Lithuania: End of the Brazauskas Era

Last Tuesday, Lithuania's Parliament - the Seimas - voted for Gediminas Kirkilas as new Prime Minister. This effectively marks the end of the Brazauskas era in Lithuanian politics, and possibly also a new climate on how to run state affairs. The Seimas' decision to elect Kirkilas as new PM comes after period of political crisis and scandals, which in the end ousted Brazauskas from power at the end of May.

Lithuania's new Prime Minister, Kirkilas, is a 54-year old professional Social-Democratic politician with a background in the Communist party - as was also the case of Brazauskas. Until chosen PM, he served as Defence Minister. In contrast to his predecessor, Kirkilas is considered a soft-spoken and EU-oriented politician with good knowledge of English. Furthermore, he still lives with his family in an old Vilnius flat, whereas most high-level Lithuanian politicians have acquired stately mansions on relatively low wages. However, rumours about Kirkilas have already started to surface. Apparently, he has a BA from a party school, which would not have granted him a place at Vilnius university, where he earned his MA. Even though this is comparatively little to form even the nucleus of a scandal, one cannot but wonder what will come in a few months, when this has been disclosed even before coming into office.

The appointment of Kirkilas as Prime Minister ends a lengthy political crisis in the country. Since Brazauskas resignation on 31 May, president Lithuania was edging towards early elections. However, only the Conservative Party wanted early elections, as the other parties feared being cast out of parliament by popular vote. So what remained was to patch up what could be saved and nominate a new PM. Just two weeks before Kirkilas appointment, the president's nomination for the Premiership, Zigmantas Balcytis, was rejected by the Seimas. This was just another proof of the political turmoil that has hit Lithuania this Spring.

In May, first the Social Liberals and then the Labour Party left the Brazauskas-led coalition government, making the PM's position impossible. The Labour Party was also under police investigation on suspicion of having received economic backing from Russian interests and for imbestlement of EU-funds. The Labour Party chairman, Viktor Uspaskich, who had gone into exile in Russia, then resigned the leadership of his party. One of the key scandal factors was the fight for control over the Mazeikiu Nafta oil refinery, which strong Russian interests were keen on buying. Without going too much into details, the heritage Brazauskas left behind was far from enviable.

All the same, it is indisputable that Brazauskas has made great services to his country. As first secretary in the Lithuanian Communist Party, Brazauskas made the party break away from Moscow in support of the Lithuanian independence movement. He transformed the party into a modern Social-Democratic party and led it to victory in the 1992 parliamentary elections, once Lithuania's independence had been regained. In 1993, he became Lithuanian president, which he served as until 1998, when he chose not to run for reelection. He was succeeded by present president Valdas Adamkus. Despite the fact that Brazauskas had declared his retirement, he had difficulties to keep out of state affairs, and eventually returned to politics to become Prime Minister in 2001.

As Brazauskas has now left the Premiership, many would feel that his retirement is long overdue. In fact, he has been speaking of retirement over the past year, but of course did not realise that it would be forced upon him. Brazauskas great role in the history of Lithuania is arguably also what eventually caught up with him.

During Soviet reign, Lithuania was relatively spared from Russification. Therefore, it was a national communist party in Lithuania that had to come to terms with perestroika in the late 1980s. As the leadership and political class of Soviet Lithuania were almost exclusively of Lithuanian origin, the choice to support independence and reform the party was closer at hand than in most other Soviet republics. However, this also meant that the country's political élite remained almost intact. The consequence was that independent Lithuania inherited the soviet political culture to a greater extent than other republics. It is the effects of this culture that now eventually has caught up with Brazauskas and sealed his fate in Lithuanian politics. Hopefully, Lithuanians will remember him as the leader that brought independence to them, and not for the many scandals that engulfed his last years in office.

Belarus Opposition Leader Sentenced to Jail

Today, a court in Minsk sentenced Belarus opposition leader and former presidential candidate Alyaksandr Kozulin to five and a half years' imprisonment, according to his wife. Kozulin was charged with organising protests in March against the reelection of Alyaksandr Lukashenka as president of Belarus. Lukashenka received some 83% of votes, which provoked widespread public protests and demonstrations.

