Belarus: HR-Activists Get Swedish Awards

On Monday, the Anna Lindh Memorial Fund announced that this year's human rights' awards both go to Belarus. Thus, Tatiana Ravyaka receives the 2006 Anna Lindh Prize and Alyaksandr Byalyatski the Per Anger Prize. Both prize winners represent the Belarusian Human Rights Center Viasna.

Byalyatski, the leader of Viasna, has for a decade supported human rights in Belarus by offering legal aid to the thousands of people that have been repressed by Lukashenka's regime. He is awarded the Per Anger Prize for his "brave struggle for the rights of the individual in the fight against oppression of human rights."

Tatiana Revyaka, also of Viasna, receives the 2006 Anna Lindh Prize for her "committment, empathy and persistence in disclosing wrongs and supporting and advocating the oppressed. She courageously defies political oppression and spreads knowledge of an alternative society in which the rights of the individual are inviolable."

The Anna Lindh Memorial Prize was founded in honour of former Swedish minister of foreign Affairs, Mrs. Anna Lindh, who was murdered by a madman during a political campaign in 2003. The Per Anger Prize is in honour of ambassador Per Anger, Raoul Wallenberg's closest associate in salvaging jews in Hungary during WWII. The prizes will be presented to Revyaka and Byalyatski at a ceremony in Stockholm on 14 june.

Russia Warns Ukraine & Georgia of NATO

On Wednesday, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine and Georgia of joining Nato. During a speech in the Russian State Duma, Lavrov argued that such a "colossal geopolitical" change would threaten relations with the two countries. "We assess all possible consequences primarily from the point of view of Russia's national interests," Lavrov said.

According to Ukrainian foregn minister, Anton Buteiko, a majority of Ukrainians support that Ukraine would join Nato. If Buteiko would be right, this would constitute an enormous change in Ukrainian public opinion. As late as last year, only some 10% of public opinion supported Nato-membership. Why public opinion may have turned is unclear, but it might be as a consequence of the New Year's Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. As for Georgia, Tbilisi has for long had the ambition to join Nato, but it has been regarded unrealistic as long as it is not accompanied by a Ukrainian application to enter the North Atlantic alliance.

That Russia, at this point, warns of the consequences primarily of Ukrainian Nato-membership, is due to regional political developments, not least with GUAM's recent formation of the Organization for Democratic and Economic Development, combined with increasing US openness to accepting the two countries as members of Nato. In Moscow eyes, such tendencies form part of a much greater geopolitical struggle between Russia and the US for influence over post-soviet space - Russia's traditional sphere of vital national interest.

Estonia: Gay Ambassador Flees Homophobia

The Dutch ambassador to Tallinn, Hans Glabitz, has decided to leave his mission to Estonia due to "persistent racist and homophobic abuse," BBC reports. Glaubitz is openly gay and lives with his coloured Cuban partner.

The problem has not been on an official level. The Estonian foreign ministry is, to the opposite, careful to point out that the couple has been well received at an official level. Instead, Glaubitz decision is due to widespread public homophobia in Estonia. According to Glaubitz, the couple has been constantly harassed in public by skinheads and drunkards with homophobic and racist remarks.

The Glaubitz case regrettably demonstrates the kind of homophbia still latent in many East European countries. That even a foreign ambassador finds his posting to a fellow European country unbearable, shows how profound a clash in cultures may be between the liberal Netherlands and relatively conservative Estonia.

Russia: Dollar vs Rouble

Last week, the Russian State Duma proposed a law prohibiting the use of prices in foreign currency. For all practical reasons, this would mean that price-setting in dollar and euro would be banned in Russia. The law proposal, which stands good chances of being passed, has been much ridiculed by domestic and international media alike. However, is there really reason for such ridicule if one would only closer consider the general idea?

Russians like to set their prices in dollar for the simple reason that any bigger business transaction in Russia is made in dollar. With inflation rates of up to 2,500% annually in the early 1990's, Russians have grown accustomed not to trust the country's own currency, viz. the rouble. Therefore, most Russians also keep their savings in US dollar. Despite a mere 11% inflation rate last year, people remember the latest great financial crisis in 1998, when the rouble dropped some 86% in the course of a year. Today's relative macroeconomic balance in the Russian economy, not least due to rising oil incomes, is therefore not reflected by greater trust in the rouble. Only this year, the rouble exchange rate has increased by 7% against the dollar. However, this does not seem to change how Russians value the rouble.

Nevertheless, sound scepticism is currently motivated to the dollar as store of value. Earlier this Spring, Russian Finance Minister, Aleksei Kudrin, questioned the US dollar as international reserve currency. In view of how volatile the dollar course has been in recent years, Kudrin's question has some rationale. People and national banks alike have, to an increasing extent, turned to the euro to hedge currency risks. Of course, this challenges the advantage of seigniorage for the US economy, allowing the country its current budget deficit due to the Iraq war. However, US deficit has now reached such levels that trust in the dollar is inevitably dropping. That oil producers are tending to turn to the euro for setting oil prices instead of the dollar, is a worrying tendency for the US. In view of increasingly diverging interests between Moscow and Washington, Russia's increasing scepticism towards the dollar comes at a time when the US economy is vulnerable to critique. Whether Russian initiatives to rid itself of dollar dependency also have a political motive sparked by deteriorating US-Russian relations is too early to say.

For now, the new legislation is interesting enough. So, will such a law actually work? No, of course not. Banning public use of dollar or euro denominations will have absurd consequences. Looking only at president Putin's recent annual address to the State Duma, it would have rendered him a considerable fine, judging from the number of times he used the "d" word. The new law may also create considerable confusion at the upcoming G8 Summit in Petersburg, as the Duma has recommended the Russian delegation only to use rouble denominations when presenting financial data. Former Finance Minister Boris Fedorov argues that the law will make Russia an international laughing-stock. His successor, Aleksei Kudrin, predicts that state officials will become totally confused by amounts "followed by an infinite number of zeros."

Still, is it not quite natural that a state uses its own currency denominations as a measurement of transactions? What would e.g. an American say if all US prices were in euro, despite the fact that payment would be made in dollar? That a reserve currency - such as the dollar or euro - is used in inflatory or crisis economies is quite natural, because people want to be sure of the value of their money. However, the rouble has preserved its value relatively well for such a long time now, that one should perhaps start reconsidering its value also in psychological terms. This will take time, but one has to start somewhere. It is quite evident that an economy the size of Russia cannot in the long-run go on using foreign currency as its financial gauge. The price of this is too great, not least in terms of transaction-costs and non-deposited money with no interest. So, despite the fact that the specific Duma bill and the debate surrounding it may be laughable, Russia has to start somewhere to normalise its economy. In light of this, the Duma may not be all wrong.

Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.