Lithuania: End of the Brazauskas Era

Last Tuesday, Lithuania's Parliament - the Seimas - voted for Gediminas Kirkilas as new Prime Minister. This effectively marks the end of the Brazauskas era in Lithuanian politics, and possibly also a new climate on how to run state affairs. The Seimas' decision to elect Kirkilas as new PM comes after period of political crisis and scandals, which in the end ousted Brazauskas from power at the end of May.

Lithuania's new Prime Minister, Kirkilas, is a 54-year old professional Social-Democratic politician with a background in the Communist party - as was also the case of Brazauskas. Until chosen PM, he served as Defence Minister. In contrast to his predecessor, Kirkilas is considered a soft-spoken and EU-oriented politician with good knowledge of English. Furthermore, he still lives with his family in an old Vilnius flat, whereas most high-level Lithuanian politicians have acquired stately mansions on relatively low wages. However, rumours about Kirkilas have already started to surface. Apparently, he has a BA from a party school, which would not have granted him a place at Vilnius university, where he earned his MA. Even though this is comparatively little to form even the nucleus of a scandal, one cannot but wonder what will come in a few months, when this has been disclosed even before coming into office.

The appointment of Kirkilas as Prime Minister ends a lengthy political crisis in the country. Since Brazauskas resignation on 31 May, president Lithuania was edging towards early elections. However, only the Conservative Party wanted early elections, as the other parties feared being cast out of parliament by popular vote. So what remained was to patch up what could be saved and nominate a new PM. Just two weeks before Kirkilas appointment, the president's nomination for the Premiership, Zigmantas Balcytis, was rejected by the Seimas. This was just another proof of the political turmoil that has hit Lithuania this Spring.

In May, first the Social Liberals and then the Labour Party left the Brazauskas-led coalition government, making the PM's position impossible. The Labour Party was also under police investigation on suspicion of having received economic backing from Russian interests and for imbestlement of EU-funds. The Labour Party chairman, Viktor Uspaskich, who had gone into exile in Russia, then resigned the leadership of his party. One of the key scandal factors was the fight for control over the Mazeikiu Nafta oil refinery, which strong Russian interests were keen on buying. Without going too much into details, the heritage Brazauskas left behind was far from enviable.

All the same, it is indisputable that Brazauskas has made great services to his country. As first secretary in the Lithuanian Communist Party, Brazauskas made the party break away from Moscow in support of the Lithuanian independence movement. He transformed the party into a modern Social-Democratic party and led it to victory in the 1992 parliamentary elections, once Lithuania's independence had been regained. In 1993, he became Lithuanian president, which he served as until 1998, when he chose not to run for reelection. He was succeeded by present president Valdas Adamkus. Despite the fact that Brazauskas had declared his retirement, he had difficulties to keep out of state affairs, and eventually returned to politics to become Prime Minister in 2001.

As Brazauskas has now left the Premiership, many would feel that his retirement is long overdue. In fact, he has been speaking of retirement over the past year, but of course did not realise that it would be forced upon him. Brazauskas great role in the history of Lithuania is arguably also what eventually caught up with him.

During Soviet reign, Lithuania was relatively spared from Russification. Therefore, it was a national communist party in Lithuania that had to come to terms with perestroika in the late 1980s. As the leadership and political class of Soviet Lithuania were almost exclusively of Lithuanian origin, the choice to support independence and reform the party was closer at hand than in most other Soviet republics. However, this also meant that the country's political élite remained almost intact. The consequence was that independent Lithuania inherited the soviet political culture to a greater extent than other republics. It is the effects of this culture that now eventually has caught up with Brazauskas and sealed his fate in Lithuanian politics. Hopefully, Lithuanians will remember him as the leader that brought independence to them, and not for the many scandals that engulfed his last years in office.

Pride & Prejudice

Gay rights are human rights. It is a paradox that the same rights, that served as the moral basis of liberation from the communist yoke in Eastern Europe, are now denied a group most in need of them. Still, today this is the case in large tracts of our continent, remaining a stain on the very same shield of liberty set to protect the right of the individual.

During the last few weeks, events related to LGBT-rights have given rise to both concerns and hopes about the situation of homosexuals in Central and Eastern Europe. Developments have clearly shown that homophobia is still rampant in the region, but all the same there are promising tendencies in some countries that at least some authorities have started to respond to international critique against official homophobia. Reviewing recent events, gives a somewhat more hetereogeneous picture than was the case only a year ago.

Lithuania

A few weeks ago, a celebrity homosexual was beaten beyond recognition in Lithuanian capital Vilnius. The only reason was that he was openly gay. He might as well have had a pink triangle stitchted to his chest. Homosexuality is simply not socially accepted in this deeply Catholic country, and people and parliamentarians alike do not hesitate to openly condemn this "pariah to society."

