Lights out Luzhkov

Driving past the Moscow mayor's office at night in the early 1990s, lights were always on in Mayor Popov's office. During the turbulent times back in 1991-92, this was meant as a sign to Muscovites that at least someone struggled to get things back on course. As usual, the paradox of doing the impossible merely resulted in a plethora of Popov anecdotes. Now, lights have gone out for his successor, Yuri Luzhkov, and as a conflict unveils before the eyes of an amazed public, interpretations of it as part of a general Russian power struggle for the 2012 presidential elections risk becoming anecdotical. To avoid this, my advice is simple: Follow the money!

That Luzhkov's position was precarious has been evident since this summer's wild fires covering the Russian capital in smoke for weeks. Still, one should not forget that his dismissal has been longer in the making than most would care to remember. The struggle between Russia's two capitals, Muscovites and Pitertsy, is a major theme in Russian politics, that also Putin's road to power is part of. As a protegé of erstwhile St. Petersburg mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, Putin is likely never to forget how instrumental Muscovite interests were for defeating Sobchak back in 1996, and the dire consequences this had for himself. Ever since, the Pitertsy have been longing to get back at Luzhkov, barely succeeding to keep him at bay in the 2000 presidential elections that brought Putin to the Kremlin. Of course, this is common knowledge for anyone following Russia. What is interesting is how little this has been the focus of attention recently. Instead, Luzhkov's dismissal is predominantly interpreted as part of a struggle between Medvedev and Putin for the 2012 presidential elections.

Of course, as Gazprom-owned TV-channel NTV led the campaign against Luzhkov, it is easy to draw the conclusion that Medvedev, still retaining power over Gazprom, pushed the button, which is likely also the case. Does this mean that Putin was against ousting Luzhkov, as part of some ongoing duel between himself and Medvedev? Well, there is reason for skepticism to such arguments, even though they currently seem at sway. As much as there are contrasting interests between Putin and Medvedev - as in any dual power system - one should be careful when it comes to explaining everything in such terms. Still, the temptation is great for any Kremlinologist to jump at too far-reaching conclusions when centres of power engage into open battle. Simply following the political trail may however prove a sidetrack.

Instead of zooming in on who will succeed Luzhkov as Moscow mayor - a relevant question in itself - now any Russia watcher may - in real time - be able to cover a greater field in charting power relations in the country than might be deduced merely from the political game. Those who remember the Khodorkovsky case and the Yukos scandal back in 2003 are likely to recognize a recurrent pattern. As back then, Putin stands aside, some mediator - this time Sechin - carries on deceptive negotiations on how to settle a conflict of interests, while the possy prepares to move in for the kill. So, as was the case with Yukos, the interesting issue is who will divide the spoils after Luzhkov - or rather what will happen to his wife's business empire. As illustrated by the NTV-documentary, it is not only Luzhkov one is going after, but also his financial basis.

Needless to point out, there is a reason why Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina, ranks eight in Russian riches. The politico-financial symbiosis between the mayor and his wife in the capital's building and construction business is a racket that has sky-rocketed Moscow real estate prices to some of the highest in the world. With all adjoining businesses under the former mayor's influence, living costs have reached ridiculous levels for most Muscovites. Still, this is the sort of daily corruption that no one cares to bother with, regarding it merely as a way of life. The question now is if Luzhkov has reached a settlement e.g. with Sechin, giving him some sort of immunity in an ordered exchange for his wife's business empire, or if we will witness something similar to what happened to Yukos.

The point is that regardless of struggle or settlement over the Luzhkov spoils, following the money may shed much more light on how forces arrange themselves for the future than merely regarding it as a traditional Kremlinologist game. So, it may be worthwile to pay attention to who goes in for the kill on Luzhkov's legacy - whether in person or by proxy. As lights go out for Luzhkov, lights on his legacy should be kept on for anyone wanting to decipher the machinations of Russian politics.

Stalin's summer snowstorms

Some stories are too good - or bad - not to be retold. One of them is about Moscow's summer snowstorms that annually rage across the city at the beginning of June to the surprise and bewilderment of unsuspecting visitors. For Muscovites, they simply form a half a century old legacy of folly and megalomania.

