Politkovskaya Podcast

On Tuesday evening, Open Source radio broadcasted a show on "The death of Anna Politkovskaya", with myself, Masha Gessen - Deupty Editor of Bolshoy Gorod, Raffi Aftandelian - maaskva: nashimi glazami, and Edward Lucas, The Economist Central and East European Correspondent. The programme in full will, in due course, be available for download at OpenSource, but in the meanwhile, it will have to suffice with their presentation of the show:

What did she know about Putin’s Russia that we don’t? Politkovskaya was murdered in Moscow this week, shot on the street. A journalist, she spent the last seven years as a columnist for Novaya Gazeta, covering Chechnya and the oligarchs and the list of official sins that continues to grow in Putin’s Russia. She titled collections of her columns Putin’s Russia, A Dirty War and A Small Corner of Hell; it’s not hard to figure out why she made a lot of people uncomfortable.

She had a lot of enemies, they all had motives, and the threat isn’t limited to her. Russian journalist Masha Gessen revealed on the phone this afternoon that, given the choice between a lighthearted piece for a Russian paper on the economy or a more sober look at Putin for an American paper, she’d take the economy. Safer that way.

Several guests we spoke to this afternoon described Politkovskaya as “passionate”; she opened her 2004 book Putin’s Russia with the words “These are my emotional reactions, jotted down in the margins of life as it is lived in Russia today.” She established her own credibility; she was asked to help negotiate the hostage crisis in Beslan and then — she believed — poisoned on the plane on the way down. After the crisis, when it became illegal to sell a newspaper within a hundred meters of a subway entrance or bus stop, she was one of the few fearless journalists left; The Economist described her in an obit on Sunday as brave beyond belief.

And now she’s gone. What does this say about Putin’s Russia? Was an oligarch — or a Chechen, or police sergeant exposed for corruption — angry at what she’d done to his image, or did the Kremlin send a signal? And as we focus our attention on the Middle East, Russia threatens European natural gas supplies and rounds up Georgians as “criminals” for export back to Georgia. Are we completely missing a serious and not-so-new problem?

What is interesting with a discussion like this, is how various perspectives meet: a Russian and a western journalist, an Armenian American in Moscow and a Swedish expert on Russia. The greatest fear participating in a broadcast is not to get one's message through. This time the message is urgent: The significance of Anna Politkovskaya and how her murder reflects current Russia.

In these days, the negative attitudes towards Russia dominate. At the same time, Politkovskaya's murder may prove a turning-point for Russia. Although, there were only familiar faces - old soviet dissidents in their seventies - at her funeral yesterday, her death may actually rejuvenate the civil rights movement in Russia.

In 1966, the trial against Danilov and Sinyavsky set off a spark that ignited the soviet dissident movement of the 1970s - Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner and others. Nobody could then fully grasp the significance of a few "lost souls" in the quagmire of Brezhnevite soviet society. Still, the perseverance of the dissidents inspired others and eventually led to the era of glasnost and perestroika of the 1980s.

Today, the murder of Anna Politkovskaya may inspire a young generation of "new Russians" to gradually look beyond self-interest when confronted by mounting oppression. Regrettably, oppression is the situation for Russian media today, and journalists fear for their lifes and far too many try to avoid sensitive subjects, while they otherwise risk the necks of themselves and their families. Still, perhaps it has to become worse before it becomes better.

Perhaps, Anna Politkovskaya's death will become the start of something new in Russia. That would be a testimony worthy of her bravery and moral standing as an independent journalist and a whistleblower on all the injustices prevailing in Russia of today. Anna Politkovskaya was an inspiration when she lived. Now her legacy may become an even greater inspiration for future Russia. Her mission was to fight injustices. Her vision was a better Russia - a Russia which the people deserves but must fight hard to attain. Her final sacrifice must not be in vain!


Comment: The show in full may be listened to at Open Source Radio.