Last week, Amnesty criticised Lithuania for not respecting gay rights, actively hindering an EU-sponsored campaign "For Diversity - Against Discrimination" - in celebration of the Europan Year for Equal Opportunities for All. Now, the campaign has had to be delayed in anticipation of permission from Lithuanian authorities. Last week, the Vilnius Rainbow festival was denied the right to assembly in the capital. In response to the exposed situation for the Lithuanian LGBT-community, the European section of the International Gay and Lesbian Association (ILGA) has decided to arrange its annual conference in Vilnius this autumn.

Russia

Turning East to Moscow, a group of LGBT-activists - including several western parliamentarians - were brutally beaten by anti-gay groups, when trying to hand over a petition to mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Their simple plea was to argue for the permission to march through central Moscow during the 2007 Moscow Pride festival. While being beaten by skinheads, Russian police stood idly by watching the "spectacle" afar, only to afterwards arrest some thirty gay rights' activists, including two members of the European Parliament.

Latvia

However, what might be considered a slight improvement was yesterday's Pride march in Latvian capital Riga, organised by the Mozaika network. With the experiences from last year's violent anti-gay protests in fresh memory, authorities now allowed some 1,000 activists to march the streets under heavy police protection. Still, the march has created a deep rift in the Latvian LGBT-community, and ILGA-Latvia has publicly denounced organisers as provocateurs and profiteers, whose actions will only worsen the situation in the country.

Poland

Another partial success was the 19 May Warsaw Pride festival, where some 5,000 LGBT-activists were, for the first time, allowed to undertake the march. Despite massive anti-gay protests, the Pride parade went by without the extensive violence we have got used to see in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. However, Poland remains a fundamentally homophobic country, and the Kaczyński twins, ruling Poland as President and Prime Minister, are among the country's foremost opponents of gay rights. Polish homophobia is, to be quite frank, on the edge of the ludicrous. Thus, last week, Poland's Children's Ombudsman considered banning the kids' show Teletubbies. Why? The reason is laughable: Apparently, one of the "male" characters in the show carries a handbag. Such a role model might prove a negative influence on Polish children, the Polish Ombudsman argued, as it might indicate the small blue figure was - GAY! Lo and behold! It was only after widespread ridicule in international media, that the Ombudsman decided to reconsider her position.

Gay Rights are Human Rights

Protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has gradually become a self-evident part of international law over the decades. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has been judged applicable on sexual orientation, thus safeguarding the same political rights to the LGBT-community as any other social or political movement.

In a regional context, the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms nowadays covers protection against sexual orientation discrimination, and the European Social Charter safeguards the social and economic rights of homosexuals.

In the framework of the European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam enables the EU to fight sexual orientation discrimination as does the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The list is far from exhaustive, and serves only to illustrate how current international law protects the human rights of LGBT-individuals. Still, although many states of Central and Eastern Europe pride themselves with becoming part of Europe, prejudice prevails against homosexuals in large tracts of the region. It simply is not acceptable when politicians and people alike pursue a policy of public homophobia, as is the case in many of the abovementioned countries. Becoming part of Europe means becoming party to the humanistic social and cultural heritage of Europe. As long as this is not the case, the road to true integration remains long. The tragedy about sexual orientation discrimination in Central and Eastern Europe is however that it often is the same dissidents and democratisers who, during the soviet era, fought for human rights, that today deny one of the most exposed groups in society the very same rights they once held so dear. Obviously, the fruits of freedom are sown unequally.

A Bursting Baltic Bubble?

Are the Baltic states facing an impending economic crisis? So seems to be the case, due to the current overheating of both Estonian and Latvian economies. Earlier this week, Standard & Poor's as well as Deutsche Bank warned that Latvia's economic imbalances might cause a currency devaluation. Estonia risks a similar fate in the runup to its 4 March parliamentary elections. Only Lithuania seems to be getting off scot free.

In January, Standard & Poor declared Latvia Europe's "most dynamic economy in 2007" with a GDP growth of 8.9%, and with neighbouring Estonia coming in second, with a 7.5% growth. Estonia and Latvia - along with Slovakia - are the fastest growing economies in Europe.

Growth, however, has a price. Both economies are facing an inflationary spiral with most economic indicators going wild. In the battle over customers, Latvian banks have lended money to consumers at an interest lower than the inflation rate, and Estonian banks have followed suit.

However, Latvia's problems are the most acute. Since January, economic growth has risen to 11%, by far exceeding the 6-7% that are long-term economically sustainable. High domestic demand and corporate investment rates add to the problems. The increase in imports - clearly over what the country exports - has also created a worryingly negative balance of trade.

As for the labour market, supply cannot meet demand as many Latvians work abroad. The annual wage-rises of an average 10% have so far been compensated by a corresponding growth in productivity, but this year the tendency is towards an impassable 20% rise.

What may really topple the economy, however, is the negative real interest rate combined with a high rate of public lending - largely in euro-loans. According to some sources, this has caused prices of real estate to double in recent years.

All in all, if Latvia were now to devalue its currency - the Lat - banks would be forced to compensate themselves by a drastic increase in interest rates. With loans largely in foreign currency, consumers would face acute solvency problems, potentially with a consequent crisis for the banking system. As it appears, recession seems to stand at the door.

