Russia Opposes Rivals in Central Asia

Russia opposes the emergence of new organisations in Central Asia that could rival Russian influence in the region, Interfax reported on Tuesday. Instead, Moscow refers to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the sole instrument to combat terrorism in Central Asia.

This statement by Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian Duma, indicates Moscow's fears that the US might have a card up its sleeve for a new design to Central Asia. At an SCO parliamentary meeting on Tuesday, Gryzlov reportedly said:

We can tackle the tasks of resisting and fighting terrorism together in the framework of SCO and Russia does not support the establishment of organizations comparable to the SCO in Central Asia. --- The establishment of a parallel entity would be a barrier to cooperation. We don't need pressure or compulsion wherever they may come from.

When asked about the meaning of this, Gryzlov pointed at the US, which he accused of having plans to set up a parallel organisation to the SCO in Central Asia. Apparently, Moscow fears increased US interest in the region, whereas perhaps Washington would not see anything wrong in a little bit of sound competition. However, it is becoming painstakingly clear that the two old partners in the fight against terrorism are rapidly drifting apart in what is becoming a new Great Game in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul

Last week, International Crisis Group issued a new policy brief on developments in Uzbekistan - "Uzbekistan in for the Long Haul." In it, ICG gives a dark picture of future developments in the country, after the May 2005 Andijon massacre. As western relations with Tashkent have been frozen ever since, ICG advocates long-term measures to deal with the Karimov regime, partly based on a regional perspective. As for US-Uzbeki relations, one may, however, question whether ICG's analysis may be wholly correct.

In its analysis, ICG claims that "Uzbekistan is well down the path of self-destruction," where the "elite prospers while the majority lives in worsening poverty." The country is marred by political repression and economic misrule, and president Karimov has stopped any further attempts at political and economic reform. "Religious and political repression and worsening living standards have raised domestic tensions and provoked violence," ICG reports.

Uzbekistan is also depicted as a regional threat. Primarily, the country is a source of trafficking in drugs and people, and thereby complicates regional measures to deal with these problems, in relation to Afghanistan and the region as a whole. Furthermore, the threat of violence that Karimov poses to his own citizens may spark a refugee crisis if political and religious repression would peak and things would come to the worst. That Tashkent consistently tries to spoil any attempts at regional cooperation only adds to the picture of Uzbekistan as a potential threat to Central Asia. Already at this point, Karimov-imposed border closures and trade restrictions on neighbour countries, significantly hampers regional development. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has thus far been negative to cooperate with its neighbours on common concerns and resources, such as water, energy, and infrastructure. All in all, ICG claims that "Uzbekistan could well become the centre of instability in Central Asia in the medium to long term."

Despite this dark picture one may only agree with ICG that the "government in Tashkent is not at risk of imminent collapse." However, on the regional level one should perhaps pause to ponder whether ICG is completely right in its concerns and predictions. It is true that western policies towards Uzbekstan have failed. Support to develop "political and economic openness" was simply not in the interest of Karimov's regime. The question is whether this was in the interest of the US. It is quite obvious that western sanction policy imposed after the Andijon massacre remains a resounding failure. Thus, ICG reports that "relations with Europe and the US are the worst since independence in 1991." As far as this may be correct regarding Europe, one should perhaps be cautious to draw the same conclusion as for the US, as indicated above. The main question is whether the prospects of a volatile process of democratisation in Uzbekistan is in the interest of US policy in Central Asia.

By now, it would appear a well-established fact that democracies are stable but democratisation is shaky. Therefore, one might, contrary to ICG's argument, assume that the US is quite happy with the current situation. The Andijon massacre gave the US a convenient excuse to get the issue of democratisation off the agenda, thus avoiding further confrontation with Karimov. The situation allows the US and Uzbekistan respectively to go about their own business without the fear of interference by the other. On the official level, relations may well be frozen, but this this also leaves room for informal cooperation and tacit agreement on matters of mutual importance. One may also question whether it really is so important for the US to have "influence with the Karimov government" as long as conditions for US policy in Central Asia remain stable. Given this, who rules Uzbekistan is of little interest to the US. That the US implicitly has chosen to acquiesce with the situation is probably because further confrontation might have posed a threat of instability to the US position in Central Asia. For Washington, it is better to leave things as they are rather than rocking the boat.

Such an argument would also challenge ICG's assumption that Uzbeki instability could "prompt an aggressive Russian intervention in the region." Firstly, Russia has - for long - abandoned the alternative of armed intervention in post-soviet space, while Moscow has realised that it has much more effective - mainly economic - means at its disposal. Secondly, Moscow and Washington see eye to eye on the importance of stability in Central Asia. This shared realist view, is likely to make the US and Russia act in concert to avoid instability in the region.

Then, one should rather consider ICG's assumption that political and religious repression could "stimulate the undercurrents of Islamic extremism that so far have been more of an irritant than a major threat." That would be more in line with an argument linked to the dangers of future socio-economic collapse in Uzbekistan spiralling into increasing and small-scale conflict and confrontation rather than outright revolution. Such developments might well strengthen extremist movements in Central Asian societies. Extremism is born by extremities - something people turn to out of despair and desperation. It is from this perspective, that one is likely to agree with ICG that "Uzbekistan could well become the centre of instability in Central Asia in the medium to long term."

As for ICG's policy conlusions, one cannot - as a soft European caffe latte liberal - but agree on them. This "lifeboat strategy to maintain political activity, civil society and educational opportunities in the expectation of future change" may perhaps not be the most effective way to support change in Uzbekistan, but it is the means at our disposal. Long-term measures within education, good governance, civil society etc, combined with socio-economic support as well as assistance to neighbouring countries to solve outstanding problems with Uzbekistan, is what one can reasonably do. On this nomative level, one is likely to agree with ICG. The thousand dollar question is, however, whether conclusions would be different if taking a different - more realist - view on stability into account.

Gerontocrat Ghostbusters?

A spectre is haunting Eurasia - the spectre of Gerontocracy. All the Powers of new Europe are deserting a divided Union to shy away from this spectre: Bruxelles and Rome, Merkel and Blair, French anti-globalists and German Federalists.

The new Great Game over Central Asia between Russia and the West is becoming a struggle to either raise or exorcise the ghosts of gerontocratic systems. Russia's sphere of vital interests in the near abroad can only be preserved by control over infrastructure, and above all the flows of energy from the region. This is achieved by catering to the needs of a gerontocratic and corrupt system, originating from the soviet heritage, which Moscow has left the states of Central Asia with.

The West, to the contrary, has a vested interest in exploiting regional resources of oil and gas, and produce safe passages for receiving them. For long, the West was pragmatic in its approach to authoritarian regimes in the region, in order to reach the overarching goal of access to the coveted energy resources. Now, the realisation that it is impossible to work with corrupt and Machiavellian regimes is starting to dawn.

