Swedish blogs on "Eastern Europe"

It is safe to say that the blog scene reflecting "Eastern European" events is quite limited as compared to "hotter" regions such as the Middle East. True to its ambition of commenting and promoting quality blogs, Global voices makes efforts to introduce its readers to most aspects of the blogosphere and also to Eastern Europe, Russia, Caucasus & Central Asia. As for the many country-specific blogs on "Eastern Europe," there is, however, little information to be found. Therefore, I here try to account for Swedish blogs on the region.

One of the most frequently visited blogs is Tobias Ljungvall on Belarus. Ljungvall, a liberal with a deep commitment to freedom and democracy in Belarus, here makes his "observations of political developments in and around the Republic of Belarus." The blog also advertises Ljungvall's book Kontoll - Rapport från Vitryssland (Control - Report from Belarus). The blog is updated every Sunday. Needless to say, Ljungvall is not welcome any longer in Belarus under the current Lukashenka regime. All the same, he is probably one of the most well-informed people in Sweden on the situation in Belarus.

Allt om Georgien (in Swedish) is an anonymous blog dedicated to tell "all about Georgia" - as its title indicates - to a Swedish audience. It thus informs about, comments on, and promotes current events in Georgia, and things related to Georgia in Sweden. As for its anonymity, it is no hard guess that Göran Dalin and his lovely Georgian wife Ekaterine are behind this blog. The couple seems to have formed the hub of Georgian community in Sweden during recent years - correct me if I am wrong - and this, I believe, is just another of their ventures. As for contents, the love and devotion to Georgia is quite apparent in the blog.

I think many of us may recognise familiar things and phenomena on Camilla Bondareva's blog Ad notam (in Swedish). She writes and reflects on everyday life in St. Petersburg and Russia, and many of her texts are illustrated by her own photos. Bondareva is a free-lance communication manager. In addition to the texts, the general layout and impression of the blog is very nice.

A Swedish expat in Tajikistan - Erik Petersson - actually has two photo blogs on the region. The reason is simple - he started up in Moscow and then moved on to Dushanbe. The Moscow blog (in Swedish) - Samtidigt, i Moskva - depicts Moscow life with Petersson's own pictures and accompanying comments. His Tajikistan blog (in English) - Dushanbe pictures - is so far simply a photo blog with few comments. The pictures themselves may, however, need no further comment. Some of the black-and-white pictures bear the hallmarks of a professional photographer.

Wictoria Majby - a Swedish Institute teacher in Murmansk - runs the blog Ryska Rövarhistorier (in Swedish). Its Swedish title means "Russian cock-and-bull stories" and that is perhaps more of an ironic ambition than reality. Majby simply writes and reflects on various phenomena of her daily life and chores as a foreigner in the Russian north. Those of us who know her, will find her frequent comments well in tune with her vibrant personality.

A UN intern in Abkhazia - Carl Gustaf Erixon - tells about his experiences during out-of-service time on CG Bloggin' (in Swedish). The blog mainly features his reflections from this conflict-ridden part of Georgia. He also runs a photo blog - cgerixon's photos - to post pictures, which there is not enough space for on his regular blog.

Then there is Fredrik Nejman's Ukraina-blogg (in Swedish), which forms part of the Swedish Union of Journalists' website. The aim of Nejman's blog is to inform about the union's ongoing cooperation with the Ukrainian journalist trade union. As such, it is somewhat particular to the ongoing project, but that is also its purpose and aim.

Under the pseudonym of "Annabengan," a Swedish woman serving with the IOM in Albania tells us about her experiences there and elsewhere on her blog Annasblog (part Swedish - part English). She is careful to point out that: "Everything on this website is purely my own thoughts and in no way reflects the policies or thoughts of the organization I'm working for."

Finally, there are a couple of blogs that are not specifically dedicated to "Eastern Europe" but where one might regularly find comments on the region. First, there is Andreas's blog, (part English - part Swedish) by Swedish liberal Andreas Ribbefjord. Last, but not least, mention must be made of former Swedish Prime Minister's, Carl Bildt, blog - Bildt comments. With his great interest in international affairs, liberal-conservative Bildt every once in a while writes something about Russia and other parts of "Eastern Europe." It may often be worthwhile to read his blogs on these issues.

As may have been gathered by now, the Swedish blogosphere on "Eastern Europe" is limited. This is somewhat strange, as there is quite a lot of people in Sweden with an interest in the region. It has apparently so far not resulted in any greater urge to blog on issues related to "Eastern Europe." A question, however, lingers on: Have I missed something? Is this really the case?

Sweden, blogs, Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia

Belarus - The Tacit Triumph of Totalitarianism?

Hits, blows and kicks - the eternal language of totalitariansim - today confonts the people's inalienable right to freedom and democracy. This is Belarus - the centre of Europe - in February 2006. Here, evil old times still reign. With the grip as of an iron fist, president Aleksandr Lukashenka rules the country as a last remnant of soviethood. The outcome of the upcoming 19 March presidential elections seem predictable for the pre-ordained president in power.

A few days earlier, on March 15, the democratic opposition of Belarus may want to commemorate the country's first democratic constitution - that of 1994. However, few will probably dare to demonstrate for a democracy that has become defunct. This is so while, since then, Lukashenka leads a regime with increasing totalitarian expressions.

