Estonia: Battle by Bronze Proxy

Why is it that a WW II-monument repeatedly sparks bilateral crises between Estonia and Russia? This question has, in recent days, gained new relevance after strong Russian reactions against the Estonian parliament's decision to remove the so called Bronze Soldier (Pronkssõdur) soviet war monument from central Tallinn. The reason is simple: The Bronze Soldier has become a proxy for the conflict between Estonian and Russian interests in Estonia before the 4 March parliamentary elections. The Estonians thus vage a battle by bronze proxy.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Edgar Savisaar's Centre Party (Keskerakond), will stand as victors on election day, ousting the coalition government led by Prime Minister Andrus Ansip's Reform Party (Reformierakond). Such a result risks toppling the delicate balance between western financial interests, dominating the Estonian banking system, and Russian interests controlling the lucrative transit trade, with far-reaching consequences for domestic and foreign policy.

Economic interest has been one of the main driving-forces in Estonian politics since the country regained its independence in 1991. A division of labour was developed roughly between two opposing groupings - the Russians controlling transit trade and backed by Moscow, and the Estonians controlling the financial and banking sector and backed by western - mainly Scandinavian - interests. This is reflected also in politics. Thus, Savisaars Centre Party has gradually become Moscow's agent, with heavy economic backing from Russia, to the point that the party actually has entered into union with Russian power party United Russia (Единая Россия). Savisaar's main opponent, the Reform Party, is to the contrary linked to finance and banking dominated by western business interests. A final peculiar twist to the matter is that these two main contenders for political power in Estonia, in fact form the current coalition government, together with the People's Union (Rahvaliit).

It is obvious that the the Bronze Soldier crisis this time is a desperate attempt by the Reform Party, facing potential defeat, to gain votes by shedding light over the close relations between the Centre Party and Russia. So, who are the major players in Moscow's relations with Estonia? On the Russian side, two names stand out as safeguarding these interests, namely Gleb Pavlovsky, one of Russia's foremost "political technologists," and Igor Levitin, Russia's Minister of Transportation. Pavlovsky gained wider international attention in 2005, due to allegations of involvement in the dioxin poisoning of Ukrainian president-to-be Victor Yushchenko. As for Levitin, Savisaar the other year unsuccesfully tried to grant him Estonian citizenship due to his great services to the country.

Then, what is actually at stake for the upcoming elections? Estonia is currently struggling with an overinflated rate of public lending - a financial bubble that could easily burst in face of any radical change of power in Tallinn. If Savisaar's Centre Party would win on 4 March, this might well be the spark to set off a major financial crisis in Estonian economy. As the Reform Party relies on the finance and banking sectors that constitute the lenders, such development would be catastrophic to the party, and potentially topple the fragile balance of power within Estonian politics and society. Moreover, it would hit hard on the western investors, forming Estonia's link to European economy. Therefore, the Reformists now are desperate to undermine the Russian interests forming the power base for Savisaar's Centrists. Thus, the Bronze Soldier crisis must be seen as an attempt to provoke sanctions from Russia, which would hit the very transit trade that forms the basis of Savisaar's Russian backing.

As the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) this morning decided to move the Bronze Soldier monument, the country's president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, was quick to declare that he would not sign such legislation, claiming it to be in breach of the constitution. In this context, one must ask whether it really was necessary for the parliament to pass a law on the removal of the Bronze Soldier. If this really was the intention of the Reform Party, could it not have been easier accomplished by a simple government decision? From this perspective, it is quite obvious that the Reformist ulterior motive was to provoke a crisis with Russia that would benefit the party for the upcoming elections.

So, what have been the reactions in Moscow? Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was quick to characterise the decision as a "grave mistake" and as a "blasphemous act." Also, the chairman of the Russian Duma's foreign relations committee said that the decision would have catastrophic consequences for Russian-Estonian relations, especially trade and economy, thus hinting at exactly the effect the Reformist Party wanted to achieve. However, Estonia's ambassador to Moscow, Marina Kaljurand, was quick to point out that Russia would be unlikely to impose bilateral sanctions on Estonia, not wanting to risk a "trade war" with the European Union. What will actually come out of this is yet to be seen, but it seems that Russian politicians would be shrewd enough to call the bluff. Still, Russian-Estonian relations have been shaky for long, as previously reported, so it is difficult to say what will come out of Moscow this time.

