First Year of Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution

Today, 24 March, is the first anniversary of the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Whether one may speak of a true revolution is not as clear as in the cases of Georgia's rose revolution or Ukraine's orange revolution.

That president Askar Akayev chose to go into exile, today looks rather the effect of the tumultuous events of 24 March 2005 than of a coordinated political action. Rumours of a palace coup or the realisation that the situation under Akayev was politically unsustainable, leading to a managed takeover, have been manifold. No matter what one thinks of this, it is evident that one cannot speak of a people's revolution in the same way as in Georgia and Ukraine. New president Kurmanbek Bakiyev has recently declared 24 March a public holiday. It will be interesting to see whether this will become a day of public celebrations, ridicule or indifference.

Kyrgyzstan, tulip revolution, Akayev, Bakiyev

2008 Press Review

To what extent does mainstream media take into account what bloggers say about developments in Central and Eastern Europe? This is the question one has to put to oneself as one threads the thin line between blogging and expertise. Is the blogosphere but a shortcut for covering issues too complex to write about facing a deadline or is there a true desire to present a second opinion beyond the everyday chores of public policy-media discourse?

A couple of examples of what hopefully is the latter concern my own writings and analyses. Thus, in June this year I was interviewed by Aleks Tapinsh, Baltic correspondent of Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) for the upcoming Riga Summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The story - "Baltic States Want Energy Cooperation Despite Pipeline Row" - covered the same theme as has been the case over the course of the Council's existence, viz. environmental issues and economic development, with the recent addition of energy and pipeline disputes in the Baltic. Still, amidst the course of yawnful meetings and press conferences, the DPA succeeded in posing the crucial question: What role for Baltic Sea cooperation and the CBSS now that an overwhelming majority of its members are also part of the European Union? My reply was the following:

Without the EU the CBSS would be naught, but also the EU needs this sort of regional cooperation. In this sense, organizations like the CBSS or the European Dialogue in the Mediterranean are essential for making EU policies work.

In December, Gabriela Ioniţă of Romanian policy journal Cadran politic interviewed me on Russian domestic and foreign policy, sovereign democracy, the 2020 policy plan, and consequences of the war with Georgia. Quoting me, in titling the article "Russia’s strive for recognition as an equal in international affairs is ---the greatest flaw in Moscow policy,” very much reflects a basic argument, that the high politics of the Kremlin leaves too little room for actively pursuing Russian interests. Russia's foreign policy simply is too much a matter of existence and recognition, and too little one of strategy and action. In military terms, one would say that the linkage between strategic, tactical and operative levels is too weak. Still, attention should be given to the fundamentally more strategic thinking, which has developed in recent years - currently labelled sovereign democracy.

Coverage in Swedish media has largely revolved around a couple of reports I have written or participated in. Thus, following the publication of my 2008 report on Russian democracy, Russia - a sovereign democracy: a study of popular rule and state power in demise, Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet wrote:

Konnander also puts the finger on a more unexpected consequence of developments under Putin. Normally, one associates political stability and centralization with a strong exercise of state power. But Konnander shows, using e.g. the World Bank governance indicators, that so has not become the case in Russia in ecent years. Instead, "the state capacity to exercise power has been significantly reduced, why the political system becomes all the more susceptible to crises. --- Democracy in Russia has decline, but so has also the capacity to sustain an authoritarian rule in the long run. Russia's political future thus becomes increasingly uncertain."

Commenting on Russia's tense relations with Georgia, Dagens Nyheter quotes the study in extenso:

For Moscow the loss of Ukraine as political friend - the historical Little Russia - became a rude awakening from the illusion that Russia's rising political stability could also encompass its near abroad - the country's vital sphere of interest. The Kosovo 1999 intervention, Serbia's 2000 bulldozer revolution, Georgia's 2003 rose revolution - in the same year as the US-led invasion of Iraq - Ukraine's 2004-2005 orange revolution, and Kyrgyzstan's 2005 tulip revolution, in all formed a pattern, which the Russian élite interpreted as a ever-growing threat against Russia itself.

