Time to rid the blinders about NordStream

The Swedish government's decision to accept the disputed gas pipeline NordStream has caused debate. Is the Russian-German gas pipeline a security policy threat to vital Swedish interests? Or is it a project that safeguards stability and development in Russia? In a recent interview by Andreas Henriksson from political web journal makthavare.se, I try to put some of these questions into perspective.

Vilhelm Konnander participated as one of the lecturers at the Fokus magazine conference "When technology changes politics" a few weeks ago, where he spoke at the Global outlook seminar. He is also one of the authors of the international blog gateway Global Voices, and has both professionally and privately followed developments in Russia for a long period of time. Makthavare.se asked him to give his views on the gas pipeline, and also account for the role that Russian gas and oil giant Gazprom plays in current Russia.

Q: How do you think that the Russian political leadership looks at the gas pipeline? Is it an important project for them from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, or is it a more downright economic project that carries its own merits and might have fallen had Swedish resistance been to great?

A: It is time to rid ourselves of blinders concerning the Nordstream issue. For Russia, NordStream and energy exports is a classical question of domestic foreign policy. It is about fattening a system that rests on a far-reaching political and economic symbiosis between competing political and economic élites, which seek to monopolize political and economic power. And the loyalty of élites is dependent on the incomes from oil, gas, and other raw materials, and how these profits are divided.

Extenstive regulations, taxation, and charges on the domestic market, has put the Russian energy industry in a position where the largest profits are made on foreign markets. For example, the internal Russian price on gas has, at times, been as low as a mere 3 percent of the export price. In the course of time, Gazprom's export incomes have varied between 50 and 70 percent of the business conglomerate's total revenues, despite the fact that substantially lower gas volumes have been delivered to Europe than to the domestic market. The Russian élites have thus enveloped itself into a so great dependency to divide the spoils of energy export revenues that it has become an integrated part of the country's informal system of government.

Q: And what would be the consequences of that?

Today, Russia's political stability is dependent on stable energy export revenues. In the event that this money flow is stopped - especially in times of economic crisis - it may subvert or threaten the political stability of the country.

The link between falling energy prices and Russian systemic collapse is obvious, regardless of whether one speaks of the fall of the Soviet Union or the financial crisis in the wake of which Putin came to power. Therefore, the effects of the international financial crisis is now all becoming resemblant of a fight for life or death to get hold of a piece of an ever diminishing cake. The consequences of Russian domestic political instability are still unclear, but increasing Russian desperation might cause greater uncertainties in the foreign and security policy area - in contrast to the clarity and predictability of recent years.

Q: What then might we expect from or great Eastern neighbour in the future?

A: In this perspectve, NordStream is, of course, important, but a basic mistake from the Swedish horizon is to constantly depart from very obscure geopolitical perspecitve, at the same time as the fundamental Russian domestic motives behind the project either are put in the background or regarded as purely economic.

In the interplay between politics and business, NordStream and similar projects are strategically vital for Russia, and here the domestic driving forces marginalise any potential foreign policy considerations - especially concerning a country like Sweden, which is hardly visible on the Russian political map. Continued Swedish resistance to NordStream would therefore be regarded as a ridiculous source of irritation from a Lilliputian country in the European periphery.

Q: In Sweden, NordStream has been thoroughly discussed, mostly from a critical perspective, by representatives of both the political blocs. Do you think that the NordStream management - and consequently the heavy political actors behind i in Russia and Germany - have paid any attention to Swedish critique, or would they have built the pipeline no matter what the Swedish government would have thought and said?

A: That Russia and Germany would have shown any greater consideration of Swedish critique is not very probable. Some considerations may well be made as for the stretch and makeup of the gas pipeline, and Sweden may surely also grumble and protract the issue if desired, but eventually both Moscow and Berlin counts on the Swedish government coming around. It is one thing if Sweden throws gravel into the Russian machinery, but to oppose both Russia and - above all - Germany will prove difficult in the long run.

Q: How important is NordStream, in your opinion, to Germany?

