Ukraine: New Government Underway?

Ukraine may eventually get a new government this week. Seven weeks after the March 26 parliamentary elections, Timoshenko again declares that she stands as victor and new Prime Minister.

Thus, Timoshenko would reconquer the position she lost last year, by forming a coalition with Yushchenko's Our Ukraine, and Moroz' Socialist Party. In combination, the three parties control 243 out of the 450 seat in the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, as opposed to the 186 seat of Yanukovich's Party of Regions.

Whereas such a coalition seems more natural than e.g. an unlikely government between Timoshenko and Yanukovich or Yushchenko and Yanukovich, it would not be an easy path to tread. Rivalries between Timoshenko, Yushchenko, and Moroz have previously led to politicial crises in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, and this may become a recurrent phenomenon also with a new orange government.

The road map that has led the way to, what could now become a new government, has created a common platform for political action between the three parties. Issues at stake are relations with Russia, WTO-membership, Ukraine's potential accession to Nato, as well as privatisations of state businesses and agriculture. Governemt talks have also been compared to reuniting a family after a lengthy and difficult divorce.

A wild card in negotiations is obviously also ramifications of the new constitution, which entered into force on January 1 this year. Limiting the powers of the president, parliamentary power increases, e.g. by the right to appoint Prime Minister.

According to the current coalition bid, Timoshenko's bloc will get half the ministerial posts, Our Ukraine a third, and the Socialists the remaining cabinet seats. It is also said that Moroz would become Parliament Speaker. How the actual division of the spoils will be in the end, however remains to be seen. Setbacks have been manifold up till now, so a repetition should not be ruled out, although the possibilities for renewed negotiations and solutions are quickly narrowing. According to the constitution, a government must be formed within 60 days of the elections. Today, 53 days have passed since 26 March, leaving a mere week to form a government. Time is simply running out, so the choice is to deal or die.

At the core, coalition talks reflect a struggle between mighty interests over profits from the Ukrainian economy. Despite the progress won by the Orange Revolution, corruption is still endemic to Ukrainian society and politics, and this also applies to the parties that now might form a new government. It is essentially a question of who will get the billions of dollars that end up in the pockets of private interests, not least from the transit of Russian gas to the EU - now controled by the RosUkrEnergo company.

As stakes are so high in getting a "fair" share of these proceeds, there is no wonder that the political struggle is so tough. Thus, forming a new government for these parties means to pay up or lose out on one's cut. To lose is not an option for either of the three parties, which perhaps is the main reason why a government eventually must form. The alternative would be to hand power and proceeds to Yanukovich, which definitely would leave the coalition partners with naught. Barring Yanukovich from power is thus what unites Timoshenko, Yushchenko, and Moroz.

However, there are still a few "buts" before a new government is in place. The greatest obstacle is still Yushchenko's opposition against accepting Timoshenko as Prime Minister. Thus, as news of a government deal became public on Monday, a spokesman of Our Ukraine was quick to declare that the party would suspend talks in response to Timoshenko's statement that she would become Prime Minister and Moroz Parliament Speaker. Instead, Our Ukraine launched an unexpected candidacy of the Socialist leader Moroz as Prime Minister. The rationale would be that parliament might not want to accept Timoshenko as Prime Minister, which then would severely complicate any further possibilities of reaching a common solution.

Our Ukraine's stern reaction was not unexpected. The party has repeatedly characterised Timoshenko's ambitions for the Premiership as an "ultimatum" in negotiations. Sooner or later, however, this is an argument that will not be taken seriously by anyone. The question now is, if the three potential partners have not reached a point of no return in negotiations. Having more or less struck a deal, Our Ukraine can no longer turn its back to agreeing on a solution. With almost two months since elections, the orange forces are reaching a decisive stage in negotiations when they must either unite or part. In the end, Yushchenko must most likely face realities and drink the bitter cup Timoshenko offers him, for the simple reason that he is running out of options. The alternative would be to part from power, if not from the presidency.

