Turkmens Thrash Turkmenbash?

As Turkmenistan is facing presidential elections on 11 February, it is becoming increasingly clear that the late Nyýazow's successors have begun to turn their backs on Saparmurat Türkmenbaşy's political legacy, in brokering the terms of Aşgabat's new oligarchy.

Abandoning Nyýazow's unique Turkmen third way alternative to the values of modern civilization, seems the preferred choice of the new regime in the making. A recent secret poll, by the Eurasian Transition Group, shows that 81% of Turkmens support democratic reform, while 55% doubt that the upcoming elections will be free and fair. Even though these figures are far from reliable, they indicate popular fatigue with the current situation and a wish for change. The political realization of this has led political leaders to at least simulate a free and democratic process for the upcoming elections.

That Türkmenbaşy's political legacy is in question is furthermore signalled by declarations to restore the education system dismantled by Nyýazow, return to fully fledged pensions, grant free access to the Internet, and even restore railway traffic with Russia. All the same, the intentions of Turkmenistan's new leadership are far from clear. Thus, it seems that repression has been stepped up since the December 21 death of Nyýazow, and Reporters Without Borders singles out Turkmenistan as one of the most repressive countries in the world, in its 2007 annual press freedom survey. Despite reformatory indications, it thus stands beyond doubt that the main goal of current power in Aşgabat is to safeguard stability and a peaceful transition of leadership.

In an excellent article in Sunday's Washington Post, Peter Finn presents an overview of the situation for the upcoming elections. Whereas Turkmenistan for the first time allows more than one person to run for office, it is more than obvious that acting president Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow will be declared winner on Sunday. Thus, the remaining five presidential candidates stand under constant supervision of the national security service, MNB, and their public appearances are directed by the political principles outlined by the leading candidate, Berdimuhammedow. Indeed, all measures since Nyýazow's death have been directed towards bringing Berdimuhammedow into power, including constitutional violations and changes.

As for power, it however seems that Berdimuhammedow is rather a frontman of an evolving political oligarchy, centred around the national security council, than a strong political figure in himself. Allegiance to the legacy of Nyýazow - interpreted however the new rulers see fit - here appears to become both a formula for legitimacy and a tool to suppress whatever opposition might arise. Consequently, it seems that Turkmenistan is poised for a transition to oligarchic dictatorship rather than any real or even gradual reform process.

As for international reactions to the new situation they may be characterised by a combination of relief over Nyýazow's death with hopes to exploit any chances of closer cooperation with Aşgabat, not least within the energy sector. Thus, both the US and the EU are stepping up their contacts with Turkmenistan. However, it is Russian president Putin that, by all appearances, stands as victor in the struggle over relations with Aşgabat. Putin was the first to single out Berdimuhammedov for support and thereby Moscow seems to be succesful in safeguarding Russian interests - primarily the 25 year gas accord with Turkmenistan, signed in 2003. By supporting Berdimuhammedow, Putin seeks a successor who will honour the committments so crucial for Russian interests in and influence over the region. However, also China lurks about in the scenery, trying to secure a recent deal to build a gas pipeline to meet the country's increasing energy demand.

To sum up, it is in the interests of both domestic and international actors to maintain stability in Turkmenistan, almost whatever it takes. It is likely that internal interests of the current regime will be strong enough to exercise oligarchic dictatorship with the silent consent of the international community. If worst comes to worst, Nyýazow can always be used as a common scapegoat for the country's lack of progress. Such acts of "turkmenbashing" however seem distant in today's Turkmenistan.

Russia Goes Ballistic over Missiles

A recent US proposal to deploy a ballistic missile defence system to NATO-members Poland and the Czech Republic, has provoked stern reactions from Moscow and citizens of the concerned countries alike, Washington Post reports. The US motive is to create a missile defence shield for Eastern Europe, protecting the region from attacks of "rogue states" such as Iran or North Korea.

The US plans are to place 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar tracking station in the Czech Republic with the purpose to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It thus appears that this would add a strategic perspective to the sort of tactical theatre missile defence that is currently within technical reach. The Bush administration perceives the initiative primarily as part of its international war on terrorism rather than as an element of regional security.

In contrast to this, Moscow regards these plans as directed also against Russia. In response, the Russian MFA stated that "the creation of a U.S. European anti-missile base can only be regarded as a substantial reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe." It is "a mistaken step with negative consequences for international security."

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) - commonly known as Star Wars - was one of the driving forces for the Soviet Union's defeat in the international arms race. Moscow then neither had the technique nor the resources to compete in developing a corresponding system. Star Wars thus presented a new phase in the arms race that would potentially render the soviet strategic advantage obsolete at a time when the USSR already was at loggerheads with maintaining the existing balance of power. Ever since, any proposal of this sort has hit a sore spot in Moscow.

To counter further NATO initiatives, then Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, in 2001 proposed a common solution for a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, instead of a NATO national missile defence (NMD), aimed at protecting the alliance's European members. NATO reactions were lukewarm, portraying the Russian proposal as an attempt to "drive a wedge between the US and its European allies."

In this context, it is interesting to note that this time the US proposal is on a bilateral level, viz. between Washington and Warzaw and Prague respectively and not as part of the NATO collective defence system. The feelings in Bruxelles and among NATO-members are that such a US unilateralist approach would further threaten to undermine the Atlantic alliance, adding to Washington's tendency towards multilateralism à la carte.

Also, popular protests against the US plans have begun to mount in both Poland and the Czech Republic. Recent reminiscences of Soviet bases in these countries remain a mental obstacle for people to accept foreign military elements on their soil. Fears are also rising that hosting an anti-missile defence system would rather make the Poles and the Czechs targets for attack than act as a means of protection. Still, many observers on both sides of the Atlantic also regard this as yet another US test of allegiance for the European states with the greatest debt of gratitude for their independence and security.

What stands out as perhaps the most peculiar part of Washintgton's proposal is how the Republican administration has revived one of its pet projects of the 1980s. Since then, the Star Wars/SDI remains an extremely expensive and technically cumbersome project with little proof of relevance as to its efficiency in countering current threats. That Europe would form the primary target of a potential Iranian or North Korean ICBM-attack is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future for two obvious reasons. First, Europe poses no threat to either Iran or North Korea. Targeting Europe would thus only serve as a threat by proxy towards the United States. Secondly, if Iran or North Korea would indeed develop nuclear arms and ICBMs to carry them, the primary target would be the US and its regional allies in the vicinity of Teheran and Pyongyang - not a distant and inoffensive Europe.

Why is it then that the US wants these weapons in Europe? Using the terrorist threat as a pretext for toppling the nuclear balance in Europe, as Moscow holds, simply seems too far-fetched. Instead, the simple truth may be sought in the minds of Bush & co. Reviving Star Wars is like kissing the sleeping beauty. The beauty of it is that you know what to expect as long as she lies there sound asleep. What you do not know is who she will become when awoken. Still, it simply is too tempting to resist.

Update: See also Peter Finn's update on the issue in the February 21 issue of the Washington Post.