The summit between presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in May was bad news for the European Union and the United States. Presidents Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Berdymukhammedov of Turkmenistan spoke in favour of closer energy relations with Russia, and against developing the westward trans-Caspian gas project. As previously reported, the trans-Caspian gas project is the key to long-term profits for the Western alternative of transferring gas from Central Asia - the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). Among BTC-investors are British Petroleum (BP) and American Chevron. Also, Royal Dutch Shell is about to lose its controlling stake in the Russian Far East Sakhalin-2 project, and BP is in trouble with its investment in the Siberian Kovykta gas field.

Western energy companies are certainly experiencing heavy setbacks in the FSU these days. As there is little to do as concerns Russia, the importance of Central Asian resources increase. Still, there is the question of the gerontocrat ghost - the inability to deal with the corrupt regimes of Central Asia. Then, what is companies such as BP and Shell going to do? Well, as the old movie tune goes:

If there's somethin' strange in your neighborhood
Who ya gonna call - ghostbusters!
If it's somethin' weird an it don't look good
Who ya gonna call - ghostbusters!

So, who might be such a ghostbuster? Who are the energy moguls going to call to exorcise the spectre - get rid of the ghosts of gerontocracy? A qualified guess might be a traveller in political revolutions, with experience of dealing with the old post-communist foe. Who then would be a better candidate than former US Ambassador Richard Miles? That ambassador Miles was posted to Serbia before the overthrow of Milosevic, and to Georgia during the Rose revolution is, by many, regarded as no coincidence. Some even claim that Miles figured in the outskirts of Ukraine's Orange revolution. After retirement in 2005, ambassador Miles worked as Executive Director of the Open World Leadership Center - headed by James "Icon & the Axe" Billington. Now, it seems, Richard Miles is a man without a mission. So, why not take pity on this old man and turn to him for advice - even give him a job? Miles might just be the ghostbuster who - with a little help from his friends - could get rid of some of Central Asia's gerontocrat ghosts. Who would be more fit to bring democracy and market economy to Central Asia and, in the process, safeguard western energy interests in the region?

Russian Triumph in the New Great Game

Russia has gained a triumph in what has been referred to as the New Great Game in the great power struggle over energy resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Eurasianet reports. During his recent visit in Moscow, Kazakhstan's president Nazarbayev promised to increase oil exports via Russia, thus threatening future supplies to the western-sponsored BTC-pipeline.

In June 2005, the new oil pipeline Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan was officially opened. At the mind-boggling cost of $3.6 billion, the new pipeline was seen as the "deal of the century", providing a vital link between the Caspian Sea oil fields and the rest of the world by way of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. This was to become the "Silk Road of the 21st Century", according to Turkey's president Sezer. Above all, the BTC-pipeline allowed western oil companies to circumvent dependence on Russian pipelines to transport oil from the Caspian Sea basin. This was a great blow to Russian economic interests in the region and presented a geopolitical threat to Moscow's position in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.

Why is this new deal with Kazakhstan president Nazarbayev such a triump for Moscow? By increasing oil exports to Russia, Kazakhstan diverts oil production that could potentially be transported through the BTC-pipeline.

The BTC-consortium has for long been trying to involve Kazakhstan in channeling the country's oil production by the BTC-pipeline. This has been BTC's calculation from the outset, and therefore Nazarbayev's decision now threatens the long-term economic viability of the BTC. Over the last years, critics have been questioning whether the BTC-project, based on inflated oil-prices, would be financially sustainable in the long run. It now remains to see, how this will effect the BTC.

From a wider perspective, Russia has gained an important success in the geopolitical and economic struggle over Central Asia. For western powers and economic interests in the region, the future prospects of influence and business has now turned somewhat more bleak than a year back, when the BTC held the promises to open up Central Asia's reources to the world. Whether Moscow will use its regained influence to make money or as a political lever on an oil-dependent West, will have great consequences for the future of Eurasia and, potentially, the world economy.

Russia, Kazakhstan, great game, energy, oil, gas, pipeline, BTC, Nazarbayev

Presidential Termination

In July 2010, some 2,000 researchers from all over the world will gather in Stockholm for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. For a week, issues related to Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia will be discussed at over 400 seminars and panels.

The International Council for East and Central European Studies (ICCEES) is the academic world organisation of analysts within this field. The ICCEES World Congress is a quintennial event, which last took place in Berlin in 2005. Since then, Germany and its national organisation - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde - hosts the ICCEES Information Centre, at University of Münster. Previous congresses have e.g. taken place in Helsinki in 2000, and in Warzaw in 1995.

The history of the organisation originates from 1974, when the International Committee for Soviet and East European Studies (ICSEES) was formed at a first congress in Banff, Canada. Due to the revolutionary political developments in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid 1980s, the name was altered in 1990 to International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) at its IV World Congress in Harrogate, England. Today, ICCEES consists of 20 national organisations, and an additional 4 associate members.

As ICCEES now has passed its third decade of existence, the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia is undertaking increasingly intense preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress in Stockholm in 2010. Reflecting an expanded regional scope, the congress theme will be “Eurasia: Prospects for Wider Cooperation”.

The decision to let Sweden and its CEE Society host the congress was made by the ICCEES Executive Committee at the 2005 Berlin Congress. However, since then, preparations have admittedly been complicated by a presidential change in the Swedish organisation briefly after the decision was made, a consequent loss of instutional belonging, and a protracted interim period.

In March 2006, I was elected president of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia. The task set before the board was tremendous, with high demands on forming the financial and institutional basis for the 2010 ICCEES Congress. Thus, the ensuing work was very tough on the board, and many of us at times doubted that we would succeed. Still, at year's end, we had managed to get the backing of the Swedish government, key academic instititutions and major research foundations. This very satisfying result was due to the dedicated and determined voluntary work of the board and individual members of the Society. Now, I think that belief is strong among our members and the academic community that we will be able to carry through with the 2010 ICCEES World Congress with the quality such an event deserves. This is a very gratifying result indeed, even if it also has taken a tremendous amount of hard work and a deep toll on the commitment and time of those involved.