It is now becoming painstakingly clear that Yushchenko can no longer perform a play to the gallery, and must admit that he plays too high a game. Now it's do or die - neck or nothing, and Yushchenko must swallow his pride by accepting Timoshenko, while next week might be too late. It remains to see whether Yushchenko will rise to the challenge or extend his role as election loser to that of lame duck as president. It all lies in Yushchenko's hands and how he decides will seal his fate in the history of Ukraine. Time is running out for him to show that he believes in, knows how, and can make a change for his country.

Ukraine, government, Timoshenko, Yushchenko, Moroz

Financial Times Special on Georgia

Financial Times deals with Georgia in its May 2006 World Report. It contains among others an interview with president Mikheil Saakashvili, and various pieces on essential political and economic issues. Great emphasis is thus put on reform versus corruption: "While liberal reforms and a drive against corruption have brought the former Soviet republic back from the brink, the country is still trying to fulfil its potential," FT writes. The full list of contents is:

• Young country looks to the west
• Interview: Mikheil Saakashvili
• Separatists: Conflicts undermine state’s integrity
• Aromaprodukt: Natural fruit yields organic growth
• Economics: Rooting out corruption is priority
• Privatisation: More trouble-free sales are required
• Bank of Georgia: London share offer to lead the way
• Winemaking: Birthplace of wine suffers from success
• Badri Japaridze: Banker battles with liquid assets

Georgia, politics, economy, Financial Times, Saakashvili

Cheburashka Goes Japan

Cheburashka - a favourite animated figure from the soviet 1970's is about to have his comeback on the filmscreen. "After stealing hearts at the Turin Winter Olympics, the famed Soviet cartoon charater is about to become a movie star in Japan," Moscow Times reports on Friday. The question now is whether the heritage of a cult character like Cheburashka may be preserved in a contemporary version by a non-Russian moviemaker.

For the generation brought up during the 1970's, Cheburashka and his accordion-playing companion Krokodil Gena, represent reminiscences of a happy childhood. The story of the small and unknown tropical animal - Cheburashka - that by chance is carried off from the jungle to Moscow in a crate of oranges, and his friendship with the lonely and not always so wise Gena, has fascinated generations of children. As any good adventure, there is an enemy as well - in the form of the mischievous but rather harmless Starukha Shapoklyak.

Cheburashka first saw daylight in the 1966 childrens' novel "Crocodile Gena and His Friends" by Eduard Uspensky. As Cherburashka now turns 40, he is about to have his comeback as a major moviestar - this time in Japan. In 2001, the old Soyuzmultfilm cartoons, produced from 1969 up till the 1980's, were shown in Japan, attracting great popularity. However, Cheburashka's real breakthrough came in connection with the Turin 2006 Winter Olympics, where he acted as mascot - though in white winter fur - for the Russian team.

Now a major Japanese film company has purchased the screen rights of Cheburashka to make it into a major motion picture. So now Cheburashka fans worldwide will live in great anticipation until the new Cheburaska is launched in a year or so from now. Still, one wonders if the Japanese will be able to live up to expectations among those who still have the soviet original cartoons as a point of reference - not to speak of the anecdotes. Images of cult phenomena like Cheburashka are not easily altered without public outrage. Only a couple of years ago, a new translation of Karlson na kryshe aroused massive protests in Russia. It remains to be seen how well the Japanese succeed in conveying that special character that so many associate with Cheburashka - a soviet childhood hero.

Soviet Union, Japan, animation, cartoon, movie, Cheburashka, Gena

CIS: Halfling Joins While Giants Leave?

Last Thursday 4 May, breakaway Georgian republic of Abkhazia declared its intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, Interfax reports. Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev were quick. Both Georgia and Ukraine now seriously consider leaving the CIS.

