Pussy Riot yet another example of how art is pitted against politics

For Newsmill.se: The enormous attention that the indictment against Pussy Riot has created in both Russia and internationally is an example of an increasingly widespread global trend, where politics and art are pitted against each other and the reactions of society become a part of both art and politics.

Yesterday, a two year's prison sentence was passed in Moscow against three members of the Russian "punk band" Pussy Riot. The trio was found guilty of "hooliganism motivated by religious hatred." Reactions and condemnations against the sentence are manifold in both Russia and internationally, as it is evident that the penalty is not proportional to the alleged crime.

On 21 February this year - merely weeks before the Russian presidential elections - Pussy Riot made a mimic performance in front of the altar of Christ our Saviour Cathedral in Moscow wearing balaklavas and brightly coloured dresses. Within minutes they were seized on by security guards and thrown out of the church. Shortly thereafter, a video clip of the performance was published on YouTube, where music with a provocative song-text had been added. This so called "Punk prayer" was in the form of an invocation to the Holy Mother to drive out Putin and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill I, was portrayed as putting faith in Putin before that in God.

Undoubtedly, it was this video clip rather than the performance itself that made the Russian state and church react, as it spread like wildfire on the Internet. In March, three of Pussy Riot's members were arrested, while a fourth is still hiding from authorities. The lawsuit that has dragged out for almost half a year has now been accordingly finalised, where the treatment of the prosecuted has cast new light on Russia's legal decay. A mere 2.7 % of people prosecuted by Russian courts in 2011 were acquitted. 

The entire affaire has undeniably gained dynamics of its own, so one may assume that yesterday's verdict departs from the need of power to set an example. The increased confindence in the Russian legal system in recent years has thereby been turned into a setback in the politically directed jurisprudence, which since the process against former oligarch Khodorkovsky goes by the name of Basmanny justice. The trial against Pussy Riot has however taken the debate a step further, and several Russian liberal writers have compared the case with the show trials of the soviet era. The playback performance Pussy Riot made in Christ our Saviour Cathedral has thus also given rise to a historical playback.

It is also Russia's lack of due process that has caused reactions both in Russia and internationally. Already in April, Amnesty International characterized the members of Pussy Riot as prisoners of conscience. International organizations and artists are now joined by western public opinion, where the verdict against Pussy Riot become a symbol for all that is wrong with Russia. In this context, both strong and equally diverse  Russian reactions shuold be brought to the fore. A number of opinion polls during the process have shown both strong support for dismissing the case and for a guilty verdict. Russian public opinion is divided and varied in relation to a complex issue that has come to address religion, ethics, and politics more than actual law. 

That many believers in Russia have rightly felt offended by Pussy Riot's performance is beyond doubt, but this has been depreciated by the fact that a tasteless provocation has been overshadowed by an even more tasteless legal process. When the Russian Orthodox Church, in its condemnations of a feminist "punk band", has compared feminism with satanism, the Orthodox Patriarch, Kirill II, appears as the foremost representative of a patriarchic society. 

Then, what is Pussy Riot and what is it all about? Let us first put a myth to rest. Pussy Riot is not a punk band. It is a feminist art commune, dedicated to performance art in a wide sense, where provocation is a means to gain attention. 

Pussy Riot originates from the Russian street-art group Voina, which has produced a number of provicative and politically charged art projects. For the presidential installation of Medvedev in 2008, Voina made the performance "Fuck for the heir, Pussy Bear!", where five couples from the group - including a heavily pregnant woman - engaged in public group sex in the Moscow Museum of Biology, which was videotaped and published on the Internet. In 2010, the - then divided - group painted a giant phallos on a bascule bridge opposite the security service headquarters in St. Petersburg, where the result of raising the bridge should be obvious. Several members of Voina have previously been arrested for art projects. One of the now convicted women of Pussy Riot used to be a prominent member of Voina. 

The enormous attention that the indictment against Pussy Riot has created in both Russia and internationally is an example of an increasingly widespread global trend, where politics and art are pitted against each other and the reactions of society become a part of both art and politics. A parallel may e.g. be drawn to China's repression of the artist Ai Weiwei. In Sweden, the performance art project "Okänd kvinna, 2009-439701" of art student Anna Odell met with strong negative reactions the other year, not least from politicians. One should remember that Odell was sentenced to pay 50 day-fines for "dishonest conduct".It is far from a rule that artistic freedom of expression - as in the case of Lars Vilks' Mohammed roundabout dogs - gains strong public support. 

