Anniversary of Anguish over Bronze Battle

This weekend past saw the first anniversary of the Estonian Bronze Soldier crisis - over the removal of a soviet WW II monument from central Tallinn. As the crisis evolved it ignited a bilateral quarrel between Tallinn and Moscow, in the end setting Russia and the European Union at loggerheads. As the first anniversary of the Bronze battle drew close, a certain extent of anguish and apprehension arose among Estonian authorities. What was to happen this time over? The simple answer was - next to nothing.

On Saturday, some 100 demonstrators gathered in a park in central Tallinn to commemorate last year's events, and to call for the resignation of the Estonian government led by Andrus Ansip. The event was peaceful and heavily monitored by police and the Estonian secret service (KAPO).

That the demonstration actually rallied less of a crowd than the number of people merely injured last year must be considered a fundamental failure for Russian "minority" interests in Estonia. Not least so as, just a few weeks ago, an organization to unite Russians in Estonia held its first congress. That Saturday's demonstration had such a poor showing may thus point to a waning significance of the Russian issue in Estonia. Or should perhaps alternative explanations be sought?

What evolved over a few weeks last spring was that the same methods used during the coloured revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and the Ukraine, were now applied by Russians themselves. As the protest was reaching its crescendo, actions and debate were coordinated by sms, e-mail, and blogs targeting largely unprepared Estonian political leaders and authorities. The subsequent cyber attacks on Estonian web-servers proved the peak in efforts to paralyze society. Someone had obviously done his homework.

In terms of the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic States, Russia has long propagated that these "minorities" are consistently discriminated against, and has even ventured so far as to compare the situation with Apartheid. Last year's events also gave Moscow an opportunity to highlight the issue on the international scene. Although much of recent bravado has mysteriously evaporated, Russia has e.g. demanded an addendum on the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia in ongoing negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union.

Still, much indicates that Moscow came out of the 2007 conflict with the EU on the wrong end of the stick - besides the PR-fiasco for Moscow's international image - why such demands are most likely to be ignored. Also, Russian policy towards the Baltic States since 1991 has largely proven a failure. Already in 1997, Russia's Council for Foreign and Defence Policy - an influential think-tank - in a report characterised Moscow's policy as counterproductive, if it intended to safeguard the interests of Russian "minorities".

It is far too seldom argued that what is not said and done may be as interesting as what actually is. So may be the case also here, although reporting on something that did not happen - as the Bronze battle anniversary - would hardly qualify as breaking news or of interest to a larger audience.

Turning to the case in point, the Bronze Soldier crisis has fundamentally been interpreted as an ethnic conflict. In fact, few issues are as politically sensitive as ethnic tension. Recent history has witnessed oppression and even genocide on minorities to an extent that has shocked world opinion. However, this also has made us prone to see far too many societal conflicts with ethnic lenses.

So, why did the anniversary of the Bronze Soldier crisis pass by next to unnoticed? May it be that there are alternative or complementary explanations to last year's turmoil than the ethnic angle? Before trying some hypotheses, it should be clearly stated that the removal of the Bronze Soldier from central Tallinn unequivocally was the igniting factor of the 2007 crisis. It is quite obvious that the Estonian government acted in haste and with poor judgement. Thus, they partly brought the crisis upon themselves.

Still, that does not explain the absence of protests a year after the so far largest protests by ehtnic Russians in post-soviet Estonia. The situation has not altered and the reasons for, arguably, Russian discontent with conditions in the country has not changed for the better - rather the opposite as a fact. Political forces traditionally safeguarding interests of Russians have partly been rendered obsolete. In socioeconomic terms, nothing has really happened, as illustrated in a report by Marju Lauristin last autumn.

So, except for Estonia's monumental mistake and obvious Russia-related explanations of lacking protests this year - the upcoming presidential installation on 7 May and last year's domestic need in Russia to rally around a cause - what might serve as alternative or complementary hypotheses for the difference between last year and now?