Abkhazi leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that: "Abkhazia's priorities are membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States and further rapprochement with Russia." Last August, Bagapsh openly confirmed his ambition of "Abkhazia's secession from Georgia and de facto merger with Russia." Now he sets the goal to join the CIS by the end of the year, but "Abkhazia's further political and economic rapprochement with Russia is the central issue. We remain adherent to our proposals on Abkhazia's associated membership of Russia," Bagapsh concluded, according to Interfax.

Reactions from Tbilisi and Kiyev
Bagapsh's declaration was immediately met with stern reaction from Georgia and Ukraine. Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his government to assess whether "it is worth remaining in the CIS," Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. He went on to say that the conflict in Abkhazia back in 1993 had "forced Georgia to sign the declaration of joining the CIS." Now Georgia is seriously contemplating to leave the CIS.

On Friday, Ukraine also for the first time officially declared that the country might leave the CIS. Kiyev has for long been disappointed with how the organisation works. Thus, speaking about a Ukrainian withdrawal from the CIS, Yushchenko's foreign policy advisor, Kostyantyn Tymoshenko, said that "if there are no results, the question arises." During last week's Vilnius Forum, president Yushchenko also characterised integration with the EU and NATO his main foreign policy objective, according to NG. Such ambtions might prove incompatible with remaining a CIS-member.

A future for the CIS?
This puts the future of the CIS even more in question than previously has been the case. Today, few of its members - not even Russia - have any great hope in the organisation. The original split in perceptions of its purpose, viz. political as opposed to economic cooperation, remains. The political aim is epitomised by the CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed by six countries - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. Turning to CIS economic cooperation, it can only be characterised as a resounding failure. Thus, demands were raised to find alternative to the CIS in lieu of its defunct economic record.

GUUAM instead of CIS?
In 1997, GUUAM was founded by the CIS-members not party to the Collective Security Treaty, with the single exception of Turkmenistan. GUUAM comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (1999), Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Its aim was to fulfil the original purpose of the CIS by economic cooperation and free trade. Excluding Russia, GUUAM has remained on the second echelon of post-soviet foreign policy, and the organisation has been careful not to portray itself as a counterbalance to members of the Collective Security Treaty, although it seems evident that so is the case. Georgia and Ukraine have also been GUUAM's most eager members in pursuing a regional policy independent from Russian influence.

Borjomi - a way forward?
To take the matter further, Saakashvili and Yushchenko, last August, issued the Borjomi Declaration, calling on their neighbours to unite "efforts to turn the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region into a sea of democracy, stability and security, to make it a fully integrated region of Europe and of the Democratic and Atlantic community." In Moscow's eyes, Borjomi's outright western orientation was seen as yet another attempt to insulate Russia and curve its influence over the near abroad. Whereas there may be some truth to Moscow's contentions on this point, one should however not shy away from the paramount fact of the matter: Russia and the CIS have little to offer in comparison to the fruits of western integration. That Georgia and Ukraine are the first to publicly raise their concerns whether to remain CIS-members should therefore come as no surprise, as they have seized the opportunity of western integration offered to them by their coloured revolutions.

The Abkhazi question
All in all, one must conclude that there is more to the issue than simply a statement by a renegade republic leader. As for Abkhazia, the region broke away from Georgia already in 1992. This separatist republic remains unrecognised by the international community, and there is no secret that Abkhazia would not survive long without Russia's backing. For long, Moscow has remained ambivalent on how to deal with the issue. As the UN, the EU and the OSCE insist that Abkhazia is part of Georgia, Russia has been reluctant to recognise its de facto independence. Instead, Abkhazia has oscillated between outright independence and associate membership in the Russian Federation. Today, most Abkhazis hold Russian citizenship, facilitating a potential future incorporation into Russia. This is also what Georgia claims is Moscow's long-term ambition, making the issue an international bilateral conflict instead of an internal secessionist conflict. So, is it a mere coincidence that a statement by some half-wit chieftain of a secessionist region would seem to shake the foundations of the entire CIS? Why should Abkhazia's wholly unrealistic ambitions to join the CIS spark off such stern reactions from both Georgia and Ukraine?