Anna Politkovskaya In Memoriam

Чудовищное убийство Анны Политковской – это трагедия не только для России, но и для многих друзей России, борцов за права человека, а также для зарубежных коллег-журналистов. Анна часто приезжала к нам в Швецию. За три недели до этого трагического события она приняла участие в семинаре, состоявшемся неподалеку от Стокгольма, и мы с нетерпением ожидали ее следующего визита. Несмотря на мировую известность, она была непритязательным человеком, внимательным и терпеливым слушателем, хотя наши вопросы часто были наивны.

Анна рассказала нам, что она предупредила своих детей о том, что ее могут убить. Она просила нас защитить ее. Мы, слушатели Анны, вдохновляли ее продолжать свою бесстрашную деятельность. Мы тоже виновны в том, что не уберегли ее. Наш моральный долг перед Анной - сделать все зависящее от нас, чтобы ее отвага и самопожертвование не пропали даром…

Мы выражаем глубокое соболезнование семье, друзьям и коллегам Анны. Светлая память о ней навсегда останется в наших сердцах.

От имени Шведского общества по изучению России, Центральной и Восточной Европы и Центральной Азии
(политологи, социологи, экономисты, географы, историки, филологи, переводчики, дипломаты, журналисты, преподаватели и многие другие)

Кристина Абиала, Хелен Карлбак, Анника Элияссон, Торгны Хиннему, Марианна Хультберг, Андреас Юханссон, Анна Йонссон, Вильгельм Коннандер, Мю Лилья, Джонни Родин, Карин Сарсенов, Ивонна Собис, Петер Сталенхейм, Якуб Свисицки
______________

The heinous deed against Anna Politkovskaya is a tragedy not only for Russia but for many friends of Russia, defenders of human rights and journalist colleagues abroad. Anna was a frequent visitor to Sweden. She participated in a seminar outside Stockholm three weeks before the tragic event and we were already waiting for her next visit. Although a public person she was always modest, a good listener though our questions were sometimes naive.

Many of us heard her say that she had told her children she might be murdered some day. This was an appeal to us to give her shelter by keeping watch over her. By becoming her audience we encouraged her to continue her work bravely. Thus we are also guilty through our inability to protect her. We owe her our gratitude but also not to let her deed be in vain.

We wish to express our sincere condolences to Anna's family, friends and colleagues. Her memory will live on through those lives that she has touched.

On behalf of The Swedish Society for the study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(political scientists, sociologists, economists, geographers, historians, philologists, translators, diplomats, journalists, teachers and many others)

Kristina Abiala, Helene Carlbäck, Annika Eliasson, Torgny Hinnemo, Marianne Hultberg, Andreas Johansson, Anna Jonsson, Vilhelm Konnander, My Lilja, Johnny Rodin, Karin Sarsenov, Iwona Sobis, Petter Stålenheim, Jakub Swiecicki

Death & the Kremlin

Anna Politkovskaya is dead. Murdered by the same cruelty and brutality that she herself dedicated her life to fight. For a moment the world has come to a standstill. Political leaders and common people alike react with sorrow and abhorrence as a mighty voice of freedom and tolerance is silenced. As darkness falls over Moscow, Russia is engulfed by dumb gloom as the walls of the Kremlin stay silent, when even the stones should scream out: "Так нельзя жить!" - We cannot live like this!

The fact remains: When Russia's "first journalist" is silenced, Russia's "first person" stays silent. No word from Putin, no word from the Kremlin when the freedom of the press is trampled on by brutal suppression. The tacit message thus sent, resounds with piercing echo: Freedom of speech has no place in Putin's Russia. "Qui tacet, consentit" - silence implies consent - is regrettably the conclusion drawn from Kremlin reticence, thereby making power implicitly complicit to a crime against the inalienable rights of the Russian people. That the Kremlin most probably bears no direct guilt in Politkovskaya's assasination, is thus obscured by its unwillingness to react with vehemence and call out for the guilty to be brought to justice.

