First Year of Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution

Today, 24 March, is the first anniversary of the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Whether one may speak of a true revolution is not as clear as in the cases of Georgia's rose revolution or Ukraine's orange revolution.

That president Askar Akayev chose to go into exile, today looks rather the effect of the tumultuous events of 24 March 2005 than of a coordinated political action. Rumours of a palace coup or the realisation that the situation under Akayev was politically unsustainable, leading to a managed takeover, have been manifold. No matter what one thinks of this, it is evident that one cannot speak of a people's revolution in the same way as in Georgia and Ukraine. New president Kurmanbek Bakiyev has recently declared 24 March a public holiday. It will be interesting to see whether this will become a day of public celebrations, ridicule or indifference.

Kyrgyzstan, tulip revolution, Akayev, Bakiyev

Belarus: Acta est Fabula - Plaudite

Election offices had hardly closed in Belarus on Sunday evening, as the chairman of the National Election Committe proclaimed that Lukashenka had got some 90% of votes in the presidential elections. This is utterly ludicrous and makes Lukashenka ever more an object of ridicule. Reality, however, makes one see that this is no laughing matter.

It is quite obvious, that these "preliminary results" was more an act of flattery than "real" figures. All the same, as official results were proclaimed, it turned out that Lukashenka had received an overwhelming 82.6% of votes, as compared to the 6% of his main contender, Milinkevich. Election fraud is too poor a word to describe this. It is simply an outrage of unprecedented character and an indication of how far Lukashenka has entered the realms of megalomania. As for actual results, little is known. The Russian Levada Centre is probably the most correct in attributing Lukashenka some 50% of the votes as opposed to 25% to Milinkevich. As these figures indicate, there is little doubt that Lukashenka, at least presently, would win a free and fair election. So, why cheat? The answer is probably that Lukashenka is so full of himself that he knows no other way than to deceive himself and the populace.

Still, the election campaign has in some ways been quite intriguing. Lukashenka has in an alarmist and high-pitched tone warned for western-supported coup attempts and the likes of it. From the looks of it, this seems like either paranoia or a government-run attempt at gathering further support for Lukashenka by producing an external threat. Let us, however, pause for a moment to hypothesize on other options. Has the regime perceived - instead of pretended - that there was a real threat to their power? If so, there might have been three possible sources of such a threat: domestic opposition within and outside the regime, the West, and Russia.

As for open opposition, claims have been made that Aleksandr Kozulin's candidacy for president was staged by Lukashenka in order to split the opposition and support for its main candidate, Milinkevich. Potential opposition within the regime is much harder to speculate on. Most analysts would probably rule out such a possibility, but at least some of Lukashenka's stooges must realise that this cannot go on forever. Any palace coup might only have succeeded with the support or consent of Moscow. Therefore, if pursuing such an argument, this would mean that Moscow might have considered an alternative to Lukashenka. It is well-known that Putin has met with representatives of the Belarusian opposition, but it is also widely held in Moscow that the option of supporting the opposition has been ruled out as unrealistic. However, one might go on with such speculation by asking whether Kozulin was Moscow's man if things with Lukashenka would have got out of hand. The third option, viz. that of a western threat, is on an equally unrealistic level. Western support would certainly have played a limited role in an overthrow of Lukashenka, just like it did during Ukraine's orange revolution. However, as domestic opposition - in all respects - seems unable to make such a move, such speculation leads nowhere.

It is somewhat noteworthy that opposition protesters on Minsk Oktyabrskaya Square have largely been left in peace by the police so far. That the sit-in already is falling prey to a sort of gradual dispersement by the police is quite obvious. This must however be compared to previous official statements that any unsanctioned protests would be heavily cracked down on and demonstrators tried for terrorism. Is Lukashenka feeling so safe as to allow this or are other factors at play? For now nobody knows, and it will thus be all the more interesting to follow as events evolve.

As for Lukashenka, he might now quote a more august leader: Acta est fabula, plaudite! (the play is over, applaud!), at least for this time. With a little luck, Lukashenka will also face his political death in due course, and there will be little place in history for him. For nobody really believes that Lukashenka will be able to continue indefinitely under the motto: "Together towards a strong and prosperous Belarus!"

Belarus, elections, fraud, results, Lukashenko, Milinkevich, Kozulin

Politkovskaya on "Putin's Russia"

"These are my emotional reactions, jotted down in the margins of life as it is lived in Russia today. --- I live in the present, noting down what I see." This declaration is the outset of Anna Politkovskaya's Putin's Russia (London: Harvill Press, 2004). It is an important and urgent book that Politkovskaya has written, where her unfettered subjectivity is both a strength and a weakness. Thereby, she puts the reader to the test of dealing with his own subjectivity in relation to current Russia. One approach is to read the book as Politkovskaya's Russia rather than as Putin's Russia. Those who want to learn more about Putin are also in for a disappointment.

Politkovskaya is an icon in the international media coverage of Russia. It is hard not to join the ranks of those paying homage to her. In Putin's Russia the standard of quality has also risen in comparison to her two previous books on the Chechen conflict. The book is fascinating and seducing reading about the cancer that, according to Politkovskaya, is growing in the corpus of Russian society. Thus, she develops the theme from previous works, though on a wider scale.