As a guest to Russia's capital, waking up to to the sounds and sights of a bustling metropolis may also present a freak of nature in the form of an apparent summer snowstorm. For those not drawing the curtains again, going back to sleep as after a bad dream, curiousity drives the kind of questions that demand but do not await an answer. For most, though, they are simply met with a frown or a dejected shrud of the shoulders, possibly followed by a sighing sound exclaiming "pukh." If not mistaking this pooh sound for Russian rejection to an inquisitive foreigner, "pukh" is the first lead in a Moscow mystery waiting to be solved. Likewise, a subsequent "topol" should not be interpreted by prospective security specialists as some Russian trying to divulge secrets about the country's latest nuclear missile programme, coincidentally carrying that very same name. Instead, the true secret is - as many secrets are - common knowledge to any Muscovite.

So, "pukh" and "topol" - meaning tuft and poplar - are the first keys to a mystery waiting to be solved. Still, some visitors content themselves with learning that the white drifts amassing the streets of Moscow are simply poplar pollen that this time of the year terrorize the lives out of allergics and asthmatics. Looking at the mere mass of it, the question "why?" brings you back to an era when questions were dangerous and answers were deadly. It is the era of Stalinist folly and megalomania.

The year 1934 has come down in the historic annals for the Congress of the Victors, finalizing the success of the first five year plan. For 1,108 of the 1,996 delegates to this Communist Congress, it was to become the Congress of the Condemned. From this perspective, it is perhaps a historical irony that 1934 also serves as a constant reminder of how wrong things may come out when fulfilling the plan, and what punishment lies in wait for generations to come. So, what is the reason for this "Stalin's revenge" as an afflicted US ambassador once chose to call it?

Having in the 1930s razed Moscow of its pictoresque 19th century architecture to give way for his Empire style skyscrapers and stucco laden street buildings, Stalin was struck by the depressing sight of the urban stone desert he had set out to create. There simply had to be greenery to match the fearful façades with equally imposing trees to straddle soviet streets and avenues. Moreover, it had to be done fast, not merely fulfilling but over-fulfilling the plan. Whether dizzy with success or merely desperate, Stalin's city planners and gardeners made an unlucky choice, by settling for the poplar.

Surely, poplar is an imposing tree, reaching some 20 metres full-grown, giving ample shade during hot Moscow summer days, and - of crucial importance - grows faster than most trees accustomed to the dire Russian climate. For all reasons, it seems as a natural choice. That a quarter of Moscow trees would become poplars was not possibly perceived as any major problem. However, as a latter day potentate once put it: "We wanted the best, but it turned out as always."

In a freak turn of events, it so happened that the consequential mass tree plantation was exclusively of female poplars. So, each spring, as the poplars bloom, there are no male poplars to pollinate the abundant seeds of the females. The result is that the female poplars, let go of their seeds, as there are no males to fertilise them, producing clouds of white fluff floating through the air, in places creating ankle-deep drifts of pollen, and - with a gale - producing a virtual summer snowstorm. As usual, the soviet system could not let nature take its natural course, and now Muscovites have to pay the price for Stalin's megalomanic folly, presenting parades of poplar to the people.

If but one lesson is learnt from history, it is that victors often become the vanquished. Thus, turning from the victors of 1934 to those of 1945, a phrase from A.N. Vertinsky's triumphant song to Stalin comes to mind:

Slightly grey, as a silver poplar,
he stands to receive the parade.

What was not the price of Sevastopol,
not the price of Stalingrad!

And in those blind, cold nights,
when the front was swept by snowstorm.

These clear and penetrating eyes,
in the end looked through the enemy.

Perhaps, we - the people - should learn not to trust the vision of our leaders, whose sight may well be obscured by the vertigo of victory and absolute adoration. Perhaps, it is instead our task to penetrate the plans and programmes of populist power, or else have to suffer the summer snowstorms of natural condemnation. Perhaps, Moscow's Stalinist poplars could serve as a memento for us that politics of pure power may bring snowstorms in the summer and heatwaves in the winter.

