed with vodka gets me up in the morning." However, she is not exclusive among regional reporters. Erik i Ryssland is a Swedish expat who has been living in and reporting from Rostov-na-Donu ever since 2005.

Turning to the big cities, another fine newcomer is Expat i Ryssland by female boxer Anna Ingman, who blogs about a training-existence in St. Petersburg. She also contributes with regular chronicles to the Västerbottens-Kuriren daily. Guran i Moskva and Thomas i Moskva are two blogs by Swedish teachers, telling about life and school in Russia. Furthermore, Kina i Moskva blogs about experiences and fashion in the Eastern metropolis. Turning west, Mats i Warszwa writes about his endeavours in the Polish capital. Last but not least, Sweden has - for the last year - had a welcome visit by one of the long-standing Russia bloggers, namely American expat Megan Case. Her unpretentious and down-to-earth accounts of life in Russia have gradually developed into an indispensable component of the expat Russia blogosphere, and she has also recently started blogging in Russian at американка, к сожалению.

To sum up, the Swedish blogosphere on Eastern Europe is undergoing expansion and some of the necessary stabilisation to form the dynamic density needed for a blog community. What is also positively surprising is that the number of women blogging about Eastern Europe equals that of the men, which seems an exception to the international East European blogosphere. A disadvantage for the international audience is that blogs, with few exceptions, are in Swedish. For Swedish bloggers though, the domestic audience seems larger than the international, even when blogging about events and phenomena taking place abroad.

As for contents, it is obvious that the Swedish blogosphere on Eastern Europe is much more Swedish than it is East European. For better or for worse, much of it reflects both the norms and values of Swedish society, and its views and perceptions of Eastern Europe. This is especially so when it comes to Russia blogging, where the idealistic often takes precedence over the realistic, which may prove dubious in the long-run, as Swedish views and Russian realities become too divergent. Still, despite this caveat, the Swedish blogosphere on Eastern Europe seems to meet with a bright future - a situation unforeseen but a year ago.

Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.

Belarus Bans Helsinki Committee

Yesterday, a voice of freedom, justice, and democracy was silenced in Belarus. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee was finally banned by the Lukashenka regime, having fought a long and uneven struggle in defence of Human Rights. This leaves the people of Belarus without a champion for the individual rights and freedoms enjoyed by the bulk of European citizens.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court decision to illegalise the Helsinki Committe was announced by Belarusian Ministry of Justice. Supreme Court judges are appointed by the president, why the decision to ban the Committee must be seen in this context. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee has fought a consistent and continuous battle for the observance of Human Rights in Belarus. Since last autumn, its activities have however gradually petered out in view of the regime's increasingly oppressive measures against it, drastically curtailing conditions for its mere existence. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Lukashenka regime now has taken the final step of closing down the committee by outlawing it.

The pretext for the ban are accusations of Committee irregularities during the 2004 parliamentary elections, and breach of laws regulating NGO activities in Belarus. Last autumn, the Helsinki Committe was fined some 75,000 USD for tax evasion. Needless to say, most of the charges brought against the Committee have been fabricated by the regime. The ban testifies to Lukashenka's fear of the power of human rights and individual freedoms. He is probably right in this fear, as norms and values have previously proven a mighty power to change the minds of people in Central and Eastern Europe. The struggle for human rights was a contributing factor to the demise of the communist East bloc. Creating awareness of these issues led people to realise that: "We can no longer live like this - we have rights."

Little did Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev realise that values and not weapons would become the crucial issue, when he in 1975 approved the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its third basket, dealing with individual freedoms, laid the foundation of a rights movement that was to contribute to the downfall of the Soviet Union and put an end to political oppression in the Eastern bloc. In 1976, the Moscow Helsinki Group was formed to make the Soviet Union observe its commitments from Helsinki, inspiring dissidents throughout the East bloc to follow in Czechoslovakia - Charta 77 - and in Poland in 1977. The inspiration from Helsinki initiated a movement today associated with names such as Nobel laureates Andrei Sakharov and Vaclav Havel, and fellow dissidents like Yelena Bonner, Adam Michnik, and Jacek Kuron.