Here one should instead direct more attention to an overseen foreign policy factor in the context of Russian-Estonian relations, namely the projected Russian gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. This crucial project for Russia is meeting increasing opposition among Baltic Sea states, and currently public opinion also in Sweden is turning against letting the pipeline run through its territorial waters. Would Sweden and other Baltic states turn down the project, with a Centrist government ruling Estonia, one scenario is that Russia might turn its frustration towards Tallinn, possibly giving massive support to Savisaar in order to gain a permanent influence over EU-member Estonia. This would create a very difficult terrain for the EU and Estonia's neighbours to manouevre, not to speak of what challenges it would pose to president Ilves and the Estonian political system.

Finally, is there any solution in sight for the issue of the Bronze Soldier monument? As for its removal, Estonia probably lost its chance back in 1991. However, doing so spurred an idea of expanding the monument to hold also statues of Estonian, German, as well as allied soldiers of WW II, along with various paraphernalia. This idea was never realised, paradoxically due to lack of metal for the statues. In the early 1990s, Estonia was a major exporter of metal, despite its evident lack of this type of natural resources. Mainly Russian business interests made fortunes by exporting whatever metal scrap they could lay their hands on, thus forming the mighty Russian economic interests that now dominate the transit trade. So, what then made Russian fortunes - the metal that might have expanded the Bronze Soldier monument into a unifying symbol for Russians and Estonians alike - now comes back to haunt the transit profiteers by a constant threat of sanctions to their trade. Had there been metal then, this explosive matter might have been defused at an early stage. Then, of course, Estonians and Russians would probably have found some other symbol to quarrel over.

Comment: On Baltic economy, especially Latvia, cf. "A Bursting Baltic Bubble." For an overview of Russian-Estonian relations see also "Estonia: Stalemate in Russian Relations."

Armenia Railroaded on Train Line

Last Thursday, an agreement was signed between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the contruction of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad, further barring Armenia from infrastructural cooperation in the western Caucasus. Effectively, Armenia is increasingly isolated from regional developments of great consequence for the country's future. As a consequence, Armenia may be further driven into the arms of Russia, strengthening the delineation of spheres of interest in the Caucasus between Russia and the West.

The agreement, signed in Baku, by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, Azerbaijani president Aliyev and Georgian President Saakashvili, bypasses Armenia by opting for the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tblisi-Baku stretch, instead of the previously designated, and already existent, Kars-Gyumri rail line, going through Armenia. The Armenian-Turkish border, and along with it the Kars-Gyumri railway, has been closed since 1993, due to the 1988-1994 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabağ. Thus, the Kars-Gyumri alternative would have meant reopening the border - a matter too difficult for Turkey to deal with in view of the sensitive Armenian question and upcoming parliamentary elections. As the opposite now is the case, Thursday's Baku agreement, by excluding Armenia, only serves to prolong a stifling status quo in relations between Yerevan and Ankara, and furthermore risks regionally isolating Armenia to the benefit of Russia.

The idea of the railway project, popularly known as the Iron Silk Road, originates from the 1960s, when the first plans to form, what is now known as, the Trans-Asia Railway Network (TAR) were raised. From the original plan of uniting 14.000 kms railroad from Singapore to Turkey, the scheme has grown to fathom some 81.000 kms, spanning all over the Eurasian continent. Thus, in November last year an agreement was signed to this end, under the aegis of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), as reported by RFE/RL-Online.

On the regional level, the question has been how to unite the various railway systems, linking the countries in the Caucasus with Turkey, as part of the larger Iron Silk Road project. Thus, a corresponding agreement was reached, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), as early as in 2005. It stipulated that the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi-Baku railway should be considered the only viable option for uniting the regional railway network, while it would connect all countries in the region, not need any substantial investments, and avoid any potential dividing lines. However, keeping to these and similar committments has proven very difficult.