The now sentenced Kozulin remains somewhat of an enigma to most analysts. In contrast to the other presidential candidate, Alyaksandr Milinkevich, Kozulin unexpectedly appeared as a candidate at a late stage of the runup to the March elections. His populism and provocative slandering of president Lukashenka was something new to Belarus politics. Many also wondered why he was allowed to attack the president on state TV, which is strictly controlled by the regime.

The initial assumption was that the regime had Kozulin run for the presidency in order to split the opposition. A more likely explanation is that he was Moscow's man. Accordingly, Russia would have used Kozulin to replace the increasingly difficult Lukashenka. Such assumptions are supported by an apparent power struggle within the regime in connection to the elections.

Thus, it seems that Lukashenka might just have averted being ousted from office by political forces allied with Moscow. His disappearance from the public after elections and the postponement of the presidential inauguration are further circumstantial evidence of a power struggle. That Belarus authorities now crack down so hard on Kozulin would serve as the final confirmation of the Russian connection. However, as is often the case with authoritarian regimes, one should be careful with taking rumours for granted. What is obvious is the increasing desperation of the Lukashenka regime to hold on to its grip on power.

US Pays Off Russia For Iran?

According to the New York Times, Washington is about to broker a deal with Moscow on Russian storage of US nuclear waste. In exchange, the White House expects the Kremlin to support its stance towards Iran on potential nuclear weapons' development. Thus, the US would bribe Russia to turn a blind eye on Washington's Iran policy.

The real issue at stake is, of course, Iran's plans to develop its nuclear capabilties. The Bush administration claims that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, whereas Teheran argues that it is only exercising its right to develop nuclear energy. During the last year, this issue has become so heated that it on several occasions has become a concern for the UN Security Council. Therefore, as new of US-Russian negotiations on a bilateral nuclear deal broke last Saturday, speculations peaked how this would affect Iran.

So, why is Iran's nuclear affairs of concern to Moscow? Except Russia's seat on the Security Council and strategic concerns, the great reason is that Russia is Iran's biggest supplier of fuel, equipment, and expertise to the country's nuclear programme. As previously reported, Russia's nuclear industry is one of the few technically advanced sectors where Russia can still compete for shares on the international market with other technically developed states. The steady flow of incomes from nuclear supplies to Iran has been an indispensable and reliable factor for the survival of Russia's atomic sector.

If the prospects of a Russian-American nuclear deal would prove much more lucrative and stable to Moscow than continuing nuclear supplies to Iran, the US might stand a chance of turning Russia's position on Iran. This would be to pay off the Russians. However, it ignores that competing interests in Russia might complicate Moscow's ability to keep to such a deal. Still, the US has obviously been very ingenious in elaborating its proposal based on the fundamental paradigm of contempoary Russian society: When money talks - politics is silent.

By the way, today the UN "permanent five" - USA, Great Britain, France, China, and Russia - declared that they had agreed to bring Iran's nuclear programme before the UN Security Council.

Russia: Chechen Rebel Leader Killed

According to Interfax, Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev was killed by Russian special forces in Ingushetia last night. Nikolai Patrushev, head of Russia's security service (FSB), said Basayev was killed while preparing a terrorist attack in Ingusheti capital of Nazran on occasion of the St. Petersburg G8 Summit this week.

Apparently, Basayev and his fellow insurgents were caught in the act, riding an accompanying car to a lorry filled with explosives intended to blow up the republic headquarters of the Interior Ministry in Nazran. However, it was only after Russian troops had blown up the lorry that Basayev's body - decapitated by the blast - was found and identified. An initial impression is thus that Russian troops came across Basayev more by chance than by anticipation.

President Putin was quick to congratulate "all members of the special unit that prepared and carried out this operation" and continued saying that "this is a well-deserved retaliation against the bandits for our children in Beslan, in Budennovsk, and for all the terrorist acts that they have performed in Moscow, and in other Russian regions, including Ingushetia and the Chechen republic."

Basayev's predecessor as Chechen rebel leader, Aslan Maskhadov was killed in March last year. This broke Russia's apparent tendency to avoid killing leading Chechen guerilla leaders. Until then, it was simply more worth keeping them alive as a threat and an object of hatred, motivating the Russian people to continue their support for the war in Chechnya.