The Helsinki Final Act to this day stands out as a beacon for freedom and enlightenment in the eyes of the oppressed throughout the Eurasian hemisphere. By linking peace and security with the respect for human rights, soft security in the 1980s made the difference for change whereas hard security spiralled into an arms race threatening our very existence. Instead, by the recognition of universal rights, humanity became the salvation for mankind. Today, peace is secured but the Helsinki rights live on - as self-evident and inalienable as those of the American bill of rights.

When Lukashenka now bans the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, it is because he understands that it is a threat to his power. What he does not realise is that ideas, norms, and values can neither be suppressed nor banned, while they rest in the minds of people. Lukashenka may deprive the people of their rights, but he cannot silence the voices of the people calling for freedom and justice. Instead, robbing the people of their rights only leaves them with a feeling that they are bereaved of what is intrinsically theirs. It only serves to further spur them to better know and act upon their rights and duties, and by exercising them bring about change. It is with this in mind, one realises that the ban of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee is yet another step towards a level of repression that in the end will produce a counter-reaction. Sooner or later the people will rise to the challenge of reinstating freedom and democracy in Belarus. That day, come when it may, will inevitably mean the downfall of Lukashenka and his dictatorial accomplices.

Belarus, human rights, Helsinki Committee, ban

Belarus: Crackdown on Opposition

Two weeks before the 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, the Lukashenko regime is now orchestrating a heavy crackdown on the Belarusian opposition, RFE/RL Newsline reports.

On March 2, police clamped down on the largest opposition rally since 1999, gathering some 3,000 people in central Minsk, in support of united opposition presidential candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich. In a separate action the same day, police also beat and arrested another of the presidential candidates, Alyaksandr Kazulin.

It now seems that the only candidate that in reality will be allowed to run for the presidency will be the president himself, Alyaksandr Lukashenka. It thus seems correct that "This isn't an election. It's a sham," as BBC quoted Yaroslav Romanchuk of the United Civil Party saying.

At the same time, the regime is orchestrating its soviet-style party congress - the All-Belarusian People's Assembly - confirming a new five year plan for Belarus. Thus, GDP and industrial output are to grow by 50%, and farm production by 40%. Lukashenka, in his three-hour-speech, also took this opportunity to warn for a western conspiracy to bring down his rule. Calling his opponents "bastards", he claimed that the west is spending "hundreds of million" dollars to oust him from power, and that the Belarusian KGB had "busted 72 organizations" that were conspiring to overthrow him. "The opposition is planning a coup", Lukashenka concluded. As opposition candidate Kazulin said, it is becoming increasingly clear that Lukashenka "will do anything, even use force and weapons" to stay in power. In the meantime, a new symbol of opposition is appearing in the streets of Belarusian cities - jeans ribbons clad on lampposts and fences.

Western concern for developments in Belarus is also rising. The EU is following the situation in Belarus with extra attention and worries in Bruxelles are great that things will get out of hand and turn into violent clashes between regime and opposition. Yesterday, a Polish government spokesman also declared that Poland might not recognise Lukashenka as the legitimate ruler of Belarus, according to Polish daily Rzeczpospolita. Worries are also great that a recently adopted law - permitting police to open fire on illegal demonstrators - will be used, and that opposition protests thus will be met by lethal force.

The massive regime crackdown in combination with the fact that the opposition was able to rally that many people for a demonstration might indicate that Lukashenka's grip on power is not so absolute as was expected. Developments in Belarus are becoming very worrisome two weeks before the elections, and who knows to what lengths Lukashenka is willing to go to remain in power. Memories of the orange revolution in Ukraine are still fresh, and the regime seems intent to prevent any similar turn of events in Belarus - come what may. Hopefully, we will not witness blood in the streets of Minsk on March 19, but we cannot eliminate the possibility that this will be the case.

Belarus, opposition, demonstrations, oppression, Lukashenko