Concerning my own role, leadership is the art of making oneself obsolete. As president, I had set the task before me to form the financial and organisational basis of the ICCEES Congress. Having succeeded with this, I realised that the next stage in the process was to start filling the congress with relevant and solid academic content. Here, I was simply not the right man for the job, not because I could not successfully solve the task, but because I understood that other people could do it even better. As a consequence I made it very clear that the next step in the process needed professional academics, who could formulate the tasks from their experience and work with the dedication that their trade motivates. This requires the commitment and concerted efforts of the academic community. My decision was therefore to step aside to let other people in and find a solution that would better serve the interests of the Society and further preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. Consequently, I recently left the presidency of the Society, confident that a very competent and professional new board will be successful in carrying on the work. So, with my mission completed, I can only say that it - despite all the hard work - has been a privilege and an honour to head the Swedish East European community and cooperate with the board and individual members in our joint efforts to further our interests and positions as an academic community nationally and internationally. I can now but wish the new board the best of luck in its further work.

Monkeys & Tigers of Putin's Foreign Policy

What are the major characteristics of Russia's Putinist foreign policy? What is obvious is that the growth in oil incomes is parallel only to the growth in self-confidence and self-reliance in foreign affairs. Thereby, the "multivector policy" has finally got off the ground. Current Russian foreign policy strategy may, however, turn back with a vengeance on Russia. Solitude is not a succesful recipe for international affairs.

Threats to Russia
The long-term security policy threats to Russia are terrorism, militant Islamism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, a stronger China, and instability due to the spread of "open society". These are serious problems that demand serious answers. Instead, Russian foreign policy is characterised by increased self-confidence and a walk it alone mentality.

Multivector policy

Since 2003, the drive for co-operation and partnership with the West has been abandoned. Current "multivector policy" avoids stable relations and partnership with other powers. Moscow exploits Western weakness - the EU crisis and US endless engagement in Iraq. Russia tries to be a "monkey on top of a hill, overlooking the tigers fighting on the plain".

The near abroad - a chain of instability

Dominance over the "near abroad" is still the overarching goal of Russian foreign policy. Moscow's increased self-confidence obscures the setbacks in Georgia and the Ukraine. The danger of current policy is that the risk for new crises and revolutions in the Russian sphere of interest is underestimated. The contradiction between personified power and weak systems in post-soviet states constitutes a latent risk of instability in Russia's backyard for the coming 10-15 years. Here, elections counterposes self-perpetuation of personified power and political legitimacy. It is the soft authoritarian hybrid regimes - as previously Ukraine and perhaps Armenia next - that are the weakest links in the chain of instability, which runs through Russia's proximity.

Central Asia - the Great Game revisited?
In Central Asia, there is danger of escalating tension between Moscow and Washington. Russia and China jointly try to act as regional stabilisers, at the same time as increased Chinese influence contributes to growing conflict potential between the two countries. Post-soviet space constitutes an unstable, volatile and fluidous region in the vicinity of the EU.

Making it alone - a recipe for disaster

As Russia is all the more turning into a unilateral and uncooperative actor, one must realise that Putinist foreign policy will face great challenges. Perceived threats to Russia are based on traditional views, which may not be entirely in tune with times. If Moscow continues to pursue the multivector policy, such threats may, however, become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To abandon cooperation with the West is tantamount to losing a potential partner in solving the problems facing Russia in post-soviet space. Moscow's support for weak regimes - undemocratic and illegitimate - will only serve to amplify instability in the "near abroad". As an effect, revolution may turn on Russia as well. Finally, Russia is treading a delicate balance-act in Central Asia, where a new "Great Game" may evolve, if not being careful. In all, Russia is applying a traditional policy on untraditional problems, which cannot possibly succeed in the long run. Therefore, it is likely that the image of monkeys and tigers will prove an act of self-deception. Instead, Russian foreign policy may prove a recipe for disaster if the monkeys were to: "Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil". This is, however, the path Russia currently is heading with its multivector policy.

Kazakh Crimes or Borat's Chimes?

As Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Washington last week, his meetings with top US officials - including president Bush - was overshadowed by the launch of British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen's upcoming movie: "Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan."

The British comedian - depicting the fictional Kazakh journalist Borat - has long been a nail in the eye for Kazakhstan's efforts to create a positive international image for the country. Cohen's character instead produces an image of a backward country on the verge of civilisation run by a comic dictator. Over the past years, Kazakh authorities have gone to great lengths to counter the "Borat image" of the country, and its foreign minister has even threatened to sue Cohen in Britain for smearing Kazakhstan. Also, Borat's official website in Kazakhstan has been closed down by authorities, provoking widespread protests internationally, from among others Reporters Without Borders. The issue has grown to such proportions that Kazakhstan chose to publish a four page ad in both The New York Times and Washington Post for Nazarbayev's visit in the US. The only problem was that the ads only served to emphasise the comic image of Kazakhstan by attributing the country's successes to Nazarbayev himself.

Still, the question is if Borat's image of Kazakhstan is the one that an initiated Western audience would like to get across to the general public. It would seem that greater issues are at stake such as human rights and democracy. Several critical voices were raised before Nazarbayev's visit to the US, but they were later largely overshadowed by on the one hand the message the Bush administration wanted to send and on the other by Sascha "Borat" Cohen's media coup. Critical issues were thus largely left out.

One leading analyst, S. Frederick Starr of Johns Hopkins, though succeded in getting access to the media by a column in the Washington Post. The only problem was that Starr joined the crowd of those paying tribute to Kazakhstan's progress in recent years, thus furhter defusing a potentially embarassing situation for the White House wanting to avoid questions on the human rights and democracy situation. It is true that Starr was right in pointing to improvements on many levels, in contrast to a generally dark depiction in the West of post-soviet republics. However, this does not warrant leaving the difficult issues out. Also, Starr's article in the post stands in contrast to the negative story the Post published but little over a month ago.

Kazakhstan is, essentially, a country run as a corrupt company by one family, namely that of president Nazarbayev himself. In June, Nazarbayev's son-in-law became chief of the country's gas and oil company, whereas the presidential daughter is a key stake-holder in one of Kazakstan's largest banks. Another daughter is party leader and MP, with a husband serving as deputy foreign minister. It is in this autocratic climate that little room is left for democracy and human rights, and magnanimous ideas - such as turning the flow of Siberian rivers - are increasingly coming into vogue. This is perhaps no wonder as Nursultan Nazarbayev received 91% of votes in the rigged December 2005 presidential elections.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticised Kazakhstan for severe human rights violations, lack of democracy and persecution of political opposition groups and independent media. Furthermore, authorities keep a close check on all NGOs and registration is mandatory. The freedom of organisation is thus legally circumscribed. Moreover, Kazakshtan was rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International in its 2004 report. It is with such a country that the US has so cordial relations.

Then, what is the White House position on these issues? Meeting Nazarbayev last Friday, president Bush praised Kazakhstan for its "commitment to institutions that will enable liberty to flourish." Also, during his visit to Astana in May, vice-president Dick Cheney declared the country a "key strategic partner of the United States” in its war on terror. Besides the war on terror, oil is the main reason for the Bush administration's cordial relations with Kazakhstan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) is a key strategic asset for the West in the future access to oil from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the BTC is dependent on the inflow of Kazakh oil for long-term profitability.