A pretext for divorce?

First, it is beyond doubt that the Abkhazi CIS-ambition is utterly senseless. It would presuppose Abkhazi independence, and even then CIS-members Georgia and Ukraine might still easily bar Abkhazia from membership. Second, one should ask why such a ridiculous statement is made specifically at this point in time, when the dividends of post-soviet space are are about to be paid to either Russia or the West. That Abkhaz leader Bagapsh's statement coincided with US vice president Cheney's critique of Russia at the Vilnius conference last week, shows that there is more to this than first expected. Third, the declared western orientation of Georgia and Ukraine - reiterated in Vilnius - serves only to underline the basic contradiction in clinging on to an imagined union by a post-soviet Commonwealth. From Moscow's point of view, the CIS is to little avail as long as the organisation cannot be used as an instrument for Russia's de facto power and influence over most CIS-countries. So, both parties want out. Georgia and Ukraine want to go west. Russia wants to rid itself of difficult CIS-members to better control the organisation. Fourth, were Ukraine and Georgia to leave the CIS, remaining members would, in the process, be left to the best of their abilities to deal with Russian dominance over the CIS.

To conclude, it is remarkable how willingly Georgia and Ukraine swallowed Russia's bait - hook, line and sinker. Provided that considerations to other CIS-members do not prevail, it appears that Ukraine and Georgia will go west while the rest are left to their own devices. Going separate ways in concord is no loss. What such a split of the CIS may constitute, however, is part of a division of the spoils between Russian and US influence over post-soviet space, at a time when their strategic partnership seems to have come to the end of the road. Then, one might ask how much the sovereign choice of the nations and peoples of Central Asia is worth to the great powers of global politics. Would a halfling state join and make the giants leave, it might also well constitute the moral choice of halflings and not of the great giants. That is perhaps also the lesson of our times, that when power talks morale steps aside: "Erst kommt das Freßen, dann kommt die Moral." It remains to be seen how Great the Game will be played, and with what appetite.

CIS, Georgia, Abkhazia, Ukraine, Russia, GUUAM, Borjomi

Russia-Georgia: Turning Wine into Water

Moscow is now turning from wine to water in Russia's ongoing trade war with Georgia. As of today, Saturday 7 May, Georgia's flagship mineral water - Borjomi - is banned from the Russian market, BBC reports. Borjomi mineral water is Georgia's largest export commodity, and - as with wine - some 80% goes to Russia. A little more than a month ago, Russia banned the imports of Georgian wines. It has now become apparent, that Moscow is waging a trade war against Tbilisi to stifle the weak Georgian economy.

As with the wine ban a month ago, Russia's chief epidemiologist, Gennady Onishchenko, blames it on failing purity standards. This comes as somewhat of a surprise to Russian consumers, as the Borjomi trademark has been one of purity ever since tsarist times. For some reason, Borjomi is for long renowned among Russians as the best bottled water on the market, although most western customers would shed it due to its high salinity.

Since Georgia's rose revolution, the city of Borjomi has become somewhat of a symbol internationally of the new and independent Georgia. Thus, last August, the leaders of the coloured revolutions - Georgia's Saakashvili and Ukraine's Yushchenko - signed the Borjomi declaration aiming at European and Euro-Atlantic integration to the entire "Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian" area. To the Kremlin, the declaration was seen as anti-Russian and a challenge to Moscow's influence over post-soviet space. Furthermore, Borjomi is also a candidate for the 2014 Winter Olympics, which but a few years back would have been next to impossible. That the Borjomi mineral water has become the next victim in Russia's trade war on Georgia should therefore come as no surprise.