Pride & Prejudice

Gay rights are human rights. It is a paradox that the same rights, that served as the moral basis of liberation from the communist yoke in Eastern Europe, are now denied a group most in need of them. Still, today this is the case in large tracts of our continent, remaining a stain on the very same shield of liberty set to protect the right of the individual.

During the last few weeks, events related to LGBT-rights have given rise to both concerns and hopes about the situation of homosexuals in Central and Eastern Europe. Developments have clearly shown that homophobia is still rampant in the region, but all the same there are promising tendencies in some countries that at least some authorities have started to respond to international critique against official homophobia. Reviewing recent events, gives a somewhat more hetereogeneous picture than was the case only a year ago.

Lithuania

A few weeks ago, a celebrity homosexual was beaten beyond recognition in Lithuanian capital Vilnius. The only reason was that he was openly gay. He might as well have had a pink triangle stitchted to his chest. Homosexuality is simply not socially accepted in this deeply Catholic country, and people and parliamentarians alike do not hesitate to openly condemn this "pariah to society."

Last week, Amnesty criticised Lithuania for not respecting gay rights, actively hindering an EU-sponsored campaign "For Diversity - Against Discrimination" - in celebration of the Europan Year for Equal Opportunities for All. Now, the campaign has had to be delayed in anticipation of permission from Lithuanian authorities. Last week, the Vilnius Rainbow festival was denied the right to assembly in the capital. In response to the exposed situation for the Lithuanian LGBT-community, the European section of the International Gay and Lesbian Association (ILGA) has decided to arrange its annual conference in Vilnius this autumn.

Russia

Turning East to Moscow, a group of LGBT-activists - including several western parliamentarians - were brutally beaten by anti-gay groups, when trying to hand over a petition to mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Their simple plea was to argue for the permission to march through central Moscow during the 2007 Moscow Pride festival. While being beaten by skinheads, Russian police stood idly by watching the "spectacle" afar, only to afterwards arrest some thirty gay rights' activists, including two members of the European Parliament.

Latvia

However, what might be considered a slight improvement was yesterday's Pride march in Latvian capital Riga, organised by the Mozaika network. With the experiences from last year's violent anti-gay protests in fresh memory, authorities now allowed some 1,000 activists to march the streets under heavy police protection. Still, the march has created a deep rift in the Latvian LGBT-community, and ILGA-Latvia has publicly denounced organisers as provocateurs and profiteers, whose actions will only worsen the situation in the country.

Poland

Another partial success was the 19 May Warsaw Pride festival, where some 5,000 LGBT-activists were, for the first time, allowed to undertake the march. Despite massive anti-gay protests, the Pride parade went by without the extensive violence we have got used to see in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. However, Poland remains a fundamentally homophobic country, and the Kaczyński twins, ruling Poland as President and Prime Minister, are among the country's foremost opponents of gay rights. Polish homophobia is, to be quite frank, on the edge of the ludicrous. Thus, last week, Poland's Children's Ombudsman considered banning the kids' show Teletubbies. Why? The reason is laughable: Apparently, one of the "male" characters in the show carries a handbag. Such a role model might prove a negative influence on Polish children, the Polish Ombudsman argued, as it might indicate the small blue figure was - GAY! Lo and behold! It was only after widespread ridicule in international media, that the Ombudsman decided to reconsider her position.

Gay Rights are Human Rights

Protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has gradually become a self-evident part of international law over the decades. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has been judged applicable on sexual orientation, thus safeguarding the same political rights to the LGBT-community as any other social or political movement.

In a regional context, the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms nowadays covers protection against sexual orientation discrimination, and the European Social Charter safeguards the social and economic rights of homosexuals.