Therefore, a new Great Game between Russia and the West over the energy resources of Central Asia is played by mighty international commercial interests, in which US companies have a high stake. Earlier this year, Russia won a small victory in this new Great Game over Central Asian resources by being promised increased oil exports by Nazarbayev. This poses a threat to the BTC pipeline, as the very same oil that was intended to flow westwards now instead may go to Russia. With increasingly scarce international oil reserves in the future, now is the time of determination of who will control what resources are left. Here, Kazakhstan plays a key role in Central Asia in view of political stability combined with relative accessability to resources. Consequently, it is very important for the Bush administration to get relations between the US and Kazakhstan back on track.

Then, does Kazakhstan matter? Is it not yet another far away country of which we know nothing? For now, the paradox remains that Kazakhstan matters greatly to the US provided that it stays such a far away country, which the US public cares little about in terms of the basic values forming the basis of American society. In the long run though, the question is if it is in the best interest of the US to end up on the side of the rats of international politics in contrast to supporting the people in its strive for democracy and human rights? As the story goes, "Qui vivra verra" - Who lives shall see. In the meantime, the comedian Sascha "Borat" Cohen may paradoxically be doing Nazarbayev a favour by distracting the American public from the real issues at stake. Following Borat's chimes hides Kazakh crimes.

Swedish blogs on "Eastern Europe"

It is safe to say that the blog scene reflecting "Eastern European" events is quite limited as compared to "hotter" regions such as the Middle East. True to its ambition of commenting and promoting quality blogs, Global voices makes efforts to introduce its readers to most aspects of the blogosphere and also to Eastern Europe, Russia, Caucasus & Central Asia. As for the many country-specific blogs on "Eastern Europe," there is, however, little information to be found. Therefore, I here try to account for Swedish blogs on the region.

One of the most frequently visited blogs is Tobias Ljungvall on Belarus. Ljungvall, a liberal with a deep commitment to freedom and democracy in Belarus, here makes his "observations of political developments in and around the Republic of Belarus." The blog also advertises Ljungvall's book Kontoll - Rapport från Vitryssland (Control - Report from Belarus). The blog is updated every Sunday. Needless to say, Ljungvall is not welcome any longer in Belarus under the current Lukashenka regime. All the same, he is probably one of the most well-informed people in Sweden on the situation in Belarus.

Allt om Georgien (in Swedish) is an anonymous blog dedicated to tell "all about Georgia" - as its title indicates - to a Swedish audience. It thus informs about, comments on, and promotes current events in Georgia, and things related to Georgia in Sweden. As for its anonymity, it is no hard guess that Göran Dalin and his lovely Georgian wife Ekaterine are behind this blog. The couple seems to have formed the hub of Georgian community in Sweden during recent years - correct me if I am wrong - and this, I believe, is just another of their ventures. As for contents, the love and devotion to Georgia is quite apparent in the blog.

I think many of us may recognise familiar things and phenomena on Camilla Bondareva's blog Ad notam (in Swedish). She writes and reflects on everyday life in St. Petersburg and Russia, and many of her texts are illustrated by her own photos. Bondareva is a free-lance communication manager. In addition to the texts, the general layout and impression of the blog is very nice.

A Swedish expat in Tajikistan - Erik Petersson - actually has two photo blogs on the region. The reason is simple - he started up in Moscow and then moved on to Dushanbe. The Moscow blog (in Swedish) - Samtidigt, i Moskva - depicts Moscow life with Petersson's own pictures and accompanying comments. His Tajikistan blog (in English) - Dushanbe pictures - is so far simply a photo blog with few comments. The pictures themselves may, however, need no further comment. Some of the black-and-white pictures bear the hallmarks of a professional photographer.

Wictoria Majby - a Swedish Institute teacher in Murmansk - runs the blog Ryska Rövarhistorier (in Swedish). Its Swedish title means "Russian cock-and-bull stories" and that is perhaps more of an ironic ambition than reality. Majby simply writes and reflects on various phenomena of her daily life and chores as a foreigner in the Russian north. Those of us who know her, will find her frequent comments well in tune with her vibrant personality.

A UN intern in Abkhazia - Carl Gustaf Erixon - tells about his experiences during out-of-service time on CG Bloggin' (in Swedish). The blog mainly features his reflections from this conflict-ridden part of Georgia. He also runs a photo blog - cgerixon's photos - to post pictures, which there is not enough space for on his regular blog.

Then there is Fredrik Nejman's Ukraina-blogg (in Swedish), which forms part of the Swedish Union of Journalists' website. The aim of Nejman's blog is to inform about the union's ongoing cooperation with the Ukrainian journalist trade union. As such, it is somewhat particular to the ongoing project, but that is also its purpose and aim.

Under the pseudonym of "Annabengan," a Swedish woman serving with the IOM in Albania tells us about her experiences there and elsewhere on her blog Annasblog (part Swedish - part English). She is careful to point out that: "Everything on this website is purely my own thoughts and in no way reflects the policies or thoughts of the organization I'm working for."

Finally, there are a couple of blogs that are not specifically dedicated to "Eastern Europe" but where one might regularly find comments on the region. First, there is Andreas's blog, (part English - part Swedish) by Swedish liberal Andreas Ribbefjord. Last, but not least, mention must be made of former Swedish Prime Minister's, Carl Bildt, blog - Bildt comments. With his great interest in international affairs, liberal-conservative Bildt every once in a while writes something about Russia and other parts of "Eastern Europe." It may often be worthwhile to read his blogs on these issues.

As may have been gathered by now, the Swedish blogosphere on "Eastern Europe" is limited. This is somewhat strange, as there is quite a lot of people in Sweden with an interest in the region. It has apparently so far not resulted in any greater urge to blog on issues related to "Eastern Europe." A question, however, lingers on: Have I missed something? Is this really the case?

Sweden, blogs, Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia

On a personal note...

This evening, I was elected president of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. How it all came about, is still somewhat of an enigma to me, but apparently I was regarded a good enough candidate to fill the position, which - I must admit - is both flattering and a great honour. However, it was quite unexpected until only a few days ago.

The Society is an organisation of mainly analysts dedicated to "Eastern Europe". It has some 200-250 members and is the Swedish branch of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES). One of the main tasks for the Society over the coming four years will be preparations to host the VIII World Congress of ICCEES, which will take place in Stockholm in July 2010. Thus, great challenges lie ahead but also many interesting encounters and venues. Hopefully, I will learn something from it. If not, I rely on my fellow colleagues to knock me on the head every once in a while to remind me of my faults and shortomings. Either way, I am positive that it will be great fun.

