Swedish sub hits Russian ground

Amid heated Swedish debate on the existence of a Russian Cold War sub threat, a Swedish sub this morning hit Russian ground. Information about the incidence is still scarce, but according to unnamed sources, the grounding may have been caused by a combination of overweight and shallowness. Witnesses also report rumbling from the sub's hull, indicating lack of fuel.

As of this time, no official comments have been made from either Sweden or Russia, but initiated sources within Swedish intelligence indicate that the sub for long has been transferred from military to civilian purposes, with a "healthy distance from the defence sphere."

The incident comes at an awkward moment for the two countries, coinciding with both US President Obama's visit to Moscow, and Sweden's assumption of the EU Presidency last week. Speculations thus run rampant that the grounding until now has been deliberately submerged for political reasons.

Swedish submarine scare
News about the sub may prove very inconvenient for Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, who is currently facing allegations for misleading public and media on the Russian sub threat during the 1980s, following the 1981 grounding of Soviet submarine U-137 in the Swedish archipelago. An editorial in today's Dagens Nyheter, Sweden's leading newspaper, thus claims that Bildt's "career was largely founded on alleged soviet submarines - frequently improbable, sometimes minks." As the Swedish EU Presidency might further propel Bildt's international career, such ambitions could now be thwarted by an embarrassing incident of this kind.

Political parallels
Also, comparisons are made to the confidence crisis facing the Swedish political establishment after the 1979 Harrisburg nuclear accident. As news of the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown broke, leading Swedish politicians had for years been saying that the risks of nuclear power were inprobable on the verge of incredibility. The political consequences of this grave misjudgement led to a disastrous "maybe" decision in the 1980 Swedish referendum on the future of Swedish nuclear power, forming an anticlimax on nuclear termination that has since marred the country's energy policy.

In what now seems as a surfacing Swedish-Russian sub crisis, any Swedish claims that the sub ran aground due to faulty navigation may be retorted by Russia as "improbable" - echoing both Bildt's statements during the 1980s Swedish submarine scare, and reminiscences of recurrent ministerial misjudgements, gradually eroding the legitimacy of the Swedish political system.

Things are not always what they seem...

The above only serves to prove that, in the interplay between politics and media, things are not always what they seem. Regreattably, this is also the case with the news about the Swedish sub, which would have made a true scoop had it been true. Instead, the sub in question is no other than yours truly, who over the next two weeks will be SUB-stituting as Central and Eastern Europe Editor of Global Voices - a Harvard-based project that provides alternative reporting on world affairs to that of mainstream international news media.

Alternative reporting does not mean misleading reporting, as the above paragraphs may indicate. To the contrary, following the blogosphere and other Internet resources may, in my own view, at times present a more accurate and up-to-date picture, not least of evolving events, than presented by most other media. It gives the capacity to look beyond press conferences and newsdesks, which at times tend to present nicely wrapped-up truths about events often too obscure and complex for most to comprehend.

Giving precedence to first-hand accounts and on-the-field reporting, with all the ambiguities that may involve, can thus at times be preferrable to stories about "quarrels in far away countries between people of whom we know nothing." Yesterday it might have been Czechoslovakia and Germany, today it might be Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, forming a loosely concocted perceptive pattern of numerous and frequently disparate stories, to form the truth of the matter as we see it.

For truly, if you put your hand on your heart, how much does the faked story about a Swedish sub hitting Russian ground differ from far too much media coverage on events evolving on the margins of the world as we know it. So, it may not always be advisable to follow the calls: "As reports pour in, stay tuned as the story develops..."

Putin's Presidential Pseudo-News

Putin will not run for a third presidential term in 2008. This is a message that he has been repeating every other month over the past years. Still, it was one of the top stories of international media today. Why is it that this is considered so important news as to reach the headlines of respected news sources throughout the globe next to every time that Putin says he will step down from power in 2008? The answer might be that this is the effect of a well-orchestrated media-coup by Putin's political spin-doctors - the political technologists.