One reason largely unexplored is the transit of Russian goods and products through Estonia. Russia has long wanted to divert this trade to Russian harbours instead of having to pay the costs of transit. Furthermore, Kremlin-sponsored Russian companies had long been eager to out-compete those companies that controlled and profited from the Estonian transit trade. The same applied for control over export-harbours in Estonia. For most observers, it serves as no surprise to state that the transit trade involves enormous sums of money. One can only imagine how much by pointing to the fact that Estonia lost some 6,3 billion Estonian Kroonas in transit revenues due to a few weeks of Russian blockade.

Consequently, just a week or so before the April 2007 events, Russian vice Premier, Sergei Ivanov, held a speech in Murmansk, in which he propagated curbing transit trade and diverting Russian exports to ports in the Petersburg region and Gulf of Finland.

Negotiations for transit quotas and pricing on Russian goods by Estonian railway were to be held in May 2007. In 2006, the Estonian state re-nationalized Estonian Railway (Eesti Raudtee), why preconditions for influencing the outcome of negotiations had been altered to the detriment of Moscow's interests.

As for harbour facilities, the ports of Tallinn and Muuga represented around one-quarter of Russia's total refined-product exports, thus by far outweighing any Russian harbour. Control over harbours in Tallinn, Muuga and Sillamäe had long been coveted by Russian business interests. As previously reported, last year's crisis also saw a transfer of trade between these ports to the benefit of Russian interests.

Then, there is also the question of shipping. The crisis and the subsequent Russian trade blockade is said to have favoured shipping operations, controlled by Swiss-based Gunvor Group. Gunvor is owned by Swedish oil trader Torbjörn Törnqvist, with interests in e.g. Surgutneftegaz. In November last year, Russian political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky made allegations in the German newspaper die Welt that Putin had amassed a personal fortune of some 40 billion USD, and that part of this was held by a 50% share of the Gunvor Group.

Although these rumours and allegations cannot be corroborated, and in fact have been denied by most concerned parties - among others Törnqvist himself - one cannot but stop to wonder what role business with a Russian stake had in the 2007 Russian-Estonian crisis. The example of controlling the transportation system - railways, harbours, and shipping - of Russian exports by way of Estonian transit might thus arguably be one alternative or complementary explanation to why last year's Russian-Estonian crisis was allowed to escalate to the level it did.

Russia's imposition of a trade blockade on Estonia for a few weeks last year was a hard hit on the transit trade. The transport of Russian goods by rail, road, and boat was halted. The companies involved in this line of trade, were among the all too evident losers, and many of them were more or less put out of business - both Russian companies and Estonian with often large Russian ownership interests. These companies were not sponsored by the Kremlin. Instead, it appears that the blockade wiped out annoying competition, and that mightier Russian business interests moved in to take over the transit trade, once the blockade was lifted. Such methods would not be a novelty in Russian business practices and thus serve to surprise nobody. Big business in Russia regularly gets Kremlin's blessing to move in and wipe out competition in order to monopolise a market. The difference in what would arguably be the Estonian case, is that these practices were now applied on another state not in the CIS, but on a member of the European Union.

So, apart from speculations and conspiracy-theories that normally surround events such as the Bronze Soldier crisis, it would seem worthwhile to test such alternative or complementary hypotheses as accounted for above. Who stood to gain from a blockade halting transit trade, and who has actually done so? However, if proven right, such an argument would not only expose that the Kremlin serves its own interests, but also a blatant disregard by Russia for the interests of the Russian "minorities" in the Baltic States, because the greatest losers of the conflict would turn out to be the very same Russian minorities that Moscow claims to defend.

Consequently, it may actually have been the Russians in Estonia who lost most out of the Russian-Estonian conflict over the removal of the Bronze Soldier. Russians were hit by losing the revenues from transit trade, both in terms of profits and employment. Furhtermore, Russians were the ones who were most exposed by raising the issue of disloyalty to Estonian society as a whole. For any minority in any country, such cross-pressure may prove highly detrimental to their future prospects of finding a place in society in social, economic and political terms, and still Moscow decided it was worth to run this risk.