Sweden, East European studies, Konnander, president

Happy Nowrūz!

To all friends and acquaintances celebrating nowrūz, I wish you a really Happy New Year, from Albania in the West to Kazakhstan in the East. Let it be new beginnings for you all, and an opportunity to clense the evils of the past - Khouneh Tekouni.

From ancient times, the tradition of celebrating nowrūz - the first day of spring or vernal equinox - has spread throughout the historic and cultural world of Persian influence to encompass large tracts of Asia, engulfing also the Turkic peoples of Asia Minor, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Originally, Zoroastrians believed it to be the day when the universe first started its motion. As light defeats darkness, the force of fire is brought to bear to rid mankind of past evils and offer the good of the future. What better way to make a new start?

Anna Politkovskaya In Memoriam

Чудовищное убийство Анны Политковской – это трагедия не только для России, но и для многих друзей России, борцов за права человека, а также для зарубежных коллег-журналистов. Анна часто приезжала к нам в Швецию. За три недели до этого трагического события она приняла участие в семинаре, состоявшемся неподалеку от Стокгольма, и мы с нетерпением ожидали ее следующего визита. Несмотря на мировую известность, она была непритязательным человеком, внимательным и терпеливым слушателем, хотя наши вопросы часто были наивны.

Анна рассказала нам, что она предупредила своих детей о том, что ее могут убить. Она просила нас защитить ее. Мы, слушатели Анны, вдохновляли ее продолжать свою бесстрашную деятельность. Мы тоже виновны в том, что не уберегли ее. Наш моральный долг перед Анной - сделать все зависящее от нас, чтобы ее отвага и самопожертвование не пропали даром…

Мы выражаем глубокое соболезнование семье, друзьям и коллегам Анны. Светлая память о ней навсегда останется в наших сердцах.

От имени Шведского общества по изучению России, Центральной и Восточной Европы и Центральной Азии
(политологи, социологи, экономисты, географы, историки, филологи, переводчики, дипломаты, журналисты, преподаватели и многие другие)

Кристина Абиала, Хелен Карлбак, Анника Элияссон, Торгны Хиннему, Марианна Хультберг, Андреас Юханссон, Анна Йонссон, Вильгельм Коннандер, Мю Лилья, Джонни Родин, Карин Сарсенов, Ивонна Собис, Петер Сталенхейм, Якуб Свисицки
______________

The heinous deed against Anna Politkovskaya is a tragedy not only for Russia but for many friends of Russia, defenders of human rights and journalist colleagues abroad. Anna was a frequent visitor to Sweden. She participated in a seminar outside Stockholm three weeks before the tragic event and we were already waiting for her next visit. Although a public person she was always modest, a good listener though our questions were sometimes naive.

Many of us heard her say that she had told her children she might be murdered some day. This was an appeal to us to give her shelter by keeping watch over her. By becoming her audience we encouraged her to continue her work bravely. Thus we are also guilty through our inability to protect her. We owe her our gratitude but also not to let her deed be in vain.

We wish to express our sincere condolences to Anna's family, friends and colleagues. Her memory will live on through those lives that she has touched.

On behalf of The Swedish Society for the study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(political scientists, sociologists, economists, geographers, historians, philologists, translators, diplomats, journalists, teachers and many others)

Kristina Abiala, Helene Carlbäck, Annika Eliasson, Torgny Hinnemo, Marianne Hultberg, Andreas Johansson, Anna Jonsson, Vilhelm Konnander, My Lilja, Johnny Rodin, Karin Sarsenov, Iwona Sobis, Petter Stålenheim, Jakub Swiecicki

CIS: Halfling Joins While Giants Leave?

Last Thursday 4 May, breakaway Georgian republic of Abkhazia declared its intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, Interfax reports. Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev were quick. Both Georgia and Ukraine now seriously consider leaving the CIS.

Abkhazi leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that: "Abkhazia's priorities are membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States and further rapprochement with Russia." Last August, Bagapsh openly confirmed his ambition of "Abkhazia's secession from Georgia and de facto merger with Russia." Now he sets the goal to join the CIS by the end of the year, but "Abkhazia's further political and economic rapprochement with Russia is the central issue. We remain adherent to our proposals on Abkhazia's associated membership of Russia," Bagapsh concluded, according to Interfax.

Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev
Bagapsh's declaration was immediately met with stern reaction from Georgia and Ukraine. Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his government to assess whether "it is worth remaining in the CIS," Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. He went on to say that the conflict in Abkhazia back in 1993 had "forced Georgia to sign the declaration of joining the CIS." Now Georgia is seriously contemplating to leave the CIS.

On Friday, Ukraine also for the first time officially declared that the country might leave the CIS. Kiyev has for long been disappointed with how the organisation works. Thus, speaking about a Ukrainian withdrawal from the CIS, Yushchenko's foreign policy advisor, Kostyantyn Tymoshenko, said that "if there are no results, the question arises." During last week's Vilnius Forum, president Yushchenko also characterised integration with the EU and NATO his main foreign policy objective, according to NG. Such ambtions might prove incompatible with remaining a CIS-member.

A future for the CIS?
This puts the future of the CIS even more in question than previously has been the case. Today, few of its members - not even Russia - have any great hope in the organisation. The original split in perceptions of its purpose, viz. political as opposed to economic cooperation, remains. The political aim is epitomised by the CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed by six countries - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. Turning to CIS economic cooperation, it can only be characterised as a resounding failure. Thus, demands were raised to find alternative to the CIS in lieu of its defunct economic record.

GUUAM instead of CIS?
In 1997, GUUAM was founded by the CIS-members not party to the Collective Security Treaty, with the single exception of Turkmenistan. GUUAM comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (1999), Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Its aim was to fulfil the original purpose of the CIS by economic cooperation and free trade. Excluding Russia, GUUAM has remained on the second echelon of post-soviet foreign policy, and the organisation has been careful not to portray itself as a counterbalance to members of the Collective Security Treaty, although it seems evident that so is the case. Georgia and Ukraine have also been GUUAM's most eager members in pursuing a regional policy independent from Russian influence.

Borjomi - a way forward?
To take the matter further, Saakashvili and Yushchenko, last August, issued the Borjomi Declaration, calling on their neighbours to unite "efforts to turn the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region into a sea of democracy, stability and security, to make it a fully integrated region of Europe and of the Democratic and Atlantic community." In Moscow's eyes, Borjomi's outright western orientation was seen as yet another attempt to insulate Russia and curve its influence over the near abroad. Whereas there may be some truth to Moscow's contentions on this point, one should however not shy away from the paramount fact of the matter: Russia and the CIS have little to offer in comparison to the fruits of western integration. That Georgia and Ukraine are the first to publicly raise their concerns whether to remain CIS-members should therefore come as no surprise, as they have seized the opportunity of western integration offered to them by their coloured revolutions.