Hudiksvall's Tidning also reflects on my results:

Also during the Yeltsin era, one freedom or another could be somewhat arbitrarily limited. The difference is that now the limitations have been written down in a number of fluffy laws, which more or less give a carte blanche for authorities to intervene against about anything that they think is annoying.

Blekinge Läns Tidning directs attention to similarities between the old Soviet élite and its current Russian epitomisation:

Even though Konnander does not explicitly say so, similarities with Marxist thinking are striking - a very élitist perception of society. He also illustrates by many examples how the regions and the media have lost their power, and how Russians turn to the European Court of Human Rights instead of seeking redress in their own court system, as this is nowadays considered too fundamentally biased.

Whereas my contribution to another study, The Caucasian Test case, on the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, largely questioned generally accepted truths, the overall media reaction was one of portraying Russia as a growing threat to international security. Thus, Svenska Dagbladet wrote that "Russia chose its path in Georgia - the wrong path". Deutsche Welle wrote that "The Russian lesson was that the international community was not prepared, willing or able to add any costs to the Russian actions".

Finnish daily Hufvudstadsbladet reasoned along similar lines of thought: "Russia's actions now compels a reassessment of the prevailing world order". Västerbottenskuriren adds to this argumentation: "It is not the conflict per se - known for long - that has triggered the deterioration, but the fact that Russia has chosen to lower its threshold barring the use of violence and thus has chosen to change the rules of international relations. The Russian position constitutes a direct challenge to the current world order and signifies a new phase in Russian foreign policy." Världen idag concludes: "Due to Russian action in Georgia the security situation in Europe has deteriorated. And when Russia challenges the world, the mechanisms of the world community are paralyzed." Finally, Russian Novye Izvestiya has its own angle on the report, claiming that it supports the notion that Israeli military advisors took active part in the war on Georgia's side.

It is indeed peculiar how the media spins different stories, but also how security interests get their story across - here the Russian menace. That my own contribution to the Georgia report got minimal attention may perhaps point to the fallacies of mainstream media. Fundamentally questioning the extent and significance of the so-called Russian cyberwar against Georgia, it should really have attracted more notice than it did, since the general image portrayed by international media was that of a massive cyber attack.

Still, it is often not the stories that challenge assumptions, but the ones that confirm bias which conquer the day. Once the media beat has been set, even a potential scoop would have great difficulty to overcome a consensual media agenda. So, by the end of the day, there is little room for deviance as the public policy-media discourse evolves. When one, to the contrary, gets one's message across, there is no saying how it will be processed by its recipients, given the fundamental predisposition to interpret Russia in very simplified terms. That is the basic dilemma of policy-media interaction - a dilemma that may or may not be averted by the workings of a global and independent blog discourse. At least, blogs give each and everyone the opportunity to have his or her say, even though alternative facts and hypotheses risk getting lost in cyberspace.

Swedish sub hits Russian ground

Amid heated Swedish debate on the existence of a Russian Cold War sub threat, a Swedish sub this morning hit Russian ground. Information about the incidence is still scarce, but according to unnamed sources, the grounding may have been caused by a combination of overweight and shallowness. Witnesses also report rumbling from the sub's hull, indicating lack of fuel.

As of this time, no official comments have been made from either Sweden or Russia, but initiated sources within Swedish intelligence indicate that the sub for long has been transferred from military to civilian purposes, with a "healthy distance from the defence sphere."

The incident comes at an awkward moment for the two countries, coinciding with both US President Obama's visit to Moscow, and Sweden's assumption of the EU Presidency last week. Speculations thus run rampant that the grounding until now has been deliberately submerged for political reasons.