The people is denied not only democracy, but also the right to national identity. As a gesture of omnipotence, Lukashenka introduced Russian as the official language and forbade national symbols at an early stage of his presidential tenure. Oppression of national identity is one element of the nomenklatura strategy to hold on to the power and privileges of soviet times. Leading oppositionists are jailed or disappear in a country where the secret service still is called the KGB.

From democracy to dictatorship?
The road to democracy for Belarus was barred when Aleksandr Lukashenka in 1994 was elected president. Within a year, Lukashenka eliminated potential opposition from legislative power by staged parliamentary elections and a referendum that jointly gave him unrestricted powers. This was the first of a series of elections which legitimacy have come to be rejected by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the international community in general. By power of decree and manipulated referenda, the president himself has been able to set the limits of his rule. A third presidential period was ensured in 1999 by way of changes in the constitution, and in 2004 all bars for presidential term limits were removed.

As Lukashenka now inevitably seems to be up for his third presidential term, one might ask what characterises Lukashenka's leadership? Several former associates question the mental health of the president. His demagogics express populism as well as paranoia. In the country that during WWII lost the highest percentage of its population, anti-semitism and admiration of Hitler seems awkward to say the least. Still, this has been part and parcel of presidential personality in Belarus. The international isolation of Belarus is explained by a conspiracy directed by the US and NATO. This was far from true when Lukashenka first aired such thoughts, but by provocative domestic and international behaviour, he has become l'enfant terrible of European politics. Today, western governments would cheer to see Lukashenka ousted from power. Conspiracy or no conspiracy - this is the simple fact. The veracity of Lukashenka's madness may probably be questioned. His policies may likewise be considered a shrewd calculation that he would never be able to make it, if Belarus were to become party to European integration. However, it seems clear that he suffers from a distorted sense of reality, which hardly can be explained by unrestricted power or international isolation.

Opposition

That the country's opposition is fighting an uneven battle has numerous reasons. They may be sought in remnants of soviet mentality and lack of freedom for the press. Still, there is greater freedom now than during the dark ages of soviet rule. As long as the power of the president remains unchallenged, the opposition has been allowed to act within restricted limits. One early example of the opposite were the 2001 presidential elections. Of Lukashenka's two opposing candidates one was in jail and the other in exile. Several mysterious deaths have also occurred among leading oppositionists. The question is also who are the legitimate representatives of the people. Is is the 1990 Supreme Soviet or the 1995 parliament? Neither the opposition nor Lukashenka's regime may lay claim to public support on the basis of free and fair democratic elections. A number of attempts at dialogue between regime and opposition have been made, primarily by the OSCE. So far, all efforts to fill the country's democratic vaccuum have failed.

Market socialism?

Belarus is located where historic trade-routs between east and west meet. When the country gained its independence in 1992, it had the highest level of education and the most modern economy of the former soviet republics. Prospects for a transition to market economy initially looked bright. Positive developments were, however, interrupted when Lukashenka implemented "socialist market economy." What this meant more than chaos and arbitrariness still remains an enigma. Thereby, Belarus joined other East European economies in free fall. However, contrary to its neighbours, Belarus never succeeded in turning development to the better. Official figures, as far as they went, indicated that only some 20% of the companies made ends meet. The apparent failure of economic policy ended in implicit liberalisation by simple popular disregard in order to get by. The abusive greed of the regime is also satisfied by other means. Thus, Belarus has become a centre of international arms trade since the 1990's.

The Chernobyl heritage

The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster meant that 70% of radioactive downfall ended up in Belarus. Some 130,000 people were permanently evacuated from a zone the size of Wales. Long-term costs and consequences of Chernobyl are hard to estimate. Still, Lukashenka keeps silent on the effects of the catastropy on environment and health. That the Chernobyl issue, at times, has been able to unite opposition, has not facilitated the situation. It is becoming increasingly clear that democracy is a prerequisite to limit the long-term effects of Chernobyl.

Moscow and Minsk
Since the 1990's, Russia and Belarus have been knit closer together by a series of union agreements. Lukashenka's ambitions to one day become leader of a resurrected union has provoked irritation as well as ridicule in Moscow. It is also quite obvious that Russian president Putin despises Lukashenka as something the cat has dragged in. Putin has also met with representatives of the Belarus' opposition in a futile attempt to explore the possibilities of an alternative to Lukashenka that would be favourable to Russia. Returning to union plans, leading Russian politicians criticised the cooperation at an early stage. Russian policy towards the "near abroad" - the former soviet republics - initially set EU economic cooperation as an example. The realisation that the soviet empire was advantageous neither to Russia nor to the republics is easily counterbalanced by Russia's strategic interest in retaining Belarus within its sphere of influence. Neither the economic burden of Russian subsidies nor the knowledge of what happens in Minsk are important as long as Moscow keeps control over Belarus' security policy. Still, it is Russia that sets the limits of Lukashenka's rule. Russian support for his authoritarian regime is both untactical strategy and unstrategic tactics. In view of the country's size and location, Belarus might have the potential to become a bridge between the economies of Russia and the EU. A future democratic Belarus is Russia's window to Europe.