On a strategic level, the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku agreement further underlines how the delineation of spheres of interest in the Caucasus between Russia and the West is exacerbated. Leaving Armenia out of the dynamics of regional development in this way, poses the question of how far-reaching a tacit understanding there is, that "Armenia belongs to Moscow." Another factor for leaving Yerevan at the side of the road, might be that western interests want to avoid being exposed to the risks of relying on infrastructure that, in event of crisis, may be controlled by Russia. A 5,000 man strong Russian troop contingent is currently posted on Armenian territory.

The agreement also shows how both Russia and the West attach an increasing importance to control over strategic infrastructure. It is no secret that the West's most important regional infrastructure project in Eurasia, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, partly due to the ambition of strategic control. That Moscow has been negative to reopening the Kars-Gyumri railway, between Armenia and Turkey, serves as no surprise in this context.

As for Armenia's international position, Yerevan would like to regard itself as a "Finland of the Caucasus" in terms of dealing with Moscow. During the Cold War, the Finns succesfully defended their national sovereignty by a well-balanced policy towards Moscow, safeguarding their country against recurrent Soviet plans to bring Finland in under the umbrella of the Warzaw pact. The fears in the West of so called "finlandisation" thus in the end turned out to be exaggerated, although Helsinki at times was weighed down under the pressure of Moscow's interests.

While Finland could benefit from the Cold War balance-of-power system in Europe, as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, Armenia since the 1990s has had greater difficulty to gain a corresponding means of balance. A double-edged instrument has been to use the Armenian diaspora in the West, which could equally complicate as facilitate regional relations. In the context of the Kars-Gyumri railway, Armenia has used its Westen lobby-groups to bar the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku stretch favoured by Turkey. Thus, US Armenian groups last year succeeded in blocking American funding of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway by securing a decision of the US Congress. By Thursday's Baku agreement, such measures now seem to no avail, as construction of the new railway stretch - bypassing Armenia - now are to be realised. However, the final word has perhaps not been said yet, judging from how positions on the issue have slided back and forth in recent years.

On a national level, the Baku decision comes at a most inconvenient time, as Armenia is up for parliamentary elections on 12 May this year. Overshadowed by the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia is undergoing somewhat of a political refolution, as Ralf Dahrendorf so succinctly termed events in Central and Eastern Europe by the end of the Cold War. It remains to be seen whether Armenia will be able to carry through its process of change under the weight of various domestic and international pressures.

Regretfully, Thursday's railway agreement puts Yerevan at the crossroads between Russian influence and continued regional integration. It is thus fair to say that Armenia has been railroaded in making its independent and sovereign choice on its future forms of regional and international cooperation.

Turkmens Thrash Turkmenbash?

As Turkmenistan is facing presidential elections on 11 February, it is becoming increasingly clear that the late Nyýazow's successors have begun to turn their backs on Saparmurat Türkmenbaşy's political legacy, in brokering the terms of Aşgabat's new oligarchy.

Abandoning Nyýazow's unique Turkmen third way alternative to the values of modern civilization, seems the preferred choice of the new regime in the making. A recent secret poll, by the Eurasian Transition Group, shows that 81% of Turkmens support democratic reform, while 55% doubt that the upcoming elections will be free and fair. Even though these figures are far from reliable, they indicate popular fatigue with the current situation and a wish for change. The political realization of this has led political leaders to at least simulate a free and democratic process for the upcoming elections.

That Türkmenbaşy's political legacy is in question is furthermore signalled by declarations to restore the education system dismantled by Nyýazow, return to fully fledged pensions, grant free access to the Internet, and even restore railway traffic with Russia. All the same, the intentions of Turkmenistan's new leadership are far from clear. Thus, it seems that repression has been stepped up since the December 21 death of Nyýazow, and Reporters Without Borders singles out Turkmenistan as one of the most repressive countries in the world, in its 2007 annual press freedom survey. Despite reformatory indications, it thus stands beyond doubt that the main goal of current power in Aşgabat is to safeguard stability and a peaceful transition of leadership.