In the framework of the European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam enables the EU to fight sexual orientation discrimination as does the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The list is far from exhaustive, and serves only to illustrate how current international law protects the human rights of LGBT-individuals. Still, although many states of Central and Eastern Europe pride themselves with becoming part of Europe, prejudice prevails against homosexuals in large tracts of the region. It simply is not acceptable when politicians and people alike pursue a policy of public homophobia, as is the case in many of the abovementioned countries. Becoming part of Europe means becoming party to the humanistic social and cultural heritage of Europe. As long as this is not the case, the road to true integration remains long. The tragedy about sexual orientation discrimination in Central and Eastern Europe is however that it often is the same dissidents and democratisers who, during the soviet era, fought for human rights, that today deny one of the most exposed groups in society the very same rights they once held so dear. Obviously, the fruits of freedom are sown unequally.

TV-Tower Ostankino on Fire

A fire has broken out in the Moscow Ostankino TV-tower, according to Moskovski Komsomolets. The famous tower, a scene of the 1993 shootout between president Yeltsin and parliament, was set ablaze in 2000, killing tree people and halting national broadcasts.

Ostankino was last set ablaze in 2005, and fire safety is apparently becoming an increasing problem for the 40-year old building. This time though, the fire is not considered very serious, and it is limited to a segment at a 30-40 meter height of the tower.

With its 540 meters, Ostankino is one of the tallest - if not the tallest - buildings in Europe. It was inaugurated in 1967, and has remained a well-known part of the Moscow skyline. Ostankino was constructed by famous Russian building-engineer Nikolai Nikitin - creator of inter alia the Moscow State University high-raise, the Warzaw palace of culture and science, and the Volgograd "Motherland Calls" giant statue.

Moscow Has Lost Its Pride

Yesterday, thirteen years had passed since the law prohibiting homosexuality was abolished in Russia. Yesterday, Russia's first pride parade was crushed by police. The event was carried through, despite an official ban on a LGBT-demonstration in the streets of Moscow. However, it seems that this opportunity to advance homosexual rights in Russia was lost by the Pride organisers.

The Moscow Pride parade was preceded by a prolonged legal battle with authorities for the basic right of assembly and demonstration. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was among those that at an early stage tried to prevent Moscow Pride. This comes as no surprise, as the LGBT-movement has all the more become a target of populist politicians. Less than a month ago, right-wing demonstrators prevented a gay party in Moscow.

So, what happened in Moscow on Saturday? In short, organisers decided to carry through the Moscow Pride march, despite a Friday court decision to prohibit it. In view of the legal battle and anticipated violent right-wing protests, the turnout was small - 50-100 people at the most. As expected, they were confronted by a much larger right-wing anti-demonstration of skinheads, Orthodox clergy, and general reactionaries. Also, more than 1,000 riot policemen oversaw the parade. Thus, it was the general setup for running the gauntlet for gay rights in Central and Eastern Europe, as witnessed over the last year with gay events in e.g. Warzaw and Kiev. The few brave LGBT-rights demonstrators started out facing the general bigot scorn and phsyical abuse expected in these parts of the world. All things alike, this is however where similarities ended.

Approaching the Red Square, Pride organisers decided to go along with plans of laying down flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, thus equating the fight for gay rights with the victims of the fight against fascism in WWII - Russia's Great Patriotic War. This was a provocation that Russian authorities could not accept, and the tumultuous reactions to this attempt led to the arrest of some 40 gay activists as well as 30 anti-demonstrators. Thus, the Moscow Pride parade was dispersed by riot police, under the close supervision of international media. Organisers must have been aware of the effect this was destined to provoke. Controversial actions at this national memorial next to always lead to stern police reaction.

Having stated the facts, there is reason to question whether the Pride manifestation at the Tomb was in the best interest of the Russian LGBT-movement. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is Russia's most revered national shrine to the approximately 20 million soviet citizens who perished in WWII. Its fundamental significance to the relatives of victims of fascist oppression is something that goes far beyond politics. Therefore, any attempts at exploiting the monument for purposes other than commemorating the victims are regarded a grave sacrilege by most Russians.

However, it is everyone's right to commerorate the victims of fascism at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. This right is even more important for homosexuals to be allowed exercising, not least while gay and lesbian rights are human rights. Fascist crimes against gay people during WWII were especially heinous, why LGBT-victims should be rightly revered. Commemorating gay victims of fascism deserves greater attention, and the issue has until recently largely been overlooked by historians and society alike.