The silence of the Kremlin is no surprise. The Russian administration has actively ignored Politkovskaya and the charges she has brought against the Putinist poles of power. She published three international bestsellers on the war in Chechnya and the state of Russia. None was ever published in Russia. Dead or alive, Putin shuns Politkovskaya like the plague.

During the last year, the Kremlin has poured millions of dollar on PR consultants to improve the international image of the country. How the world looks on Russia, is partly the way Russia looks at itself. Putin and his political technologists know this, and still they do not react, when the world must think fundamental freedoms has no place in Russia. All prejudice is thus confirmed and Russia risks returning to the dark ages of dehumanising authoritarian power.

Still, it would be so easy to go the other way, to acknowledge one's greatest critic, to speak out loud for liberty and dignity. Regardless of the sincerity of such an act, Putin would stand out as a statesman, truly concerned with the destiny of free speech in his country. That he does not, may have a simple logic: For Putin, Politkovskaya was a traitor who betrayed her country on Russia's road to resurrection as a great power among nations. She was the one who told the truth about an unpleasant reality that the Kremlin would rather ignore. She showed the Russians the vanity of "greatness" and the price the people had to pay to suffer and sacrifice for the sake of their leaders deluded ambitions. In her last book, Politkovskaya is asked: "things surely cannot be that bad"? Now, turning the last page of Anna Politkovskaya's life, one can only agree with her reply: "It is much worse."

Anna Politkovskaya lived in the present and jotted down her emotional reactions "in the margins of life as it is lived in Russia today." What she saw was not pleasant, but someone had to say out loud what many knew and thought. This proved her destiny in life and tragically destined her to the fatal fate she suffered. Her clear and frank voice may have gone silent, but the values she fought for are revived by her final sacrifice.

Anna Politkovskaya Murdered

According to Russian TV-news Vesti24, the famous Russian journalist and author, Anna Politkovskaya was shot down half an hour ago in her home in Moscow by a lone assailant. Politkovskaya was hit by four shots in the elevator of her Moscow apartment building and evidently died at once. The murderer has so far not been arrested.

Anna Politkovskaya was Russia's internationally most well-known journalist and was revered for her great courage in crititically reporting on developments in Russia. Her books on Russia's war in Chechnya were spread in various translations throughout the globe, but never published in Russia. Her last book, "Putin's Russia", attacks the societal climate that the Putin era has brought to the Russian people. Working as a journalist for the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, Politkovskya stood on the forefront of regime critique. For years, Politkovskaya has had death-threats hanging over her head. Tragically, her brave posture and deeds have now resulted in her own death. Inevitably, she will stand out as a beacon of light in the history of journalism.

Kazakh Crimes or Borat's Chimes?

As Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Washington last week, his meetings with top US officials - including president Bush - was overshadowed by the launch of British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen's upcoming movie: "Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan."

The British comedian - depicting the fictional Kazakh journalist Borat - has long been a nail in the eye for Kazakhstan's efforts to create a positive international image for the country. Cohen's character instead produces an image of a backward country on the verge of civilisation run by a comic dictator. Over the past years, Kazakh authorities have gone to great lengths to counter the "Borat image" of the country, and its foreign minister has even threatened to sue Cohen in Britain for smearing Kazakhstan. Also, Borat's official website in Kazakhstan has been closed down by authorities, provoking widespread protests internationally, from among others Reporters Without Borders. The issue has grown to such proportions that Kazakhstan chose to publish a four page ad in both The New York Times and Washington Post for Nazarbayev's visit in the US. The only problem was that the ads only served to emphasise the comic image of Kazakhstan by attributing the country's successes to Nazarbayev himself.

Still, the question is if Borat's image of Kazakhstan is the one that an initiated Western audience would like to get across to the general public. It would seem that greater issues are at stake such as human rights and democracy. Several critical voices were raised before Nazarbayev's visit to the US, but they were later largely overshadowed by on the one hand the message the Bush administration wanted to send and on the other by Sascha "Borat" Cohen's media coup. Critical issues were thus largely left out.