A: All since Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was launched in the 1970s, Berlin and Moscow have enveloped into a mutual dependency according to the formula "change by rapproachment," where gas deliveries to Germany has become the basic ingredient in the political concepts of both continental powers.

Even if Angela Merkel's (the German Chancellor) enthusiasm towards the project is more controlled than her predecessor's , Gerhard Schröder, who by the way is on Gazprom's payroll, the realization of the gas pipeline is central to future German-Russian cooperation. That Germany, in current times of economic crisis, would terminate a project, which ensures long-term, secure, and cheap gas deliveries, would be very surprising - both from a political and a financial perspective.

Q: How politically directed is the Russian gas and oil giant Gazprom?

A: The question should perhaps rather be how economically directed the Kremlin is by Gazprom. That both Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, and on of the country's previous Prime Ministers, Victor Chernomyrdin, have been chairmen of Gazprom should be a clear indicator. Despite privatization attempts during the 1990s, Gazprom has remained a state gas monopoly with great influence on political power. With increasing political control over so called strategic resources, Gazprom has served as a tool for quasi nationalizations of remaining private gas and oil companies, why its position has been all the more strengthened. The question about Gazprom and the Kremlin is like tha classical question about the hen and the egg: Which one came first?

Q: To what extent would you say that Russia is using its great oil and gas resources as an instrument of foreign policy power?

A: Rhetorics about Russa as an energy superpower have, in recent years, almost become a mantra for Russian leaders, as a way of strengthening national self-images and confidence. However, judging from results, it is hard to show that Moscow is using energy as a direct foreign policy tool. Seen frlom an economic and domestic political viewpoint, the energy issue is, however, currently part and parcel of almost all Russia's conflicts with its neighbours in recent years - Estonia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia.

What is interesting is, however, to look at how Moscow indirectly uses energy as a means of strategic manipulation. With the help of energy, foreign policy advantages and concessions are simply achieved in other areas than exactly the one that each conflict focuses on. Energy is used indirectly rather than directly as a foreign policy tool, where domestic politico-economic considerations often determine foreign policy action.

Q: What do you think about the Swedish debate about NordStream? Is it substantially mostly correct or is it mared by antiquated Swedish fears of the Russians?

A: When Nordstream is addressed in Swedish debate, it is not hard to make up an image of a security policys establishment, where old realist political views are mutually confirmed and reinforced - no matter whether it is about security policy reservations or pretexts for the very same kind of perspectives. The interesting thing is not what is actually said, but what is not said.

Fundamentally, Sweden is faced by a catch 22 concerning the gas pipeline. Should one seek to undermine Russia's political stability by torpedoing the NordStream project, with increased Russian security policy unpredictability as a consequence, or should one indirectly contribute to support the continuation of a corrupt and authoritarian regime, of which one at least knows what to expect? That is a question that gets little or no attention.

Q: As you see it, is there something we in Sweden have misconstrued in the security policy and geopolitical judgement of NordStream?

A: We, basically, pose the wrong questions about NordStream, and consequently get all the wrong answers. As long as the Swedish political and security policy establishment is dedicated to self-binding about the question of our relations to Russia - regardless of whether it concerns NordStream or general approaches - we risk ending up with the wrong conclusions. As 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin wall, it is possible that we as little now as then might predict fundamental changes in Russia. Still, the invasion threat from the East returns in various forms. From military threat to criminality, from criminality to refugee invasion, from refugee invastion to epidemics, from epidemics to energy. The list is long, but what has become reality?

Translation published by permission of Andreas Henriksson, makthavare.se

Building Babylon

The simplest things in life pass with so little notice that they have to jump up and bite you in order to be understood. Evidently, so is also the case with social media and the political particularities and mechanisms of about any country. As once the tower of Babel was wrought by confusion of language, social media risk becoming a mere edifice of a failed attempt to combine politics and technology.

Addressing a Fokus magazine conference on "How technology changes politics" last week, I was struck by a feeling that I spoke a different language than most other participants. This was peculiar to me, as I am well-versed in Swedish political and media culture, and knew many of the other participants. At first, I could not get a grip on why such was the case, before realizing that the combination of politics and social media was at the core of the problem. I simply did not relate to the use of social media in politics in the same way as most other participants did.