In this context, the perspective is not a comparison between preconditions of art in authoritarian and democratic states, but instead of how the margins of freedom of expression are tested as an effect of art regardless of the character of society. Thereby, the mechanisms of power and authority are illustrated - hopefully with different results in various political systems. That many of both Voina's and Pussy Riot's actions would be subject to public prosecution in most countries is evident. However, what differs is the legal process and the harsh sentence of the three members of Pussy Riot.

The lawsut against Pussy Riot can only be characterized as a travesty of justice. The law against hooliganism that motivated the verdict has such a broad definition that it may more or less cover all "crimes" perpetrated in public space. Hooliganism has however so far not been applied to "crimes" related to religion. If one would have wanted to prosecute the group on religious grounds, the law against extremism would have been applied instead, which e.g. covers acts to incite ethnic or religious hatred among groups in Russian society. However, the Russian constitution is secular, why application of the law against extremism in such a high-profile case, could have resulted in questioning of its compatibility with the constitution. Already in the choice of law, it is obvious that the process has been politically directed and motivated. Where Pussy Riot has claimed politics, the court has claimed religion as motive for the action. By interpreting the law in such a way that defamation of religion may constitute hooliganism, the court avoids applying the more politically chared law against extremism. Thus, paradoxically, the intent of the court appears clearer than that of the convicted, as an avoidance at any price to represent the process as what it actually is - a political trial. 

The question is also to what extent Pussy Riot has had to answer to the previous "crimes" of their art movement. Is it a case of collective punishment? Is it art itself rather than its practitioners that stands trial? From the freedom of expression perspective, these questions are both central and complex, but when art is political, they end up in the background. Instead, focus has been at the intersection of politics and religion in Russia.

The issue of relations between church and state is very sensitive in Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church has developed into providing both legitimacy and identity for political power. The church has subordinated itself to the state, in a way resembling the soviet era, at the same time as it supports reactionary forces within the regime - with a background within the security structures - which at times challenge both Putin and Medvedev. It is thus evident that the regime's internal political considerations have dictated the application of the law. For what Pussy Riot has done is to pinpoint Russia's politico-religious symbiosis.

During the soviet era, the Orthodox Church was strictly directed by the KGB. The Russian journalist Yevgeniya Albats e.g. claims that some half of the clergy in reality were agents of the KGB. Inter alia, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church until 2008, Aleksy II, served the KGB for many years and made decisive steps in his career by denouncing opposition elements within the clergy. As Pussy Riot now sings about how the state and the church row the same boat, it is a political provocation that challenges mighty interests within Russian society, where relations between church and security interests are a taboo. The reactions of the church has therefore been powerful, but religiously motivated condemnations have carried a clear political undertone. The irritation is further exacerbated as Pussy Riot has compared themselves to Godly maniacs - a tradition of dissenters within Orthodoxy, which e.g. has manifested itself by crazy, but often tolerated, truthsayers. The truth said by Pussy Riot is however too stark for the church, and the parallel to Godly maniacs has thus been portrayed as further evidence of the group's disrespect for religion.

A danger in the process against the Pussy Riot trio lies equally in simplyfying and complicating the case. The simple approach, to consider the trio's destiny merely as political persecution, obscures more complex issues on how far society may allow art to go in its various expressions. To the contrary, the danger of complicating the case, lies in ascribing the group greater artistic qualities than it actually possesses. A rather simplistic art performance has here been regenerated and magnified by the mechanisms of politics and media.

How generously or narrowly the margins of artistic freedom of expression should be drawn is a question that concerns us all and lacks simple answers. However, Russia has for long stepped over the limits of what a purportedly democratic state can allow itself in curtailing civil liberties and human rights. In this context, Pussy Riot has had to pay a disproportionate and exceedingly high price for art as political provocation. In essence, the verdict against Pussy Riot can be summarized by the famous thesis of German author, Kurt Tucholsky: "A country is not just what it does, but also what it tolerates." In Russia, this thesis has been put to the test, and the result stands out as a strongly negative indicator of the country's continuous authoritarian decay.

Belarus: East and West and Nothing in Between?