Since Moscow's campaign against Georgian products began, the government in Tbilisi has accused Russia of waging economic warfare against Georgia. Despite Russian assurances that this is not the case, a trade war must now be regarded as a fact to Russians and international observers alike. As for Borjomi's faithful Russian consumers, they might well conclude that "maybe it’s time to send it all to the devil and go to Kislovodsk."

Russia, Georgia, conflict, trade, water, Borjomi

Lukashenka Wins Bad Democracy Award

On 2 May, Belarus president Lukashenka won the Sixth openDemocracy Award for his great achievements and ingenuity in creating his special "brutal brand of paternalism" and for his excellent parenting methods in fostering the youth of his country to the right values of a just and righteous society.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka is the first leader of a post-soviet state that has won this great honour, and he thereby joins the ranks of such illustrious personalities as Silvio Berlusconi, John Howard, George W Bush, Meles Zenavi, and Abu Laban.

Above all, Lukashenka's paternalistic batka image impressed immensely on the jury of voters - possibly in combination with his splendid implementation of ideological teaching to the new generation of Belarus. One cannot but feel an irresistable urge to extend one's heartfelt congratulations to Lukashenka for this new victory in leading the people of Belarus towards a bright and promising future. By setting this example, he epitomises the true meaning of his people's aspirations: "Together towards a strong and prosperous Belarus!"

Belarus, Lukashenko, openDemocracy, bad democracy award

Russia: Protests Stop Moscow Gay Party

On Sunday, right-wing protesters in Moscow stopped a gay party in the centre of the city, BBC reports. A gathering of skinheads and elderly women amassed outside the club entrance hindering and threatening party organisers to go through with the party.

The news comes as a cold shower to the Russian gay movement, just weeks before local authorities are to rule whether to allow the first Moscow gay pride parade. Mayor Luzhkov and many other influential politicians have previosly tried to ban the parade on 27 May, attracting international protests by doing so for violating the right civil rights. As a definite ruling is pending, Sunday's protest must be seen as an attempt to influence the decision whether to allow Moscow pride or not. It also serves as testimony to the influence of extremist views in Russia in comparison to advocates of tolerance. It remains to be seen whether the gay parade will be carried through and if so, whether yesterday's action will transform into violent protests on 27 May.

Russia, Moscow, gay, pride, parade, protests, extremism

Poles Take Russia to Court Over Katyn

Families of the 1940 Katyn massacre victims have brought charges against Russia to the European Court of Human Rights, due to Moscow's denial to further investigate the soviet executions of some 22,000 Polish officers during WWII. Their demand is full Russian disclosure of the truth about the massacre. Katyn to this day remains a sore in Polish-Russian relations, and the subject of recurrent quarrels between Warzaw and Moscow. Now Katyn once more brings the two countries at loggerheads.

Earlier this Spring, Russian president Putin condemned the soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czeckoslovakia in 1968, during official visits to Budapest and Prague. This display of statesmanship raised Polish expectations that Putin would be the man to eventually rid Russia of this sour grape in relations to Poland, by disclosure of all facts on Katyn. Instead, the Poles were once more let down, which now has made them bring matters to a head.

Moscow assumed responsibility for the Katyn massacre already in 1990, and initiated an investigation into the matter, which was concluded at the end of 2004. As documentation was to be handed over to Polish authorities earlier this year, it turned out that only half the papers would be available to the Poles. The rest was Russian "state secrets" - effectively classifying all records on the people that carried out the massacre. As a consequence, any chances for Poles to obtain justice in the case were eradicated.

As opportunities for legal redress by the Russian judicial system then were further explored, this was rebuffed by the Russian Chief Military Prosecutor. He claimed the case had been closed as there was no evidence of genocide in the Katyn killings, why the normal statute of limitation for murder had precluded any further investigation on the responsible for the killings. This really made things heat up.