One leading analyst, S. Frederick Starr of Johns Hopkins, though succeded in getting access to the media by a column in the Washington Post. The only problem was that Starr joined the crowd of those paying tribute to Kazakhstan's progress in recent years, thus furhter defusing a potentially embarassing situation for the White House wanting to avoid questions on the human rights and democracy situation. It is true that Starr was right in pointing to improvements on many levels, in contrast to a generally dark depiction in the West of post-soviet republics. However, this does not warrant leaving the difficult issues out. Also, Starr's article in the post stands in contrast to the negative story the Post published but little over a month ago.

Kazakhstan is, essentially, a country run as a corrupt company by one family, namely that of president Nazarbayev himself. In June, Nazarbayev's son-in-law became chief of the country's gas and oil company, whereas the presidential daughter is a key stake-holder in one of Kazakstan's largest banks. Another daughter is party leader and MP, with a husband serving as deputy foreign minister. It is in this autocratic climate that little room is left for democracy and human rights, and magnanimous ideas - such as turning the flow of Siberian rivers - are increasingly coming into vogue. This is perhaps no wonder as Nursultan Nazarbayev received 91% of votes in the rigged December 2005 presidential elections.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticised Kazakhstan for severe human rights violations, lack of democracy and persecution of political opposition groups and independent media. Furthermore, authorities keep a close check on all NGOs and registration is mandatory. The freedom of organisation is thus legally circumscribed. Moreover, Kazakshtan was rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International in its 2004 report. It is with such a country that the US has so cordial relations.

Then, what is the White House position on these issues? Meeting Nazarbayev last Friday, president Bush praised Kazakhstan for its "commitment to institutions that will enable liberty to flourish." Also, during his visit to Astana in May, vice-president Dick Cheney declared the country a "key strategic partner of the United States” in its war on terror. Besides the war on terror, oil is the main reason for the Bush administration's cordial relations with Kazakhstan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) is a key strategic asset for the West in the future access to oil from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the BTC is dependent on the inflow of Kazakh oil for long-term profitability.

Therefore, a new Great Game between Russia and the West over the energy resources of Central Asia is played by mighty international commercial interests, in which US companies have a high stake. Earlier this year, Russia won a small victory in this new Great Game over Central Asian resources by being promised increased oil exports by Nazarbayev. This poses a threat to the BTC pipeline, as the very same oil that was intended to flow westwards now instead may go to Russia. With increasingly scarce international oil reserves in the future, now is the time of determination of who will control what resources are left. Here, Kazakhstan plays a key role in Central Asia in view of political stability combined with relative accessability to resources. Consequently, it is very important for the Bush administration to get relations between the US and Kazakhstan back on track.

Then, does Kazakhstan matter? Is it not yet another far away country of which we know nothing? For now, the paradox remains that Kazakhstan matters greatly to the US provided that it stays such a far away country, which the US public cares little about in terms of the basic values forming the basis of American society. In the long run though, the question is if it is in the best interest of the US to end up on the side of the rats of international politics in contrast to supporting the people in its strive for democracy and human rights? As the story goes, "Qui vivra verra" - Who lives shall see. In the meantime, the comedian Sascha "Borat" Cohen may paradoxically be doing Nazarbayev a favour by distracting the American public from the real issues at stake. Following Borat's chimes hides Kazakh crimes.

EU Discord on Armenian Genocide

Turkey will not have to recognize the Armenian genocide to become an EU member, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, said on Tuesday thus contradicting French president Jacques Chirac, who only this weekend set recognition as a sine qua non for Turkish accession.

Celebrating the first anniversary of Turkish membership talks with the EU, Olli Rehn is on a visit to Ankara trying to encourage further progress in Turkish pre-accession preparations. The visit comes only days after French President's, Jacques Chirac, visit to Armenia, where he again stressed that Turkey's recognition of guilt for the Armenian genocide was a condition for EU membership. France remains hesitant to Turkish accession and also faces an influential Armenian diaspora at home. Many influential public figures in France are of Armenian descent and Chirac for example was accompanied by Varenagh Aznavourian - more commonly known as Charles Aznavour - France's most famous singer - on his visit to Yerevan.