The Tacit Triumph of Totalitarianism?
What do the affairs of Belarus concern us? For most, Belarus remains a far-away country of which we know nothing. Despite western efforts to turn developments in Belarus towards democracy, next to nothing has been achieved. The lack of unity towards Belarus between the US and the EU, and among EU members themselves, has made western policies erratic and ineffective. It is also likely that any solution to the "Lukashenka problem" must involve Russia, while the west itself has imposed Moscow's droit de régard on the issue of Belarus. As external support by the joint and concerted efforts of the US and the EU, as well as perhaps - unlikely as it might be - Russia, are necessary to create conditions for change, such measures are far from sufficient to overturn the Lukashenka regime. True change can only be brought about by the people of Belarus itself. As long as neither external nor internal conditions exist, Belarus will remain a black hole in the middle of Europe.

As oppression against the opposition mounts for the upcoming March 19 presidential elections, the west may - to no avail - holler in protest at the top of its voice, if this is not accompanied by a sincere will to apply the measures necessary for change. For as long as the people of Belarus cannot exercise their freedom of speech and liberty of choice, totalitarianism tacitly triumphs in the Europe of 2006.

Who/How are you, Ivan Ivanovich?

In the 1970’s, Finnish foreign minister Karjalainen was to welcome his American colleague Kissinger to Helsinki. The problem was that Karjalainen hardly knew any English. In great haste he was taught at least some fundamental phrases. In the limo from the airport, Karjalainen, however, had great difficulties to remember a single word of this new language. In the end it came to him. With a smile, he lent over to Kissinger and asked: “By the way – who are you?” – Instead of an “How are you?” Karjalainen’s mistake turned out to be one of the basic questions of international relations – that of identity.

In his National Self-Images and Regional Identities in Russia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), Bo Petersson deals with the issue of Russian identity. By doing so, he unveils new perspectives of how to explore the empirical basis of national identity.

As for the theme of the by now five year old book - that of centre vs. periphery in Russia, it is motivated to question what relevance such a publication may have in these days of Putinist centralisation. However, the overarching juxtaposition of identity and relations between Moscow and the regions, still makes it a study of interest.

Over the last decade there have been numerous studies trying to grasp Russia’s ‘Self’ (e.g. Neumann, 1996; Prizel, 1998). Most of them share with Petersson’s study the theoretical tenet of symbolic interactionism. Few, however, turn to Russians themselves to disseminate individual and collective identities. Therefore, the great merit of Petersson’s approach is that he doesn’t hesitate to go into the trenches to dig out the lacunae of national and regional self-perceptions. Juxtaposing national self-images and regional identities, the author puts relations between centre and periphery at the fore. Thus, “tensions within and between the national self-images [---] in the regions” (2001:18), would show whether there are “any chances of attaining a viable sense of civic nationhood in this extensive country” as contrasted by “centrifugal tendencies and regionally based identity structures” (2001:16).

From a theoretical perspective, Peterson holds that: “National self-images are cognitive and affective conceptual lenses, organising devices and information filters which partly represent, and partly inform national identity” (2001:7). From this perspective, politicians in Khabarovsk, Perm, St. Petersburg and Volgograd are interviewed to discern differences in regional identities and national self-images. They represent an average stratum of political society by age, ideology and regional distribution. Confronted by Petersson’s questions, their answers illustrate how regional politicians perceive the country’s present, past and future as well as its internal and external relations. The study encompasses a period from 1997 to 1999 when the perspective of centre and periphery is becoming increasingly acute in Russian politics.

Therefore, Petersson’s results are immensely interesting by combining self-images and identities with centre and periphery to illustrate Russia’s general political development, leading up to Putin’s seizure of power in 2000. By studying respondents’ perceptions of what Russia was, is and ought to be, Petersson points to viable factors for common and unifying national self-images. In analysing external others (the U.S. and China), an ambivalent relationship is found in positive and negative reflection. Internally, however, the strongest negative reflection is found in regions’ relations with the centre. Moscow is, by all standards, Russia’s negative internal ‘Other’. Results are even so far-reaching as to indicate that regional identities – to the extent they exist – are actually formed by negative reflection of Moscow. The single exception is St. Petersburg, being the only example of a positively defined regional identity.

To sum up, regional identities may form by distrust in Moscow being stronger than uniting national self-images. In order for the centre to remain control over periphery – the regions – a strong positive image must be displayed to unite the Russians. Today, we might witness this in Putin and his centralising policies. Finally, what the author shows, is a viable approach to the empirical study of national self-images and identities. In essence, by asking the intended “How are you?” Petersson’s query also answers the accidental “Who are you?”

Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul

Last week, International Crisis Group issued a new policy brief on developments in Uzbekistan - "Uzbekistan in for the Long Haul." In it, ICG gives a dark picture of future developments in the country, after the May 2005 Andijon massacre. As western relations with Tashkent have been frozen ever since, ICG advocates long-term measures to deal with the Karimov regime, partly based on a regional perspective. As for US-Uzbeki relations, one may, however, question whether ICG's analysis may be wholly correct.

In its analysis, ICG claims that "Uzbekistan is well down the path of self-destruction," where the "elite prospers while the majority lives in worsening poverty." The country is marred by political repression and economic misrule, and president Karimov has stopped any further attempts at political and economic reform. "Religious and political repression and worsening living standards have raised domestic tensions and provoked violence," ICG reports.