Perhaps, in the end it is safest not to test such hypotheses as forwarded above, because - if validated - they would bring the perceived cynicism of Russian leaders to new and even higher levels. Moscow's indignation and heavy hand towards Estonia was officially motivated by the public outcry among Russians over the removal of the Bronze soldier. General opinion held that Moscow now finally had to step in to protect the Russian "minority" in Estonia. In stark contrast to this official policy, a proven transit trade hypothesis would - to the opposite - paint a picture of Russians abandoned by Russia and their cause sacrificed for the sake of petty business interests. One cannot help but wonder what the Russians who took to the streets in both Tallinn and Moscow in protest against "fascist Estonia" would think if confronted by proof to that effect. In the meantime, such hypotheses are, of course, just a fidget of one's imagination - or are they?

Putin World's Richest Man

An increasing number of surveys rate Russian president Vladimir Putin the richest man in Europe. Putin is allegedly to have amassed enormous wealth during his presidential reign and all the way back to the Petersburg days. At his annual press conference on 14 February, Putin for the first time commented on these rumours:

It is true. I am the richest man not only in Europe, but in the world: I amass emotions and am rich in the sense that the Russian people twice put the trust in me to rule such a great country as Russia. I count this as my biggest wealth.

What concerns various rumours concerning my financial situation, I have seen some documents on this issue. This is simply gossip, which there is no reason to discuss - mere nonsense.

In Russia, there is a tradition of denial whenever such accusations arise. Instead, Putin chose to make fun of the issue - or rather make himself out as honoured by the trust and responsibility the Russian people has put in him. Judging from his body language, the Russian president appeared somewhat ill at ease with the question. Not that it was unexpected, and the answer was certainly rehearsed. Still, one did not need more than a glance at Putin's reaction to gather that he would not have passed a polygraph test.

The question of rising wealth and power in Russia is destined to determine the future development and stability of the country. As long as the elites may share the dividends of growing wealth and power, they will remain loyal to the system. The day this situation will change - e.g. by falling international oil prices - there is nothing to hold the system together except mere repression. The question is but for how long the elites will accept such a system, if they no longer have anything to gain from it. The risk is that a lack of growth will eventually lead Russia into crisis and turmoil with little to keep the system together.

A Slave to Power?

At his annual news conference, Russian president Vladimir Putin revealed that he had never been tempted to run for a third term. From the very outset, he decided never to violate the Russian constitution. The constitution stipulates a maximum of two consecutive presidential terms.

As usual this pseudo-news ran as the top story in international media's comments on the news conference. As previously reported, the Kremlin has succeeded to keep speculations on a potential third Putin presidential term alive for years, and media have only been to keen to swallow the bait. That journalists simply have not been able to take Putin's word for it, only testifies to the politechnologists' successful media coup in manipulating western and Russian news coverage alike. It should also send a warning to news audiences worldwide that they run the risk of deception due to international media's one-eyedness in Russia reporting.

At the news conference Putin said: "Throughout all these eight years I have toiled like a slave in the galleys, from morning till evening and, have done so with the full devotion of my strength." This is most probably a very sincere statement, and is also in line with what Putin has previously said repeatedly. Also, people working in the Kremlin has let it be no secret that the Russian president has been quite tired and weary of his duties in recent years. So, being a slave to power does not in Putin's case have to be a fixation to power, but an actual slavery of duties. Still, media have failed to see this.

At times, it is simply appauling to see how bad the knowledge is among western journalists covering Russia, when they repeatedly fail even to get the basic facts right. For instance, only this Tuesday the BBC covered Ukrainian president's Yushchenko meeeting with Putin in Moscow. With badly covered indignation, the reporter comments on Putin's upcoming attendance to the April NATO-conference in Bucharest: "Mr Putin will no longer be Russian president in April. Elections for his successor will be held next month." It is thus suggested that Putin and his croonies do not know when his presidential term ends or that they do not care, as things will anyway remain the same. Well, I have news for the BBC: Putin was inaugurated for his second term in May 2004, which means that he has the constitutional right to remain in office for the full four years of his term, viz. until May this year. That he has every intention to exercise his presidential powers to the maximum until the last minute is also clear from Putin's own statements. Still, one cannot but sigh when even the BBC cannot get such basics right.