So, what has the Latvian government done to curve inflation and battle economic overheating? Precious little, one must admit. Already last spring, Standard & Poor predicted several years' delay for Latvia's inclusion into the eurozone, postponing it for 2009-2010 at the earliest. Prognosis was based on sustained price growth, driven by demand and rising inflationary expectations. This, in itself, should have been a clear stop-sign for the Latvian government.

All the same, the Latvian economy is basically in good shape. The country's foreign debt is low and the state economy is under control. And, obviously, economy is booming. So, why waste a winning concept, seems to have been the reasoning of the government. Some measures have been made, but they have either failed or been dubious as for their effects.

Also, it is quite obvious that the government had had more reasons to be content. In October, the government coalition, led by conservative People's Party (Tautas Partija) leader Aigars Kalvītis, was the first to be re-elected since the country regained independence in 1991. No wonder the government had a laid back attitude to developments, wanting to enjoy its honeymoon with the voters as long as possible.

However, now the government has come to a rude awakening, as the situation has quickly gotten out of hand. The question is if it will dare to challenge the banking and financial sector, which - as in Estonia - belongs to its key support groups. It is questionable if the Kalvītis cabinet can rise to the challenge. In the meantime, the fear that the Baltic bubble bursts will linger on.

Time to rid the blinders about NordStream

The Swedish government's decision to accept the disputed gas pipeline NordStream has caused debate. Is the Russian-German gas pipeline a security policy threat to vital Swedish interests? Or is it a project that safeguards stability and development in Russia? In a recent interview by Andreas Henriksson from political web journal makthavare.se, I try to put some of these questions into perspective.

Vilhelm Konnander participated as one of the lecturers at the Fokus magazine conference "When technology changes politics" a few weeks ago, where he spoke at the Global outlook seminar. He is also one of the authors of the international blog gateway Global Voices, and has both professionally and privately followed developments in Russia for a long period of time. Makthavare.se asked him to give his views on the gas pipeline, and also account for the role that Russian gas and oil giant Gazprom plays in current Russia.

Q: How do you think that the Russian political leadership looks at the gas pipeline? Is it an important project for them from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, or is it a more downright economic project that carries its own merits and might have fallen had Swedish resistance been to great?

A: It is time to rid ourselves of blinders concerning the Nordstream issue. For Russia, NordStream and energy exports is a classical question of domestic foreign policy. It is about fattening a system that rests on a far-reaching political and economic symbiosis between competing political and economic élites, which seek to monopolize political and economic power. And the loyalty of élites is dependent on the incomes from oil, gas, and other raw materials, and how these profits are divided.

Extenstive regulations, taxation, and charges on the domestic market, has put the Russian energy industry in a position where the largest profits are made on foreign markets. For example, the internal Russian price on gas has, at times, been as low as a mere 3 percent of the export price. In the course of time, Gazprom's export incomes have varied between 50 and 70 percent of the business conglomerate's total revenues, despite the fact that substantially lower gas volumes have been delivered to Europe than to the domestic market. The Russian élites have thus enveloped itself into a so great dependency to divide the spoils of energy export revenues that it has become an integrated part of the country's informal system of government.

Q: And what would be the consequences of that?

Today, Russia's political stability is dependent on stable energy export revenues. In the event that this money flow is stopped - especially in times of economic crisis - it may subvert or threaten the political stability of the country.

The link between falling energy prices and Russian systemic collapse is obvious, regardless of whether one speaks of the fall of the Soviet Union or the financial crisis in the wake of which Putin came to power. Therefore, the effects of the international financial crisis is now all becoming resemblant of a fight for life or death to get hold of a piece of an ever diminishing cake. The consequences of Russian domestic political instability are still unclear, but increasing Russian desperation might cause greater uncertainties in the foreign and security policy area - in contrast to the clarity and predictability of recent years.

Q: What then might we expect from or great Eastern neighbour in the future?

A: In this perspectve, NordStream is, of course, important, but a basic mistake from the Swedish horizon is to constantly depart from very obscure geopolitical perspecitve, at the same time as the fundamental Russian domestic motives behind the project either are put in the background or regarded as purely economic.

In the interplay between politics and business, NordStream and similar projects are strategically vital for Russia, and here the domestic driving forces marginalise any potential foreign policy considerations - especially concerning a country like Sweden, which is hardly visible on the Russian political map. Continued Swedish resistance to NordStream would therefore be regarded as a ridiculous source of irritation from a Lilliputian country in the European periphery.

Q: In Sweden, NordStream has been thoroughly discussed, mostly from a critical perspective, by representatives of both the political blocs. Do you think that the NordStream management - and consequently the heavy political actors behind i in Russia and Germany - have paid any attention to Swedish critique, or would they have built the pipeline no matter what the Swedish government would have thought and said?

A: That Russia and Germany would have shown any greater consideration of Swedish critique is not very probable. Some considerations may well be made as for the stretch and makeup of the gas pipeline, and Sweden may surely also grumble and protract the issue if desired, but eventually both Moscow and Berlin counts on the Swedish government coming around. It is one thing if Sweden throws gravel into the Russian machinery, but to oppose both Russia and - above all - Germany will prove difficult in the long run.