Uzbekistan is also depicted as a regional threat. Primarily, the country is a source of trafficking in drugs and people, and thereby complicates regional measures to deal with these problems, in relation to Afghanistan and the region as a whole. Furthermore, the threat of violence that Karimov poses to his own citizens may spark a refugee crisis if political and religious repression would peak and things would come to the worst. That Tashkent consistently tries to spoil any attempts at regional cooperation only adds to the picture of Uzbekistan as a potential threat to Central Asia. Already at this point, Karimov-imposed border closures and trade restrictions on neighbour countries, significantly hampers regional development. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has thus far been negative to cooperate with its neighbours on common concerns and resources, such as water, energy, and infrastructure. All in all, ICG claims that "Uzbekistan could well become the centre of instability in Central Asia in the medium to long term."

Despite this dark picture one may only agree with ICG that the "government in Tashkent is not at risk of imminent collapse." However, on the regional level one should perhaps pause to ponder whether ICG is completely right in its concerns and predictions. It is true that western policies towards Uzbekstan have failed. Support to develop "political and economic openness" was simply not in the interest of Karimov's regime. The question is whether this was in the interest of the US. It is quite obvious that western sanction policy imposed after the Andijon massacre remains a resounding failure. Thus, ICG reports that "relations with Europe and the US are the worst since independence in 1991." As far as this may be correct regarding Europe, one should perhaps be cautious to draw the same conclusion as for the US, as indicated above. The main question is whether the prospects of a volatile process of democratisation in Uzbekistan is in the interest of US policy in Central Asia.

By now, it would appear a well-established fact that democracies are stable but democratisation is shaky. Therefore, one might, contrary to ICG's argument, assume that the US is quite happy with the current situation. The Andijon massacre gave the US a convenient excuse to get the issue of democratisation off the agenda, thus avoiding further confrontation with Karimov. The situation allows the US and Uzbekistan respectively to go about their own business without the fear of interference by the other. On the official level, relations may well be frozen, but this this also leaves room for informal cooperation and tacit agreement on matters of mutual importance. One may also question whether it really is so important for the US to have "influence with the Karimov government" as long as conditions for US policy in Central Asia remain stable. Given this, who rules Uzbekistan is of little interest to the US. That the US implicitly has chosen to acquiesce with the situation is probably because further confrontation might have posed a threat of instability to the US position in Central Asia. For Washington, it is better to leave things as they are rather than rocking the boat.

Such an argument would also challenge ICG's assumption that Uzbeki instability could "prompt an aggressive Russian intervention in the region." Firstly, Russia has - for long - abandoned the alternative of armed intervention in post-soviet space, while Moscow has realised that it has much more effective - mainly economic - means at its disposal. Secondly, Moscow and Washington see eye to eye on the importance of stability in Central Asia. This shared realist view, is likely to make the US and Russia act in concert to avoid instability in the region.

Then, one should rather consider ICG's assumption that political and religious repression could "stimulate the undercurrents of Islamic extremism that so far have been more of an irritant than a major threat." That would be more in line with an argument linked to the dangers of future socio-economic collapse in Uzbekistan spiralling into increasing and small-scale conflict and confrontation rather than outright revolution. Such developments might well strengthen extremist movements in Central Asian societies. Extremism is born by extremities - something people turn to out of despair and desperation. It is from this perspective, that one is likely to agree with ICG that "Uzbekistan could well become the centre of instability in Central Asia in the medium to long term."

As for ICG's policy conlusions, one cannot - as a soft European caffe latte liberal - but agree on them. This "lifeboat strategy to maintain political activity, civil society and educational opportunities in the expectation of future change" may perhaps not be the most effective way to support change in Uzbekistan, but it is the means at our disposal. Long-term measures within education, good governance, civil society etc, combined with socio-economic support as well as assistance to neighbouring countries to solve outstanding problems with Uzbekistan, is what one can reasonably do. On this nomative level, one is likely to agree with ICG. The thousand dollar question is, however, whether conclusions would be different if taking a different - more realist - view on stability into account.

Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin

Everyone who has done it, knows how much works it takes to write or edit a book. As the editor with main day-to-day responsibility of Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin (London: Routledge, 2005), I was happy and relieved to finalise a year's work on the volume, and getting it accepted for publication by Routledge. Little did I know that it would take another year for it to appear on the market. Being an anthology, with contributions by 14 different writers from 7 European countries, I was and still am very pleased that we succeeded in staying in line with the general theme of the book, viz. that of Russia as a Great Power foreign and security policy actor. Whether this is really the case is, however, up to the reader to judge.

The book covers four dimensions of Russian policy: external security, regional security, internal security, and terrorism.

After a period of relative weakness and instability during most of the 1990s, Russia is again appearing as a major security player in world politics. This book provides a comprehensive assessment of Russia's current security situation, addressing such questions as:

• What kind of player is Russia in the field of security?
• What is the essence of its security policy?
• What are the sources, capabilities and priorities of its security policy?

One important conclusion to emerge is that, while Russian foreign policy under Putin has become more pragmatic and responsive to both problems and opportunies, the growing lack of checks and balances in domestic politics makes political integration with the West difficult and gives the president great freedom in applying Russia's growing power abroad.