For Global Voices Online: "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." This chronically misused Kipling phrase seems to catch realities for an increasing number of Belarusians, as recent protests and crises have become a rude awakening from the torpor of the last Soviet "sleeping beauty." Waking to a wild and hostile world, many people now start asking: "Who cares about Belarus?"

Coverage found in the Western media of the recent developments in Belarus largely follows the general pattern of repression, with a few opposition activists highlighted, but still with little added to the familiar story. It is true that the economic crisis that has recently hit the country and Russia's gradual takeover of Belarus' economy have added spice to the stew, whilst the ultimate news would be the ousting of President Lukashenko.

Until that day, though, Belarus seems deemed to remain in limbo between East and West. Or would Lukashenko or no Lukashenko really make a difference? An increasing number of voices in Belarus say that the limbo will linger on, and Belarus is bound to remain in a grey zone between East and West.

Thus, LiveJournal user by_volunteer complains [ru] that the country's economy is sold out to Russia, whereas Europe has enough problems of her own to trouble to care:

Беларусь пошла с молотка и это очевидный конец. Руководство Беларуси заключило сделку и тихонько распродаёт страну, в расчёте на политическое убежище, все наши ура-патриоты спокойно на это смотрят. Основные предприятия страны переходят в собственность к России, это российские капиталовложения в нашу собственность. Как можно это допустить и как может ЕС так спокойно упускать свои перспективы на будущее в Беларуси?! Это же полный провал европейской политики, тем более в ЕС нарастает огромный финансовый кризис, европейский бизнес девать просто некуда. Это немощный инфантилизм и позор, нельзя допускать завершения сделки с Россией, это огромная ошибка, нужно срочно принимать меры!

Belarus went under [the auctioneer's] hammer and it was a foregone conclusion. The leaders of Belarus made a deal and are quietly selling off the country, counting on political asylum, and all our hooray-patriots calmly look at it. The main enterprises of the country are becoming Russian property. It is a Russian investment in our property. How can this be allowed, and how can the EU so calmly give up on its views on Belarus?! It is simply a total collapse of European policy, especially as an enourmous financial crisis is brewing in the EU, and European business simply has nowhere to turn. It is powerless infantilism and a shame. Оne cannot allow dealing with Russia. It's a big mistake, and urgent action is needed!

But where is Europe, and where is justice? Feelings of abandonment and, for all appearances, being treated unfairly are obviously spreading, adding to a sense of general disappointment and hopelessness in everyday life and in hopes for the future. Writing about a denial of an EU-Schengen visa for her son, a mother laments [ru] over how she feels people from Belarus are regarded:

Нет правды в Беларуси. Десятки лет мы получаем лживую информацию, слышим безответственные обещания, видим потемкинские деревни. Наелись. Все цивилизованные страны единодушны в оценке и называют такое поведение властей издевательством над народом. Но как оценить издевательство над многострадальными гражданами посольств этих цивилизованных стран, когда после заявлений о смягчении визовых режимов для белорусов, отказывают в визе даже тем белорусам, которые по всем критериям очень даже выездные. [---] Мой сын закончил третий курс университета. Хотел съездить во Францию по частному приглашению. Получил отказ. Поскольку ничего плохого за ним никогда не водилось, единственной причиной отказа считаю административный арест 19 декабря на 15 суток. Он проходит по спискам и, скорее всего, поэтому посольство Франции ответило: «У нас нет уверенности, что вы покинете страну по истечению срока визы». Интересно получается. Два списка фигурируют для запрета въезда в Евросоюз: официальный - список чиновников и неофициальный список задержанных. [---] И стало, знаете, очень обидно. И очень одиноко. И за демократию бьют по голове, и демократия бьет по голове. И никому мы не нужны. Ладно бы не нужны – и на порог не пускают. А главное, никакими демократическими процедурами это решение не оспорить. Где справедливость, где права человека, какие гаагские суды рассматривают отказы в выдаче визы? Какие правозащитные организации защищают таких людей? А главное, отличается ли белорусская судья, превентивно выносящая приговор за несовершенное правонарушение, от французского чиновника, отказывающего в визе за несостоявшийся невозврат?