In an excellent article in Sunday's Washington Post, Peter Finn presents an overview of the situation for the upcoming elections. Whereas Turkmenistan for the first time allows more than one person to run for office, it is more than obvious that acting president Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow will be declared winner on Sunday. Thus, the remaining five presidential candidates stand under constant supervision of the national security service, MNB, and their public appearances are directed by the political principles outlined by the leading candidate, Berdimuhammedow. Indeed, all measures since Nyýazow's death have been directed towards bringing Berdimuhammedow into power, including constitutional violations and changes.

As for power, it however seems that Berdimuhammedow is rather a frontman of an evolving political oligarchy, centred around the national security council, than a strong political figure in himself. Allegiance to the legacy of Nyýazow - interpreted however the new rulers see fit - here appears to become both a formula for legitimacy and a tool to suppress whatever opposition might arise. Consequently, it seems that Turkmenistan is poised for a transition to oligarchic dictatorship rather than any real or even gradual reform process.

As for international reactions to the new situation they may be characterised by a combination of relief over Nyýazow's death with hopes to exploit any chances of closer cooperation with Aşgabat, not least within the energy sector. Thus, both the US and the EU are stepping up their contacts with Turkmenistan. However, it is Russian president Putin that, by all appearances, stands as victor in the struggle over relations with Aşgabat. Putin was the first to single out Berdimuhammedov for support and thereby Moscow seems to be succesful in safeguarding Russian interests - primarily the 25 year gas accord with Turkmenistan, signed in 2003. By supporting Berdimuhammedow, Putin seeks a successor who will honour the committments so crucial for Russian interests in and influence over the region. However, also China lurks about in the scenery, trying to secure a recent deal to build a gas pipeline to meet the country's increasing energy demand.

To sum up, it is in the interests of both domestic and international actors to maintain stability in Turkmenistan, almost whatever it takes. It is likely that internal interests of the current regime will be strong enough to exercise oligarchic dictatorship with the silent consent of the international community. If worst comes to worst, Nyýazow can always be used as a common scapegoat for the country's lack of progress. Such acts of "turkmenbashing" however seem distant in today's Turkmenistan.

Russia Goes Ballistic over Missiles

A recent US proposal to deploy a ballistic missile defence system to NATO-members Poland and the Czech Republic, has provoked stern reactions from Moscow and citizens of the concerned countries alike, Washington Post reports. The US motive is to create a missile defence shield for Eastern Europe, protecting the region from attacks of "rogue states" such as Iran or North Korea.

The US plans are to place 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar tracking station in the Czech Republic with the purpose to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It thus appears that this would add a strategic perspective to the sort of tactical theatre missile defence that is currently within technical reach. The Bush administration perceives the initiative primarily as part of its international war on terrorism rather than as an element of regional security.

In contrast to this, Moscow regards these plans as directed also against Russia. In response, the Russian MFA stated that "the creation of a U.S. European anti-missile base can only be regarded as a substantial reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe." It is "a mistaken step with negative consequences for international security."

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) - commonly known as Star Wars - was one of the driving forces for the Soviet Union's defeat in the international arms race. Moscow then neither had the technique nor the resources to compete in developing a corresponding system. Star Wars thus presented a new phase in the arms race that would potentially render the soviet strategic advantage obsolete at a time when the USSR already was at loggerheads with maintaining the existing balance of power. Ever since, any proposal of this sort has hit a sore spot in Moscow.

To counter further NATO initiatives, then Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, in 2001 proposed a common solution for a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, instead of a NATO national missile defence (NMD), aimed at protecting the alliance's European members. NATO reactions were lukewarm, portraying the Russian proposal as an attempt to "drive a wedge between the US and its European allies."

In this context, it is interesting to note that this time the US proposal is on a bilateral level, viz. between Washington and Warzaw and Prague respectively and not as part of the NATO collective defence system. The feelings in Bruxelles and among NATO-members are that such a US unilateralist approach would further threaten to undermine the Atlantic alliance, adding to Washington's tendency towards multilateralism à la carte.

Also, popular protests against the US plans have begun to mount in both Poland and the Czech Republic. Recent reminiscences of Soviet bases in these countries remain a mental obstacle for people to accept foreign military elements on their soil. Fears are also rising that hosting an anti-missile defence system would rather make the Poles and the Czechs targets for attack than act as a means of protection. Still, many observers on both sides of the Atlantic also regard this as yet another US test of allegiance for the European states with the greatest debt of gratitude for their independence and security.