Monkeys & Tigers of Putin's Foreign Policy

What are the major characteristics of Russia's Putinist foreign policy? What is obvious is that the growth in oil incomes is parallel only to the growth in self-confidence and self-reliance in foreign affairs. Thereby, the "multivector policy" has finally got off the ground. Current Russian foreign policy strategy may, however, turn back with a vengeance on Russia. Solitude is not a succesful recipe for international affairs.

Threats to Russia
The long-term security policy threats to Russia are terrorism, militant Islamism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, a stronger China, and instability due to the spread of "open society". These are serious problems that demand serious answers. Instead, Russian foreign policy is characterised by increased self-confidence and a walk it alone mentality.

Multivector policy

Since 2003, the drive for co-operation and partnership with the West has been abandoned. Current "multivector policy" avoids stable relations and partnership with other powers. Moscow exploits Western weakness - the EU crisis and US endless engagement in Iraq. Russia tries to be a "monkey on top of a hill, overlooking the tigers fighting on the plain".

The near abroad - a chain of instability

Dominance over the "near abroad" is still the overarching goal of Russian foreign policy. Moscow's increased self-confidence obscures the setbacks in Georgia and the Ukraine. The danger of current policy is that the risk for new crises and revolutions in the Russian sphere of interest is underestimated. The contradiction between personified power and weak systems in post-soviet states constitutes a latent risk of instability in Russia's backyard for the coming 10-15 years. Here, elections counterposes self-perpetuation of personified power and political legitimacy. It is the soft authoritarian hybrid regimes - as previously Ukraine and perhaps Armenia next - that are the weakest links in the chain of instability, which runs through Russia's proximity.

Central Asia - the Great Game revisited?
In Central Asia, there is danger of escalating tension between Moscow and Washington. Russia and China jointly try to act as regional stabilisers, at the same time as increased Chinese influence contributes to growing conflict potential between the two countries. Post-soviet space constitutes an unstable, volatile and fluidous region in the vicinity of the EU.

Making it alone - a recipe for disaster

As Russia is all the more turning into a unilateral and uncooperative actor, one must realise that Putinist foreign policy will face great challenges. Perceived threats to Russia are based on traditional views, which may not be entirely in tune with times. If Moscow continues to pursue the multivector policy, such threats may, however, become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To abandon cooperation with the West is tantamount to losing a potential partner in solving the problems facing Russia in post-soviet space. Moscow's support for weak regimes - undemocratic and illegitimate - will only serve to amplify instability in the "near abroad". As an effect, revolution may turn on Russia as well. Finally, Russia is treading a delicate balance-act in Central Asia, where a new "Great Game" may evolve, if not being careful. In all, Russia is applying a traditional policy on untraditional problems, which cannot possibly succeed in the long run. Therefore, it is likely that the image of monkeys and tigers will prove an act of self-deception. Instead, Russian foreign policy may prove a recipe for disaster if the monkeys were to: "Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil". This is, however, the path Russia currently is heading with its multivector policy.

Whatever happened with the vodka crisis?

A few weeks back, headlines of western newspapers warned for a coming "vodka crisis" in Russia. The country was to turn dry due to a clerical error. Reminiscences of Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign in the late 1980's, made us recall images of people drinking whatever liquor they could get hold of. Then, nothing more was heard of this potentially dangerous crisis. Why so?

The reason is simple. Consumer is king - in Russia as elsewhere. As long as there is money to be made, any problems may be solved. And, lo and behold, how much money wouldn't be lost if Russia dried up? This was simply unthinkable, and the problem - if one may speak of a real problem - was quickly solved.

Then, what was the problem? Apparently, a special print-shop making tax-labels for vodka bottles was late with a delivery to vodka factories. Thus, vodka factories would not be able to put out their products on the market. Strangely enough, it never appeared to western media that there might be other print-shops to do the job, or that this particular print-shop might catch up on production. No, the story was simply too good to be passed, regardless of the unfeasability that Russia would run out of vodka.

Today, many liquor stores are very service-minded. In major cities, it might even happen that a store that doesn't have a special brand, might get hold of a bottle for you within a few hours and then deliver it to your home - sometimes at any hour of the day. So, regrettably, the "vodka crisis" once more turned western media to focus on an obvious haux, which was well in line with western prejudice towards Russia as a wholly backward country. It stands out as a true paradox, that the alleged vodka crisis almost got as much attention in western media as the recent NGO-bill. The list of Russia's problems is long - democracy, civil liberties, media, human rights, corruption etc - but lack of vodka is not one of them.

Yakovlev - An Architect of the Perestroika

On 18 October 2005, one of the great architects of the Perestroika, Aleksandr Yakovlev, passed away. In commeration of Yakovlev, I here publish my account of his lecture from a visit in Stockholm, Sweden, in March 2003.

Confronting the past
"Why delve into the past? Yes, why annoy people with what has been? What has been - has been." These questions were the starting-point of Aleksandr Yakovlev's Stockholm lecture. In analogy with L.N. Tolstoy, he pointed to the inability of himself and others to fathom the horrors of the past: "That will only happen when we admit that we are sick."