Basayev's death will most likely mean little for the conflict. With Moscow-backed Ramzan Kadyrov as leader of Chechnya, criminality as a form of government has been institutionalised. When Kadyrov turns 30 in October, he will most likely succeed puppet president Alkhanov to rule Chechnya without much restraint from Moscow.

Who will succeed Basayev as rebel leader is too early to say, but guesses are that this will have little significance for the continuation of the conflict. A potential candidate is obviously Doku Umarov, who recently was appointed president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria - the rebel government, although Basayev in reality was the man in charge.

Basayev was the man to change the the goals of the Chechen insurgence from national liberation movement to the formation of an Islamic caliphate in the Caucasus. He also changed tactics from conflict within Chechnya by bringing warfare to Russian soil by terrorism in Moscow and other parts of the country. His justification was tit-for-tat: Russian troops targeted civilians in Chechnya, why Chechen resistance should target civilians in Russia.

The coincidence that Basayev's corpse was decapitated only serves to symbolise the decapitation of the Chechen guerilla. Basayev's combination of strategist, military commander, and ideologist will be hard to replace. However, one should not forget that without leaders there is nobody to negotiate peace with.

Thus, by the death of Basayev, Russia will get even less of a counterpart in the Chechen conflict. The effect might be that the fragmentation, criminalisation, and proliferation of warfare to other parts of the Caucasus as the rebels will lack cohesion to contain the conflict. However, Moscow lost the interest in any negotiated settlement of the conflict in Chechnya long ago and by the death of Basayev, it appears that this has become a policy of no return. The Kremlin thus gives the Chechen people little hope of peace in an increasingly self-perpetuating conflict.

Moldova: Transnistria Blast Kills Eight

On Thursday, at least eight people were killed in an explosion in Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, BBC reports. Local authorities believe the blast, hitting a city minibus in early morning, might have been caused by a bomb, triggered by accidence. If so, this only adds to the picture of Transnistria as a region tarnished by violence and criminality.

Transnistria constitutes an ignored and absurd anachronism in contemporary Europe. It is still, officially, a part of Moldova, although the region de facto seceded as early as in 1990. Then Transnistria declared independence with assistance of the Russian 14th Army, making its commander, Aleksandr Lebed, a folk hero in Russia. This was followed by low intensity warfare, until a ceasefire was reached in 1992, putting an end to hostilities. Since then, the Transnistrian question is considered a frozen conflict by the international community.

During its roughly 15 years of independence, Transnistria has become a centre of organised crime and trafficking in people, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, weapons and whatever contraband one might imagine. The region is led by Igor Smirnov, who won a landslide victory in the 2001 presidential elections - even to the extent that he reportedly gained over 100% of votes in some districts. Smirnov's eldest son runs Sheriff, one of Transnistria's biggest and most lucrative businesses. As the dedicated football fan he is, he has founded his own professional football team and constructed an international standard football stadium in the capital of Tiraspol - a city numbering a mere 150,000 inhabitants. Such extravagance contrasts to the average income of some 100 USD a month for Transnistrians, which is roughly half that of Moldova - Europe's poorest country.

For long, Transnistria has been able to go about its business relatively undisturbed, not least because of massive backing from Moscow. In 1999, Russia however agreed to withdraw its troops from the region by the OSCE-negotiated Istanbul agreement. To this day, Russia remains reluctant to honour these commitments. During the last year, the tide all the same seems to have turned for Transnistria.

One of the key factors of Transnistrian subsistence has been smuggling. For this, the region was dependent on Kuchma's Ukraine turning a blind eye to such activities, especially as the Ukrainian port of Odessa served as a great outlet of contraband. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has - with international assistance - made great efforts to curve smuggling, why the Transnistrian regime may slowly be approaching the brink of ruin. Also, in December 2005, the EU launched a monitoring mission to supervise the border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

This was followed in March 2006 by Ukraine imposing new customs regulations, demanding all imports from Transnistria to be processed by Moldovan authorities. The new regulations were an effect of the enforcement of a joint customs protocol between Ukraine and Moldova. In effect, this constituted a Ukrainian-Moldovan economic blockade, which both Transnistria and Russia were quick to point out. However, from an international law perspective, Ukraine and Moldova were in the right for the simple reason that Transnistria is still regarded part of Moldova by the international community.