What stands out as perhaps the most peculiar part of Washintgton's proposal is how the Republican administration has revived one of its pet projects of the 1980s. Since then, the Star Wars/SDI remains an extremely expensive and technically cumbersome project with little proof of relevance as to its efficiency in countering current threats. That Europe would form the primary target of a potential Iranian or North Korean ICBM-attack is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future for two obvious reasons. First, Europe poses no threat to either Iran or North Korea. Targeting Europe would thus only serve as a threat by proxy towards the United States. Secondly, if Iran or North Korea would indeed develop nuclear arms and ICBMs to carry them, the primary target would be the US and its regional allies in the vicinity of Teheran and Pyongyang - not a distant and inoffensive Europe.

Why is it then that the US wants these weapons in Europe? Using the terrorist threat as a pretext for toppling the nuclear balance in Europe, as Moscow holds, simply seems too far-fetched. Instead, the simple truth may be sought in the minds of Bush & co. Reviving Star Wars is like kissing the sleeping beauty. The beauty of it is that you know what to expect as long as she lies there sound asleep. What you do not know is who she will become when awoken. Still, it simply is too tempting to resist.

Update: See also Peter Finn's update on the issue in the February 21 issue of the Washington Post.

Making Frontpage News in Norway

A story partly based on a recent piece on Borat and Kazakhstan published on this weblog, today made the frontpage of the Norwegian daily Aftenposten - Norway's second largest newspaper with a circulation of about 300,000 copies.

The real argument of the Aftenposten story is that the comedian Sacha Baron Cohen has to periodically invent new role characters. Once roles such as Ali G or now Borat become publicly known, Cohen can no longer use them, as people know that their legs are being pulled. The absurd and very politically incorrect ideas that he expresses, provoke either support or confusion, but very seldom dissent. Politicians, businessmen or ordinary people are thus made out as fools or spineless.

As for the Aftenposten story, it ends with the argument on this blog, that Borat may actually be doing Kazakhstan a favour, by belittlement of problems with the oppressive and corrupt Nazarbayev regime. Can really a country with people as funny as Borat be all that bad when even the most despicable dictator appears to be a mere clown? Well, only the western public can judge, as "Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan" is not likely to hit the cinemas of Astana and Almaty.

Five CIS Cities in Top Ten Polluted Places

Five out of the ten most polluted places in the world this year are to be found in the Former Soviet Union, according to a list published by the Blacksmith Institute. No, it's no beauty paget, even if the list is an annually recurrent event, shedding light upon some of the greatest man-made environmental disasters in history.

According to the UN, 20% of premature deaths in the world may be ascribed to environmental factors. "There are some towns where life expectancy approaches medieval rates, where birth defects are the norm not the exception. In other places children's asthma rates are measured above 90%, or mental retardation is endemic. In these places, life expectancy may be half that of the richest nations", the report states.

In Russian Dzerzhinsk, average life expectancy among men is 42 years and among women 47 years. This was one of the places where the USSR produced its chemical weapons during the Cold War. Norilsk houses the world's largest nickel producer, and life expectancy for factory workers is 10 years below the Russian average. In Rudnaya Pristan and Dalnegorsk, lead poisoning is endemic due to emissions from local lead mines. Levels of lead in children's blood are between 8 and 20 times higher than maximum allowable rates in the US.

Mailuu-Suu in Kyrgyzstan presents some of the highest figures of nuclear radiation in the world, due to the waste from soviet time uranium mining. The situation may also worsen as earthquakes threaten to negatively affect containment of radioactive waste in this area of high seismic activity. The situation sets the security of large tracts of Central Asia in peril, while the Mailuu-Suu river might carry great quantities of highly radioactive sediments to the Ferghana valley - the region's most densely populated area.

The most well-known place on the list is probably Chernobyl in Ukraine. Even 20 years after the accident, radioactivy is on such high levels to remain life hazardous during lengthy exposure. The 19 mile exclusion zone remains uninhabitable, and the number of thyroid cancer cases among people in exposed areas is on highly elevated. Even if efforts are made to improve the environmental situation, there are fears of a new disaster if the sarcophagus - the concrete inclosure of the reactor - collapses, or if nuclear waste leaks into the groundwater.

