Lights out Luzhkov

Driving past the Moscow mayor's office at night in the early 1990s, lights were always on in Mayor Popov's office. During the turbulent times back in 1991-92, this was meant as a sign to Muscovites that at least someone struggled to get things back on course. As usual, the paradox of doing the impossible merely resulted in a plethora of Popov anecdotes. Now, lights have gone out for his successor, Yuri Luzhkov, and as a conflict unveils before the eyes of an amazed public, interpretations of it as part of a general Russian power struggle for the 2012 presidential elections risk becoming anecdotical. To avoid this, my advice is simple: Follow the money!

That Luzhkov's position was precarious has been evident since this summer's wild fires covering the Russian capital in smoke for weeks. Still, one should not forget that his dismissal has been longer in the making than most would care to remember. The struggle between Russia's two capitals, Muscovites and Pitertsy, is a major theme in Russian politics, that also Putin's road to power is part of. As a protegé of erstwhile St. Petersburg mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, Putin is likely never to forget how instrumental Muscovite interests were for defeating Sobchak back in 1996, and the dire consequences this had for himself. Ever since, the Pitertsy have been longing to get back at Luzhkov, barely succeeding to keep him at bay in the 2000 presidential elections that brought Putin to the Kremlin. Of course, this is common knowledge for anyone following Russia. What is interesting is how little this has been the focus of attention recently. Instead, Luzhkov's dismissal is predominantly interpreted as part of a struggle between Medvedev and Putin for the 2012 presidential elections.

Of course, as Gazprom-owned TV-channel NTV led the campaign against Luzhkov, it is easy to draw the conclusion that Medvedev, still retaining power over Gazprom, pushed the button, which is likely also the case. Does this mean that Putin was against ousting Luzhkov, as part of some ongoing duel between himself and Medvedev? Well, there is reason for skepticism to such arguments, even though they currently seem at sway. As much as there are contrasting interests between Putin and Medvedev - as in any dual power system - one should be careful when it comes to explaining everything in such terms. Still, the temptation is great for any Kremlinologist to jump at too far-reaching conclusions when centres of power engage into open battle. Simply following the political trail may however prove a sidetrack.

Instead of zooming in on who will succeed Luzhkov as Moscow mayor - a relevant question in itself - now any Russia watcher may - in real time - be able to cover a greater field in charting power relations in the country than might be deduced merely from the political game. Those who remember the Khodorkovsky case and the Yukos scandal back in 2003 are likely to recognize a recurrent pattern. As back then, Putin stands aside, some mediator - this time Sechin - carries on deceptive negotiations on how to settle a conflict of interests, while the possy prepares to move in for the kill. So, as was the case with Yukos, the interesting issue is who will divide the spoils after Luzhkov - or rather what will happen to his wife's business empire. As illustrated by the NTV-documentary, it is not only Luzhkov one is going after, but also his financial basis.

Needless to point out, there is a reason why Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina, ranks eight in Russian riches. The politico-financial symbiosis between the mayor and his wife in the capital's building and construction business is a racket that has sky-rocketed Moscow real estate prices to some of the highest in the world. With all adjoining businesses under the former mayor's influence, living costs have reached ridiculous levels for most Muscovites. Still, this is the sort of daily corruption that no one cares to bother with, regarding it merely as a way of life. The question now is if Luzhkov has reached a settlement e.g. with Sechin, giving him some sort of immunity in an ordered exchange for his wife's business empire, or if we will witness something similar to what happened to Yukos.

The point is that regardless of struggle or settlement over the Luzhkov spoils, following the money may shed much more light on how forces arrange themselves for the future than merely regarding it as a traditional Kremlinologist game. So, it may be worthwile to pay attention to who goes in for the kill on Luzhkov's legacy - whether in person or by proxy. As lights go out for Luzhkov, lights on his legacy should be kept on for anyone wanting to decipher the machinations of Russian politics.

