Uzbekistan: Video of the Andijon Uprising

Last week, New York Times reported about video recordings from the events leading up to the 2005 Andijon massacre. The tapes were confiscated by Uzbek authorities after the massacre and have been used as evidence and propaganda by the Karimov regime. However, they may be interpreted in various ways, and cast considerable doubts on the Uzbek version of events. This comes as no surprise as the official Uzbek story has been twarted from the very outset. However, the tapes also give a much more complex picture of developments in Andijon prior to the massacre than has previously been the case.

In May 2005, public protests against a number of arrests in Uzbek city of Andijon led to a massive jail-brake. Protests were sparked by a trial of 23 local businessmen charged with involvement in Islamic extremism. On 12 May, an armed crowd stormed the local prison and prisoners were released, including also heavy criminals. By then, public disconent had peaked and people flooded the streets in massive demonstrations against the Karimov regime, which were to be know as the Andijon uprising. On 13-14 May, demonstrations were brutally quashed, and as many as 750 people - mainly civilians - were killed, although Uzbek officials have put the death toll at a mere 169. Thus far, accounts more or less concur.

The Uzbek government's version of events was that an uprising of Islamist extremists - with links to al-Qaida - had been put down by police and interior ministry troops. This version, backed also by Russia and China, holds that there were next to no civilian casualties and that the action was directed against Islamist insurrectors and bandits. Of course, this story is evidently incorrect. Testimonies by Andijon refugees instead clearly point to a majority of civilian casualties. Furthermore, it seems that also the military was used against civilians, at least judging from what arms apparently were used to put down the rebellion.

As the story came across to the international audience, more or less peaceful demonstrators had been brutally massacred by the Karimov regime. This version must be seen against the background of discontent over social and economic conditions that swept over Uzbekistan in Spring 2005.

As a consequence, massive international protests against the massacre were levelled against the Karimov regime. Thus, the international community reacted to the Andijon events. Following the lead of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the OSCE called for an independent international investigation to find out what transpired in Andijon during those fatal 2005 Spring days. In September 2005, the EU imposed sanctions against the Uzbek leadership, walking a thin line between Human Rights concerns and the needs among its member states for the continued use of the Uzbek Termez airbase for supplies to international operations in Afghanistan. Still, such considerations were eventually put aside, and in retaliation Uzbekistan banned Nato, the US and most EU-states from continued use of Termez.

As is often the case with sanctions, international measures against the Uzbek leadership were somewhat blunt, hitting also reform-oriented regime politicians, e.g. the Uzbek Minister of Defence, Kadyr Gulyamov. Western critics of the sanctions have also argued that the only result was to drive Uzbekistan into the arms of Russia, while at the same time losing all possibilities for Western influence over political developments in the country.

Until now, the real events that took place in Andijon have remained obscure. The 70 minute recording now obtained by the New York Times gives a more nuanced picture of events leading up to the massacre. Recordings show the demonstrations after the prison-break but before troops arrived to quash the rebellion. Most of the demonstrators are unarmed civilians, but a number of armed insurgents and criminals take cover in the crowd. Also, a convicted murderer as well as a known female drug-dealer are agitating to the crowd to stir up wider protests. It is simply obvious that some of the escaped prisoners try to exploit the situation to their own advantage. However, it is even more obvious that the overwhelming majority of demonstrators are unarmed civilians exercising their democratic rights. Also, young men making Molotov cocktails are portrayed. When fire fighters arrive to put out fires ignited by insurgents, they are not only hindered to do so, but also taken hostage.

That public protests of this kind should warrant action by the police or interior ministry troops is clear. Needless to state, Uzbekistan - as any other state - has the right to preserve public order by the legal means at hand. However, there is no excuse for massacring civilians in the process of returning order. It is all too evident that the Karimov regime knowingly used excessive force to set an example to the Uzbek people to put an end to protests that had been growing throughout Uzbekistan during Spring 2005. That armed insurgents and criminals used civilians as cover and exploited public discontent in Andijon can never motivate indiscriminate shooting at civilians. Uzbekistan committed a haineous act against its own people no matter what the rationale for it might have been. That the now published recordings gives a more nuanced picture of events does not change this in the least, but only adds to what many observers guessed already from the outset, given the factors involved. Andijon still stands out as Karimov's worst crime. Let us but hope that the world and the Uzbek people will escape a repetion of similar events elsewhere, despite continued repression.

Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul

Last week, International Crisis Group issued a new policy brief on developments in Uzbekistan - "Uzbekistan in for the Long Haul." In it, ICG gives a dark picture of future developments in the country, after the May 2005 Andijon massacre. As western relations with Tashkent have been frozen ever since, ICG advocates long-term measures to deal with the Karimov regime, partly based on a regional perspective. As for US-Uzbeki relations, one may, however, question whether ICG's analysis may be wholly correct.

In its analysis, ICG claims that "Uzbekistan is well down the path of self-destruction," where the "elite prospers while the majority lives in worsening poverty." The country is marred by political repression and economic misrule, and president Karimov has stopped any further attempts at political and economic reform. "Religious and political repression and worsening living standards have raised domestic tensions and provoked violence," ICG reports.

Uzbekistan is also depicted as a regional threat. Primarily, the country is a source of trafficking in drugs and people, and thereby complicates regional measures to deal with these problems, in relation to Afghanistan and the region as a whole. Furthermore, the threat of violence that Karimov poses to his own citizens may spark a refugee crisis if political and religious repression would peak and things would come to the worst. That Tashkent consistently tries to spoil any attempts at regional cooperation only adds to the picture of Uzbekistan as a potential threat to Central Asia. Already at this point, Karimov-imposed border closures and trade restrictions on neighbour countries, significantly hampers regional development. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has thus far been negative to cooperate with its neighbours on common concerns and resources, such as water, energy, and infrastructure. All in all, ICG claims that "Uzbekistan could well become the centre of instability in Central Asia in the medium to long term."

Despite this dark picture one may only agree with ICG that the "government in Tashkent is not at risk of imminent collapse." However, on the regional level one should perhaps pause to ponder whether ICG is completely right in its concerns and predictions. It is true that western policies towards Uzbekstan have failed. Support to develop "political and economic openness" was simply not in the interest of Karimov's regime. The question is whether this was in the interest of the US. It is quite obvious that western sanction policy imposed after the Andijon massacre remains a resounding failure. Thus, ICG reports that "relations with Europe and the US are the worst since independence in 1991." As far as this may be correct regarding Europe, one should perhaps be cautious to draw the same conclusion as for the US, as indicated above. The main question is whether the prospects of a volatile process of democratisation in Uzbekistan is in the interest of US policy in Central Asia.

By now, it would appear a well-established fact that democracies are stable but democratisation is shaky. Therefore, one might, contrary to ICG's argument, assume that the US is quite happy with the current situation. The Andijon massacre gave the US a convenient excuse to get the issue of democratisation off the agenda, thus avoiding further confrontation with Karimov. The situation allows the US and Uzbekistan respectively to go about their own business without the fear of interference by the other. On the official level, relations may well be frozen, but this this also leaves room for informal cooperation and tacit agreement on matters of mutual importance. One may also question whether it really is so important for the US to have "influence with the Karimov government" as long as conditions for US policy in Central Asia remain stable. Given this, who rules Uzbekistan is of little interest to the US. That the US implicitly has chosen to acquiesce with the situation is probably because further confrontation might have posed a threat of instability to the US position in Central Asia. For Washington, it is better to leave things as they are rather than rocking the boat.

Such an argument would also challenge ICG's assumption that Uzbeki instability could "prompt an aggressive Russian intervention in the region." Firstly, Russia has - for long - abandoned the alternative of armed intervention in post-soviet space, while Moscow has realised that it has much more effective - mainly economic - means at its disposal. Secondly, Moscow and Washington see eye to eye on the importance of stability in Central Asia. This shared realist view, is likely to make the US and Russia act in concert to avoid instability in the region.

Then, one should rather consider ICG's assumption that political and religious repression could "stimulate the undercurrents of Islamic extremism that so far have been more of an irritant than a major threat." That would be more in line with an argument linked to the dangers of future socio-economic collapse in Uzbekistan spiralling into increasing and small-scale conflict and confrontation rather than outright revolution. Such developments might well strengthen extremist movements in Central Asian societies. Extremism is born by extremities - something people turn to out of despair and desperation. It is from this perspective, that one is likely to agree with ICG that "Uzbekistan could well become the centre of instability in Central Asia in the medium to long term."

As for ICG's policy conlusions, one cannot - as a soft European caffe latte liberal - but agree on them. This "lifeboat strategy to maintain political activity, civil society and educational opportunities in the expectation of future change" may perhaps not be the most effective way to support change in Uzbekistan, but it is the means at our disposal. Long-term measures within education, good governance, civil society etc, combined with socio-economic support as well as assistance to neighbouring countries to solve outstanding problems with Uzbekistan, is what one can reasonably do. On this nomative level, one is likely to agree with ICG. The thousand dollar question is, however, whether conclusions would be different if taking a different - more realist - view on stability into account.