The Abkhazi question
All in all, one must conclude that there is more to the issue than simply a statement by a renegade republic leader. As for Abkhazia, the region broke away from Georgia already in 1992. This separatist republic remains unrecognised by the international community, and there is no secret that Abkhazia would not survive long without Russia's backing. For long, Moscow has remained ambivalent on how to deal with the issue. As the UN, the EU and the OSCE insist that Abkhazia is part of Georgia, Russia has been reluctant to recognise its de facto independence. Instead, Abkhazia has oscillated between outright independence and associate membership in the Russian Federation. Today, most Abkhazis hold Russian citizenship, facilitating a potential future incorporation into Russia. This is also what Georgia claims is Moscow's long-term ambition, making the issue an international bilateral conflict instead of an internal secessionist conflict. So, is it a mere coincidence that a statement by some half-wit chieftain of a secessionist region would seem to shake the foundations of the entire CIS? Why should Abkhazia's wholly unrealistic ambitions to join the CIS spark off such stern reactions from both Georgia and Ukraine?

A pretext for divorce?

First, it is beyond doubt that the Abkhazi CIS-ambition is utterly senseless. It would presuppose Abkhazi independence, and even then CIS-members Georgia and Ukraine might still easily bar Abkhazia from membership. Second, one should ask why such a ridiculous statement is made specifically at this point in time, when the dividends of post-soviet space are are about to be paid to either Russia or the West. That Abkhaz leader Bagapsh's statement coincided with US vice president Cheney's critique of Russia at the Vilnius conference last week, shows that there is more to this than first expected. Third, the declared western orientation of Georgia and Ukraine - reiterated in Vilnius - serves only to underline the basic contradiction in clinging on to an imagined union by a post-soviet Commonwealth. From Moscow's point of view, the CIS is to little avail as long as the organisation cannot be used as an instrument for Russia's de facto power and influence over most CIS-countries. So, both parties want out. Georgia and Ukraine want to go west. Russia wants to rid itself of difficult CIS-members to better control the organisation. Fourth, were Ukraine and Georgia to leave the CIS, remaining members would, in the process, be left to the best of their abilities to deal with Russian dominance over the CIS.

To conclude, it is remarkable how willingly Georgia and Ukraine swallowed Russia's bait - hook, line and sinker. Provided that considerations to other CIS-members do not prevail, it appears that Ukraine and Georgia will go west while the rest are left to their own devices. Going separate ways in concord is no loss. What such a split of the CIS may constitute, however, is part of a division of the spoils between Russian and US influence over post-soviet space, at a time when their strategic partnership seems to have come to the end of the road. Then, one might ask how much the sovereign choice of the nations and peoples of Central Asia is worth to the great powers of global politics. Would a halfling state join and make the giants leave, it might also well constitute the moral choice of halflings and not of the great giants. That is perhaps also the lesson of our times, that when power talks morale steps aside: "Erst kommt das Freßen, dann kommt die Moral." It remains to be seen how Great the Game will be played, and with what appetite.

CIS, Georgia, Abkhazia, Ukraine, Russia, GUUAM, Borjomi

Five CIS Cities in Top Ten Polluted Places

Five out of the ten most polluted places in the world this year are to be found in the Former Soviet Union, according to a list published by the Blacksmith Institute. No, it's no beauty paget, even if the list is an annually recurrent event, shedding light upon some of the greatest man-made environmental disasters in history.

According to the UN, 20% of premature deaths in the world may be ascribed to environmental factors. "There are some towns where life expectancy approaches medieval rates, where birth defects are the norm not the exception. In other places children's asthma rates are measured above 90%, or mental retardation is endemic. In these places, life expectancy may be half that of the richest nations", the report states.

In Russian Dzerzhinsk, average life expectancy among men is 42 years and among women 47 years. This was one of the places where the USSR produced its chemical weapons during the Cold War. Norilsk houses the world's largest nickel producer, and life expectancy for factory workers is 10 years below the Russian average. In Rudnaya Pristan and Dalnegorsk, lead poisoning is endemic due to emissions from local lead mines. Levels of lead in children's blood are between 8 and 20 times higher than maximum allowable rates in the US.

Mailuu-Suu in Kyrgyzstan presents some of the highest figures of nuclear radiation in the world, due to the waste from soviet time uranium mining. The situation may also worsen as earthquakes threaten to negatively affect containment of radioactive waste in this area of high seismic activity. The situation sets the security of large tracts of Central Asia in peril, while the Mailuu-Suu river might carry great quantities of highly radioactive sediments to the Ferghana valley - the region's most densely populated area.

The most well-known place on the list is probably Chernobyl in Ukraine. Even 20 years after the accident, radioactivy is on such high levels to remain life hazardous during lengthy exposure. The 19 mile exclusion zone remains uninhabitable, and the number of thyroid cancer cases among people in exposed areas is on highly elevated. Even if efforts are made to improve the environmental situation, there are fears of a new disaster if the sarcophagus - the concrete inclosure of the reactor - collapses, or if nuclear waste leaks into the groundwater.

That the effects of soviet reign laid waste to large tracts of the Eurasian continent should be commonplace knowledge nowadays. There should thus be no wonder that five out of the ten most polluted places in the world are located in the former USSR. Still, have current rulers of these states learnt from historical mistakes? No, in many cases not. Recently, ideas of turning the rivers of Siberia are again becoming fashionable in both Russia and Kazakhstan. The last time this was tried - during the 1960s "Virgin Lands" project - it led to an environmental disaster of epic proportions. It seems that even the most obvious is beyond reach for these people to fathom. Perhaps, the truth of the matter is that too many political leaders in these countries simply do not care, come what come may.

Come Rob a Botanical Garden!

"Shut up! It's a hold-up, not a Botany lesson. Now, no false moves please. I want you to hand over all the lupins you've got." Thus said the highway-robber Dennis Moore in the absurd Monty Python sketch by the same name. Taking from the rich - giving to the poor, Moore contributes to socioeconomic redistribution by robbing lupins (la. Lupinus polyphyllus). The mere thought of robbing flowers is a masterpiece of absurdity, but what few know is that reality presents an even more absurd historical parallel.

In the 1930s, the racist Nazi ideology transformed all walks of German life - and so also biology. When historians today speak about racial biology, they usually refer to the absurd idea of purifying human races, motivated by a belief in the superiority of their own race, as for example the Aryan race in Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. What we today often fail to realise is though the full meaning of racial biology in Nazi totalitarianism. As the word indicates, totalitarianism signifies the full ideological control of a society in all respects. Therefore, even flowers and plants fell victim to Nazi ambitions of racial and genetic purification.