There is no truth in Belarus. For decades, we have been getting a pack of lies, listening to irresponsible promises, seeing the Potemkin villages. We are fed up with it. All civilized countries unite in their judgment and name such conduct of power a mockery with the people. But how is such mockery with the long-suffering citizens valued by embassies of these civilized countries, when - after declarations of a softened visa regime for Belarusians - visas are denied even to those Belarusans who really by all criteria are liable for them. [---] My son finished his third year at university, and wanted to go to France on a private invitation. He got a rejection [to his visa application]. As he has never been up to anything bad, the only reason for rejection, I think, is the administrative [post-election protest-related] arrest on December 19 for 15 days. He is on the lists, and therefore, supposedly, the French Embassy replied: «We don't know if you leave the country after your visa expires». It all becomes interesting. There appears to be two lists for denial of entry to the European Union: An official - the bureaucrats' list - and an unofficial list of those who had been arrested. [---] And then, you know, it becomes really hurtful. And very lonely. Getting hit on the head for democracy, and then getting hit on the head by democracy. Nobody needs us. It's okay if we are not needed, and not let over the threshold. But the main thing is that there are no democratic procedures by which to appeal this decision. Where is justice, where are human rights, which Hague courts review the denials of visas? What civil rights organizations defend these people? And above all, does a Belarusian judge, who preventively passes verdict for a crime not committed, differ from a French bureaucrat, who denies a visa for a non-return that has not taken place?

Touching on the classical Tolstoian question of the evil inside us all and the need to come to terms with it, LJ user dolka777 asks [ru] how people allowed the Lukashenko regime to develop:

Как мы вскормили диктатора. Это вопрос, который я себе задаю постоянно. Мучительно вспоминаю, как и когда я сама впустила в себя эту диктатуру. Свято верю, что в каждой судьбе должен быть такой момент, когда ты соглашаешься со злом только потому, что твой двоюродный брат работает в КГБ и он – клевый парень, а тебе не хочется его обижать. Или хвастаешься другом, который парится в парилке с личным сантехником Его Величества. Шугаешься коллег или сокурсников, которые связаны с оппозицией. Думаю, что здесь, в бай-политикс собрались те, которые, возможно, ничего такого не делали. Но все же. [---] И теперь вопрос каждому: что ты лично сделал для того, чтобы в Беларуси воцарился диктатор?

How did we nourish a dictator? It's a question I ask myself all the time. It is painful to remember how and when I, myself, let this dictatorship in. I sincerely believe that in every destiny there has to be such a moment when you consent to evil only because your cousin works for the KGB, and he is a cool guy and you don't want to hurt his feelings. Or you boast about a friend who has steamed in the same sauna as His Highness. You vilify those colleagues or classmates who are connected with the opposition. I believe that here, in the .by-politics, those have gathered who perhaps did nothing like this. But still. And now a question to each and everyone: What have you personally done so that a dictator could reign in Belarus?

So, as the shrill voices of Lukashenko loyalists and opposition activists reach crescendo, perhaps there are weaker voices wondering why they cannot simply be allowed to be here, "tuteishi", and lead a normal life between Russia and Europe.

Kipling's famous poem on East and West has a less-known ending: "But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!"

So, even if Russia and Europe, as two strong men, would learn to respect each other, where would that leave Belarus but in a grey zone? Perhaps, for many Belarusians, East is East and West is West, and there is no place for the rest, living in between.

Orthodoxy or Death to Degenerate Art?

For Global Voices Online: "Orthodoxy or death!" are the war cries sounded in recent weeks as forces of religious reaction have entered into fierce battle with liberal arts, in an apparent Russian parallel to the Muhammad cartoon case. The casue of conflict is the trial and conviction of two art curators for a 2007 Moscow exhibition of contemporary art. Following the media spin, one may be led to believe the conviction was a resounding triumph of reactionary religious forces, but as so often is the case, appearances may be deceptive.

On 12 July, the Moscow Tagansky court found art curators Yuri Samodurov and Andrei Yerofeev guilty of "inciting ethnic and religious strife" by their exhibition "Forbidden art - 2006" -- in a case brought against them by the Russian right-wing organization Narodny Sobor -- and sentenced them to pay fines of 200.000 (6,500 USD) and 150.000 (4,900 USD) roubles respectively. The verdict was a disappointment for both reactionaries -- hoping for a three year jail sentence -- and liberals -- wanting an acquittal. Once again, concerns are raised where the limits on freedom of expression in Russia really are heading. Thus, yet another Russian case is likely to end up in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

So, is that all there is to it? Perhaps, but it may also serve as an example of how not only freedom of speech lies in the balance, but also how that balance itself becomes an art "happening" by treading the thin line between art and society -- as the debate surrounding "Forbidden art - 2006" illustrates.