As things now stand, the Transnistrian economy increasingly seems to lose out on its incomes from smuggling. This puts the very existence of Transnistrian independence in peril, which in the end might trigger the change that is so long overdue. It remains to be seen whether Russia will accept such change or if the country will step in to support the breakaway region to avoid yet another coloured revolution in its sphere of vital interests. Until then, Transnistria tragically remains an Absurdistan of Europe.

Russia: Foreign Wines Dry Up

After July 1, the imposition of a new law on liquor combined with usual bureaucratic tardiness threaten to dry up the Russian wine market by making imports of foreign wine virtually impossible for several months.

The new law aims at blocking the wide spread of counterfeit liquor by requiring mandatory excise labels on all wine and liquor bottles sold in the country. Despite the fact that the law has been long expected, Russian authorities have been slow in taking practical measures for it to work. Earlier this year, Russian liquor consumers were hit by a similar bureaucratic foulup, when there was a sudden lack of equivalent labels. Someone had simply forgot to order the labels in time for producers to put them on their bottles, which created a short but shaking "vodka crisis" for Russian society. Whether the issue was solved by postponing implementation of the law until now or if it is a case of separate laws with similar content is unknown. Nevertheless, the result is once again more or less the same.

This year, Russian liquor vendors have been especially hard hit by misdirected or poorly implemented government measures. In April Russia imposed an embargo on imports of the vastely popular Georgian and Moldovan wines, tendering a more traditional and low-price market. This might have been an eye-opener for consumers, but after some confusion Georgian wines were substituted with wines from other countries. This option now seems to peter out.

Indeed, representatives of liquor retailers do not expect that the market on imported alcohol will work properly again until November. Retailers expect a loss of some 900 million USD in revenues and that up to a third of Russian liquor stores might close indefinitely. Why the government has so blatantly bungled the issue remains unclear. Favouring a next to inexistant domestic wine production can hardly serve as an explanation, if the foulup is not directed at supporting Russia's vodka producers. The latter would, however, make no sense while such a move would but incur higher state costs for the consequences of alcholism. So, in lieu of any better explanation, one may only assume that this is yet another blunder of the infamous Russian bureaucracy.

Kazakh Leader's son-in-law New Oil Mogul

On Tuesday, Timur Kulibayev, Kazakh leader Nazarbayev's son-in-law, was elected chairman of the country's state oil and gas company, Kazmunaigas, Reuters reports. This strengthens the tendency towards increasing control of key positions in Kazakh society by the Nazarbayev family.

As is already the case, the Nazarbayev family exercises a disproportionate influence over Kazakhstan. Only last week, news came that Kulibayev's wife and presidential daughter, Dinara, is a large indirect owner of Halyk Bank, the country's third largest bank. Another daughter, Dariga, is a party leader and an MP, whereas her husband, Rakhat Aliyev, serves as deputy foreign minister.

The 65-year-old Nazarbayev is Kazakhstan's leader since 1989. During his reign, he has often been accused of nepotism and it is quite obvious that he deliberately places family members on central posts in government and business to gradually exert greater control over Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan: Video of the Andijon Uprising

Last week, New York Times reported about video recordings from the events leading up to the 2005 Andijon massacre. The tapes were confiscated by Uzbek authorities after the massacre and have been used as evidence and propaganda by the Karimov regime. However, they may be interpreted in various ways, and cast considerable doubts on the Uzbek version of events. This comes as no surprise as the official Uzbek story has been twarted from the very outset. However, the tapes also give a much more complex picture of developments in Andijon prior to the massacre than has previously been the case.

In May 2005, public protests against a number of arrests in Uzbek city of Andijon led to a massive jail-brake. Protests were sparked by a trial of 23 local businessmen charged with involvement in Islamic extremism. On 12 May, an armed crowd stormed the local prison and prisoners were released, including also heavy criminals. By then, public disconent had peaked and people flooded the streets in massive demonstrations against the Karimov regime, which were to be know as the Andijon uprising. On 13-14 May, demonstrations were brutally quashed, and as many as 750 people - mainly civilians - were killed, although Uzbek officials have put the death toll at a mere 169. Thus far, accounts more or less concur.