Over the past 15 years, Yakovlev has dedicated himself to the crimes of the soviet era; as chairman in the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression; and since 1993 through his own Yakovlev Foundation (Mezhdunarodny Fond Demokratsii). By this work, some 4.5 million innocently convicted have been rehabilitated, among those Raoul Wallenberg. Still 400,000 cases remain to scrutinise. The work encompasses documented cases, which have undegone legal trial and often been convicted in accordance with § 58 of the soviet penal code. Of course, a lot more people were executed without trial. The lack of documentation, however, complicates rehabilitation in these cases. Still, it is in the area of documentation that an important part of the work has been made. The Yakovlev Foundation has until now published some 30 volumes of historical documents, of which 16 are available on the Foundation website.

"Who is guilty?", Yakovlev asked. This recurrent question in Russia is often given a misdirected answer. When we point at Lenin, Stalin, and the Bolsheviks, we avoid to touch on our own guilt. We hide our heads in the sand, and pretend that it wasn't we that shot all those people; that it wasn't we that betrayed the neighbour to save ourselves. The truth is that the guilty are as much among us as they are in hell.

Although we succeeded in crushing Stalin's fascist totalitarianism, its heritage lives on. Then the book-fires burnt under supervision of Krupskaya. Then the churches were plundered. Then twelve-year-olds were sentenced to death.

The socialist construct - the great modernisation projects - rested on the shoulders of slave-labour. The camp system that arose from 1943, employed millions of people - from legislative system to camp prisoners.

An example of the continuity of the system was given at a visit in Magadan a few years back. Yakovlev, who was to inaugurate a monument to the victims of totalitarianism, got a cold reception. The explanation was that the liquidation of the Magadan camp system had led to massive unemployment. Of the 350,000 people in the camp system, 200,000 had been put into the street. "Why should they love you?" was the question confronting Yakovlev. In the same way, there is a "Magadan" inside us all.

It is not enough that our history is built on false documents. As we today are trying to get hold of the right documents, we are met by resistance from bureaucrats and passivity from the state. Many documents have also been burnt in individual attempts to cover ones own tracks. Other material was lost in 1941. Probably, we will not get access to all archives for a long time to come. This is not very strange. Just look how the US still hasn't opened up all the archives on the Kennedy assassination.

In the field

"History is made by coincidence." At Gorbachev's visit in Canada in 1983, it so happened that the host at a visit to a farm, was delayed. Yakovlev, then soviet ambassador to Canada, was given an opportunity to speak with Gorbachev between four eyes. The walk the two men made in the field, came to decide Yakovlev's role in the future reform process, which came to mean the end of the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev complained about the disintegration of the agricultural sector, Yakovlev got an opportunity to criticise soviet foreign policy. Three months later, Yakovlev was called back to Moscow to lead IMEMO. [On IMEMO's role in the change of soviet foreign policy see: Checkel, J, 1997, "Ideas and International Political Change", Yale UP, New Haven]. The role of Yakovlev and IMEMO, initially, was to produce analyses and alternatives for Gorbachev's action, primarily within foreign policy.

The road to power

The day Chernenko died, 10 March 1985, Yakovlev got a visit by Primakov, who informed him that Gromyko's son wanted to speak with him. Without involving his father, the son wanted to explore the possibilities for cooperation between Gromyko and Gorbachev. In a following discussion, it turned out how fed up Gromyko was with foreign policy, and that he would like to reatreat to a post in the Supreme Soviet. He was, therefore, prepared to nominate Gorbachev for Secretary General. Yakovlev, who didn't want to play a fool in a political game, however, agreed to speak with Gorbachev. The message was received as much with caution as with interest. Gorbachev was prepared to work with Gromyko, but asked himself whether this feeler in reality was a provocation. Yakovlev, however, thought that Gromyko had no room for such games. In further talks between Yakovlev and Gromyko, the message was sent that conditions for Gromyko's nomination remained. At the Polit Bureau meeting on 11 March, Gromyko immediately nominated Gorbachev for Secretary General. The proposal was seconded by Grishin, who had been subject to speculations as potential successor to Chernenko. The decision to elect Gorbachev to Secretary General was thus unanimous [Soglasny - vse]. Lack of discussion and unanimity in decisions was a social heritage within the party since Lenin's days.

Reforms

The assumption that all proposals made, have been sanctioned from above, was eventually to become an important instrument for Yakovlev in the reform process. Ideology was, however, not the driving-force behind his reformatory role. Certainly, Yakovlev had been posted as ambassador in Ottawa because of his alleged liberalism. He was to be distanced from the ideological struggle. Yakovlev, all the same, doesn't characterise himself as an ideolgoue. He passed his exams in Marxism-Leninism, but that was all. Capitalism and socialism are words beyond his comprehension. Why put an ideological label on a country? Every country lives according to its own traditions. Instead, it was practice during Stalin that upset him.