That the effects of soviet reign laid waste to large tracts of the Eurasian continent should be commonplace knowledge nowadays. There should thus be no wonder that five out of the ten most polluted places in the world are located in the former USSR. Still, have current rulers of these states learnt from historical mistakes? No, in many cases not. Recently, ideas of turning the rivers of Siberia are again becoming fashionable in both Russia and Kazakhstan. The last time this was tried - during the 1960s "Virgin Lands" project - it led to an environmental disaster of epic proportions. It seems that even the most obvious is beyond reach for these people to fathom. Perhaps, the truth of the matter is that too many political leaders in these countries simply do not care, come what come may.

Georgia's Always On My Mind

Is the current xenophobic campaign against Georgians in Russia run by Putin and the Kremlin? Much indicates that this is actually the case. Since Moscow launched its sanctionist policy towards Georgia earlier this year, living conditions have become next to unbearable for many Georgians living in Russia, making them the new "Jews" of Russia.

Police harassment and controls of Georgians have become commonplace during the last month. Even people with work and residence permits, who have lived for decades in Russia, are now experiencing the repercussions of the current Russian-Georgian crisis. A growing number of Georgians are also forcibly expelled from Russia. Popular sentiments about Georgia unavoidably also reflect upon its nationals living in Russia. So, how does Kremlin's attitude influence the Russian people?

Putin and several leading politicians consistently treat Georgia with great rancour. Recently, Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov said: "banditry in Georgia has taken on a nationwide scale." Following up on this statement, the state run All Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies asked Russians whether they agreed with Ivanov.

The result was a devastating 61% positive replies - that "Georgia is a bandit state." Only 29% disagreed. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, attitudes against Georgians were even worse with 78% agreeing with Ivanov. In the rest of Russia, results spanned from 55-61% among respondents. Also, 40% advocated "an economic blockade against Georgia and taking other tough measures in response to the Georgian authorities' unfriendly policy toward Russia." Additionally, 37% backed expulsion of Georgians without residence permit from Russia, 20% advocated a break in transports and postal services, and 20% thought that Russia should severe diplomatic relations with Tbilisi. In contrast, only 30% wanted to normalise bilateral relations and de-escalate the belligerent emotions now running high. A minuscule 5% held that no measures at all should be taken against Georgia.

There are, regrettably, no prior figures to compare with, but popular sentiments against Georgians have never seemed very negative in the past. However, over the last half year, Georgia and Georgians have suddenly become the pariah of Russia, almost on the level of Chechens when hearing Putin and other politicians talking on the subject. That an opinion poll thus takes a statement of a vice Premier as its starting-point is probably no coincidence. The Kremlin both wants to demonstrate that it leads the way and that it has the support of the people in this policy. Admittedly, the particular poll is on Georgia and not Georgians. However, it is quite evident, that these negative attitudes are reflected also on Georgian nationals - assumably to almost the same negative levels - when leading politicians practically portray Russia and Georgia on the verge of war.

The development of Moscow's policy towards the "near abroad" over the last 2-3 years - since the coloured revolutions - contrasts to Russia's prior policy. Previous policy was based on the understanding that the costs for an active policy in post-soviet space were too great in comparison to what could be achieved in other areas. It was a policy of droit de regard and not a droit de suite for an empire creating states by oppression. As Russia is again claiming real influence over post-soviet space, one must ask if we are heading back in the USSR. Surprisingly, it is not difficult to imagine Putin telling the 'ignorant peoples' now back in the fold: "Hey, You don't know how lucky you are, boy."

Censorship or Moderation?

Over the past few months, Blogger's comment moderation has not worked properly with this blog. Thus, e-mail notification has temporarily been down, why a lot of comments have remained unpublished due to ignorance of their mere existence.

As this backlog now has been detected, all comments that are not abusive or off topic have been published. Thus, apologies are in order. However, I reserve the right to moderate comments also in the future, in order to safeguard the quality of contents and to prevent trolls. Censorship or moderation? Well, whichever one it is - that is up to the readers to decide.