On March 6, Polish presidential spokesman, Maciej Lopinski, characterised the Russian statement as "shocking" while it failed to recognise Katyn as genocide - devaluing the massacre to simple homicide. For Poles, this was tantamount to a renewed Russian denial that those killed in Katyn were victims of Stalinist repression. The presidential spokesman concluded by stating that: "Truth on Katyn is paramount to our relations."

The affair produced a public and political outcry in Poland. As the Polish parliament - the Sejm - commemorated the 65th anniversary of Katyn on 23 March, it passed a resolution demanding "that Russia recognize the 1940 Katyn massacre and publish the names of its surviving perpetrators." It further said that "only a full disclosure of the truth and a condemnation of the war criminals can lead to improved relations between Poland and Russia."

As little was heard from Moscow in response to this, 70 relatives of Katyn victims on Monday 24 April filed a law suit against the Russian state to the European Court of Human Rights. Even though the suit is obviously motivated by current circumstances, the plaintiffs are completely right in bringing the case to Strasbourg, as they now lack other means of legal redress. When the case eventually will be tried a few years from now, it will stir up even more commotion in relations between Warzaw and Moscow. In the meantime, little can be done to improve the situation, as Katyn once more has resurfaced as an outstanding issue.

As for Russia, this is yet another display of bad political judgement. Putin had an opportunity of the decade to demonstrate himself to the world as a true statesman by getting both the soviet invasions of Hungary and Czeckoslovakia, and the Katyn massacre off the agenda for all future. By failing to do the last, the impetus of the former was lost. Putin thus spoiled his chances of gaining a foreign policy triumph that would substantially have improved his tarnished image and authoritarian trackrecord in the eyes of the European public.

In effect, the political value of Russia's condemnation of Hungary '56 and Czeckoslovakia '68 was nullified by overlooking Poland and Katyn. So little was demanded - so much could have been gained. Putin did not seize this opportunity, but let it slip through his fingers. One almost feels sorry for him for this enormous blunder. Was it really so hard to understand, that getting a clean slate in relations to Central Europe demanded 3 out of 3, and that 2 out of 3 would only add up to failure? If not being able to clear up the Katyn mess, Putin obviously should have waited with Budapest and Prague, until the time was ripe also to settle affairs with Warzaw. This was not the case, and one cannot help wondering why. For Putin, it could have become a historical moment of great symbolic significance - something people would have remembered him for. And still, Putin lost his chance. Why choose defeat when triumph is at hand?

Poland, Russia, Katyn, European Court of Human Rights

Belarus - Opposition Leader Jailed

After a press conference in Minsk this morning, Belarus opposition leader and former presidential candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich was arrested by Belarus police. The arrest was due to an "illegal" demonstration in Minsk on Wednesday to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.

According to Interfax, "The Pervomaisky district court in Minsk has sentenced former opposition candidate for the Belarussian presidency Alexander Milinkevich to 15 days of administrative arrest for unsanctioned actions during the Chernobyl Shlyakh procession in Minsk on March 26. Milinkevich is to appeal the judgment."

Milinkevich claims that permission for the demonstration had been granted by authorities. He has also been known for trying to restrain his followers on such occasions, in order not to provoke violent action from the police. Wednesday's demonstration thus seems only a pretext for the authorities to put Milinkevich in jail.

Even though the Chernobyl anniversary all the more has turned into an opposition rally during recent years, it is remarkable that Belarus authorities chooses this opportunity to clamp down on Milinkevich. Perhaps, it testifies to the desperation of the Lukashenka government, which was gravely shocked by the extent of public protests after massive fraud in the recent presidential elections.

Chernobyl is a hotter issue in Belarus than might be expected 20 years after the accident. The people of Belarus have never really learnt the full extent of the accident and the government has put a lid on information on its consequences for the country. Basic information on radiation levels is therefore not available and no real official assessments of the health and environmental effects have become public.