What is at risk is good and objective reporting about developments in Russia. As the situation is becoming increasingly severe in many fields of politics and society, news coverage is increasingly tendentious and predisposed to prejudial perceptions. The worse the situation becomes, the greater is the need for journalistic integrity and professionalism. Or else, not only the general news audience will be misled but even world leaders might base their decisions on policies towards Russia on bad information and faulty images. Getting the basic facts right might actually change assessments of developments to better cope with challenges ahead. Those challenges are great, and the greatest is perhaps coping with the myth of Russia as a reemerging great power in the world. Still, we fail to see realities as they are, and as long as we do not challenge our own prejudice, we will go on living in a world of illusions about Russia.

Nashi is not ours anymore

The pro-Putin youth movement Nashi is to be dissolved as a national organisation, Russian daily newspaper Kommersant reports. The decision comes after prolonged Kremlin dissatisfaction with Nashi's increasing radicalisation and extremist tendencies as a mass movement.

As previously reported, sentiments have been rising in Moscow that Nashi has outlived its purpose after the December 2007 parliamentary elections. With increasing concern that the radicalisation of the organisation has given it a life of its own - beyond blind allegiance to the Kremlin - fear of what a loss of control over the movement might mean has probably resulted in the decision to disband the movement. In what appears almost as a Russian equivalent to the night of the long knives, the national organisation is dissolved along with all but five of its regional units.

What is interesting is also what the Kremlin chooses to keep on to in Nashi's organisation. Except the five loyal regional units, the rest of the movement's members are referred to participate in the national projects of the organisation. This is in line with how the Putin plan is devised to change and develop Russia. The step from mass movements to mass projects is logical, as mobilisation now has to turn from populism to product. Thus, Nashi's emphasis on demonstrations and picketeering is yesterday's story in Russia. Now all energy must be used to modernise the country in line with the next step of Putinism.

What is surprising with this move is not per se that Nashi is disbanded. Instead, it is the evident confidence and security that the Putinist regime obviously feels even before the March presidential elections. There is no longer any need for a mass movement to take to the streets in defence of power - no need to root out the "extremists" of the non-system opposition of Another Russia. The national projects lie ahead in the guise of "sovereign democracy" to fulfill Putin's legacy. In the eyes of the Kremlin, Nashi is not ours anymore.

This signifies both arrogance and ignorance to the severe problems that may be facing Russia in years to come. With inflation rising and facing an international economic downturn, it is a fight against time to diversify Russian economy and turn it away from its dependence on energy exports, before the momentum of change is lost. We have seen the consequences of falling oil prices before in 1986 and 1998. As global macroeconomic indicators are now turning downwards, Russia can no longer rely on a constant high demand for oil. This would go beyond arrogance and ignorance. It would be outright foolish. Still, Moscow treads on along the pre-determined road to realising the expansionist economic policies of the Putin plan, despite facts pointing to the soundness of the opposite.

To rid oneself of such an instrument of political stability as Nashi in face of future potential middle-class discontent might prove unwise in the long run. One should remember that it is the middle-class that has something to lose from the consequences of irresponsible policies. It is they that might take to the streets in disappointment of gross government failure to deliver on its promises. Then neither laws or brute force will be enough, and without Nashi to defend the regime, it might well meet with an unexpected destiny. Such a scenario is not as far-fetched as might be considered, as the price Russia has had to pay for Putin's political stability is stagnation in most walks of life and society. This, however, the Kremlin fails to see, as it is too busy maintainting the status quo of Russian politics and economy.

Zyuganov steps up to step down?

According to Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Russian communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov considers withdrawing his candidacy for the March 2 Russian presidential elections. A withdrawal would be to protest against a similar negative PR-campaign that the Communist Party experienced during the December 2007 parliamentary elections.