For Turkey, admitting the Armenian genocide is a difficult process involving a reevaluation of the country's own history and its transformation from the multiethnic Ottoman empire to Turkey as a nation state. Ankara claims that 300,000 Armenians were killed as part of civil war during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, concurrently stating that at least as many Turks were killed in the same conflict, occuring prior to Turkish statehood. Armenians, to the contrary, point to a death toll of 1.5 million people slain by the Turks during 1915-17, and argue that Turkey sooner or later must assume responsibility for its crimes against the Armenian people.

Although the Armenian issue has presented a regional and international deadlock for decades, some progress has been made as of late, even though there still is a long way to go before the issue is resolved. Recently, Turkey has proposed a joint Turkish-Armenian historical commission to investigate "atrocities against Armenians." So far, Olli Rehn has been the only EU-representative to support the proposal, but more may follow. Defusing the Armenian issue is, however, not in France's best interest due to its negative stance on Turkish EU-accession and large Armenian minority.

That some half-wit EU Commissioner should spoil the glorius aftermath of Chirac's grand visit to Armenia, supporting France's illusory self-image as a great power is also simply too much of an insult for the palais de l'Elysée to be accepted. Therefore, Commissioner Rehn is in for a scolding by France - concurrently also weakening positions of Turkish membership proponents. What Armenia stands to gain from this remains unclear.

Death of a Russian Hero?

Yesterday, deputy head of the Russian Central Bank, Andrei Kozlov, died from gunhot wounds protracted when shot down by armed assailants in central Moscow Wednesday evening. Kozlov is the highest ranking official murdered during president Putin's reign and his assassination now sparks indignation and raises doubts about Russia's fight against organised crime.

Kozlov was responsible for cleaning up the Russian banking sector and closed down several banks involved in money laundering schemes and violations of Central Bank regulations. In 2004, Kozlov closed down Sodbiznesbank and this year Neftyanoi bank in high-profile cases against organised crime in Russia. In 2006, the Central Bank has stepped up efforts in the fight against the financial activities of the Russian mafia and banking licenses have been revoked almost on a weekly basis. Therefore, Kozlov was an obvious target for retaliation from criminal elements. That Kozlov refused having bodyguards regretfully facilitated his murder.

Kozlov's death is a tragic blow against Russia's efforts to clean up criminality within the financial sector. The importance of his work cannot be overestimated, while it targeted the core interests of Russian organised crime, restoring a sound Russian economy by legal means. Such efforts by grey bureaucrats are exactly what hit hardest at the mafia as has been demonstrated by both US and Italian efforts to fight organised crime. However dull Kozlov's work might have appeared, his efforts were of great importance in restoring the legality and transparency so much needed in contemporary Russia. His eulogy might therefore read "death of a Russian hero."

Ukrainian Lighthouses & Landmarks

Little more than a month after becoming Ukrainian Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, seems poised to break his pledge to president Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine's continued western integration. Visiting Brussels on Thursday, Yanukovich put a moratorium on Ukraine's plans to join Nato, saying that: "Because of the political situation in Ukraine, we will now have to take a pause," according to International Herald Tribune.

However, what should be clear by now is that NATO and EU accession has become a parallel process in the integration of former Eastern bloc countries. Therefore, Yanukovich "pause" effectively means a halt - or at least a severe delay - for Ukraine's western integration.

That NATO and the EU are different organisations and deal with different issues should not disguise the fact that a majority of EU-members are also members of NATO. Combined with the backlash of the Orange revolution, Yanukovich statement is likely to further put off western leaders from any real association with Ukraine. Trust in Ukraine is at a low and the only real motivation for western efforts is to keep the country out of Moscow's orbit.

