Nashi is not ours anymore

The pro-Putin youth movement Nashi is to be dissolved as a national organisation, Russian daily newspaper Kommersant reports. The decision comes after prolonged Kremlin dissatisfaction with Nashi's increasing radicalisation and extremist tendencies as a mass movement.

As previously reported, sentiments have been rising in Moscow that Nashi has outlived its purpose after the December 2007 parliamentary elections. With increasing concern that the radicalisation of the organisation has given it a life of its own - beyond blind allegiance to the Kremlin - fear of what a loss of control over the movement might mean has probably resulted in the decision to disband the movement. In what appears almost as a Russian equivalent to the night of the long knives, the national organisation is dissolved along with all but five of its regional units.

What is interesting is also what the Kremlin chooses to keep on to in Nashi's organisation. Except the five loyal regional units, the rest of the movement's members are referred to participate in the national projects of the organisation. This is in line with how the Putin plan is devised to change and develop Russia. The step from mass movements to mass projects is logical, as mobilisation now has to turn from populism to product. Thus, Nashi's emphasis on demonstrations and picketeering is yesterday's story in Russia. Now all energy must be used to modernise the country in line with the next step of Putinism.

What is surprising with this move is not per se that Nashi is disbanded. Instead, it is the evident confidence and security that the Putinist regime obviously feels even before the March presidential elections. There is no longer any need for a mass movement to take to the streets in defence of power - no need to root out the "extremists" of the non-system opposition of Another Russia. The national projects lie ahead in the guise of "sovereign democracy" to fulfill Putin's legacy. In the eyes of the Kremlin, Nashi is not ours anymore.

This signifies both arrogance and ignorance to the severe problems that may be facing Russia in years to come. With inflation rising and facing an international economic downturn, it is a fight against time to diversify Russian economy and turn it away from its dependence on energy exports, before the momentum of change is lost. We have seen the consequences of falling oil prices before in 1986 and 1998. As global macroeconomic indicators are now turning downwards, Russia can no longer rely on a constant high demand for oil. This would go beyond arrogance and ignorance. It would be outright foolish. Still, Moscow treads on along the pre-determined road to realising the expansionist economic policies of the Putin plan, despite facts pointing to the soundness of the opposite.

To rid oneself of such an instrument of political stability as Nashi in face of future potential middle-class discontent might prove unwise in the long run. One should remember that it is the middle-class that has something to lose from the consequences of irresponsible policies. It is they that might take to the streets in disappointment of gross government failure to deliver on its promises. Then neither laws or brute force will be enough, and without Nashi to defend the regime, it might well meet with an unexpected destiny. Such a scenario is not as far-fetched as might be considered, as the price Russia has had to pay for Putin's political stability is stagnation in most walks of life and society. This, however, the Kremlin fails to see, as it is too busy maintainting the status quo of Russian politics and economy.

Back to Belavezha?

A union between Russia and Belarus with Putin as president? Those are the rumours presently at sway in Moscow, as Dmitri Medvedev has just been nominated Putin's successor as Russian president. According to Ekho Moskvy, Putin is to sign an agreement on a full political union between the two countries during his visit to Minsk this week.

One would normally be inclined to agree with the Kremlin spokesman who characterised these rumours as coming "from the realm of speculative fantasies," but one never knows what might come out of Moscow these days. Still, the idea seems far-fetched and appears to arise from those who simply cannot imagine a Russia without Putin. Fears are wide-spread among the security structures that the choice of Medvedev as new Russian leader might topple the delicate balance Putin has ensured. Still, in recent years, the security structures have gained many of the system changes they have so eagerly wanted.

Putin's presidency has been an era of stabilization for Russia. However, from 2005 the influence from security structures have been felt by the so called new democratisation or the development of sovereign democracy - effectively ridding Russia of political rights and freedoms. Now, having attained stability and control of the country, Russia's next project is modernization, as expressed by the so called Putin plan. Then, the choice of Medvedev comes naturally.

Letting go of influence to enable socioeconomic development is no minor matter for the security structures, especially if it means giving power to so called liberals. As has however been demonstrated, there is little liberal politically in Russian elite liberalism. Or, as James Carville once put it: "It's the economy, stupid!" Russian elite liberalism today is all about economic growth and development and has little to do with liberal rights and freedoms.

Still, despite an impressive economic growth in recent years, there is a long way to go yet and many obstacles to overcome. The main problem on the way ahead might actually be to deal with the consequences of dismantling Russian democracy. Paradoxically, the greater political control the Kremlin has gained, the more severe are the potential consequences for the economy. As surveys from the World Bank has shown, the 2005 policy of new democratization coincides with a general downturn for the systems supporting a good business climate. Would this trend continue, it might become a mounting obstacle for the economic growth and diversification envisioned by the Putin plan as the coming era of modernization. Then, both security structures and Kremlin liberals are in for trouble.

To even consider a union with Belarus under these circumstances appears mere wishful thinking by soviet nostalgics, but might well be a test-balloon to see what room there is for a new political project by the security structures. Reunification of the Slavic lands - Belarus, and perhaps eventually Ukraine and even Kazakhstan - would be exactly the kind of task that would topple the construction of a new and successful Russia the entire Putin presidency has been about. If Putin were to sign an agreement on political union with Belarus, it would be as if reverting the 1991 Belavezha accords, signifying the dissolution of the Soviet Union. That would be a thoughtless revanchist act of the magnitude of Compiègne, but perhaps those are the sentiments in Russia presently.

A union between Russia and Belarus fundamentally contradicts the Putin plan's policy of modernization, and the only reason why it might still be seriously considered, would be as a concession from the liberals to the security structures for letting Medvedev succeed Putin as president of Russia. The question one must then ask, is if the ongoing Kremlin power struggle has been allowed to go so far, as to enable even the craziest ideas. If the union and similar ideas would materialise, people will in a few years time look back with nostalgia to the relative peace and quiet of the Putin era.