2008 Press Review

To what extent does mainstream media take into account what bloggers say about developments in Central and Eastern Europe? This is the question one has to put to oneself as one threads the thin line between blogging and expertise. Is the blogosphere but a shortcut for covering issues too complex to write about facing a deadline or is there a true desire to present a second opinion beyond the everyday chores of public policy-media discourse?

A couple of examples of what hopefully is the latter concern my own writings and analyses. Thus, in June this year I was interviewed by Aleks Tapinsh, Baltic correspondent of Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) for the upcoming Riga Summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The story - "Baltic States Want Energy Cooperation Despite Pipeline Row" - covered the same theme as has been the case over the course of the Council's existence, viz. environmental issues and economic development, with the recent addition of energy and pipeline disputes in the Baltic. Still, amidst the course of yawnful meetings and press conferences, the DPA succeeded in posing the crucial question: What role for Baltic Sea cooperation and the CBSS now that an overwhelming majority of its members are also part of the European Union? My reply was the following:

Without the EU the CBSS would be naught, but also the EU needs this sort of regional cooperation. In this sense, organizations like the CBSS or the European Dialogue in the Mediterranean are essential for making EU policies work.

In December, Gabriela Ioniţă of Romanian policy journal Cadran politic interviewed me on Russian domestic and foreign policy, sovereign democracy, the 2020 policy plan, and consequences of the war with Georgia. Quoting me, in titling the article "Russia’s strive for recognition as an equal in international affairs is ---the greatest flaw in Moscow policy,” very much reflects a basic argument, that the high politics of the Kremlin leaves too little room for actively pursuing Russian interests. Russia's foreign policy simply is too much a matter of existence and recognition, and too little one of strategy and action. In military terms, one would say that the linkage between strategic, tactical and operative levels is too weak. Still, attention should be given to the fundamentally more strategic thinking, which has developed in recent years - currently labelled sovereign democracy.

Coverage in Swedish media has largely revolved around a couple of reports I have written or participated in. Thus, following the publication of my 2008 report on Russian democracy, Russia - a sovereign democracy: a study of popular rule and state power in demise, Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet wrote:

Konnander also puts the finger on a more unexpected consequence of developments under Putin. Normally, one associates political stability and centralization with a strong exercise of state power. But Konnander shows, using e.g. the World Bank governance indicators, that so has not become the case in Russia in ecent years. Instead, "the state capacity to exercise power has been significantly reduced, why the political system becomes all the more susceptible to crises. --- Democracy in Russia has decline, but so has also the capacity to sustain an authoritarian rule in the long run. Russia's political future thus becomes increasingly uncertain."

Commenting on Russia's tense relations with Georgia, Dagens Nyheter quotes the study in extenso:

For Moscow the loss of Ukraine as political friend - the historical Little Russia - became a rude awakening from the illusion that Russia's rising political stability could also encompass its near abroad - the country's vital sphere of interest. The Kosovo 1999 intervention, Serbia's 2000 bulldozer revolution, Georgia's 2003 rose revolution - in the same year as the US-led invasion of Iraq - Ukraine's 2004-2005 orange revolution, and Kyrgyzstan's 2005 tulip revolution, in all formed a pattern, which the Russian élite interpreted as a ever-growing threat against Russia itself.

Hudiksvall's Tidning also reflects on my results:

Also during the Yeltsin era, one freedom or another could be somewhat arbitrarily limited. The difference is that now the limitations have been written down in a number of fluffy laws, which more or less give a carte blanche for authorities to intervene against about anything that they think is annoying.

Blekinge Läns Tidning directs attention to similarities between the old Soviet élite and its current Russian epitomisation:

Even though Konnander does not explicitly say so, similarities with Marxist thinking are striking - a very élitist perception of society. He also illustrates by many examples how the regions and the media have lost their power, and how Russians turn to the European Court of Human Rights instead of seeking redress in their own court system, as this is nowadays considered too fundamentally biased.

Whereas my contribution to another study, The Caucasian Test case, on the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, largely questioned generally accepted truths, the overall media reaction was one of portraying Russia as a growing threat to international security. Thus, Svenska Dagbladet wrote that "Russia chose its path in Georgia - the wrong path". Deutsche Welle wrote that "The Russian lesson was that the international community was not prepared, willing or able to add any costs to the Russian actions".

Finnish daily Hufvudstadsbladet reasoned along similar lines of thought: "Russia's actions now compels a reassessment of the prevailing world order". Västerbottenskuriren adds to this argumentation: "It is not the conflict per se - known for long - that has triggered the deterioration, but the fact that Russia has chosen to lower its threshold barring the use of violence and thus has chosen to change the rules of international relations. The Russian position constitutes a direct challenge to the current world order and signifies a new phase in Russian foreign policy." Världen idag concludes: "Due to Russian action in Georgia the security situation in Europe has deteriorated. And when Russia challenges the world, the mechanisms of the world community are paralyzed." Finally, Russian Novye Izvestiya has its own angle on the report, claiming that it supports the notion that Israeli military advisors took active part in the war on Georgia's side.