Still, it was Yakovlev who introduced the concept of "Glasnost". He thought that the system would collapse, when people found out the truth about the crimes that had been committed. That was - as we all know - also what happened. How then, did we succeed in puttin down the soviet monster? A direct attack was unthinkable. One would be confronted by a "Magadan". If Yakovlev had been clear about his true intentions, he wouldn't have survived the day. Therefore, one had to deceive [obmanyvat] the nomenklatura. The party was convinced that reforms would renew and improve socialism; that the speed of development would increase. Only after a few years, they started to understand what was about to happen. The decision, on closed elections with several candidates, which was made at the January 1987 January plenary of the Central Committe, became an alarm-signal for the nomenklatura. The realisation that one was not about to be elected led to discussions on "Bolshevik principles". Of course, power was central.

What concerns the reforms, many mistakes were made. "We are masters at stepping on the rake." The fight against alcoholism is one example. Alcohol cannot be fought with slogans. The fight against corruption turned out to become an attack on old ladies selling carrots in the square. A system for quality control did not improve quality. Disappointment spread and the anecdotes also about this regime began to flourish.

One says that "time is a difficult companion." As soon as we are not in pace with time, misery overtakes us. The same thing happens as we are trying to catch up. The conclusion can only be that Russia is particularly difficult to reform.

The end

During 1991, the danger of a conspiracy became all the more apparent. As the August coup evolved, Yakovlev had already resigned. He warned Gorbachev four times - in writing - about what was to happen. Gorbachev, however, underestimated how enterprising and courageous his oppinents would be, and simply chose to go away on vacation. So the coup d'état and its failure came about.

It was obvious that the Soviet Union must be transformed into a confederation on a voluntary basis by agreement. The Belovezha summit was, still, illegitimate. Confronted by fait accompli, only the unavoidable decisions remained to be made. Gorbachev and Yeltsin met in the Kremling and Yakovlev was called there to assist. One hour before their meeting, Yakovlev was called for. He still doesn't know why. They sat another eight hours together. The nuclear portfolio and the top secret documents were turned over. It was generally a quiet and considerate discussion. Just think if they would have been able to cooperate like that all the time! Then, at least, the state divorce could have passed by in more civilised forms. The situation as it now was, mostly appeared peculiar. When everything had been finished, they all went for a meal. Gorbachev retired to rest a little. Yakovlev and Yeltsin sat on for a while, before Yakovlev joined Gorbachev. What struck Yakovlev was that the otherwise talkative Gorbachev, with tears in his eyes, only said "Vot tak, Sasha" [That's it, Alexander]. Thus, a great era had passed. To this day, Gorbachev's exploits are unrecognised in Russia. In due course, the young will though learn to understand and appreciate his role.

Power and future

During his time in the Polit Bureau (1987-1990), also Yakovlev experienced how it was when the people paraded by with his portrait. It was a feeling neither of joy or moral distancing. The human is weak and power transforms her. Subordinates are soon regarded as inferior. Therefore, it is better the more often people in power are exchanged. Regrettably, current developments are going in the opposite direction. The nomenklatura has learnt to win also democratic elections. The communists party has forgot its ideology in the strive for power. The important thing is to keep ones hold of the Duma. Accordingly, there are also discussions to allow the president to run for a third term. If one succeeds in that, there will soon be talk of a fourth term. It is all like a psychological disease, but Tolstoy also claimed that the state governs as one governs lunatics. Warning signs abound - from anthem to Dzerzhinsky statue - and tendencies are dangerous. Even if Yakovlev fears a re-totalitarianisaton, he holds it unlikely in today's information society. Steps towards a law-governed society have also been made, among which are that court decisions have become mandatory for arrests and that minors receive redcution of penalties. Thus, the future is as hopeful as it is worrying.

Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis: Profits vs Politics

The recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine has raised fears - not least in the EU - that Moscow is increasingly using energy as a political weapon. Such fears may be correct from a general perspective, when reviewing the political will of the Kremlin. An opposite case must, however, also be made for economics - that the crisis was more a case of profit than of politics.

An overarching question of the Russian élite since the late 1980's has been how to maximise ones own profits. The driving-force has been the individual desire for wealth. During Yeltsin's privatisation, such desires resulted in unharnessed "bandit-capitalism." Enormous fortunes were made by more or less doubtful means. Although president Putin seems to be trying to redistribute some of this wealth to his own political and private benefit, most oligarchs have been left alone as long as they don't meddle into politics. From the perspective of the mega-rich and major enterprise, trying to leave politics aside of making money has become a goal in itself, regardless of whether you are within or outside the walls of the Kremlin. To make profit in real money and to avoid being forced into economically worthless political deals should appear the obvious choice in rational terms for enterprise. Private interest comes before state interest. This, initially, may have been the motive of Gazprom - the Russian gas monopoly - in connection to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. Still, many Western analysts claim that the crisis was politically motivated. Such analysis, however, leaves out the first logical step of analysis, namely that of making real money.

As the crisis arose in late December, Russian gas monopoly Gazprom demanded that Ukraine paid a price roughly equivalent to that, which Western European customers pay (some 230$ per cubic metre compared to the Ukrainian price of 50$). Raising revenues from exports to Ukraine almost fivefold, was - needless to say - tempting to Gazprom in order to boost the company's stock price. In June 2005, the Russian government became majority shareholder in Gazprom, which opened up possibilities to lift the state-imposed 20% limit of foreign investment in the company by year's end. This would also be in line with the liberalisation schemes of Gazprom and its aim to expand in the oil-market, creating - all in all - the basis for a shooting stock price and compensation for the failed merger with oil-producer Rosneft. This would indicate that the main reason for Gazprom's action against Ukraine was to attain higher profits.