According to recent opinion polls, Zyuganov receives surprisingly little popular support for his presidential candidacy, which would effectively force him to abandon his leadership of the communist party if they were to become official election results. Thus, even if withdrawing from the presidential race would open up to contenders to the leadership of the party, Zyuganov might consider this drastic option as preferential to a devastating election loss. According to a source in the presidential administration, the communists are currently seeking support in the Kremlin for receiving 15-20% of votes instead of the prognosticized 6%.

In the background, forces advocating a Russian two-party system seem to be at work. Hence, a discussion of merging the communist party and Fair Russia has been renewed, which would be considerably facilitated by the dethtronisation of Zyuganov. According to Nezavizimaya Gazeta, these are the same forces that want to undermine the position of Medvedev as future president of Russia. Zyuganov is very well aware of the fact that his candidacy legitimises the election of Medvedev. In the 2004 presidential elections, Zyuganov's role was much of a stage-hand in the act of reelecting Putin.

However, this time it seems to become the LDPR-leader, Vladimir Zhirinovski, who will conquer the second place in the presidential race. Such a result would further undermine Medvedev's legitimacy. Still, if Zyuganov would decide to step down, the effect is the same. Ending up in third place would be equal to his resignation as communist leader, why Zyuganov now seems to be playing out the legitimacy card against Medvedev to gain sufficient support in order to stay on as party leader. If Zyuganov would fail in these discussions and actually decide to withdraw, this has to happen no later than 27 January, as the communists otherwise will have to pay state election costs.

Even though Dmitry Medvedev seems sure to be elected the third president of Russia on 2 March, what goes on behind the scenes in Moscow at the moment is both interesting and confusing. It also provides further evidence that Putin and his aides are becoming increasingly dependent on the bureaucratic monster of political power that they have created during his era. What this will mean for Russia is still hard to say, but the evolving pattern bodes ill for the future.

Police crackdown on Nashi demonstration

According to Russian newspaper Vzglyad, a number of activists of Russian pro-Putin youth movement "Nashi" were arrested today during an illegal demonstration outside the EU-commission's Moscow office. The demonstration, gathering some 700 people, was arranged in protest against Nashi-activists, partaking in last year's picket against the Estonian embassy in Moscow, being denied visas to the EU-Schengen area.

Russian police has obviously learnt from last year's events, and urged the demonstrators to dissolve the meeting, which also was obeyed after some further disorder and some arrests. Nashi had not applied for a demonstration permit for the event. Even though the Russian constitution safeguards the right to assembly, legislation has been approved in recent years demanding official approval of any demonstration gathering more than one (sic!) person. Detainees were subsequently released out of police custody.

That police actually intervened against Nashi demonstrators seems an exception to the rule of giving the movement great leeway in their public appearances and propaganda. In view of Nashi's increasing radicalisation, not least since the Estonian crisis, concern has been raised that Nashi rethorics and actions might get out of hand. Some sources even suggest that the Kremlin is fearing a loss of control over the movement, not least if the down-to-earth practicalities and bartering of Russian politics would demand a turn away from Nashi ideals.

However, it would be an exaggeration to claim the crackdown on Nashi as a sign of the Kremlin starting to turn its back on the movement, in view of the evolving political landscape in the runup to Russian presidential elections this March. Still, one might wonder if Nashi is not all the more becoming a used political force after having fulfilled its purpose as a Kremlin instrument for the 2007-2008 parliamentary and presidential elections.

Would the movement continue to complicate matters and exaggerate Kremlin policies, official support for Nashi might dwindle in favour of other movements, as e.g. Molodaya Gvardiya - the youth organisation of Putinist party Edinaya Rossiya. The need to organise and foster the youth ideologically however persists, so whatever form this will assume, the phenomenon of forming a nationally-minded "elite" is here to stay.

Back to Belavezha?