Why was it so? The simplest explanation is that dealing with social media on an international level - mainly with Central and Eastern Europe - the way political topics and issues are addressed there has little similarity with how things are dealt with in a Swedish context. The social media culture is totally different, as well as the mechanics of political and social media interaction. Despite knowing the language and context of Swedish politics, I had no way of understanding the mechanisms of how social media are used in a Swedish context. Giving a global outlook, I got the impression that portraying realities of politics-social media interaction internationally - in striking accordance with the political landscape in countries concerned - was received almost as cynical by parts of the audience. But hey, this is normal. If the security services in e.g. Uzbekistan boil political dissidents alive, then it is destined to leave an imprint on politics and the social media landscape in that country. This is not acting the devil's advocate. It is addressing the issues at hand without either malice or idealism.

A paradox is perhaps that I felt I had a lot more in common in terms of social media with the conference keynote speaker, Alan Rosenblatt of the Center for American Progress, than I had with my fellow countrymen, of whom I had known several for decades. A relevant question is, of course, if lessons learnt from a US context are applicable to that of another country or culture. This is usually not a problem, but the mere dynamics of social media and consequent development causes difficulties when regarding both politics and social media, because they evolve interactively and must therefore by nature be different to each particular context. Or else they would be to no use. Besides the cultural caveat, disabling copycat application of social media in political campaigning, there is also the issue of repetition. Techniques are largely applicable only to limited scopes and spans of political action, as social media as a means of communication is dynamic and sui generis.

For me, web activism and the use of social media is still a matter of simple political logics. You have a political content and then you use social media as an instrument for interaction and exchange of ideas with an open mind and willingness to argue your case. What struck me as odd was however that despite knowing the particular "language" or context, the social media culture was so different from the one I am used to relating to, that I had difficulties understanding how Swedish political activists could have any use of them in campaigning or communication. Still, that is hardly for me to say, as my main point is a lack of understanding, of course, provided I do not do that too well, which I lay no claim to.

One great exception to the lack of lingua franca was the enfant terrible of the show, Pirate Party leader Rickard Falkvinge. Using social media in political communication seemed as natural to him as it is to me. So, are Swedish politicians losing out on something important here? Possibly, but not necessarily. It all depends on what kind of political and party culture that exists. If you have an open mind and are ready for equally open-ended communication, then social media might become an invaluable instrument of mutual communication between people and candidates during political campaigning. If so is not the case, it may well be both money down the drain, and serve as a political liability, as not knowing how to use social media may well expose greater flaws of your policy.

All in all, it was a very worthwhile experience to attend the Fokus seminar, as it raised my awareness to matters that should really be self-evident, but I have previously not been wholly aware of. I also got an oppportunity for self-reflection and a portion of humility, which will be very useful when reflected against a more international social media context. Last but not least, it was great meeting so many bright and initiated people, who did not think of matters the way I did, thus providing an element of intellectual enrichment. However, judging from my impressions of the seminar, the one advice I might venture to give Swedish politicians as for social media is to either go full in if you have a massive message to convey, or else keep it on a low or moderate scale in proportion to what party culture, modus operandi, and campaign programme may allow. Or else you may be in for a lot of unwarranted trouble. After all, building a Babylonic tower needs finding a language in common even if you speak in different tongues. That is perhaps the greatest challenge for political establishment to overcome.

Swedish East European Blog Update 2007

Should a foreign minister be allowed to blog? This has been a burning issue in the Swedish media and blogosphere this year. The blog in question, Carl Bildt's Alla dessa dagar, is a personal weblog, describing the daily chores and reflections of his life as foreign minister. His critics, mostly representing traditional media, hold that this sort of one-way-communication belittles the critical role of media, and that Bildt runs Sweden's foreign policy through a blog.