Q: How important is NordStream, in your opinion, to Germany?

A: All since Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was launched in the 1970s, Berlin and Moscow have enveloped into a mutual dependency according to the formula "change by rapproachment," where gas deliveries to Germany has become the basic ingredient in the political concepts of both continental powers.

Even if Angela Merkel's (the German Chancellor) enthusiasm towards the project is more controlled than her predecessor's , Gerhard Schröder, who by the way is on Gazprom's payroll, the realization of the gas pipeline is central to future German-Russian cooperation. That Germany, in current times of economic crisis, would terminate a project, which ensures long-term, secure, and cheap gas deliveries, would be very surprising - both from a political and a financial perspective.

Q: How politically directed is the Russian gas and oil giant Gazprom?

A: The question should perhaps rather be how economically directed the Kremlin is by Gazprom. That both Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, and on of the country's previous Prime Ministers, Victor Chernomyrdin, have been chairmen of Gazprom should be a clear indicator. Despite privatization attempts during the 1990s, Gazprom has remained a state gas monopoly with great influence on political power. With increasing political control over so called strategic resources, Gazprom has served as a tool for quasi nationalizations of remaining private gas and oil companies, why its position has been all the more strengthened. The question about Gazprom and the Kremlin is like tha classical question about the hen and the egg: Which one came first?

Q: To what extent would you say that Russia is using its great oil and gas resources as an instrument of foreign policy power?

A: Rhetorics about Russa as an energy superpower have, in recent years, almost become a mantra for Russian leaders, as a way of strengthening national self-images and confidence. However, judging from results, it is hard to show that Moscow is using energy as a direct foreign policy tool. Seen frlom an economic and domestic political viewpoint, the energy issue is, however, currently part and parcel of almost all Russia's conflicts with its neighbours in recent years - Estonia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia.

What is interesting is, however, to look at how Moscow indirectly uses energy as a means of strategic manipulation. With the help of energy, foreign policy advantages and concessions are simply achieved in other areas than exactly the one that each conflict focuses on. Energy is used indirectly rather than directly as a foreign policy tool, where domestic politico-economic considerations often determine foreign policy action.

Q: What do you think about the Swedish debate about NordStream? Is it substantially mostly correct or is it mared by antiquated Swedish fears of the Russians?

A: When Nordstream is addressed in Swedish debate, it is not hard to make up an image of a security policys establishment, where old realist political views are mutually confirmed and reinforced - no matter whether it is about security policy reservations or pretexts for the very same kind of perspectives. The interesting thing is not what is actually said, but what is not said.

Fundamentally, Sweden is faced by a catch 22 concerning the gas pipeline. Should one seek to undermine Russia's political stability by torpedoing the NordStream project, with increased Russian security policy unpredictability as a consequence, or should one indirectly contribute to support the continuation of a corrupt and authoritarian regime, of which one at least knows what to expect? That is a question that gets little or no attention.

Q: As you see it, is there something we in Sweden have misconstrued in the security policy and geopolitical judgement of NordStream?

A: We, basically, pose the wrong questions about NordStream, and consequently get all the wrong answers. As long as the Swedish political and security policy establishment is dedicated to self-binding about the question of our relations to Russia - regardless of whether it concerns NordStream or general approaches - we risk ending up with the wrong conclusions. As 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin wall, it is possible that we as little now as then might predict fundamental changes in Russia. Still, the invasion threat from the East returns in various forms. From military threat to criminality, from criminality to refugee invasion, from refugee invastion to epidemics, from epidemics to energy. The list is long, but what has become reality?

Translation published by permission of Andreas Henriksson, makthavare.se

Estonia: Stalemate in Russian Relations

In August 1991, Estonia regained its lost independence after nearly 50 years of soviet occupation. Some 15 years later, Estonia and Russia still lack regulated borders. Last year a border agreement was finally signed, but it did not take long before Russia withdrew from the treaty - something next to unprecedented in international relations. Since then, a stalemate persists between the two countries as relations thus reached a dead end. What will it take for Estonia and Russia to sort out their differences?

In May last year, everything seemed set for a go-ahead on a final Russian-Estonian border treaty. The last hurdles had been cleared, as the two foreign ministers decided to sign the treaty in Moscow on May 18, instead of the infamous 9 May Soviet victory day. The latter was not possible, while 9 May 1945 signified the seal of Estonia's soviet occupation. The treaty was signed and the only thing that remained was to have it ratified by parliaments in the two countries. Both were eager to remove the matter from the agenda once and for all, and hastened to have ratification bills passed by parliaments. Just weeks earlier, president Putin had declared that:

Russia is ready to sign formal border treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. I hope this will not be accompanied by some idiotic territorial demands. In today’s Europe, in the 21st century, one country making territorial demands against another, at the same time wanting to ratify a border treaty - this is complete nonsense.