Swedish submarine scare
News about the sub may prove very inconvenient for Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, who is currently facing allegations for misleading public and media on the Russian sub threat during the 1980s, following the 1981 grounding of Soviet submarine U-137 in the Swedish archipelago. An editorial in today's Dagens Nyheter, Sweden's leading newspaper, thus claims that Bildt's "career was largely founded on alleged soviet submarines - frequently improbable, sometimes minks." As the Swedish EU Presidency might further propel Bildt's international career, such ambitions could now be thwarted by an embarrassing incident of this kind.

Political parallels
Also, comparisons are made to the confidence crisis facing the Swedish political establishment after the 1979 Harrisburg nuclear accident. As news of the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown broke, leading Swedish politicians had for years been saying that the risks of nuclear power were inprobable on the verge of incredibility. The political consequences of this grave misjudgement led to a disastrous "maybe" decision in the 1980 Swedish referendum on the future of Swedish nuclear power, forming an anticlimax on nuclear termination that has since marred the country's energy policy.

In what now seems as a surfacing Swedish-Russian sub crisis, any Swedish claims that the sub ran aground due to faulty navigation may be retorted by Russia as "improbable" - echoing both Bildt's statements during the 1980s Swedish submarine scare, and reminiscences of recurrent ministerial misjudgements, gradually eroding the legitimacy of the Swedish political system.

Things are not always what they seem...

The above only serves to prove that, in the interplay between politics and media, things are not always what they seem. Regreattably, this is also the case with the news about the Swedish sub, which would have made a true scoop had it been true. Instead, the sub in question is no other than yours truly, who over the next two weeks will be SUB-stituting as Central and Eastern Europe Editor of Global Voices - a Harvard-based project that provides alternative reporting on world affairs to that of mainstream international news media.

Alternative reporting does not mean misleading reporting, as the above paragraphs may indicate. To the contrary, following the blogosphere and other Internet resources may, in my own view, at times present a more accurate and up-to-date picture, not least of evolving events, than presented by most other media. It gives the capacity to look beyond press conferences and newsdesks, which at times tend to present nicely wrapped-up truths about events often too obscure and complex for most to comprehend.

Giving precedence to first-hand accounts and on-the-field reporting, with all the ambiguities that may involve, can thus at times be preferrable to stories about "quarrels in far away countries between people of whom we know nothing." Yesterday it might have been Czechoslovakia and Germany, today it might be Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, forming a loosely concocted perceptive pattern of numerous and frequently disparate stories, to form the truth of the matter as we see it.

For truly, if you put your hand on your heart, how much does the faked story about a Swedish sub hitting Russian ground differ from far too much media coverage on events evolving on the margins of the world as we know it. So, it may not always be advisable to follow the calls: "As reports pour in, stay tuned as the story develops..."

Five CIS Cities in Top Ten Polluted Places

Five out of the ten most polluted places in the world this year are to be found in the Former Soviet Union, according to a list published by the Blacksmith Institute. No, it's no beauty paget, even if the list is an annually recurrent event, shedding light upon some of the greatest man-made environmental disasters in history.

According to the UN, 20% of premature deaths in the world may be ascribed to environmental factors. "There are some towns where life expectancy approaches medieval rates, where birth defects are the norm not the exception. In other places children's asthma rates are measured above 90%, or mental retardation is endemic. In these places, life expectancy may be half that of the richest nations", the report states.

In Russian Dzerzhinsk, average life expectancy among men is 42 years and among women 47 years. This was one of the places where the USSR produced its chemical weapons during the Cold War. Norilsk houses the world's largest nickel producer, and life expectancy for factory workers is 10 years below the Russian average. In Rudnaya Pristan and Dalnegorsk, lead poisoning is endemic due to emissions from local lead mines. Levels of lead in children's blood are between 8 and 20 times higher than maximum allowable rates in the US.