That Bildt is next to the only prominent Swedish blogger, who regularly writes about Eastern Europe, is a little recognised fact. With a life-long commitment to regional issues, support for the independence of the Baltic States in the early 1990s, and role as EU mediator in former Yugoslavia, Bildt has insights and knowledge in this area unique to Swedish politics. Regrettably, and in contrast to his dormant Bildt Comments, his current Swedish-language blogging efforts at Alla dessa dagar are but daily notes dotted down in the margins of a life as a travelling salesman in foreign policy, and lack the clear views and analysis that he previously provided his readers with. It would probably have been much more interesting if Bildt's critics had been proven right, viz. that he would actually run Swedish foreign policy through a blog. Instead, it might seem that Bildt has fallen victim to the noblesse oblige of his office, by self-imposed censorship. The truth of the matter may, however, be much closer at hand: As foreign minister, life is simply too demanding to write analytically in the precious little spare time available.

In comparison to the 2006 review of Swedish blogs on Eastern Europe, Bildt is one of the few bloggers remaining. Only about half of the blogs in the 2006 survey are still active. On the positive side though, the number of Swedish East Europe bloggers has expanded, including some very promising new blogs, forming potential nuclea of blog clusters. The evolving pattern is thus a division into media, politcal, Slavophile, organisational, and expat blogs.

A decisive point for the expansion of the issue specific blogosphere was probably the October 2006 murder of Anna Politkovskaya. The leading Swedish evening paper, Aftonbladet, intensified coverage on Russia, and started cooperating with Novaya Gazeta. Recently, some experiments have also been made with blogging, by Johanna Melén's Moskva direkt, and one might expect this to become a recurrent feature of reporting.

The most regionally initiated blogger among Swedish journalists is indisputably Kalle Kniivilä of the Sydsvenska Dagbladet daily. He regularly posts stories, mainly about politics, in Swedish, Finnish, Esperanto, and Russian at his blog diVERse. Kniivilä's enthusiasm for his subject clearly shines through, and despite clear and strong views, he delivers a reasonably balanced coverage. The only downside of it is that you never know which language to expect, potentially discouraging regular reading. Still, it is definitely worth the effort.

Another journalist blogging about Russia is Sylvia Asklöf of Barometern-OT daily. She regularly blogs in Swedish at Sylvanien - a title obviously alluding to both her own name and the subjects she covers. The intention is to deliver her own reactions to our time, developments in Russia, and some tidbits about Swedish politics. By blogging, she shares her reflections and experiences of some 15 years as a russophile.

An infant Swedish East European blog cluster is the political, totally dominated by liberals. With the Swedish International Liberal Forum (SILC) as a base, a number of blogs about the region have been started. The first was Tobias Ljungvall's blog on Belarus, which regrettably closed down about a year ago. Instead, SILC activities have given rise to e.g. Amanda Lövkvist's blog Lindrig huliganism (Swedish), which main focus is on the situation of the Russian liberal opposition. Lövkvist - as was the case with Ljungvall - had also a book published by SILC on the topic of her blog. It also seems Amanda is running a blog in Russian called olydiagron, with views from Stockholm and St. Petersburg.

Another liberal in the blogosphere is Andreas Ribbefjord, with Andreas's Blog on Russian and Swedish foreign policy and current affairs. Coverage on Russia is, to a great extent, based on experiences from cooperation between the Swedish liberal party and its Russian counterpart Yabloko and the dissenters' movement.

Similar to both the political and media blogs are a few Slavophile blogs, which often offer interesting views and insights. Mi Lennhag at demo.se provides really good coverage of Eastern Europe with a focus on Russia. Anna-Maria Norman posts various pieces on the Ukraine at en salig blandning, and currently also runs a summer 2007 Ukrainian travelogue - ukraina 2007 - with her friend Hanna Söderbaum. Norman has both commitment to and insight into the Ukraine, which hopefully will encourage her further publishing efforts. A recent Slavophile addition is blogger Bjolso, who writes about politics and society at Ett annat Ryssland and about music at Russian music video blog.