A litmus test turned sour?

On December 4, elections were held for the Moscow Duma. They were seen as a rehearsal for the 2007 parliamentary and the 2008 presidential elections. As for the liberal opposition, these elections were envisaged as "a litmus test" for the prospects of a democratic breakthrough in Russia. Seeing the results, one may ask whether this was a litmus test turned sour for liberalisation prospects in Russia.

What has become glaringly obvious during the election campaign is the control that incumbent mayor Yuri Luzhkov, by administrative and other means, has exercised to obtain the desired outcome by an overall victory of the "power party" United Russia.

United Russia's main opponent was, originally, the populist enfant terrible of Russian politics - the nationalist Rodina party. In the uprun to elections, Rodina played on racist sentiments among the Muscovites, namely popular fears of "strangers" - Caucasians, posing a threat to public safety. Such fears were confirmed by opinion polls, soon to be followed by Rodina TV-campaign-ads, portraying such strangers as "garbage". All moral judgement set aside, the administration used the campaign as a pretext for banning Rodina from the elections. In its place, the Communist party stepped in to fight for the "nationalist" populace.

Preliminary results of the Duma elections show that United Russia received some 47% of the votes, the Communists 17% and the liberal Yabloko party about 11%. By banning Rodina, the victory for United Russia was ensured with the foreseen side-effect that the more manageable Communists were strengthened. As for the liberal Yabloko party, the elections can only be characterised as a resounding failure in comparison to its high-pitched expectations. Why so?

A first reason is that Yabloko put so much hope on the elections as a turning-point for what they deem is Putin's failed policy of authoritarian modernisation. This, however, appeared to be beyond the point, as national politics were of little concern for Muscovites, who instead turned to local concerns.

Another reason is that liberals grossly exaggerated voter turnout. An estimated staggering turnout of some 60% in the end resulted in only 33% going to the ballot-boxes. This was, by all means, a fair turnout by Russian standards and an improvement compared to the 2001 local elections. Whatever made liberals think that things were to change this time, one can only speculate upon. All in all, it was yet another Yabloko misjudgement.

Finally, it is obvious that liberals underestimated the determination of people in power to use all means necessary to obtain desired results. As with anywhere in current Russia, free and fair elections are but a mirage, and one might have thought that Russian liberals by now had learnt this lesson. Instead, Yabloko's Sergei Mitrokhin was outraged by blatant breaches of electoral legislation, and steps were taken to contest the results. But, what's new? And besides, who should the liberals appeal to? There is no greater justice or public conscience of "fairness" in today's Russia, so what's the point of hollering "it's not fair"? What else to reply but: "-It's the politics, stupid!"

The Moscow elections are, by all means, a failure for the prospects of a liberal turnaround in Russia. For the liberals, it is once more clear that they have let the basics of Russian politics turn sour on them - litmus-test or no litmus-test. However, one might ask what alternative liberals in Russia are left with but struggling for a few seats in managed elections. Perhaps, it is becoming painstakingly clear, that change in Russia will not come about by balloting but by similar "revolutionary" events as we have seen in Georgia and Ukraine during recent years. The question is whether popular sentiments will ever reach the boiling-point as long as the current stability and relative economic progress is maintained. Would current developments turn negative and such revolutionary change come about, one may also ask what role Russian liberals might be able to play.

Last but not least, one must speculate on how long the Kremlin will allow Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov to retain his relative independence in Russian politics. When will we see an infight between Luzhkov and Putin's entourage? This may, indeed, be a much more interesting question than more or less staged elections to the Moscow Duma. Such conflicts in the ruling élite would pose a much greater danger to a peaceful and managed succession of power among the élite in the 2007 and 2008 elections. However, what is obvious, is that Russia's liberals today seem unable to exploit such differences, and instead put their hopes on factors beyond their control. As long as this is the case, all attempts at liberaling Russia will, most likely, turn sour.