This year, such worries have taken a new turn as Lukashenka wants to repopulate those areas of Belarus that in 1986 were evacuated due to high levels of nuclear radiation. The decision to repopulate worries many people, as nobody really knows how contaminated these vast areas still are. To make people move back thus seems as yet another irresponsible and cynical action by Lukashenka. As long as people are barred from knowledge and information, it is like asking "-Would you like to move to Chernobyl?".

Belarus, Milinkevich, arrest, opposition, Chernobyl

The Chernobyl Myth

Exactly 20 years ago to the minute, reactor 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear plant 100 kilometres north of Kiev exploded in a nuclear meltdown that ever since has remained a symbol of the dangers of nuclear energy and the hypocrisy of the soviet system. Today, the consequences of Chernobyl stand out as the apocalyptic disaster it was in terms of the thousands of victims that it hit and the grave effects on the environment it had. Morever, it has become a symbol in the hands of different actors, which for various reasons use Chernobyl as a myth in their own interest or for higher purposes.

The facts
On the evening of 25 April 1986, tests on Chernobyl reactor number 4 were initiated. While doing so, numerous safety procedures were disregarded. This eventually created a chain reaction that by 1:23 AM in the morning of 26 April, made the reactor go out of control. This caused an explosion blowing off the heavy steel and concrete lid of the reactor that led to high radiation levels in the vicinity of Chernobyl. The immediate death toll from the expolosion numbered 30 people. In the days after the nuclear meltdown, evacuation of some 135,000 people in the surrounding 30-kilometre radius were evacutated. During this time, an enormous radioactive cloud spread across Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and large tracts of Europe. Large quantities of strontium, cesium, and plutionum were spread as radioactive downfall affecting millions of people. The explosion released 30-40 times the radioactivity of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To deal with the accident, thousands of workers and military conscripts were brought or forced to the area around the reactor to cover it with debree, concrete or whatever was at hand, in order to limit further radioactive emission.

In November 1986, an enormous concrete construction was molded - the Sarcophagus - over the wrecked reactor number 4. Some 350,000 tonnes of concrete were used to form a construction intended to last for 30 years. Today, the sarcophagus is gradually falling apart with great cracks in its construction. In December 2000, reactor 3 was definitely closed down, whereas the two other remaining reactors had been put out of use earlier. Some 300,000 people have left the most contaminated areas in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. At least 200 villages have been permanently evacuated due to high levels of nuclear radiation. The level of thyroid cancer has increased dramatically among those affected by the accident, among which have been some 2,000 children.

In 1970, the town of Pripyat was founded to house the hordes of specialits and their families coming to work on the reactor from all over the Soviet Union. With a population of 47,000 with an average age of 26, this was the town most immediately affected by the accident. Today, Pripyat is an abandoned town. This is but a telling example of how entire communities of people - municipal and rural - were disbanded forever to meet with uncertain futures. What today is called "the zone" remains an enormous unpopulated area - with a few exceptions - that for long will remain uninhabited. These are but some simple and concrete facts about the Chernobyl accident and its effects.

The aftermath
The first news of the accident actually reached a western audience. High radioactive levels were registered at Swedish and Finnish nuclear plants already on 28 April. It quickly became apparent that the radioactivity emanated from somewhere within the Soviet Union. Western media immediately picked up the story and in the following days the Soviet government came under great pressure to reveal what had happened.

The first news to a soviet audience came by way of a short TASS-telegramme on 1 May, declaring that there had been an accident with the Chernobyl reactor. One may assume that the date was chosen to drown the message in the 1 May celebrations. It was not until 14 May that Gorbachev informed the public by way of a television statement:

"Good evening, comrades. All of you know that there has been an incredible misfortune --- the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. It has painfully affected the Soviet people, and shocked the international community. For the first time, we confront the real force of nuclear energy, out of control."

The versions
In a recent report on the Chernobyl consequences, Greenpeace claims that the death toll due to the accident has been grossly underestimated, BBC reports. These claims have been forwarded in response to an October 2005 UN report by the World Health Organization (WHO). Whereas the WHO indicates between 4,000 and 9,000 deaths from cancer due to Chernobyl, Greenpeace estimates that the actual number of such deaths will be 93,000. It is obvious that there are different versions. Why?