The Uzbek government's version of events was that an uprising of Islamist extremists - with links to al-Qaida - had been put down by police and interior ministry troops. This version, backed also by Russia and China, holds that there were next to no civilian casualties and that the action was directed against Islamist insurrectors and bandits. Of course, this story is evidently incorrect. Testimonies by Andijon refugees instead clearly point to a majority of civilian casualties. Furthermore, it seems that also the military was used against civilians, at least judging from what arms apparently were used to put down the rebellion.

As the story came across to the international audience, more or less peaceful demonstrators had been brutally massacred by the Karimov regime. This version must be seen against the background of discontent over social and economic conditions that swept over Uzbekistan in Spring 2005.

As a consequence, massive international protests against the massacre were levelled against the Karimov regime. Thus, the international community reacted to the Andijon events. Following the lead of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the OSCE called for an independent international investigation to find out what transpired in Andijon during those fatal 2005 Spring days. In September 2005, the EU imposed sanctions against the Uzbek leadership, walking a thin line between Human Rights concerns and the needs among its member states for the continued use of the Uzbek Termez airbase for supplies to international operations in Afghanistan. Still, such considerations were eventually put aside, and in retaliation Uzbekistan banned Nato, the US and most EU-states from continued use of Termez.

As is often the case with sanctions, international measures against the Uzbek leadership were somewhat blunt, hitting also reform-oriented regime politicians, e.g. the Uzbek Minister of Defence, Kadyr Gulyamov. Western critics of the sanctions have also argued that the only result was to drive Uzbekistan into the arms of Russia, while at the same time losing all possibilities for Western influence over political developments in the country.

Until now, the real events that took place in Andijon have remained obscure. The 70 minute recording now obtained by the New York Times gives a more nuanced picture of events leading up to the massacre. Recordings show the demonstrations after the prison-break but before troops arrived to quash the rebellion. Most of the demonstrators are unarmed civilians, but a number of armed insurgents and criminals take cover in the crowd. Also, a convicted murderer as well as a known female drug-dealer are agitating to the crowd to stir up wider protests. It is simply obvious that some of the escaped prisoners try to exploit the situation to their own advantage. However, it is even more obvious that the overwhelming majority of demonstrators are unarmed civilians exercising their democratic rights. Also, young men making Molotov cocktails are portrayed. When fire fighters arrive to put out fires ignited by insurgents, they are not only hindered to do so, but also taken hostage.

That public protests of this kind should warrant action by the police or interior ministry troops is clear. Needless to state, Uzbekistan - as any other state - has the right to preserve public order by the legal means at hand. However, there is no excuse for massacring civilians in the process of returning order. It is all too evident that the Karimov regime knowingly used excessive force to set an example to the Uzbek people to put an end to protests that had been growing throughout Uzbekistan during Spring 2005. That armed insurgents and criminals used civilians as cover and exploited public discontent in Andijon can never motivate indiscriminate shooting at civilians. Uzbekistan committed a haineous act against its own people no matter what the rationale for it might have been. That the now published recordings gives a more nuanced picture of events does not change this in the least, but only adds to what many observers guessed already from the outset, given the factors involved. Andijon still stands out as Karimov's worst crime. Let us but hope that the world and the Uzbek people will escape a repetion of similar events elsewhere, despite continued repression.

Russia: Putin's Power Purge?

In recent weeks, rumours have been going around that Putin is about to clamp down on Russia's legal and security structures. The reason for this, would allegedly be that they have grown too powerful and independent for the Kremlin. A purge among its ranks would consequently serve to set the balance right between security and economic interests. However, at a closer look, these rumours seem more an effect of simplification than a correct assessment of the realities of Russia's complex political landscape.

The reason why rumours were in sway, is a number of recent dismissals of high-ranking officials. The structure mostly affected seems to have been the customs services. Thus, Aleksandr Zherikov, head of the federal customs committee was dismissed in May, to be replaced by Andrei Belyanikov. At the same time, the Federal Customs Service was transferred from the ministry of economic development to direct government supervision. Also, Interfax reported that Vladimir Shamakhov, first deputy head of the Customs Service, might tender his resignation. Furthermore, two first deputy heads of the service were retired, namely Yuri Azarov and Leonid Lozbenko.