Mailuu-Suu in Kyrgyzstan presents some of the highest figures of nuclear radiation in the world, due to the waste from soviet time uranium mining. The situation may also worsen as earthquakes threaten to negatively affect containment of radioactive waste in this area of high seismic activity. The situation sets the security of large tracts of Central Asia in peril, while the Mailuu-Suu river might carry great quantities of highly radioactive sediments to the Ferghana valley - the region's most densely populated area.

The most well-known place on the list is probably Chernobyl in Ukraine. Even 20 years after the accident, radioactivy is on such high levels to remain life hazardous during lengthy exposure. The 19 mile exclusion zone remains uninhabitable, and the number of thyroid cancer cases among people in exposed areas is on highly elevated. Even if efforts are made to improve the environmental situation, there are fears of a new disaster if the sarcophagus - the concrete inclosure of the reactor - collapses, or if nuclear waste leaks into the groundwater.

That the effects of soviet reign laid waste to large tracts of the Eurasian continent should be commonplace knowledge nowadays. There should thus be no wonder that five out of the ten most polluted places in the world are located in the former USSR. Still, have current rulers of these states learnt from historical mistakes? No, in many cases not. Recently, ideas of turning the rivers of Siberia are again becoming fashionable in both Russia and Kazakhstan. The last time this was tried - during the 1960s "Virgin Lands" project - it led to an environmental disaster of epic proportions. It seems that even the most obvious is beyond reach for these people to fathom. Perhaps, the truth of the matter is that too many political leaders in these countries simply do not care, come what come may.

CIS: Halfling Joins While Giants Leave?

Last Thursday 4 May, breakaway Georgian republic of Abkhazia declared its intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, Interfax reports. Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev were quick. Both Georgia and Ukraine now seriously consider leaving the CIS.

Abkhazi leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that: "Abkhazia's priorities are membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States and further rapprochement with Russia." Last August, Bagapsh openly confirmed his ambition of "Abkhazia's secession from Georgia and de facto merger with Russia." Now he sets the goal to join the CIS by the end of the year, but "Abkhazia's further political and economic rapprochement with Russia is the central issue. We remain adherent to our proposals on Abkhazia's associated membership of Russia," Bagapsh concluded, according to Interfax.

Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev
Bagapsh's declaration was immediately met with stern reaction from Georgia and Ukraine. Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his government to assess whether "it is worth remaining in the CIS," Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. He went on to say that the conflict in Abkhazia back in 1993 had "forced Georgia to sign the declaration of joining the CIS." Now Georgia is seriously contemplating to leave the CIS.

On Friday, Ukraine also for the first time officially declared that the country might leave the CIS. Kiyev has for long been disappointed with how the organisation works. Thus, speaking about a Ukrainian withdrawal from the CIS, Yushchenko's foreign policy advisor, Kostyantyn Tymoshenko, said that "if there are no results, the question arises." During last week's Vilnius Forum, president Yushchenko also characterised integration with the EU and NATO his main foreign policy objective, according to NG. Such ambtions might prove incompatible with remaining a CIS-member.

A future for the CIS?
This puts the future of the CIS even more in question than previously has been the case. Today, few of its members - not even Russia - have any great hope in the organisation. The original split in perceptions of its purpose, viz. political as opposed to economic cooperation, remains. The political aim is epitomised by the CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed by six countries - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. Turning to CIS economic cooperation, it can only be characterised as a resounding failure. Thus, demands were raised to find alternative to the CIS in lieu of its defunct economic record.

GUUAM instead of CIS?
In 1997, GUUAM was founded by the CIS-members not party to the Collective Security Treaty, with the single exception of Turkmenistan. GUUAM comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (1999), Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Its aim was to fulfil the original purpose of the CIS by economic cooperation and free trade. Excluding Russia, GUUAM has remained on the second echelon of post-soviet foreign policy, and the organisation has been careful not to portray itself as a counterbalance to members of the Collective Security Treaty, although it seems evident that so is the case. Georgia and Ukraine have also been GUUAM's most eager members in pursuing a regional policy independent from Russian influence.