It is indeed peculiar how the media spins different stories, but also how security interests get their story across - here the Russian menace. That my own contribution to the Georgia report got minimal attention may perhaps point to the fallacies of mainstream media. Fundamentally questioning the extent and significance of the so-called Russian cyberwar against Georgia, it should really have attracted more notice than it did, since the general image portrayed by international media was that of a massive cyber attack.

Still, it is often not the stories that challenge assumptions, but the ones that confirm bias which conquer the day. Once the media beat has been set, even a potential scoop would have great difficulty to overcome a consensual media agenda. So, by the end of the day, there is little room for deviance as the public policy-media discourse evolves. When one, to the contrary, gets one's message across, there is no saying how it will be processed by its recipients, given the fundamental predisposition to interpret Russia in very simplified terms. That is the basic dilemma of policy-media interaction - a dilemma that may or may not be averted by the workings of a global and independent blog discourse. At least, blogs give each and everyone the opportunity to have his or her say, even though alternative facts and hypotheses risk getting lost in cyberspace.

Putin's Presidential Pseudo-News

Putin will not run for a third presidential term in 2008. This is a message that he has been repeating every other month over the past years. Still, it was one of the top stories of international media today. Why is it that this is considered so important news as to reach the headlines of respected news sources throughout the globe next to every time that Putin says he will step down from power in 2008? The answer might be that this is the effect of a well-orchestrated media-coup by Putin's political spin-doctors - the political technologists.

News should always be considered critically by those who receive it. What essentially constitutes news should also be filtered by those whose profession it is - journalists and editors. As the mere term indicates, news should also present something new to its audience. How is it then that something which is news to nobody is repeatedly treated as such?

Should not any journalist in his sound mind defer from reporting what everyone already knows: That Putin does not want to remain Russia's president after 2008. On the contrary, if Putin would declare that he will run for a third presidential term and thus change the constitution, then it would be news of great significance. Until then, this is not the case.

Putin's repeated denial of furher presidential ambitions is perhaps - paradoxically - the main reason why journalists are so susceptible to this message. A climate has been created in which Putin's statement of facts becomes a crescendo of denials in anticipation of the orgiastic eruption when he finally comes out of the closet: "Yes, I will run for a third term! Yes, I will change the constitution! Yes, I cannot live without power! Yes, I am dizzy with success!" Putin's "No" becomes a resounding "Yes!!!" in the ears of media and the public.

That journalists and political analysts alike miss to comprehend Putin's "No" is partly explained by all the rumours that have reverberated throughout Moscow over the years. The question whether Putin will stay in power after 2008 has been a recurrent theme in all political discussions. Still, the answer has been the same all along, namely that the president respects the constitution and thus has no ambtion to change the fact that his tenure of power will end once his term runs out. So, rumours to the opposite must originate from somewhere else. One source might be the president himself by proxy of his "political technologists."

Why might this be the case? Putin has set before himself three tasks: to create and maintain political stability, produce economic growth, and gain control over strategic resources. Here, political stability is perceived a prerequisite for the latter two. In the political area, it is in the best interest of power that a climate of uncertainty prevails on whether Putin will continue in power. As long as this is the case, potential contenders will keep a low profile and nobody of significance will challenge Putin as long as he retains apparent popular support. Thus, Putin avoids running the risk of becoming a lame duck, and his political succession may be handled in an orderly manner by the Kremlin entourage that forms his basis of power. A measure of uncertainty for the public thus becomes an instrument of certainty for power, and thus the political tools for developing economic growth and gaining control over strategic resources is maintained.

Personally, it actually appears that Putin is weary with power and the constant obligations it involves. Associates at times describe him as disinterested with the chores of his office, allocating an increasing amount of time to activities normally not associated with the exercise of power. Also, Putin does not seem to be the sort of politician that thrives on power - to the opposite of what is often claimed in view of his extremely power-oriented policies.

Here also his KGB-background is regarded a reason why Putin would cling on to power, because KGB by essence epitomises power. To assume so may however be to miscomprehend the Chekist culture from which Putin originates. Chekist power tradition sets the system before the individual, and if Putin is true to these ideals he will also be loyal to the constitution as long as power to the system is ensured. His lack of ethics might also be construed in a Chekist context and not as evidence of self-perpetuating personalised authoritarian power.

Finally, why would Putin want to risk another period in office? His presidency has been more successful than what he himself might have imagined. Putin has restored the Russian state as an important actor both domestically and internationally. The country's economy thrives on the enormous incomes from oil, and a measure of stability has been restored to society. Why should Putin risk jeopardising an apparently favourable judgement as the great restorer of the Russian nation that the Russian people and history might pass on him, when the future is uncertain?

So, the question should perhaps be rephrased: "Why should Putin not step down from power in 2008?" So far, few substantial reasons have been presented why he should stay in power, so the assumption must naturally be that he will leave office.

Still, international media continues to report that Putin will leave power in 2008, in the anticipation that somewhere along the line he will change his mind. This does not only mean that the press runs the risk of a gigantic anticlimax once Putin actually leaves office. It above all serves the interests of Kremlin's perpetuation of authoritarian power while preventing democratic debate on the future of Russia. Wherever you turn, it seems that laughs will be on Putin in 2008, if he continues to pull off this game of ambiguities.



Comment: The full text of Putin's appearance is available at Financial Times.