Still, Yanukovich's decision on NATO is logical. Popular support for NATO-membership has never reached any substantial levels, so his excuse to "play it safe" rather than to rush into something that Ukrainians will not accept is natural. This has tacitly been accepted by NATO-officials as a statement of facts rather than intent. At the same time, questions are raised what role Russia might have had in the decision. Yanukovich has previously declared that he would like Ukraine to be a "reliable bridge" between Europe and Russia, and NATO-membership seems incompatible with such a role. Russia has adamanttly opposed Ukrainian rapprochement to the Atlantic alliance.

Relations with Russia continue to be strained. Only yesterday, a Ukrainian court ordered that authorities should take control over 22 lighthouses in the Crimea that have been leased to Russia's Black Sea Fleet, BBC reports. As late as in June, Russia and Ukraine failed to reach agreement on settling the Kerch strait border dispute, which has been going on since 2003, according to RIA Novosti.

Ukraine's relations with Russia on the one hand and the West on the other have often been simplistically depicted as balancing between East and West. A similar balance accordingly applies to Ukraine's domestic scene - between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. As anyone who has dealt with Ukraine knows, realities are much more complex.

Still, the image of a Ukraine split between East and West lingers on in the minds of international leaders and is also exploited by a variety of actors. At a time when there are great doubts in the West as for Ukraine's willingness and ability to integrate, there is little room for a more straightforward public policy.

Yanukovich might have pursued a declaratory policy on NATO and EU membership at the same time as deepening relations with Russia. As long as no real steps towards NATO-integration were to be taken, such a situation might have been acceptable both to Russia and the West. That would have kept doors open for Kiev - both towards Brussels and Moscow.

Now, Yanukovich is closing the NATO-door and thereby - in a longer perspective - also the EU-door. This might however not open the door to Russia any wider, simply because the Kremlin has never accepted its loss of influence over Ukraine. A loss that one has not accepted is not regarded a real victory once it is regained.

Public postponement of NATO-integration is thus simply not a good idea at a time like this, when Ukraine needs the best of both worlds. The paradox is that what would probably serve Kiev's interests best at this point would be to say one thing and do the other, that is pledge western integration and cooperate more closely with Russia. In that way, Ukraine might have maintained safeguarded by the West at the same time as it could have remained part of the East. Now instead, Yanukovich has set a landmark in Ukraine's modern political history by giving away an important foreign policy instrument for no obvious reason. Cui bono? What does Ukraine or Yanukovich stand to gain from self-imposed alienation when one needs all the help one can get?

Putin's Presidential Pseudo-News

Putin will not run for a third presidential term in 2008. This is a message that he has been repeating every other month over the past years. Still, it was one of the top stories of international media today. Why is it that this is considered so important news as to reach the headlines of respected news sources throughout the globe next to every time that Putin says he will step down from power in 2008? The answer might be that this is the effect of a well-orchestrated media-coup by Putin's political spin-doctors - the political technologists.

News should always be considered critically by those who receive it. What essentially constitutes news should also be filtered by those whose profession it is - journalists and editors. As the mere term indicates, news should also present something new to its audience. How is it then that something which is news to nobody is repeatedly treated as such?

Should not any journalist in his sound mind defer from reporting what everyone already knows: That Putin does not want to remain Russia's president after 2008. On the contrary, if Putin would declare that he will run for a third presidential term and thus change the constitution, then it would be news of great significance. Until then, this is not the case.

Putin's repeated denial of furher presidential ambitions is perhaps - paradoxically - the main reason why journalists are so susceptible to this message. A climate has been created in which Putin's statement of facts becomes a crescendo of denials in anticipation of the orgiastic eruption when he finally comes out of the closet: "Yes, I will run for a third term! Yes, I will change the constitution! Yes, I cannot live without power! Yes, I am dizzy with success!" Putin's "No" becomes a resounding "Yes!!!" in the ears of media and the public.