The third tendency is that organisations and institutions dealing with the region are beginning to discover the blog media. Already last year, the Swedish Union of Journalists used Fredrik Nejman's Ukraina-blogg to cover a cooperation project with its Ukrainian counterpart. Now, as this cooperation seems finalised, its blog will probably go into hiatus. An NGO-activist, Swedish Amnesty Russia coordinator, is Johanna Lärken, who runs Med blicken mot öster, which regularly presents views and reflections on Russian politics and civil society. Also, Gunilla Lindberg - a member of the Swedish-Polish Association - publishes Bulletinenbloggen, as a complement to a Swedish-Polish online journal. A nascent Polish exile blogger community is also discernible, revolving around the foremost Swedish expert on Polish politics, Jakub Święcicki. At the Święcicki blog, he writes about politics and society - currently Poland under the reign of the Kaczyński twins. Politics, culture, and society are also the subjects of choice for other bloggers in this promising group of Polish exile kulturnye and intellectuals. Furthermore, the special Swedish system of adult education - the Folk High Schools - leaves its imprints on the blogosphere by Ove R. Eriksson's blog Eurasia Studies, reflecting on the experiences of East European studies at Österlens folkhögskola. The organisational category may also include Göran Dalin's Allt om Georgien - a hub for the Georgian diaspora community in Sweden - covered already in last year's review.

Then, there are the expat blogs. A blogger already known to many interested in the area is Erik Petersson's Dushanbe Pictures, which is still going strong in contrast to his Moscow blog Samtidigt i Moskva that seems to have gone into indefinite hiatus. With Dushanbe Pictures, Petersson regularly posts pictures from Tajikistan, and his photos are really worth seeing. The Central Asian perspective is complemented by a Caucasian, with C-G Erixon's CG Bloggin' - until recently based in Abkhazia.

Among the seniors of Swedish East European bloggers is Murmansk-based Wictoria Majby's Ryska Rövarhistorier, which after a period of hiatus, has recently resumed posting Russian cock-and-bull stories. A welcome addition is A Russia of my own, by Josefina - an aspiring writer based in Yekaterinburg. Writing in English, she posts stories and reflections from a provincial perspective of the Russian Urals, with the motto "Ambition mixed with vodka gets me up in the morning." However, she is not exclusive among regional reporters. Erik i Ryssland is a Swedish expat who has been living in and reporting from Rostov-na-Donu ever since 2005.

Turning to the big cities, another fine newcomer is Expat i Ryssland by female boxer Anna Ingman, who blogs about a training-existence in St. Petersburg. She also contributes with regular chronicles to the Västerbottens-Kuriren daily. Guran i Moskva and Thomas i Moskva are two blogs by Swedish teachers, telling about life and school in Russia. Furthermore, Kina i Moskva blogs about experiences and fashion in the Eastern metropolis. Turning west, Mats i Warszwa writes about his endeavours in the Polish capital. Last but not least, Sweden has - for the last year - had a welcome visit by one of the long-standing Russia bloggers, namely American expat Megan Case. Her unpretentious and down-to-earth accounts of life in Russia have gradually developed into an indispensable component of the expat Russia blogosphere, and she has also recently started blogging in Russian at американка, к сожалению.

To sum up, the Swedish blogosphere on Eastern Europe is undergoing expansion and some of the necessary stabilisation to form the dynamic density needed for a blog community. What is also positively surprising is that the number of women blogging about Eastern Europe equals that of the men, which seems an exception to the international East European blogosphere. A disadvantage for the international audience is that blogs, with few exceptions, are in Swedish. For Swedish bloggers though, the domestic audience seems larger than the international, even when blogging about events and phenomena taking place abroad.

As for contents, it is obvious that the Swedish blogosphere on Eastern Europe is much more Swedish than it is East European. For better or for worse, much of it reflects both the norms and values of Swedish society, and its views and perceptions of Eastern Europe. This is especially so when it comes to Russia blogging, where the idealistic often takes precedence over the realistic, which may prove dubious in the long-run, as Swedish views and Russian realities become too divergent. Still, despite this caveat, the Swedish blogosphere on Eastern Europe seems to meet with a bright future - a situation unforeseen but a year ago.

Горькая чаша?