Turning to the Interior Ministry, a number of high-ranking ministry officials have been sacked from their posts. Also, the Federal Security Service (FSB) has been hit. Thus, three generals have been retired - Kolesnikov, Plotnikov, and Fomenko. As for the judiciary, some prominent judges and prosecutors were dismissed at the same time. Then, the Chairman of the Federation Council announced that a number of Senators were about to be relieved of their powers.

As all these actions occurred more or less simultaneously, there is no wonder that anticipations of a coming Putinist power purge were raised. When Putin announced the dismissal of his old ally Vladimir Ustinov, who recently got his term as Prosecutor General prolonged by five years, many drew the conclusion that the president was about to clamp down on the power structures. However, it did not take long before the soufflé collapsed. Only days later, Vladimir Ustinov was appointed Minister of Justice.

So, what conclusions might be drawn from this? First, that so much creedence has been given these rumours testifies to the tendency of Western analysts to overestimate political tendencies and occurrences in today's Russia. The system of power has become so closed that people are increasingly resorting to guesses. Secondly, the measures per se should not be underestimated. It might well be that Putin is preparing to reform the power structures, but then on a much narrower scale than these rumours have indicated. Third, some caution should be made when analysing Russia from a system's point of view, especially when relating changes in various structures to each other. The risk is that you wind up with wrong or exaggerated conclusions. Finally, what at a time seemed as a Putinist power purge, in reality turned out a mere whimper.

Ukraine: New Government in the Making

On Wednesday, news broke that a new orange coalition government is forming in Ukraine. Both president Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko bloc (BYuT) confirmed that an agreement had been reached. The news comes amid rumours that Yushchenko was teaming up with orange revolution enemy Yanukovich and his Party of Regions.

If the deal goes through, Yulia Timoshenko will once more become Prime Minister, which has been her primary goal since she was sacked from the post last September. The coalition will be between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, which has been the main negotiating approach all along.

Indeed, negotiations to form a coalition between Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialist Party, have been underway ever since the 26 March parliamentary elections. At the beginning of April, Our Ukraine announced that unity had been reached. Then, nothing happened. In mid-May, it was Timoshenko's turn to declare that a new government had been agreed on. Once again, nothing happened. So, one might well perceive news from Kiev on a new cabinet with sound skepticism, were it not for a constitutional deadline on forming a government. Therefore, it now appears that Ukraine will eventually get out of its post-election political deadlock. However, as BBC's Kiev correspondent states, "The deal will not be certain until it is signed."

If the deal goes through, BYuT is said to receive a dominant 11 cabinet posts, including the Premiership. Our Ukraine will get the post as speaker of the Parliament, and has already nominated Petro Poroshenko. The Socialist Party will appoint the vice-Premier.

By all appearances, Ukraine will be in for a tough political ride with its new cabinet. Neither president Yushchenko nor Poroshenko stand Timoshenko, since the fall-out and scandals leading to Timoshenko's dismissal as Premier last September.

Moreover, constitutional changes this year weaken the presidential powers to the benefit of parliament - the Verkhovna Rada. The Rada has a long tradition of relative independence, playing its role in the political balance of power, and party allegiance is far from granted. With fiery and controversial Yulia Timoshenko as Premier, parliament may decide to get in the way of her plans at leisure.

However, there is one strong binding-force uniting the new government. The political forces of the Orange Revolution has failed once. This time they have to succeed or face total political discredit for the foreseeable future. Thus, as Ukrainian political analyst, Volodymyr Fesenko, put it to AFP: "It's a second chance and if they fail, they'll all go down together."

Turning to Ukraine's international relations, with Timoshenko as Prime Minister, relations with Russia are in obvious jeopardy. Already the same day that the new coalition was announced, Timoshenko called for a review of the Russian-Ukrainian gas deal that ended the New Year's gas crisis earlier this year, BBC reports.

In addition to this, the US Marine Corps participated in exercises on the Crimean peninsula a few weeks ago, which sparked fears in Moscow of Ukrainian ambitions to join Nato. Thus, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine that such a move would seriously hurt relations Moscow and Kiev.

The majority of Crimeans are ehtnic Russians, and the Black Sea peninsula was transferred from Russia to Ukraine as late as in 1954 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Therefore, the presence of US troops in a disputed Ukrainian region does not serve to improve Ukrainian relations with Russia. Indeed, the government that is now being formed will inevitably have to meet major challenges in its relations with the Kremlin.