Один день Владимира Владимировича

On this particular morning, October 7, Vladimir Vladimirovich woke at nine in his native city of St. Petersburg. He had had a good night's sleep, and felt relieved not to hear the bells of the Spassky tower, as he had become used to during his six years in the Kremlin. Today was his 54th birthday, and he had decided not to let the soft sound of his Swiss alarm clock wake him to the daily chores as president of Russia. All in all, it was a lovely day and he looked forward to dinner in the evening with a small set of his old friends from the Petersburg days. For once, the day was to be spent in leisure.

For long, he had been sick with the never-ending monotony of ruling his country. Most of all, he would like to be left alone, and during the past few years he had actually succeeded in getting more free-time. Still, there were papers to be signed, people to meet, and decisions to be made. Somehow, he never seemed to rid himself of the constant responsibilities that his associates burdened him with. Not on this day, though. Today, at least, he was not to be disturbed by such petty details. After all, it was his birthday.

Today, he was to be among friends, celebrating him on his achievements of the year passed. Friends? Well, that was perhaps bringing it too far. Vladimir Vladimirovich did not believe in friendship. Connections, contacts, and acquaintances - that was another thing. They were conditions for survival - a lesson he had been taught from early childhood. His experience was that friendship and betrayal go in pairs, so he understood that "friends" were simply people he could feel comfortable and at ease with. However, he would never allow anyone to deceive or betray him. If so, he would not blink for a second before putting down anyone posing a threat to him - friend of foe alike. This was simply the nature of things in the country where he had been brought up, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought.

Well, such problems were at least none of his concern today. He was determined to celebrate his birthday in relative peace and quiet. Sure, there were to be some official celebrations. This was good and proper. However, some were excessive and Vladimir Vladimirovich silently jeered at upcoming Chechen celebrations. Some 60,000 people had been ordered to the Akhmat Kadyrov Square in central Grozny to sing the Russian national anthem in his honour. This was really bringing matters too far, but Vladimir Vladimirovich also saw it as an act of desperation from Chechen Premier Ramzan Kadyrov.

Kadyrov knew how much the Kremlin despised him, and this was obviously his desperate way of paying his respects to power in Moscow - the same power that could bring him down if he would go too far in his more commercial activities. Kadyrov had just turned 30, and thus was now eligible for the Chechen presidency. That he had received a brand new Ferrari for his birthday said it all. Just imagine going about in a Ferrari in the ruins and rubble of Grozny. It was only a question of time now how long president Alkhanov would still serve as a front for Kadyrov's power. Still, it was quite a convenient arrangement, letting the Chechen war lord run his murky operations in exchange for relative stability in the renegade republic. It all resembled franchising, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought to himself. Kadyrov and his stooges got to use the "Russia brand" in exchange for calm in Russia's soft under-belly.

However, Vladimir Vladimirovich actively distrusted the Kadyrov family. Already the father had meant trouble to Moscow, and some people in the Kremlin had even talked about having him shot. However, this never proved necessary as the Chechens themselves solved this problem by blowing him to pieces. Vladmir Vladimirovich expected that also the son would eventually meet with a similar fate, so he had been opposed to getting rid of the mafioso-like son. Things would settle for the best in the end, and in the meantime those terrorist Chechens might as well be ruled by a pathologically insane mafioso. It only served them right, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought.

But why think of such dull things on one's birthday? After all, it had been a rather good week. At last, he had got the excuse he needed to really pull the thumbscrews on those difficult Georgians, and he knew that his people was behind him in throwing those abominable Caucasians out of mother Russia. Propaganda was really a marvellous thing. It is true, some protested against it. The ban on Georgian wines and mineral waters earlier in the year had not gone unnoticed, but now next to nobody reacted. Well, some of those half-crazed old soviet dissidents and intellectuals had called for demonstrations in support of Georgia and some writers had composed a rather hilarious protest letter that Vladmir Vladimirovich well knew would pass unnoticed. Who cared about those old people nowadays? Old-age pensioners in their seventies and eighties thinking that they made a difference. It was simply pathetic and of no greater consequence to power. By the way, who read those small newspapers that were still independent? He knew that 85% of the people had television as their main source of information on what was going on in the country, and as for the TV-stations, he controlled every last one of them.