During his recent visit to Sweden, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was obliged to drink a cup of malice, literally and in terms of Russian foreign policy implementation. Attending a dinner of CBSS-ministers, the wine on the menu was Georgian. It thus seems that Lavrov took this opportunity to enjoy something banned in Russia, in a parallel to US politicians smoking Cuban cigars.

The source is none other than Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, who mentions this on his blog. Apparently, Georgian wine was served for dinner during a boat trip with foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea region, within the context of the CBSS. What Lavrov thought about this, Bildt does not tell, but at least the Swedish schnapps was a hit.

The Swedish wine monopoly, Systembolaget, recently introduced its first Georgian wine - a 2005 Teliani Valley Saperavi, which evidently was the wine enjoyed by the Russian foreign minister. The Saperavi grape is the most common in Georgian wines, which is used for brands like Kindzmarauli and Mukuzani from the Kakheti region of Eastern Georgia. The Saperavi grape - often associated with one-year wines - is sweet in taste and often produces high alcohol levels. Besides Georgia, Saperavi is also nowadays to be found in Australian vineyards. Except the Saperavi, other popular grape varieties in Georgian wines are Alexandrouli and Mudzhuretuli, to be found in the famous Khvanchkara wines of Western Georgia.

Which type of Georgian wine Lavrov prefers is unknown, but it is safe to say that he did not - as generations of Russians - venture into any deeper discussion about the qualities of various Georgian wines. Probably he was wise not to, as some Stockholm malice might be better than Moscow's bitter cup, would it be known of Lavrov's wine consumption when abroad.

Was M/S Estonia sunk by an explosion?

A new Swedish-German expert group on the 1994 M/S Estonia catastrophe does not exclude an explosion as cause of the shipwreck. Such a conclusion has so far been ruled out by all other investigations, but few explanations have been given for the fast course of events when the ship went down.

On the evening of 27 September 1994, the Estline ferry M/S Estonia left Tallinn heading for Stockholm, with 989 people on board. Around midnight, the ship came into difficulties and at 00:23 hours sent out a distress call to ships in the vicinity. Exactly what happened after M/S Estonia's mayday is still in dispute, but the ship went down within the ensuing 20 minutes, taking with it 852 lives. It was by far the biggest ferry catastrophe ever in the Baltic Sea during peacetime.

The catastrophe occurred little over a month after the last Russian troops had left Estonian soil. It thus came at an inconvenient moment for Estonia, as the country had just regained full sovereignty over its territory. Consequently, the stage was set for widespread speculations and conspiracy theories. Despite the fact that numerous investigations, reports, and commissions of inquiry have concluded that there was no foul play, such theories still linger on. One of the most widespread speculations is that the Russian secret services would have placed a bomb on board, due to alleged smuggling of Russian military equipment by the Swedish military intelligence service. The Swedish military service has later admitted that it transported such equipment on M/S Estonia, but claims that so was not the case at this specific time.

Then, why did M/S Estonia sink? Most analysts agree that the main cause of the catastrophe was that the bow visor of Estonia was torn off by hard waves, causing also the front ramp of the ship to come loose. The immediate effect was that the sea flowed directly onto the car deck of the ferry, causing it to capsize within the course of less than half an hour.

What the new expert group, commissioned by the Swedish government, will do is to review various alternatives to explain why water penetrated the ship so quickly. The assumption remains that the main reason was the loss of the bow visor, but researchers will also scrutinise complementary explanations. One is that a hole would have been ripped open in the hull of the ship due to an explosion, which several survivors claim to have heard. However, no hole has so far been found to account for such a theory. Additional theories is that ventilation shafts would have facilitated the flow of water through the ship, and another that it came in by crushed windows. All in all, the research group will analyse eight additional or complementary scenarios causing the catastrophe.

So, should this news lead us to assume that there was foul play in the Estonia catastrophe? Most probably not. The only thing this research group will do, is really to go over all evidence again without prejudice and thereby include any possible hypothesis. It is not very likely that they will reach any other conclusion than has previously been made. Still, the Estonia catastrophe remains a national trauma in both Estonia and Sweden, so it is understandable that no stone will be left unturned in trying to wholly explain the shipwreck. An Estonian report was issued only in March this year, and the new Swedish-German expert group will probably not be the last to look into the matter.