A union between Russia and Belarus with Putin as president? Those are the rumours presently at sway in Moscow, as Dmitri Medvedev has just been nominated Putin's successor as Russian president. According to Ekho Moskvy, Putin is to sign an agreement on a full political union between the two countries during his visit to Minsk this week.

One would normally be inclined to agree with the Kremlin spokesman who characterised these rumours as coming "from the realm of speculative fantasies," but one never knows what might come out of Moscow these days. Still, the idea seems far-fetched and appears to arise from those who simply cannot imagine a Russia without Putin. Fears are wide-spread among the security structures that the choice of Medvedev as new Russian leader might topple the delicate balance Putin has ensured. Still, in recent years, the security structures have gained many of the system changes they have so eagerly wanted.

Putin's presidency has been an era of stabilization for Russia. However, from 2005 the influence from security structures have been felt by the so called new democratisation or the development of sovereign democracy - effectively ridding Russia of political rights and freedoms. Now, having attained stability and control of the country, Russia's next project is modernization, as expressed by the so called Putin plan. Then, the choice of Medvedev comes naturally.

Letting go of influence to enable socioeconomic development is no minor matter for the security structures, especially if it means giving power to so called liberals. As has however been demonstrated, there is little liberal politically in Russian elite liberalism. Or, as James Carville once put it: "It's the economy, stupid!" Russian elite liberalism today is all about economic growth and development and has little to do with liberal rights and freedoms.

Still, despite an impressive economic growth in recent years, there is a long way to go yet and many obstacles to overcome. The main problem on the way ahead might actually be to deal with the consequences of dismantling Russian democracy. Paradoxically, the greater political control the Kremlin has gained, the more severe are the potential consequences for the economy. As surveys from the World Bank has shown, the 2005 policy of new democratization coincides with a general downturn for the systems supporting a good business climate. Would this trend continue, it might become a mounting obstacle for the economic growth and diversification envisioned by the Putin plan as the coming era of modernization. Then, both security structures and Kremlin liberals are in for trouble.

To even consider a union with Belarus under these circumstances appears mere wishful thinking by soviet nostalgics, but might well be a test-balloon to see what room there is for a new political project by the security structures. Reunification of the Slavic lands - Belarus, and perhaps eventually Ukraine and even Kazakhstan - would be exactly the kind of task that would topple the construction of a new and successful Russia the entire Putin presidency has been about. If Putin were to sign an agreement on political union with Belarus, it would be as if reverting the 1991 Belavezha accords, signifying the dissolution of the Soviet Union. That would be a thoughtless revanchist act of the magnitude of Compiègne, but perhaps those are the sentiments in Russia presently.

A union between Russia and Belarus fundamentally contradicts the Putin plan's policy of modernization, and the only reason why it might still be seriously considered, would be as a concession from the liberals to the security structures for letting Medvedev succeed Putin as president of Russia. The question one must then ask, is if the ongoing Kremlin power struggle has been allowed to go so far, as to enable even the craziest ideas. If the union and similar ideas would materialise, people will in a few years time look back with nostalgia to the relative peace and quiet of the Putin era.

Georgia shoots down Russian plane?

According to Georgian TV-channel Rustavi 2, Georgian interior ministry forces today shot down a Russian fighter over the Kodori gorge of breakaway region of Abkhazia. The interior ministry tonight confirms that its forces has indeed shot down a Russian plane in a remote part of Georgia. Russia, on its part, emphatically denies any such incidence and representatives of both the Foreign and Defence Ministries speak of Georgian provocations. Pending furhter information, contradictory statements cease the day. Still, it seems that the conflict between Russia and Georgia is about to heat up even more, though hopefully not in armed confrontation.

Russia: Going Off the Air or Out of Air?

When the BBC goes off the air, civilisation is at an end. At least, so seems to have been the British view during the Cold War, as submarine captains had orders to open the envelopes for the nuclear arms' codes when the BBC fell silent. Now, this bastion of free speech and independent media is silenced by authorities in Russia, BBC reports.