News should always be considered critically by those who receive it. What essentially constitutes news should also be filtered by those whose profession it is - journalists and editors. As the mere term indicates, news should also present something new to its audience. How is it then that something which is news to nobody is repeatedly treated as such?

Should not any journalist in his sound mind defer from reporting what everyone already knows: That Putin does not want to remain Russia's president after 2008. On the contrary, if Putin would declare that he will run for a third presidential term and thus change the constitution, then it would be news of great significance. Until then, this is not the case.

Putin's repeated denial of furher presidential ambitions is perhaps - paradoxically - the main reason why journalists are so susceptible to this message. A climate has been created in which Putin's statement of facts becomes a crescendo of denials in anticipation of the orgiastic eruption when he finally comes out of the closet: "Yes, I will run for a third term! Yes, I will change the constitution! Yes, I cannot live without power! Yes, I am dizzy with success!" Putin's "No" becomes a resounding "Yes!!!" in the ears of media and the public.

That journalists and political analysts alike miss to comprehend Putin's "No" is partly explained by all the rumours that have reverberated throughout Moscow over the years. The question whether Putin will stay in power after 2008 has been a recurrent theme in all political discussions. Still, the answer has been the same all along, namely that the president respects the constitution and thus has no ambtion to change the fact that his tenure of power will end once his term runs out. So, rumours to the opposite must originate from somewhere else. One source might be the president himself by proxy of his "political technologists."

Why might this be the case? Putin has set before himself three tasks: to create and maintain political stability, produce economic growth, and gain control over strategic resources. Here, political stability is perceived a prerequisite for the latter two. In the political area, it is in the best interest of power that a climate of uncertainty prevails on whether Putin will continue in power. As long as this is the case, potential contenders will keep a low profile and nobody of significance will challenge Putin as long as he retains apparent popular support. Thus, Putin avoids running the risk of becoming a lame duck, and his political succession may be handled in an orderly manner by the Kremlin entourage that forms his basis of power. A measure of uncertainty for the public thus becomes an instrument of certainty for power, and thus the political tools for developing economic growth and gaining control over strategic resources is maintained.

Personally, it actually appears that Putin is weary with power and the constant obligations it involves. Associates at times describe him as disinterested with the chores of his office, allocating an increasing amount of time to activities normally not associated with the exercise of power. Also, Putin does not seem to be the sort of politician that thrives on power - to the opposite of what is often claimed in view of his extremely power-oriented policies.

Here also his KGB-background is regarded a reason why Putin would cling on to power, because KGB by essence epitomises power. To assume so may however be to miscomprehend the Chekist culture from which Putin originates. Chekist power tradition sets the system before the individual, and if Putin is true to these ideals he will also be loyal to the constitution as long as power to the system is ensured. His lack of ethics might also be construed in a Chekist context and not as evidence of self-perpetuating personalised authoritarian power.

Finally, why would Putin want to risk another period in office? His presidency has been more successful than what he himself might have imagined. Putin has restored the Russian state as an important actor both domestically and internationally. The country's economy thrives on the enormous incomes from oil, and a measure of stability has been restored to society. Why should Putin risk jeopardising an apparently favourable judgement as the great restorer of the Russian nation that the Russian people and history might pass on him, when the future is uncertain?

So, the question should perhaps be rephrased: "Why should Putin not step down from power in 2008?" So far, few substantial reasons have been presented why he should stay in power, so the assumption must naturally be that he will leave office.

Still, international media continues to report that Putin will leave power in 2008, in the anticipation that somewhere along the line he will change his mind. This does not only mean that the press runs the risk of a gigantic anticlimax once Putin actually leaves office. It above all serves the interests of Kremlin's perpetuation of authoritarian power while preventing democratic debate on the future of Russia. Wherever you turn, it seems that laughs will be on Putin in 2008, if he continues to pull off this game of ambiguities.



Comment: The full text of Putin's appearance is available at Financial Times.