The idea was to genetically develop grain, vegetables and fruit, so that they would yield increasingly larger crops to feed a growing population in the ever-expanding Lebensraum of the German people. Consequently, as the Nazi army prepared to conquer the East - the Soviet Union - an expert team of racial biologists was assembled to form the "botanisches Sammelkommando der Waffen-SS" - the SS-Commando for botanical collection. Its task - to rob botanical gardens!

With botanist Nikolai Vavilov, Soviet botany became world leading in the field from the 1920s up till just before the Second World War. Vavilov organised botanical expedtions that were sent all over the world to collect samples, the results of which laid the foundation for his various botanical theories. Extensive research was done at the genetic institute in Leningrad that today carries his name. Botanical plant stations were built up throughout the Soviet Union to test and develop genetically modified plants. In 1940, the Vavilov institute held the world's largest botanical collections - seeds of plants, flowers, fruit etc. However, everything was not as bright as it seemed. Enter villain!

Trofim Lysenko was the Soviet biologist of the times who came to say what power and ideology wanted most - a theory on the inheritance of acquired qualities. In its most absurd versions, knowledge and skills were passed on to new generations, which fitted the image of building a new Soviet Man - Homo Sovieticus. Coming from poor circumstances, Lysenko was just the "barefoot scientist" that the Communists needed to clamp down on and discredit "bourgeois science." Being a biologist, the obvious first target was genetics. Consequently, Lysenko started a campaign to eradicate genetical science in the Soviet Union, leading to a policy of political extermination of scientific opponents. Thus, in 1940, Nikolai Vavilov - as the most prominent geneticist of his time - was imprisoned for "bourgeois pseudoscience" and eventually died of malnutrition in jail in 1943.

Then, what about the SS-Commando for botanical collection? During Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the SS-Commando was deployed to collect as much as possible of the plant samples from plant stations of the Vavilov institute throughout the USSR. Its mission resulted in the greatest theft in history of the genetic inheritance from a single nation. Samples were collected and brought back to the Third Reich for cultivation. Led by German botanist Heinz Brücher, who had long experience from expeditions to China and Central Asia, the Commando succeeded in gathering samples from most Vavilov plant stations in the USSR, though never being able to conquer the Vavilov institute itself in besieged Leningrad.

After the war, Brücher escaped to Latin America, where he continued his research. As the Cold War began, focus turned away from Nazi crimes and Brücher could gradually regain his position as a revered scholar. In secrecy, he returned to Europe to collect the samples he had robbed from the Soviet Union and recultivated in Austria. In 1972, Brücher even became an expert on agriculture and biology for UNESCO. Rumour even has it that he visited the USSR and that the KGB then extorted him into handing over some of his research results along with plant samples he had once robbed the Soviet Union of.

As in many other cases with Nazi crimes, apologists have tried to belittle also this massive theft of genetic resources. Thus, Brücher is said to have saved the Soviet genetic heritage from certain destruction, as Lysenko's policy eventually would have been sure to eradicate the majority of genetic collections in the USSR regardless of the war. However, such speculations do not change the question of guilt. Brücher therefore goes down in history as the greatest genetical robber yet.

Perhaps as a sign of remorse, he used the last years of his life to develop the virus estalla - a virus that was intended to hit the coca plant, and thus cocaine production in Latin America. In 1991, Brücher was brutally murdered in his home in Argentina. There have been speculations that the murder was ordered by Colombian drug barons, fearing that his research results would threaten cocaine production.

Although the image of robbers carrying off entire botanical gardens, seems ludicruous at first thought, the Brücher SS-Commando was the first recorded case of "biopiracy" in history, and to this day also remains the largest.

In 1993, the United Nations adopted the Convention of Biological Diversity for the protection of the genetic heritage of all nations. To this day, however, drug and agricultural companies explore nature to find plants, which they can put to commercial use, developing new drugs or crops. Of course, the biggest unexploited genetic depositories are in developing countries, which themselves are candidly bereft of their resources. Some things never seem to change.

Perhaps, the Monty Python hero of Dennis Moore has greater relevance today than ever - "taking from the rich - giving to the poor" - the genetic heritage that history and present has taken from the poor and helpless. This is equally true for the peoples of the Soviet Union in history as it is for the peoples of developing countries today. So, hand over the lupins!

Reading recommendations:

"Potatisens genetiske revolutionär" Svenska Dagbladet, 1 December 2008.

"Sovjetisk frösamling hett krigsbyte", Svenska Dagbladet, 2 December 2008.

Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.

Prometheus Unbound?

A Ukraine eternally condemned to be split between east and west is the image that persistently lingers on the retina of imagery as historical, cultural, lingual, and religious differences are allowed to dominate over unifying forces in world perceptions of the country's national identity. The image of a country fettered to its historic fate is today however confronted by a contrasting picture with roots in regional and national myths, linking together nations reunited in freedom at the shores of the Black Sea. Less known is that its origins are to be found in the ancient myth of Prometheus - the titan who stole the fire from the gods and gave it to man.

Prometheus (Gr. he who thinks ahead) brought man the enlightenment - fire and knowledge - denied to her by higher powers. In eternal punishment, Zeus had him chained to a rock on mount Kaukasos, where an eagle was set to feast on his liver. His self-sacrificial torment was eventually ended by Hercules, who killed the eagle and set the titan free. Freed from his strains, Zeus still deemed the titan forever to carry the burden of a Caucasian cliff in the remains of his chains. In memory of Prometheus' suffering, man to this day bear stones in their rings.

The appealing Prometheus myth became the theme for the Ukrainian national poet's, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), epos Kavkaz (1845). The father of Ukrainian literature wrote the work in memory of a close friend - Yakiv de Balman - who had fallen in Russian service in the Caucasus that year. Its edge is however not directed against the Chechens, who had killed his friend, but against the injustices of the Russian empire in denying oppressed peoples their freedom. What today is perceived as expressions of budding Ukrainian nationalism and a strive for independence from Russia, to the contrary encompasses a more general vision of liberty and justice to all nationalities set to carry the burden of the Tsarist yoke.

The Prometheus myth was a recurrent theme in both revolutionary and other liberation movements. It is for example found in the nationalist and socialist struggles against Tsarist rule; on the Balkans in the fight against the Osman empire as well as subsequently in attempts by the Crimmean Tatars to receive support from the new Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s. However, it was foremost by the inception of the Promethean movement that the myth gained greater fame as a symbol in the struggle against Russian and Soviet imperialism, why Prometheism at times also has been interpreted as a form of Russophobia.