However, this is more or less what happened, at least according to Moscow's version of events. Whereas the Russian parliament - the State Duma - was hesitant to ratify the border treaty, anticipating trouble, Tallinn moved on. Eager to get the question off the agenda before vacations, the Estonian government also put the treaty before parliament - the Riigkogu. Reactions to this were negative from the very outset, as many parliamentarians held that the government thereby tried to force through the treaty without proper discussion and debate. To be passed, the bill had to get a 2/3 majority. Such majority suddenly seemed unable to reach, why the government preferred to enter negotiations instead of facing certain defeat. These negotiations resulted in a separate preamble or declaration to the border treaty, referring to the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, by which Soviet Russia recognised Estonia's independence within the pre-WWII borders. However, current borders have been revised during soviet reign, which makes Tartu references unacceptable for Russia. With this preamble, the Estonian parliament passed the ratification.

Moscow's reaction
Moscow's reaction was predictable to say the least. On June 21, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would not put the treaty before the Duma for ratification. Then, during a visit to Helsinki at the end of June, foreign minister Lavrov declared that Russia had decided to revoke its signature from the border treaty. This is also what happened, and on 1 September president Putin formally withdrew Russia from the treaty. The move to withdraw from an already ratified treaty is next to unprecedented in international relations, and must be considered a very stern reaction. The scandal, a few years back, when president Bush revoked the US signature from the treaty on the International War Crimes Tribunal has reverberated in the international community ever since. Examples are scarce, because the international outcry for doing so is expected too great, and one has to pay too high a price for it to be worthwhile. Still, this was exactly what Moscow chose to do.

Estonian explanations
Why did the Estonians act in this way, if they clearly understood what the reactions from Moscow were to become? What were they to gain from this? Some suggestions have been made, although they fail to explain for - even in combination - Tallinn's action.

One factor is that Estonia in April 2005 went through a government crisis and that the sacked prime minister and leader of the Res Publica party, Juhan Parts, quickly needed to profile himself with some cause, not least after a failed unification of Estonia's two right-wing parties - Res Publica and the Reform Party. Thus, demands connected to the border treaty seemed as a convenient opportunity for Res Publica.

Another reason is that the foreign minister of Ansip's new Reform Party government - 31-year-old Urmas Paet, simply was too new and unexperienced on his post, why he could not manage to deal with Moscow and domestic political intrigues at once.

A third explanation, is that government coalition partners - not least the Social Democrats with their grey eminence Thomas Hendrik Ilves at a safe distance in Bruxelles - stood to gain from a squabble between the two right-wing parties.

Then, there is Estonian politics' black horse of Edgar Savisaar and his Centre Party. Being the new minister of finance, Savisaar was arguably the one pulling the real strings in cabinet affairs. Savisaar is a political survivor with a murky soviet past, who has been constantly scandalised over the years but always gets away without a stain on his popularity, especially among poor and rural population, including the Russians. Also, Estonian conservatives are usually quick to point out that the Centre Party is in union with president Putin's United Russia, thereby casting suspicion on him for being on Kremlin's leash or even - at times - payroll.

Finally, it must have been hard to put off Russian interests, though not necessarily Russia itself, from the temptation of exploiting Estonia's domestic difficulties in this situation. Whether the Russian factor could hold on to itself in not giving in to such an urge will however remain unclear. The effect was though in Russia's interest. Thus, Estonia stood to gain nothing, but to once again be portrayed by Russia to the great powers of Europe as an amateur in international relations in disrupting the treaty. Still, blaming Moscow is simply too much of going through the motions to be taken seriously. Perhaps, Russia in reality simply had to stand idly by while the Estonians themselves fumbled about in torpedoing the treaty.

So, is there any way out of this mess for Estonia? At an OSCE-meeting earlier this spring, foreign ministers Lavrov and Paet discussed the need for resumed negotiations to settle the border issue once and for all. Some discussions have also been held since, but both parties seem to agree that a ratified treaty will not come into force in the foreseeable future. The issue is simply politically dead at the moment, while so much prestige was put in on both sides to finalise the border settlement. Once this was lost, little room was left for future talks. Estonia thus seems to have little choice but to let the issue at rest for the time being.

Dealing with Russia
In view of the current situation, how should Estonia handle its relations with Russia? Professor Andres Kasekamp, director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, believes that Estonia now will opt for an EU-solution. According to Kasekamp, Estonia should take the CFSP/ESDP more seriously. This is also currently the sentiment among many politicians in Estonia. The country seems intent on playing out the EU-card, despite the Union's demonstrated inability to stand firm on Russia. Such a policy thus seems to have a weak foundation in current realities. That Sweden and Finland were the only other EU-states in support of the Estonian position concerning the border treaty, is a telling example of how little the EU cares about Estonia's relations with Russia. EU politicians are simply fed up with the whole affair of Estonia not being able to conclude a border treaty with Russia for the last 15 years. EU-support thus seems destined to fail, and EU's European Neighbourhood Policy appears to offer little use to Estonia, as it does not comprise relations with Russia.