On Friday, the BBC announced that its Russian partner, Bolshoe Radio, has been ordered by the authorities either to take Russia's last FM-relay of the BBC's Russian Service off the air or be shut down. That would make Bolshoe Radio the third and final Russian radio station, in the last months, that has been forced to quit BBC broadcasts in Russian.

Bolshoe Radio, which was recently purchased by the Finam investment group, was "allowed for 18% of --- content to be foreign-produced." Now, the radio station has been ordered to produce all its programming itself. The new owner of Bolshoe Radio denies that the decision to take the BBC off the air was made with outside prompting, and instead states that the radio station cannot send foreign propaganda. According to the BBC, a spokesman for Bolshoe Radio said it is "well known that the BBC was set up to broadcast foreign propaganda" and that "any media which is government-financed is propaganda."

However, it is beyond doubt that the BBC Russian Service was taken off the air by the Russian Federal Media Monitoring Service, Rossvyazokhrankultura (cf. "Russia silences its free voices?"). The head of the Russian authority, Boris Boyarskov, thus plainly states that his agency was behind shutting down the BBC in Russia, according to Interfax news agency:

The licensee who was organizing broadcasting on this frequency should have indicated the name of the mass media outlet, the BBC, in its plan, which it failed to do. We carried out checks on this and issued the broadcaster with a warning that it should only be giving air time to those mass media outlets which have been stipulated in the programming plan and that it should bring its broadcasting into line with this programming plan.

The statement that the BBC would broadcast "state propaganda" is surely a novelty in fabricating pretexts for smothering media freedom. The BBC is renowned throughout the world for its independent news coverage, and any attempt by a British government to limit the BBC's freedom would likely result in its eventual resignation. Such is considered the power of the free word in Britain, that when the BBC goes off the air - freedom is presumed at an end.

Thus, another free voice is silenced for Russians, eventually smothering the souls of the people. Is it a coincidence that the lyrics of Vysotsky's song "Спасите наши души" (Save Our Souls) come to mind?

Спасите наши души! - Мы бредим от удушья.
Спасите наши души! - Спешите к нам!
Услышьте нас на суше! Наш SOS все глуше, глуше...
И ужас режет души. - Напополам...

Save our souls! We are slowly smothered. Save our souls! Make haste to us! Hear our sorrows! Our SOS grows unheard... And horror cuts our souls in halves.

Yeltsin: Selling out Russia

Now it is official what everyone in the business has known for the last 15 years. Back in 1991, Boris Yeltsin offered Finland to buy back Karelia - lost to the Soviet Union in WW II. This public secret has now been "revealed" by Finnish paper Kainuun Sanomat, which breaks a silent understanding in Finnish establishment of suppressing public debate on relations with Russia.

In late December 1991, the Soviet Union awaited its final dissolution. Earlier in the month, the Belovezha agreement had effectively torpedoed the USSR, and republic after republic ceded from the Union. On 25 December, president Gorbachev resigned, and by New Year the red flag was lowered from the pinnacles of the Kremlin. In its place, the Russian tricolor was hoisted, signalling a Russia of uncertainty. As a new nation, Russia was in dire need of recognition as a sovereign and successor state of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, its economy was in free fall, with food shortages and an industry in total disarray. In both respects, Russia needed to become a player on the new world stage.

All this is well-known history now, but still serves to contextualise the situation when Yeltsin - allegedly - offered the return of Karelia in exchange for much needed money. On an ideological level, Russia's new leadership needed to part with the past and the injustices of history to build a new nation. Yeltsin had thus previously supported the independence of the Baltic states, partly out of personal conviction, and partly to further undermine Gorbachev's position. There was also a liberalising belief that one way out of the problems was by local and individual initiatives. Thus, in June 1991, Yeltsin had urged Russia's regions to take as much sovereignty as they could digest. Also, a similar offer was made to Japan for the return of the Kurile islands, which the Soviet Union had conquered in 1945. The offer to Japan was still on the table until May 1993, when Yeltsin cancelled a visit to Japan for further talks on the issue, whereafter no mention has been made on it from the Russian side.