For posterity, the Promethen movement has mainly come to be associated with Poland and the authoritarian nationalism of Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935). The Polish leader's ambition to contain Russian expansionism got its ideological inspiration from Promethean freedom ideals and its geopolitical expression in Intermarum - a projected federation of states between the Baltic and Black seas to counteract first Russian imperialism then the Bolshevik threat and to quell the power of the soviets. The image that - with some justification - portrays Piłsudski both as the founder and the front figure of Prometheism however also serves to obscure a more nuanced picture of a once nascent regional movement. In reality, the Promethean movement once gathered leading politicians and diplomats exiled from many of the countries, which had barely experienced a short interregnum of independence between Tsarist rule and Soviet power.

With the Paris magazine Promethée (1926) as a hub, exile circles created an ever-growing think-tank "in defence of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus and Ukraine". Gradually, this task was expanded geographically also to encompass all the peoples, who had fallen under the tyranny of soviet power, and thus the movement gained an overall eurasian expansion. The Prometheans engaged into intense lobbying to direct the attention of European government to the destinies of the oppressed peoples in the decades leading up to the Second World War. By public seminars and culture festivals, attempts were made not only to draw attention to nations erased from world maps, but also build an image of a common historical and cultural destiny, where trade and oceans united the peoples. Consequently, the Prometheans linked their ideas to the era's geopolitical division between dynamic sea power - talassocracy - and rigid land power - tellurocracy - where Russia naturally was referred to as the main example of the latter. To the contrary, the free trade of the oceans was related to free and independent states. That the maritime freedom theme was expanded to cover also old trade routes, such as between the Baltic and the Black seas - along predominantly Russian river systems - as well as the caravan routes along the Silk Road, only comes out as natural as the diminishing significance of exile communities demanded a broader basis. Focus was thus expanded from the Baltic-Black Sea-Caucasus axis to also cover Central Asia.

At the same time, ideas arose in the 1930s to found a political and economic alliance between Black Sea states such as Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as well as Ukraine and Georgia once the latter had regained independence. For the Prometheans, this appeared a greater task than Piłsudski's Intermarum vision. The Black Sea question was essentially considered the final solution to the Eastern Question. However, history wanted differently. Ukraine and the Caucasus remained under soviet rule, Romania's borders were revised, and Bulgaria became the Soviet Union's most loyal ally in the Balkans during the Cold War.

After the Second World War, the Promethean ideals appeared as antiquated as history had made them obsolete. They lived on in the memories of exile communities in the west, but found little ground in the realities of the time. The centre of the movement was moved to the US, but dwindled into oblivion already in the early 1950s.

After the end of the Cold War, the return of history has seen a - conscious or unconscious - renaissance for the ideas of Prometheism. Already in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Council was founded. After the coloured revolutions, Ukraine and Georgia deepened their relations by the 2005 Borjomi declaration. This was followed in 2006 with the CIS-sceptics Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM), setting up the regional Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, with its goal to "strengthen democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and security and stability". No great imagination is needed to realise that closer regional cooperation was aimed at reducing Russian influence over these countries.

Also, the project of creating an Intermarum between the Baltic and Black Seas seems, to some extent, to have been revived. Thus, it was the Polish and Lithuanian presidents - Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus - who served as mediator in the Ukrainian orange revolution and committed the EU to the country's continued reform process. That the inheritors of the mediaeval Polish-Lithuanian Union, once reaching the shores of the Black Sea, engaged themselves to Ukraine's political fate, undeniably brings out echoes of history. Warzaw and Vilnius are also Kiev's and Tbilisi's most ardent protagonists for continued euro-atlantic integration. Regional and bilateral cooperation in various constellations continues to evolve between the four countries. At the same time, the relation of them all to Russia, today are put on strain.

It is thus in terms of aims and ambitions that this "neo-Prometheism" evoke apprehensions. As these ideas now are brought out of the dustbin of history, one should not forget that - for good or evil - they are a creation of their time. Is the goal once more to contain Russia - to form a cordon sanitaire against Moscow's power projections? Apparently, it seems as if the tide is turning in that direction, even though a majority of EU and NATO capitals still pay great consideration to Russia.

From the US horizon, a coalition against Russia may be considered an option if relations to Moscow continue to deteriorate. In the event of a Democratic takeover in Washington, "neo-Promethean" ambitions may gain increased American support. The foreign policy nestor of the US Democratic Party - Zbigniew Brzezinski - is a long-time fan of such visions and was also the architect to the US policy of undermining the Eastern Bloc and demolishing the Soviet Union. Such a turn of events would, however, transform Prometheism from a positive to a negative mission - from integration to exclusion.

From the perspective of the European Union, the bad relations between the Soviet-Russian empire's former colonies and vassal states and current Russia, is a constant element of irritation in the capitals of old Europe. Hesitance and protraction in Ukrainian EU-integration may be interpreted as an expression of apprehension that if Europe's Eastern border would run from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it might topple a precarious balance in already strained relations to Moscow. Moreover, if the Caucasian card would be played out, EU may fear to be dealt a bad hand in a game played out between Moscow and Washington. Still, Ukrainan - as well as Turkish - accession to the Union is a natural and unavoidable development if Brussels is to remain faithful to the ideas of Europe. The dynamics this would bring may also return some of the vitality to the EU, in contrast to the prospects of Eurosclerosis.

As the Ukraine today is the geographical and polictical hub for a neo-Promethean movement, its positive sides may well prove a way ahead for both the Ukraine as the region in its entirety. If regional and western integration is allowed to walk hand in hand, the historical, cultural, lingual, and religious rifts characterising current Ukraine might perhaps be mended. A regional vision would tranform into a national vision, which might better reflect the complex nature of Ukrainian statehood. Here, European integration is an example for co-existence in multinational states.

What originally set Prometheism apart from other national liberation movements was a vision beyond narrow national interests. It waw the rights of small states to independently determine their destinies and the self-evidence in attaining development in cooperation with other nations as well as by regional integration and free trade, that gave the movement its special dynamics. In this sense, Prometheism was way ahead of its time and anachronic to the historical environment in which it existed. Its negative side was the tendency to let the legitimate strive for independence from Russian hegemony turn into outright Russophobia.

As the wings of history once more hover over the fettered Prometheus, hopes are set for Herculean liberation out of the claws of the Russian two-headed eagle. Will the chains thus be broken or will the American white-headed eagle simply take its place. Free or fettered, is Prometheus - the enlightener - destined to eternally live in the shadow of eagles? However, if the burden of freedom is merely to carry a stone in the bond of faithfulness to the ideals he has taught, this would seem a small sacrifice for the European titans of our times.