Borjomi - a way forward?
To take the matter further, Saakashvili and Yushchenko, last August, issued the Borjomi Declaration, calling on their neighbours to unite "efforts to turn the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region into a sea of democracy, stability and security, to make it a fully integrated region of Europe and of the Democratic and Atlantic community." In Moscow's eyes, Borjomi's outright western orientation was seen as yet another attempt to insulate Russia and curve its influence over the near abroad. Whereas there may be some truth to Moscow's contentions on this point, one should however not shy away from the paramount fact of the matter: Russia and the CIS have little to offer in comparison to the fruits of western integration. That Georgia and Ukraine are the first to publicly raise their concerns whether to remain CIS-members should therefore come as no surprise, as they have seized the opportunity of western integration offered to them by their coloured revolutions.

The Abkhazi question
All in all, one must conclude that there is more to the issue than simply a statement by a renegade republic leader. As for Abkhazia, the region broke away from Georgia already in 1992. This separatist republic remains unrecognised by the international community, and there is no secret that Abkhazia would not survive long without Russia's backing. For long, Moscow has remained ambivalent on how to deal with the issue. As the UN, the EU and the OSCE insist that Abkhazia is part of Georgia, Russia has been reluctant to recognise its de facto independence. Instead, Abkhazia has oscillated between outright independence and associate membership in the Russian Federation. Today, most Abkhazis hold Russian citizenship, facilitating a potential future incorporation into Russia. This is also what Georgia claims is Moscow's long-term ambition, making the issue an international bilateral conflict instead of an internal secessionist conflict. So, is it a mere coincidence that a statement by some half-wit chieftain of a secessionist region would seem to shake the foundations of the entire CIS? Why should Abkhazia's wholly unrealistic ambitions to join the CIS spark off such stern reactions from both Georgia and Ukraine?

A pretext for divorce?

First, it is beyond doubt that the Abkhazi CIS-ambition is utterly senseless. It would presuppose Abkhazi independence, and even then CIS-members Georgia and Ukraine might still easily bar Abkhazia from membership. Second, one should ask why such a ridiculous statement is made specifically at this point in time, when the dividends of post-soviet space are are about to be paid to either Russia or the West. That Abkhaz leader Bagapsh's statement coincided with US vice president Cheney's critique of Russia at the Vilnius conference last week, shows that there is more to this than first expected. Third, the declared western orientation of Georgia and Ukraine - reiterated in Vilnius - serves only to underline the basic contradiction in clinging on to an imagined union by a post-soviet Commonwealth. From Moscow's point of view, the CIS is to little avail as long as the organisation cannot be used as an instrument for Russia's de facto power and influence over most CIS-countries. So, both parties want out. Georgia and Ukraine want to go west. Russia wants to rid itself of difficult CIS-members to better control the organisation. Fourth, were Ukraine and Georgia to leave the CIS, remaining members would, in the process, be left to the best of their abilities to deal with Russian dominance over the CIS.

To conclude, it is remarkable how willingly Georgia and Ukraine swallowed Russia's bait - hook, line and sinker. Provided that considerations to other CIS-members do not prevail, it appears that Ukraine and Georgia will go west while the rest are left to their own devices. Going separate ways in concord is no loss. What such a split of the CIS may constitute, however, is part of a division of the spoils between Russian and US influence over post-soviet space, at a time when their strategic partnership seems to have come to the end of the road. Then, one might ask how much the sovereign choice of the nations and peoples of Central Asia is worth to the great powers of global politics. Would a halfling state join and make the giants leave, it might also well constitute the moral choice of halflings and not of the great giants. That is perhaps also the lesson of our times, that when power talks morale steps aside: "Erst kommt das Freßen, dann kommt die Moral." It remains to be seen how Great the Game will be played, and with what appetite.

CIS, Georgia, Abkhazia, Ukraine, Russia, GUUAM, Borjomi