According to Kainuun Sanomat, in response to the Russian offer, Finnish president Mauno Koivisto appointed a secret group to analyse the costs for regaining Karelia. An initial cost of reconstruction was estimated to 13 billion euro, but subsequently the price tag increased to 71 billion euro. Obviously, this was too high a price to pay for Karelia, and - even though Russia repeatedly reiterated the offer during spring 1992 - president Koivisto in the end told Yeltsin in July 1992 that "Finland cannot afford Karelia."

Obviously, there were also security policy considerations, as the return of Karelia would bring Finland within sight of St. Petersburg - a problem that Russia historically had taken issue with. Also, Finnish public opinion seemed ambivalent or straightout negative to the idea, so it might have proven politically hazardous to raise the issue publicly. Still, regaining Karelia was publicly discussed in Finland at the time, even though few may actually have realised that there was a concrete offer on the table. Then, the main proponents for the this cause were nationalist Karelian exile organisations, which only served to make the generation having lived through the war increasingly apprehensive. The price in human lives and suffering had been too high to once more risk the chance of having Finland's great neighbour too close at hand. The price once paid by the loss of Karelia - 10% of Finnish territory and 400,000 refugees - was simply too high to risk its reiteration in the future. A final reason why the Russian offer was turned down might have been an impending economic crisis - partly due to the total loss of trade with Russia after soviet demise - bringing mass unemployment to Finland.

So, how has the Finnish establishment reacted to these news? Well, denial seems to be the word of the day in Helsinki. Despite the fact that Koivisto on numerous occasions has both said and written things, strongly supporting that there actually was a Russian offer, he simply states through his secretary that these news "do not feel familiar." Also, most high-ranking politicians and diplomats of those days vehemently deny anything of the sort of a Russian offer to return Karelia. It is more than obvious that official Finland now closes it ranks in face of an alternative to official history.

Why the Karelia affaire is disclosed right now is unclear. Ever since 1991, information about the Russian offer has been covered by media and documentaries, although often more as a footnote than as the main story. The difference this time over though, seems to be that now there may be detailed information exactly about how the entire affaire was handled. Another motive may be that some Finnish interests now want to discredit the last moral justifications for Finland's post-war appeasement policy in relation to the Soviet Union. With an increasingly menacing Russia at its borders, and a debate on Finnish accession to NATO out in the cold, this may prove an opportunity for NATO-adherents to undermine proponents of more accomodating relations with Russia, in contrast to what would be the result of Finnish NATO-membership.

So, why these massive denials. If there was a Russian offer on the table - as much now indicates - it seems the only decent and sound decision would nevertheless have been to turn it down. Opting for status quo instead of staggering costs in a dire and uncertain economic situation in addition to the great uncertainties of how a future Russia would develop, seems the most secure and responsible decision to make. If so, president Koivisto would once more have risen to the task of being a statesman of the best Finnish tradition.

Still, memory is short, and presuming that the public in retrospect would be able to correctly assess the situation in the early 1990s is perhaps too much to ask for. Therefore, what is at stake is the reputation and historical verdict of an entire generation of politicians in Finland, which only serves as a driving-force to making the Karelia affaire into a true scandal. Perhaps, the right thing to do - instead of continued denial - would simply be to proudly confess that this was the only responsible thing to do given the historical circumstances. This would though not be in line with Finnish tradition, which perhaps is the reason why it is good that this affaire now comes out into the open. As Russia is returning to the past it parted with in 1991, Finland may need to part with a past it never totally left behind. As long as this is not the case, Finland will continue to walk a thin line in its relations with Russia.

Finally, as for Yeltsin's part in the Karelia affaire, most Russians would today claim this as further evidence that he sold out Russia. Yeltsin's sense of a historical role and obligation to part with and try to make good for the crimes of communism is something current Russia wants to forget. Paradoxically, exactly this morale and courage of the early Yeltsin, to stand up for his beliefs in a democratic and just Russia, is what he will go down in history for. To this should also be added Yeltsin's attempts to put Finlandisation behind in relations between Moscow and Helsinki.