That journalists and political analysts alike miss to comprehend Putin's "No" is partly explained by all the rumours that have reverberated throughout Moscow over the years. The question whether Putin will stay in power after 2008 has been a recurrent theme in all political discussions. Still, the answer has been the same all along, namely that the president respects the constitution and thus has no ambtion to change the fact that his tenure of power will end once his term runs out. So, rumours to the opposite must originate from somewhere else. One source might be the president himself by proxy of his "political technologists."

Why might this be the case? Putin has set before himself three tasks: to create and maintain political stability, produce economic growth, and gain control over strategic resources. Here, political stability is perceived a prerequisite for the latter two. In the political area, it is in the best interest of power that a climate of uncertainty prevails on whether Putin will continue in power. As long as this is the case, potential contenders will keep a low profile and nobody of significance will challenge Putin as long as he retains apparent popular support. Thus, Putin avoids running the risk of becoming a lame duck, and his political succession may be handled in an orderly manner by the Kremlin entourage that forms his basis of power. A measure of uncertainty for the public thus becomes an instrument of certainty for power, and thus the political tools for developing economic growth and gaining control over strategic resources is maintained.

Personally, it actually appears that Putin is weary with power and the constant obligations it involves. Associates at times describe him as disinterested with the chores of his office, allocating an increasing amount of time to activities normally not associated with the exercise of power. Also, Putin does not seem to be the sort of politician that thrives on power - to the opposite of what is often claimed in view of his extremely power-oriented policies.

Here also his KGB-background is regarded a reason why Putin would cling on to power, because KGB by essence epitomises power. To assume so may however be to miscomprehend the Chekist culture from which Putin originates. Chekist power tradition sets the system before the individual, and if Putin is true to these ideals he will also be loyal to the constitution as long as power to the system is ensured. His lack of ethics might also be construed in a Chekist context and not as evidence of self-perpetuating personalised authoritarian power.

Finally, why would Putin want to risk another period in office? His presidency has been more successful than what he himself might have imagined. Putin has restored the Russian state as an important actor both domestically and internationally. The country's economy thrives on the enormous incomes from oil, and a measure of stability has been restored to society. Why should Putin risk jeopardising an apparently favourable judgement as the great restorer of the Russian nation that the Russian people and history might pass on him, when the future is uncertain?

So, the question should perhaps be rephrased: "Why should Putin not step down from power in 2008?" So far, few substantial reasons have been presented why he should stay in power, so the assumption must naturally be that he will leave office.

Still, international media continues to report that Putin will leave power in 2008, in the anticipation that somewhere along the line he will change his mind. This does not only mean that the press runs the risk of a gigantic anticlimax once Putin actually leaves office. It above all serves the interests of Kremlin's perpetuation of authoritarian power while preventing democratic debate on the future of Russia. Wherever you turn, it seems that laughs will be on Putin in 2008, if he continues to pull off this game of ambiguities.



Comment: The full text of Putin's appearance is available at Financial Times.

Kazakhstan: Diverted Mind Diverts Rivers?

Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev is considering reviving old plans of diverting Siberian rivers to the Central Asian region, according to Interfax. Thus, Kazakhstan would get a greater inflow of fresh water for agricultural production, as was the intent with similar projects historically.

During a meeting with his Uzbek colleague Islam Karimov in Astana the other week, Nazarbayev claimed that "diverting Siberian rivers will not have a negative impact on the environment" and that "populist statements that this is dangerous were wrong."

Plans for diverting the flow of Siberian rivers have been long-lived. In the 1960s, there were even plans to do so by using atomic bombs. River diversion has however shown catastrophic consequences when employed. A Soviet decision to divert river water to cotton farming hastened the dispersion of the Aral Sea, causing social, economic and environmental disaster.

During Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev permanently put a stop to similar plans. However, the megalomanic idea of turning rivers have remained popular among some people. As late as in 2004, Russia appeared to be reviving its old river diversion plans, but thankfully enthusiasm seems to have petered out. Let us hope that this will also be the case with Nazarbayev's folly.