So, what was the purpose of laying down flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier? Was it "a symbolic protest to equate the struggle for gay rights with the struggle against fascism in World War II," as BBC reports, or was it to commemorate LGBT-victims of fascist aggression? Little evidence to support the latter is regrettably found. Being aware of walking a thin line concerning a discussion on the confines of exercising one's rigths, the question still deserves to be put, what the motive for this action was.

Whereas there is no doubt whatsoever of the right of access for all to a national monument like the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, exercising this right may prove disastrous to gay rights in Russia. If the intent of Moscow Pride organisers were to commemorate gay victims of WWII fascist oppression, this might well have aroused public sympathy. The right of commemoration is cherished among Russians, and focussing on gay victims could have brought a long overdue Russian moral self-scrutiny on equal rights in this regard to the public agenda.

The alternative of instead equating the struggle for gay rights with the struggle against fascism, may to the contrary well have played into the hands of anti-gay forces in Russia. As long as the media version of events is the equation of struggling for gay rights with struggling against fascism, Russia's LGBT-movement stands to lose from this action. That there is little difference between the two, regrettably does not much matter, as the pedagogical task of explaining this is too great in comparison to the possibilities of actually doing so.

The overall effect for the Russian LGBT-movement thus seems to be in the negative. Thus, already before the parade, gay.ru reports that it is a very controversial issue also within the Russian LGBT-movement. One gay activist's statement is telling: "This gay parade is actually making our life much tougher." Leading Russian liberal, Grigori Yavlinsky, has also turned his back on LGBT-rights in view of recent debate.

Desperation brings desperate measures, and from this perspective, Moscow Pride's action may be understandable. The situation of gay people in Russia is close to desperate. Russia is a fundamentally homophobic society. A recent opinion poll shows that an overwhelming 73% of Russians are opposed to homosexual relations. Some 43% think that homosexuality should not only be criminalised but also penalised. Another poll showed that some 80% of Muscovites were opposed to the 2006 Moscow Pride festival. These are indeed harrowing figures on the situation for Russian gays.

Thirteen years ago, homosexuality was decriminalised in Russia. Still, every year the homophobic lobby in the Russian parliament proposes that it should be criminalised again. Until now, a small majority has voted against such proposals, but the margin has narrowed in recent years. Historically, homosexuality was outlawed in Tsarist Russia. After the revolution, the communists legalised LGBT-relations, regarding the opposite "bourgeois prejudice." However, as early as in 1933, Stalin reimposed the ban, by introducing the infamous article 121 in the soviet penal code. Thus, homosexual relations could be punished by up to five years imprisonment.

Since article 121 was abolished by president Yeltsin in 1993, liberalisation has regrettably come to a halt. Homosexuality and LGBT-rights are rarely discussed in public, and these issues are in practice suppressed by the tacit norms of Russian society. It is an alarming fact that gays are still regarded as perverts or psychically ill by most ordinary Russians. The 73% opposition against gay relations tells a lot about the situation.

In this perspective, it was a brave and wise decision by organisers to go through with the Pride festival. They knew what to expect in words and violence, and still they did it. Giving in at this point would have meant that authorities and society never would have respected the equal rights of homosexuals. The long and arduous struggle for LGBT-rights in Russia has come to be epitomised by the 2006 Moscow Pride. International support has been massive and extensive.

This was a pride moment that was too precious to be lost for Russia's LGBT-movement. It was a moment when Russian authorities should have looked down in shame for denying the people their constitutional and instrinsic rights. It was also a moment when Russian gays should have looked up in pride for trying to uphold the very same rights. Instead, the opportunity to exploit international support and improve public sympathy domestically was lost. The action at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was simply carrying the argument too far. The result was a tremendous anticlimax, which may negatively reverberate for Russian gays for years to come. Moscow lost its pride, but so it seems did also the Russian LGBT-movement. It is unlikely that Russian authorities will allow Moscow Pride parades in the foreseeable future. In 2010, the Russian LGBT-movement will host the XXV conference of the International Lesbian & Gay Association (ILGA). This is a great success for the movement, but the question is if there will be much progress for Russian gays until then. Conditions truly seem discouraging.