The saying "A picture says more than a thousand words" is truer to Russia than to most other countries. Take a tormented Jesus with the head of Mickey Mouse or Christ with the face of Lenin, and then wait for reactions. The limits of art are constantly pushed further afield. The dictum of the century-old Russian futurist manifesto "A slap in the face of public taste" maintains as much a prominent role in Russian arts and culture today as it did in the early 1900s. But in our day and age, slaps are not always what they seem.

So, what is then the basic story behind it all? Well, back in March 2007 art curators Yuri Samodurov and Andrei Yerofeev organized an exhibition of artworks that had been rejected from mainstream Moscow museums and galleries during 2006 -- thus the title "Forbidden art - 2006." The purpose of the artshow was to shed light upon self-imposed censorship quelling the Russian artscene, turning the tide towards more traditional displays of art. The exhibition had a meagre total of 1,020 visitors. Still, it attracted the attention of a small reactionary religious movement, which took Samodurov and Yerofeev to court for offending their religious feelings. Thus, the show was on the road, ending with the very verdict against the art curators, that now has brought so much attention to the case both in Russian and international media. LJ user don_beaver indignantly summarizes [RUS] the case thus:

Not long ago, some artists organized an exhibition in a private gallery. People, who were not even at this gallery, declared that their religious feelings had been hurt by the exhibition and went to court. The judge agreed with them and fined exhibition organizers heavily. The only good [thing] about it was that they were not put in jail.

What was then the drama that turned media's attention towards the case -- beside its freedom of expression aspects? As the verdict was read out last week, a small crowd of bearded men in black uniforms had gathered outside Tagansky court, wearing T-shirts with the text "Orthodoxy or death." Behind these lines lies more than what meets the naked eye. "Orthodoxy or death" (gr. ορθοδοξία ή θάνατος) was originally a motto of the famous monastery of Esphigmenou on Mount Athos, Greece, in its struggle against the Patriarchy of Constantinople, but since the 1990s it has become a token of intolerance and extremism also in Orthodox countries like Serbia and Russia. This photo-op was what caught the eyes of media present outside the court, resulting in vivid pictures of crackpot nationalists setting the Russian civil liberties' agenda in newspaper articles throughout the world. The symbolic effect was so great, that rumours about an upcoming church-initiated proposal to addend the Criminal Code with the crime of "heresy" reached respectable newspapers such as Argumenty i Fakty. However, according to LJ user tristen2e [RUS], this was all a hoax:

Besides, everyone believed the sensational news, even though they sounded words, ascribed to father Vsevolod, about heresy "as any form of opposition to Orthodoxy." Obviously, such an unlearned expression in itself could hardly be uttered by such a skilled church diplomat and rhetoric as archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin [spokesman of the Russian Orthodox church]. However, as is often the case with a summer languishing with heat, journalist colleagues could have mixed it up -- everybody thought -- and thus the news started to travel the web.

For the liberal supporters of Samodurov and Yerofeev, the "Orthodoxy or death" emblem, obviously, was like raising a red rag, reminding them of battles fought during dissident days of a soviet past. This is perhaps also an important aspect that has largely been left out of reporting on the case. In fact, the art curator, Yuri Samodurov, springs from the same soviet dissident movement as Nobel Peace laureate Andrei Sakharov during the 1970-80s, and became one of the founding members of Memorial Human Rights' organization.

However, Samodurov regarded opposition to soviet power not as a political but a cultural act. This, arguably, not only set him apart from the mainstream dissident movement, but also enabled him to remain relevant in Russian debate as society at large increasingly deemed dissidentism obsolete. As director of the Sakharov museum, Samodurov, in February 2006, became an active participant in the debate over the Danish Muhammad cartoons controversy, by heralding a Moscow exhibition of these pictures. So, Samodurov's artistic career has been straddled with the constant cooptation of society as art and art as society. It would thus seem that Samodurov and his actions have become a work of postmodern art personified, in blurring boundaries between art and society.