The alternative of handling relations with Russia through Nato should, in this perspective, seem all the more tempting to Tallinn. Such a method would, in reality, mean using the US and the Transatlantic link to influence NATO-policy. In May 2005, president Bush visited Riga, and among other things discussed subjects such as democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe. This kind of US high-level discussions is in the best interest of Estonia, while statements to this fact facilitate setting the Nato-agenda in Tallinn's favour. US vice president Cheney's speech at the May 2006 Vilnius Conference also signalled a change towards a more critical stance in US policy towards Russia. In November this year, Riga will host the annual Nato Summit, offering an opportunity to further Estonian interests in relations to Russia by proxy of Nato. Estonian chances to bandwagon with the US to deal with Russia through Nato are therefore greater than ever. Still, Tallinn strangely enough seems to prefer the EU option - perhaps reflecting the post 2001 change in Nato's geographical focus. What Estonia fails to recognise is the fact that also within Nato, the tide is changing in relations with Russia. Tallinn should clearly not miss out on this opportunity to use a change in US and Nato policy towards Moscow in its own favour.

Finally, a joint approach in coordinating Estonian interests on Russia to concurrently influence both Nato and the EU in the same direction might be a recipe for success, but this is simply too complex a task for a small country to pull off.

Domestic difficulties
In the meantime, the Russian question in Estonia continues to drag on as an annually recurrent tradition. The drama has been played out by more or less the same actors over the last 15 years with little variation. This year's incident was the 20 May desecration of the Bronze Soldier Monument (Pronkssõdur) by Estonian nationalists. For Russians, it is a memorial to Soviet soldiers who died fighting in World War II. For Estonians, it is a symbol of the Soviet occupation.

Therefore, in connection to Russia's victory day each year, soviet veteran ceremonies at the monument are ritually followed by protests from Estonian nationalists. This year, events have been especially serious with a string of demonstrations. Among Estonian nationalist demonstrators were crackpot professional dissidents such as Holocaust-denier Tiit Madisson, but also more respected people such as former commander-in-chief Aleksander Einseln. Their objective is the removal of the Bronze Soldier from central Tallinn, and little consideration is taken to reasoning in view of their unwavering demands.

The situation has been exploited by extremists on both sides. Last week, the headline of the leading Russian newspaper in Estonia, Vesti Dnia (fmr. Sovetskaya Estonia), read: "On the Brink of Civil War." Also, rumours about Russian vandalisation of Estonian monuments, e.g. in Tartu, are spreading, and the resurfacing of old Interfront activists has been quite unexpected. Probably, protests will peter out in a few weeks, but it is worrisome that extremists repeatedly are allowed to set the political agenda for almost a month each year. This is simply not a sound political tradition for a small country like Estonia. Protests and demonstrations may well be overlooked by the majority of Estonians as an annual freak event, but each year extremists are allowed to set the public agenda through media.

Narva and the Russian-speaking population
When one refers to the situation of Russians in Estonia or Latvia, one should be aware of the fact that this does not necessarily mean Russians as such. Migration to Estonia in the post-war era came from all over the Soviet Union, why it might be as natural to come across a Tajik, a Ukrainian or a Lithuanian in Tallinn as it is with a Russian. Today, they all meet the same conditions and requirements for residence permit and citizenship no matter what their place of origin might once have been. That Russians are in a majority should not serve to hide this fact.

Estonia's Russian-speaking population is concentrated partly to Tallinn and neighbouring cities, and partly to Eastern Estonia. However, it is in the East that the Russian dominance is especially compact - in cities like Narva and Kohtlajärvi. For long, crisis has coincided with ethnicity in this part of the country, which incidentally also neighbours on the disputed border areas with Russia. Unemployment and social malaise have been a constant feature in Eastern Estonia during the last 15 years. A destitute population with little hope for the future has presented a great problem for Estonian authorities. The city of Narva, right on the border to Russia, facing Russian Ivangorod on the other side of the river, is a telling example.

In reality, the few Estonians living in Narva are state representatives in some capacity, and they associate little with the local Russian-speaking population. In Narva, it is perhaps no coincidence that the well-held offices of the Russian Consulate are located only a few hundred metres from the headquarters of KaPo - the Estonian security service.

However, things are now looking brighter for Narva. The situation is still such that everyone who knows how to, tries to move away from the city. Many of the top students at Estonian universities originate from Eastern Estonia, strongly motivated from knowing that the alternative is poverty. This may not be the case in the future though. In recent years, things have begun to turn around for Narva. Unemployment has decreased and many industries are moving production to this area due to dramatically rising costs and a deficit of qualified labour in Tallinn and the densely populated areas of Western Estonia. The opposite to high costs and unskilled labour is exactly what Narva has to offer. Adding to this, the lower wages in this region attract a rising number of investors. Whereas activities still are far from bustling, the tendency towards a rather rapid development within the next decade is clear.