The myth

There are many myths associated with Chernobyl, as seems to be the case with most major events of historical significance. One of the most widespread is, of course, due to a biblical reference, according to which Chernobyl was to herald the second coming or whatever biblical believers may conjure. Chornobyl is, apparently, wormwood in Ukrainian, why one might suppose this should be taken as an omen of the end of the world. Thus the book of revelations 8:10-11 says:

"And there fell a great star from heaven, burning as it were a lamp, and it fell upon the third part of the rivers, and upon the fountains of waters. And the name of the star is called Wormwood: and the third part of the waters became wormwood; and many men died of the waters, because they were made bitter."

This is, of course, the extreme version, but it serves the purpose of pointing out how a tragedy such as Chernobyl is used by various actors. Suffice it to say, this example is perhaps sufficient to point to the plethora of causes for which Chernobyl has been used.

The most recent example is actually Mikhail Gorbachev, who in 1986 had just become the new, young and energetic leader of the Soviet Union. In an editorial in Daily Star last week, Gorbachev rationalises the demise of the Soviet Union by pointing to the accident: "Chernobyl's meltdown accelerated that of the Soviet Union." Here, one must pause to consider facts and then the causality. Already in 1979, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party received a report pointing to dangerous deficiencies in the Chernobyl nuclear plant. This might have passed as just another of a flood of reports, were it not for the fact that it was signed by Yuri Andropov, who was to become soviet leader just a few years later. It is a well-known fact that Gorbachev was one of Andropov's protegees. So, people at the very top of soviet leadership were wholly aware of the state of Chernobyl already seven years before the accident. Any argument that soviet leaders did not know, must therefore be discarded. One option might, however, be that Chernobyl was just another of a multitude of such high-level risks that the soviet leaders had to deal with on a daily basis as a fact of political life. This is though not a necessary precondition to deem Chernobyl a major cause of the demise of soviethood. Even former imperial leaders must follow the simple rules of causality: "post hunc, ergo propter hunc."

What Chernobyl became, was the symbol of the state and failure of the soviet system. As such it was an expression that there was something very rotten in the union, and thus served as a contributing factor to soviet demise. The point is, however, that this factor or symbol might have been next to anything properly describing soviet societal crisis. Chernobyl was normality - not anomaly. It was an exponent of the blatant disregard for human life endemic in the soviet system.

What about today then? Is Chernobyl a thing of the past that people simply refer to as an example of recklessness of tantamount proportions? Yes, in some ways it is. Most of the people that use the Chernobyl metaphor probably never have set foot in Eastern Europe, let alone Ukraine or "the zone". Instead, they use it to portray something vaguely ominous to whatever purpose they see fit - for better or for worse. In this way, Chernobyl has become a mighty myth of our age, and who owns a myth may get his message through much more efficiently than millions of dollars. Chernobyl is indeed a mighty metaphor. Reading about Chernobyl one should therefore always ask, who benefits from it: cui bono?

However, this is not the core of the issue. It but serves to illustrate how Chernobyl is used as a utilitarian tool in the hands of whoever may apply it. To the contrary, Chernobyl is intrinsically an ethical and not a utilitarian issue. Why was this allowed to happen? On what values did a society capable of such disregard for human value rest?

Furthermore, Chernobyl is a matter of the value of the individual, in a similar way as the Holocaust. It is not a matter of numbers, even though they have their importance. The heart of the matter is that Chernobyl symbolises the contempt for human dignity and the value of the indvidual that forms the basis of totalitarianism. Therefore, today try to make out a single face among the victims to represent for you this great disaster to mankind. Then, one can start to fathom what Chernobyl really means.

Chernobyl, 20 years, nuclear disaster, Soviet Union