What is perhaps the most tragic thing about continuously new reports about the Estonia catastrophe is that the families and relatives of the victims are never really allowed to put the issue at rest. After nearly 13 years, rumours are still at sway about what really happened, regardless of all inquiries and reports. Given the evidence produced so far, it is highly unlikely that M/S Estonia was sunk by an explosion. Still, also among the families there are many that will never learn to accept what happened and are trying to find explanations that simply might not exist. Paradoxically, not being able to put a thing like Estonia behind oneself is part and parcel of the tragedy itself, so the future will probably hold a stream of reports gradually turning into a trickle, as the people affected by Estonia gradually pass away. For today and the future, this is the greatest tragedy.

Give Peace a Dance?

Who would not agree that a night at the disco is better than a night with a Kalashnikov? Hence, "the supply of discotheques in conflict resolution is often underrated. The loudest music wins." That is what Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt said during a seminar with the presidents of Georgia and Estonia - Mikheil Saakashvili and Toomas Hendrik Ilves - at the German Marshall Fund's Brussels seminar on the Caucasus this Monday.

President Saakashvili was quick to agree with Bildt, proposing to build "lots of discotecques" to contribute to peace in the Caucasus. "There is a lot to be won if you can get people to dance instead of running around the streets with weapons," the two statesmen argued.

Following up on this idea, Carl Bildt later wrote on his blog: "I suspect that we during the seminar introduced the idea of 'discotecques for peace.' It was about giving - with small means - young people in confrontation and conflict zones a possibility to naturally spend time with each other. A night at the disco is better than a night with a Kalashnikov. Especially in South Ossetia."

As much as this idea might seem daft, one should not underestimate the significance of a neutral meeting-ground during conflict. Giving people a chance to concentrate on something else for once except war and conflict, indulging in pleasure instead of shooting at each other might, at first glance, seem like a good idea. Also, bars and restaurants have in recent years become the target of terrorist attacks, much motivated by the fact that they represent values not tolerated by extremists and war-mongers.

However, when regarding the issue more closely, one wonders who would constitute the disco clientele. Who could really afford going to the discotecque in a conflict or war zone? The answer is obivous for all who have seen conflict: It is mainly the profiteers of war that can allow themselves such luxury during conflict. Ordinary people just would not even consider it when they can hardly win their daily bread, and for them establishments of this sort are only associated with criminality, prostitution, and possibly foreign soldiers and aid workers.

Still, the idea might seem novel and original. However, it is far from a new concept. Dancing for peace first came in vogue during the "flower-power" era in the late 1960s, and formed part of the expanding international peace movement. Peace dance festivals have since been a recurrent phenomenon to promote pacifism. For Carl Bildt, this is perhaps a sign that he is getting old, as his youth was much spent combatting exactly this sort of "leftist" ideas. But perhaps he has come to realise that with more discos "peace will guide the planets, and love will steer the stars."

As for the "discos for peace" proposal one cannot but wonder how distant and distraught political leaders are from the realities of war and conflict, thinking that such ideas might give peace a chance to dance. What is there then left to say but: "Send in the clowns!"

Leif Kihlsten in memoriam

Yesterday, news broke that the popular Swedish Russia expert and lieutenant colonel Leif Kihlsten has passed away at the age of 66 after a period of illness. Kihlsten was an officer true to his profession, and for long served within Swedish military intelligence. He was also a frequent commentator on Russia and the CIS in Swedish media.

The news of Leif's death has struck the Swedish East European analytical community with sorrow. It is no exaggeration to say that he was very well-liked within the community. Combining humour and wit with deep knowledge about and enthusiasm for his subject, many of us have been inspired by him throughout the years. He was a true story-teller who could fascinate his audience by the most unexpected and still ingeneous parallels on phenomena within our field of study. Leif will be truly missed and his memory cherished by those of us who had the privilege of knowing him as a friend or colleague within our community.