What are then the effects of the "Forbidden art" case on societal debate? LJ user and poet Vitaly Kaplan, critically, tries to draw the larger picture [RUS] of how art has come to divulge greater tendencies of societal developments in present Russia:

To begin with, there is the "dry residue" that then moistens a multitude of flavours. Thus, the exhibition "Forbidden art - 2006" is really a mockery with the feelings of believers. Does it need society's condemnation? Yes, it does. Was it necessary to go to court? That is where I have my doubts. What do I think about the verdict? I am happy that they did not put Yerofeev and Samodurov in jail. What do I think about the polemics on the Internet? I would say it is a battle of banners with red dogs.

And now for the details. First concerning the mockery with religious sentiments. The problem is that most disputers, regardless of their positions, do not at all understand what it is all about. So, Yerofeev's and Samodurov's defenders indignantly sigh: Oh, these Orthodox people! Everything offends them! If they were to decide -- then every man would be forced to grow a beard, and the women wear scarves, they would raze the "McDonald's" and burn mosques and synagogues alike. Because everything that does not coincide with their Orthodox ideals hurts their delicate religious feelings. And the opponents of Yerofeev and Samodurov shed tears because the pictures of an exhibition offend the Russian people and contradict national traditions, due to their terrible testimony of lost ideals, as such normative decay prevents the revival of Greater Russia...

Consequently, the effect of the "Forbidden art" case is not only pitting perceptions of postmodern and medieval icons against each other, but also serves as a token of differences between imagery and reality of current Russian society. The original grievance of Orthodox believers was -- in religious terms -- that the "Forbidden art" pictures constituted a desecration of icons as carriers of divine messages, in accordance with an Orthodox tradition arguing that the words of God cannot be reduced to text, but must be represented in symbols. What lies at the heart of the matter is then the exhibition's iconization of images portraying a metamorphosis of the divine with the profane. Icons are turned into idolatry of symbols with a mixed message representing the complexities of current society.

What impact has then the conviction of Samodurov and Yerofeev had on perceptions of Russian society, and can it serve as an indicator of where freedom of expression is heading in the country? As much as easy answers would be welcome, reality probably has more in store for the greater picture. Possibly, by seizing the agenda with a question that transcends the borders of art and society, the core of the issue becomes obscured -- whether one of art or freedom of expression, of both or neither. However, society -- in the image of the state -- chooses to take a stand for or against freedom of expression in terms of artforms which purpose may actually be to exploit the interaction such a stand unavoidably involves.

Still, at the end of the day, the question must be raised about the ramifications of that stand for the development of freedom of speech and expression in Russian society. Here, under the headline "Forbidden art gets more expensive," LJ user timur_nechaev77 offers an assessment [RUS]:

The sentence passed against the organizers of the exhibition "Forbidden art - 2006" shows that during the last few years, the price of criticizing the state ideology - Orthodoxy - has risen nearly twice. In 2005, Yuri Samodurov was fined 100 thousand roubles for the exhibition "Beware of religion" which provoked a pogrome from religious extremists of the Russian Orthodox Church. Now they sentenced Samodurov to pay 200 thousand, and Andrei Yerofeev 150 thousand roubles. Of course, the verdict will be appealed as high as Strasbourg and if the European Court will stand on the side of the pogromists and religious fanatics from the Russian Orthodox Church, then of course, Yerofeev and Samodurov will have to pay the fines.

As is often so poorly realized by contemporary society, art may cut to the core problems and developments of our times. The role of an artist increasingly becomes one of pushing the right button to ignite societal debate on issues that may actually be more profound than art itself. Art then merely becomes the symbol of greater tendencies, and thereby recreates itself sui generis by mechanisms greater than the specific work of art and its originator. In the "forbidden art" case, the verdict may serve as a conveyor -- a sign of premonition of either desirable or undesirable developments -- of what is ceasing the normative middle ground in Russian society. Is it right or wrong? Right or wrong is perhaps both not the issue here and still the issue in itself, as everything becomes part of the spectacle, a happening, or the (in)famous fifteen minutes of fame.

As the Romans used to say: “There is no accounting for taste” and art is well beyond the domain of things society may hold people accountable for. That is a matter of taste, and that taste is for each and all to decide on individually — including the right to support or protest against the views and beliefs that agree or conflict with one's own — without state interference. For who is to deem what is degenerate art?