Until now, Narva's economy has largely depended on border trade with Russia. With much lower prices on petrol, alcohol, and tobacco in Russia, shuttle traders cross the border back and forth on a daily basis, bringing merchandise for illegal distribution and sale on Estonian and Western markets. There are few figures on the full extent of this trade, but Russian customs' estimates say, that it accounts to some 20-30% of Northwestern Russia's foreign trade. There is no wonder then that transit-trade is Estonia's most profitable business, the proceeds of which have made great fortunes for the people who control it. Today, a majority of Estonia's richest businessmen are ethnic Russians. The paradox is that the population of Narva and Eastern Estonia has had little to gain from the shuttle-trade. Most of the money has ended up in the pockets of a few fellow compatriots that could not care less about the situation of their Russian kin. Therefore, the future of Narva rests on the opportunities to enter other economic areas.

That a rising number of businesses in Estonia are now moving production to Narva is thus very promising. Too long, the level of costs has not been sufficiently geographically diversified to make it profitable moving industry to the East. Now, this has changed, why companies will seek to increase their dividends by lowering costs by relocation. In the meantime, however, a generation of workers has been lost to Eastern Estonia due to unemployment destitution. The old generation may be lost, but the new generation faces a much more promising future, which might allow them to stay on in their hometowns in the East.

The Choice of a New Generation
Things are changing in Estonia with 15 years passed since regained independence. A second new generation is entering the public and business spheres. This generation has little to remember from soviet times. The situation applies to Estonians and Russians alike. The arguments from nationalists and pro-Russia groups are increasingly perceived as artificial constructs with little relation to everyday reality. Both groups are themselves becoming as antiquated as oblivious. With economic development, also social and economic differences between Estonians and Russians will narrow, and so will consequently also the potential for extremists to exploit such friction. The focus of a new generation in Estonia is set on Europe and not on Russia. Relations with Russia are increasingly becoming irrelevant for most people in Estonia. Once this is realised, Moscow will have difficulties to exploit the situation of the "Russian minority" in Estonia in relations with Tallinn. It will also become harder for Russia to raise support in Estonia per se by appealing to fellow Russians. Perhaps then, Moscow will definitely let go of its lost empire and plainly put borders and other issues at rest with Tallinn without further ado. However, also in Estonia it will take a new generation to sort out the country's differences with Russia, but in the end, Tallinn and Moscow will budge to the new realities.

What Prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

Over the past decade, regionalism has resurfaced on the international political agenda. The demise of bipolar division, globalisation, and rekindled cultural affiliation are but a few causes for such development. In a European context, there is reason to question whether the new regions will prove viable constructions, or if some are but transient phenomena in an overall evolution towards a Europe of the regions. Therefore, even advocates of Baltic Sea regionalism must ask –What are the prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

To prove cohesive, regions should be endowed with political dynamics of their own, driven by distinctive agendas, patterns of interaction and governed by regimes. They may be based on identification, institutionalism or functionalism, driven by subjective factors such as history, culture and identity, or by objective factors such as geography, geo-economics and geopolitics.

The rise of regional co-operation
The idea of Baltic co-operation arose in the late 1960’s out of concern for marine pollution in the Baltic Sea. Environmental protection proved an uncontroversial area for co-operation even for states divided by the Iron Curtain. In 1974 the Helsinki Commission was formed to monitor Baltic marine environment. All the same, it was not until the 1990 Ronneby Summit that environmental issues became a nucleus for extended co-operation. The Summit gathered regional heads of government, and for the first time the – then soviet – Baltic republics were allowed high level international representation. Ronneby led to the foundation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, forming the hub of regional co-operation for the decade since. The CBSS was perceived as ”an overall regional forum to focus on needs for intensified cooperation and coordination among the Baltic Sea States” and set as its goal to ”strengthen the cohesion among these countries, leading to greater political and economic stability as well as a regional identity.” The Council comprises the Nordic and Baltic States, Russia, Poland, Germany and the European Commission. The bulk of co-operation has taken place in the large network of issue-specific organisations that developed in the 1990’s. Success or failure for these organisations may determine if the region will gain a common political agenda or be subject to interaction between individual state interests.

A region in the making?
A region of some 70 million people, the Baltic Sea area comprises major population centres of Northern and Central Europe. It looks back on a long tradition of trade and migration dating to the origins of recorded history. Whether dealing with Viking relations with ancient Rus’ or medieval trade within the Hanseatic League, one may find factors of commonality transcending the shores of the Baltic. History may be used as a symbol of unity in the pursuit of a common cultural heritage. In modern times, the Nordic as well as the Baltic States have often been perceived as geographic entities by the outside world. Larger nations, such as Germany, Poland and Russia, have used the region as a gate to either east or west.

If today, a regional identity is to be constructed, substantial development is needed, beside common frameworks and measures facilitating interaction. This includes improving both material conditions for trade and economy, transport and communication, and conditions for social sustainability in fields such as environment and health, democracy and justice. In both areas, directions of overall European integration will prove decisive for further development.