Vladimir Vladimirovich spent the day doing as little as possible. How nice it was to be relieved of one's responsibilities, he thought. Then, as he turned on the four o'clock news, the breaking story was that a journalist had been killed in Moscow. Well, who was she anyway, this Anna Politkovskaya? A journalist of Novaya Gazeta - a paper with a circulation of little over 100,000 copies, sparsely distributed outside of Moscow. Still, she had been a nuisance to him abroad for the duration of his presidency, in fact ever since he initiated the second Chechen war in 1999. Who was she to meddle into the affairs of state? And besides, she was not even Russian. Typically, her parents had been Ukrainian, and as events had again demonstrated but a couple of years back, Ukrainians were not to be trusted. Anyway, the only thing this journalist had accomplished was to tarnish the image of Russia in the West - something the Kremlin had spent millions of dollars to improve just this year alone.

He realised that his long-coveted trip to Germany might be shadowed by this event, but still he was looking forward to visiting Dresden, where he had spent so many happy days of his youth. He knew that he would probably have to comment the murder somehow, but it was best to keep it to a minimum, not to be dragged into some discussion he could not control. As for the Russian public, he could simply keep quiet and let the whole affair pass by as unnoticed as possible. Something else would soon pop up, drawing the attention of domestic and international media away from the Politkovskaya murder. With a little luck, the murder might be pinned on that Kadyrov character, making him a little less cocky in relation to the Kremlin. It was best that such people never felt safe from Moscow's power to punish, Vladimir Vladimirovich thought.

His thoughts were interrupted by a soft knock on the door: Time for dinner. As he had suspected, the evening did not present any great surprises. Towards the early hours of the night, Vladimir Vladimirovich returned to his room in high spirits. A bit drowsy, he decided to go to bed. After all, it was a day tomorrow too. Putin fell asleep contentedly. How succesful a day had it not been. He really had not had to do anything. His birthday celebrations had been fine. Another annoying journalist was no more. Georgians were thrown out of the motherland. And best of all, that despicable Kadyrov character had been twice humiliated - by his pathetic show of faith to Putin and by having the journalist murder pinned on him. Next week, Putin was going to Germany. That would serve as a welcome pause from monotony. Another day had passed by, shadowed by nothing, an almost happy day. Three thousand four hundred and seventy two such days, from morning till evening. Those two extra days were on account of leap years... It had just been yet one day in the life of Vladimir Vladimirovich.

A Dagmar Cross to Carry?

Two weeks ago, Russian empress Dagmar was reburied in the St. Petersburg Peter and Paul's Cathedral, in accordance to her wishes. She was mother of the last Russian emperor, Nicholas II, and married to his father, Alexander III. However, the funeral service, attended by high dignitaries, did not pass without some turbulence. The crowd around the coffin was so great, that a young Danish diplomat actually fell into the grave with a big crash.

Empress Dagmar, or Maria Fyodorovna as was her Russian name, sought refuge in her native country of Denmark after the 1917 Russian revolution. She lived there for the remainder of her life, never accepting the death of her son, Tsar Nicholas II, and his family. As she now was reburied beside her husband and son, her remains were followed to the final resting-place by representatives of the Royal houses of Denmark and the UK.

The accident at her grave may well provoke some smiles, but going out with a bang is rather in line with the vivacious ways of the late Tsar family. Named after the 13th century Queen Dagmar of Denmark, she - as Maria Fyodorovna of Russia - tried to live up to the philantropic ideals of her medieval namesake. To this day, many Danes carry a Dagmar Cross round their necks in commemoration of their benign queen of the middle ages.

As for the Danish diplomat who, by an annoying hitch, ended up in the imperial grave, he survived the accident physically - if not mentally - unscathed. The poor man will probably have this Dagmar cross to carry for the remainder of his diplomatic career. Still, the Danish sense of humour and good-naturedness may well prove a consolation to him in the long run. Dagmar herself, would probably have burst out into laughter if she had known, thinking the pitfall at her grave a nice note to sign off with.