In contrast to this, one may instead argue that the political side of Gazprom's action was too obvious to be ignored. Accordingly, Russia would - by means of Gazprom - want to put further pressure on Ukraine - possibly to destabilise or topple its pro-Western government - before the country's parliamentary elections in March. Furthermore, the mere fact that Gazprom's chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, is also Russia's vice Premier, would make for a strong case that Gazprom's action was politically motivated. This may well be the case, but judging from Medvedev's surprised reaction when confronted with the stern reaction of the EU, as Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine, he obviously was ignorant of the full consequences of Gazprom's action. Is it really possible that the Kremlin was ignorant of the possibility that cutting Ukraine's gas supply might also mean cutting down gas supplies to the West? Didn't Medvedev or someone in the Kremlin think of the fact that gas to Europe first goes through Ukrainian pipelines, thus making it easy for Ukraine to compensate a cut in their supplies with those that would have gone to Europe. This, evidently, was how Ukraine acted with the consequence that gas supplies to Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and other EU countries were heavily reduced, creating a crisis as much with the EU as with Ukraine. Russia was portrayed as an unreliable business-partner by international media, and European politicians called for reviewing and diversifying energy supplies. Even worse, Russia again became a source of threat to Europe. Gazprom's action thus heavily damaged confidence in Russia in political as much as economic terms. Trust between Russia and Europe was dealt a heavy blow.

So, the question arises: Are the masters of the Kremlin really so crude in their political thinking as not to foresee the consequences of their actions? Did they really not consider that the issue could develop into something more than a bilateral crisis between Russia and Ukraine. I, for one, would like to think that this is not the case if regarding Gazprom's action as a political issue. It is true that the Kremlin has made a series of serious political misjudgements and mistakes in recent years, but despite all blunders, I do hope that Putin and his entourage are not so much of political novices as to be outright stupid. Therefore, to the extent that the Kremlin was involved in Gazprom's action against Ukraine, some other factor than politics would appear to have blurred their judgement. This factor might be that profits preceded politics. The prospects of increased profit by raising the price of gas to Ukraine might explain why the Kremlin oversaw the possibility of negative side-effects for Russian credibility in relation to the EU. Thus, the economic analysis might have crowded out thinking in political terms.

The alternative - that Russian action was deliberate and informed - would truly be tantalising. This would mean that Russia has reached such a level of confidence and self-sufficiency in foreign policy terms, as to be willing to risk relations with Europe and to signal that the country has the power to put a threat to the EU by cutting energy supplies. It is true, that energy is increasingly seen as an intrument of Russian security policy, but it is as much true that this instrument so far has been used with some caution and only in relation to former soviet republics. Would it, however, be true that the Kremlin - having gained control of Gazprom - rationally foresaw the political consequences of the company's action, European calls to review Russia as energy-supplier should be taken very seriously. As long as this has not been proved, however, it might be more plausible to assume that Russian judgement was blurred for financial reasons. Thus, it appears that profit preceded politics and private interest came before state interest. Another unintended consequence is, of course, that keeping politics and economics aside failed, and that Gazprom - in contrast to its aim to liberalise - is now looking at much greater political involvement in and direction from the Kremlin. To conclude, how likely is it - all things considered - that the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis was the effect of a Russian rational political decision?

Russia restrains West on Iran's nuclear programme

As reported by international media, US and EU relations with Iran have recently turned for the worse because of Iran's unilateral decision to resume its nuclear programme. Iran thus becomes in breech of an EU-brokered agreement on a moratorium on its nuclear programme. As the US and EU - in fear that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons - now consider turning to the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran, Russia is actively trying to hold back the West. What is Russia's interest in this?

At his recent summit with German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, president Putin urged the EU to go easy on Iran, as concerns the country's resumption of its nuclear programme. However, there is no great disagreement between Russia and "the West" on the issue at hand - a critical stance on Iran's action. Still, Russian attempts to hold the West back continue. Only today, Russian foreign minister, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, heavily criticised any attempts to impose sanctions on Iran.

The reason for Russia's position on Iran is not mainly political but economic. Russia and previously the Soviet Union have been instrumental in the construction of Iran's nuclear programme. Russian nuclear exports to Iran has been a great source of income for a domestically faltering nuclear industry. Russian nuclear industry, headed by the nuclear ministry (Minatom), have seen exports as a way to survive the economic turmoil of the 1990's. Heavily oversized, Russian nuclear energy is, however, a sector which breathes a certain extent of optimism.

The reason for this is the same as the reason for Russia's position on the Iranian nuclear programme: Russia's nuclear industry is one of the few technically advanced sectors where Russia can still compete for shares on the international market with other technically developed states. Russia's ability to compete relates to a combination of low costs and high technical skills that no other actor on the arena may offer. Nuclear exports is thus of strategic interest for Russia. International action against Iran's nuclear programme would, consequently, hit Russia's position on the international nuclear energy market.

One may, of course, seek other reasons for Russian restraints on sanctions against Iran such as balance of power and preventing further US power in the Greater Middle East. At the end of the day, economic reasons are the most important. In Moscow, money talks and politics comply.