A litmus test turned sour?

On December 4, elections were held for the Moscow Duma. They were seen as a rehearsal for the 2007 parliamentary and the 2008 presidential elections. As for the liberal opposition, these elections were envisaged as "a litmus test" for the prospects of a democratic breakthrough in Russia. Seeing the results, one may ask whether this was a litmus test turned sour for liberalisation prospects in Russia.

What has become glaringly obvious during the election campaign is the control that incumbent mayor Yuri Luzhkov, by administrative and other means, has exercised to obtain the desired outcome by an overall victory of the "power party" United Russia.

United Russia's main opponent was, originally, the populist enfant terrible of Russian politics - the nationalist Rodina party. In the uprun to elections, Rodina played on racist sentiments among the Muscovites, namely popular fears of "strangers" - Caucasians, posing a threat to public safety. Such fears were confirmed by opinion polls, soon to be followed by Rodina TV-campaign-ads, portraying such strangers as "garbage". All moral judgement set aside, the administration used the campaign as a pretext for banning Rodina from the elections. In its place, the Communist party stepped in to fight for the "nationalist" populace.

Preliminary results of the Duma elections show that United Russia received some 47% of the votes, the Communists 17% and the liberal Yabloko party about 11%. By banning Rodina, the victory for United Russia was ensured with the foreseen side-effect that the more manageable Communists were strengthened. As for the liberal Yabloko party, the elections can only be characterised as a resounding failure in comparison to its high-pitched expectations. Why so?

A first reason is that Yabloko put so much hope on the elections as a turning-point for what they deem is Putin's failed policy of authoritarian modernisation. This, however, appeared to be beyond the point, as national politics were of little concern for Muscovites, who instead turned to local concerns.

Another reason is that liberals grossly exaggerated voter turnout. An estimated staggering turnout of some 60% in the end resulted in only 33% going to the ballot-boxes. This was, by all means, a fair turnout by Russian standards and an improvement compared to the 2001 local elections. Whatever made liberals think that things were to change this time, one can only speculate upon. All in all, it was yet another Yabloko misjudgement.

Finally, it is obvious that liberals underestimated the determination of people in power to use all means necessary to obtain desired results. As with anywhere in current Russia, free and fair elections are but a mirage, and one might have thought that Russian liberals by now had learnt this lesson. Instead, Yabloko's Sergei Mitrokhin was outraged by blatant breaches of electoral legislation, and steps were taken to contest the results. But, what's new? And besides, who should the liberals appeal to? There is no greater justice or public conscience of "fairness" in today's Russia, so what's the point of hollering "it's not fair"? What else to reply but: "-It's the politics, stupid!"

The Moscow elections are, by all means, a failure for the prospects of a liberal turnaround in Russia. For the liberals, it is once more clear that they have let the basics of Russian politics turn sour on them - litmus-test or no litmus-test. However, one might ask what alternative liberals in Russia are left with but struggling for a few seats in managed elections. Perhaps, it is becoming painstakingly clear, that change in Russia will not come about by balloting but by similar "revolutionary" events as we have seen in Georgia and Ukraine during recent years. The question is whether popular sentiments will ever reach the boiling-point as long as the current stability and relative economic progress is maintained. Would current developments turn negative and such revolutionary change come about, one may also ask what role Russian liberals might be able to play.

Last but not least, one must speculate on how long the Kremlin will allow Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov to retain his relative independence in Russian politics. When will we see an infight between Luzhkov and Putin's entourage? This may, indeed, be a much more interesting question than more or less staged elections to the Moscow Duma. Such conflicts in the ruling élite would pose a much greater danger to a peaceful and managed succession of power among the élite in the 2007 and 2008 elections. However, what is obvious, is that Russia's liberals today seem unable to exploit such differences, and instead put their hopes on factors beyond their control. As long as this is the case, all attempts at liberaling Russia will, most likely, turn sour.