In the early 1990’s, countries of the region fought to grasp the new reality evolving around them. A number of alternatives were considered: formation of a neutral bloc in Central Europe, Baltic States’ admission to the Nordic Council, to mention but a few. Russia’s October 1993 events – the shelling of the White House – combined with Swedish and Finnish 1994 EU accession turned focus towards NATO and EU rapprochement among former Eastern bloc countries. Enlargement became the dominant issue on the agenda. Thus, Baltic Sea co-operation increasingly turned towards the EU, manifested by the 1996 Baltic Sea region initiative. The 1997 Northern dimension emphasised this overall direction. Today, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all entered the European Union. As the map of Europe has once more been redrawn, how will it affect the Baltic Sea region?

Most Baltic Sea states are small countries, which individually have little leverage in an enlarged Union. Forming EU-policies on the basis of regional interests would offer greater influence on the development of the Union. Polish and Baltic membership in the EU has carried prospects for regional policy co-ordination, which - thus far - have been poorly exploited. However, to form a region, Baltic Sea states must realise that success is achieved as much out of common values as out of common interests. Progress towards this aim has gradually been made by regional co-operation, laying a material foundation for a social sense of regional commonality. To assure long-term regional concord, peoples of the Baltic must develop a feeling of shared destiny – a regional identity.

Dividing lines?
It is argued that international co-operation is best pursued among states of comparable size and power. When larger and smaller states interact, co-operation risks either dominance or neglect from the large. In the Baltic Sea region, Germany, Poland and Russia are giants in comparison to other CBSS-members. While German participation in regional co-operation has been stable, EU-membership has extended Poland’s choice of partners in Union affairs. A country of some 40 million, Poland may regard unilateral action, temporary alliance-building or issue-specific agreement with other actors more attractive than Baltic Sea co-operation. Sharing a common Union framework, the Baltic Sea region may still offer sufficient synergy for both Germany and Poland to find regionalism an attractive alternative. Instead, Russia remains the great outstanding issue.

Inclusion versus exclusion was at the top of the 1990’s European agenda. Among CBSS-states, all but Russia are members of either NATO or the EU. Neither is an option for Moscow. Instead, a socio-economic gap is widening between Russia and the rest of Europe. The old debate whether Russia is part of Europe has also resurfaced. Social and material exclusion of the country from European affairs is evolving. Having conceded to NATO enlargement, Moscow’s main concern is access to the European market. Russian WTO accession may prove a means in relations with Europe. If EU-enlargement to the Baltic Sea region excludes Russia from equal terms of trade with other CBSS-states, Moscow may co-operate only as far as it serves her own interests. This would hamper regional integration. The Baltic Sea region may become the major playground for Europe’s Russian dilemma. In all, if the larger CBSS-states start pulling in different directions, the Baltic Sea region will be a concern only for the small. Such development risks endangering long-term regional stability.

What prospects for a Baltic Sea region?
Hopes are as great as misgivings for a Baltic Sea region. What it all winds down to in the end is if the area actually makes for a region. Functionally, the area may form a region in geographic, economic and political terms. Institutionally, regional co-operation has a distinctive agenda and specific patterns of interaction governed by the CBSS-regime. Whether the region will carry its own political dynamics or simply has served as an antechamber to the EU is, however, too early to say. The future of Baltic Sea regionalism will largely depend on the evolution of a regional identity. It is especially encouraging that business and finance increasingly perceive a single Baltic Sea market. Thus, material conditions would form the social basis for regional development. For over a decade now, we have crossed old borders of political and economic division to interact in the pursuit of a common good. In review of some 15 years’ co-operative development, great progress has been made in the formation of a Baltic Sea region, but its realisation is still too early to predict.

Baltic Sea, region, regionalism, prospects, future

EU Funds Broadcasting to Belarus

On Friday, RFE/RL reports that the European Union will be funding independent broadcasting to Belarus in the amount of 2 million Euro over at two year period. Radio transmissions begin on February 26 and will mainly emanate from Poland and Lithuania. Despite the source of funding, radio stations are to be independent from the EU. This is less than a month before the 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, and Lukashenka's regime will be sure to see it as an EU provocation.

Targeting a youthful audience, European Radio for Belarus and Radio Baltic Wave are to give Belarusians alternative access to information in the same manner that RFE/RL did during the Cold War. Programmes will be in both Belarusian and Russian, and be broadcast on the FM band and via the Internet.

Already in January, EU Commission spokeswoman, Emma Udwin, declared that "There will be specific TV and radio programs dedicated to the elections broadcast ahead of the election date," EU Business reports.

The new radio stations are, however, not the only independent foreign media targeting Belarus. For long, Radio Racja had regular transmissions to Belarus, but in the end had to stop sending due to lack of funding. By this project, however, Radio Racyja seems to have been adopted by the new European Radio for Belarus. Also, Deutsche Welle, has been targeting programmes at a Belarusian audience.

Rumour also has it that president Lukashenka, during a recent visit to China, took great interest in Chinese authorities' methods to control the Internet by banning and screening information. Although this may be too late for the upcoming 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, we will be sure to hear more about such measures by Lukashenka during his third term in office.

Belarus, EU, support, free media, radio, broadcasting