How does she describe Putin's Russia? The author, at an early stage, underlines that "This book is not an analysis of Putin's politics." Instead, focus is put on individual fates and processes, claiming to be representative of the state of the nation. Are Politkovskaya's cases representative of current Russia? If so, are they correctly accounted for? These questions are unavoidable, as the cases form into an accusation against Putin, climaxing in a final judgement of this "Akaky Akakievich" of our times. Thus, Politkovskaya cannot avoid scrutiny simply because she "dislikes him." She demands justice and cannot content herself with the president as a symptom of the malaise sociale of the Russian body proper. Chechnya, Dubrovka, Beslan - that would have been enough. Instead, Putin appears both effect and cause of Russia's moral decline - from excesses and injustices to corruption and bandit capitalism. Putin is guilty, if for no other reason, that he lets it happen. He symbolises the self-continuation of repressive power - the symbiosis of the nomenklatura and the noveaux Russes in a hybrid of old and new. Putin represents the continuity of a system that contempts the people, is Politkovskaya's message. At the same time, Putin is absent from Politkovskaya's story. He is a minor character, that still in the end should assume all guilt because "He despises us." These feelings are mutual. Politkovskaya badly covers her despise of Putin, perhaps mostly motivated by that "chance has enabled [him] to clamber to the top of the pile." This sacrilege seems a crime in itself. What about reality - the individual cases that are to prove this guilt?

The desperate struggle against the system of a soldier's mother to reclaim the corpse of her fallen son - Pavel - is contrasted by the same system's struggle to acquit the "war hero" - Budanov - from charges of war crime. While the account of the "Pavel" case is both authentic and characteristic, one might ask whether the "Budanov" case is representative. The use of psychiatry is e.g. put forth as the last straw for the system to rationalise Budanov's crimes. The parallel to the political psychology of the soviet system that Politkovskaya thereby draws, however, poorly corresponds to current realities. Particularities are not equivalent to systematics, no matter how much one might wish so. The state of the army is, contrarily, an area that Politkovskaya masters. She gets her message through with precision: Man is nothing against the dehumanised military system. The loyal and honest are ignored or crushed by the system. "The nail that sticks out shall be hit down."

One is met by the daily struggle of a submarine commander for his own and his family's survival while he still faithfully serves the navy he has dedicated his life to. The old veteran Ivanov is found dead - frozen to the floor of his apartment. The state and the military never cared about them. People are but cogs and wheels of the machinery from cradle to grave. Yeltsin capitulated to the generals and Putin - the officer - has never even tried to reform the army, Politkovskaya claims. She is right about the culture, but as for politics she is naïve. Putin's aim is power and control of the army that he - as an old chekist - fundamentally distrusts. This is struggle - not capitulation.

By the example of Yekaterinburg, Politkovskaya illustrates how the system unites capitalism and criminality, justice and politics in a system of comprehensive corruption. Yekaterinburg is admittedly infamous, but even when going to extremes, the general theme is familiar. The symbiosis between power and money on local and national levels is nothing that will make the reader raise his eyebrow. This image of Russia is already there. As long as the market does not bother power, it is left in peace.

It is, however, when one enters Russian daily life that Politkovskaya is at her best. One is met by the old neighbour Tanya, who has rid herself of her husband and become a likewise successful as ruthless businesswoman. This mediocrity hardens herself and survives. At the other end of the spectrum, we find the gifted - Misha - who has passed from alocohol to murder, from prison to Orthodoxy, to finally throw himself in front of the metro as a gesture to nobody. In these parts, the inner decline and indifference of man and society are painted in its brightest colours.

That Putin's Russia is captivating does not mean that one should uncritically embrace the picture Politkovskaya paints. The rage, indignation and temperament is already familiar and here reaches its peak. Politkovskaya is furious with social evils and misuse of power, with the state of man and morale. It is disturbing that she seeks no alternative explanations, no conciliatory traits. The world is divided between rulers and ruled, perpetrator and victim, black and white. Politkovskaya's critical position is clear. There is nothing wrong with that. Her position is, however, not only personal but also journalistic. Therefore, one must ask: Is Putin's Russia good journalism? The answer is both in the positive and the negative. The kind of socially and politically engaged journalism that Politkovskaya represents has been lost in the West. Her brutal sincerity can be compared to the coarse realism of the American 1930's and "muckraking". Politkovskaya displays snapshots of reality as she sees it. The book cover sends a clear message: Distanced from realities of the people, Putin is merely seen behind the drapers of power.

Stilistically, the text is screaming of a disharmony that can only be met by the reality that it shows. Regrettably, she describes it - with the zeal of the wronged - in too much detail and at too great length. There is a lack of stringency.

How sources are dealt with is also problematic. What is first-, second- or thirdhand sources? How are they assessed and evaluated? Are they correctly represented and in the right context? Can sources be controlled? The research is enormous and there is nothing wrong with the material. It is all very credible, but at the same time, Politkovskaya's unfettered subjectivity demands a higher standard of veracity. To believe in her is not enough. Would anyone else have been able to write the same and would conclusions be similar?

That Politkovskaya is a child of soviet journalism is also clearly displayed by the fact that she seldom lets the reader draw his own conclusions. One has to tell the people what it should think. Politkovskaya is equally masterful in writing and mastering her readers.

To conclude, to whom does Politkovskaya appeal? She does not reach the Russian public. The book is not published in Russia. A western audience is at the centre, but Politkovskaya is desillutioned with being able to influence western policy towards Russia. Neither does she appeal to power - she depsises it. A higher power that sets all things right is not in her liking. The answer is perhaps as simple as: "listen he, who wants to!" Politkovskaya also deserves listeners. Putin's Russia is a persuasive and credible account with a pressing message for students and public alike. But "things surely cannot be that bad," one is asked at the outset. Turning the last page, one is left with the feeling that it really is much worse.

Russia, Putin, Politkovskaya

Zyuganov: US behind bird flu

On Tuesday, Russian communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov went public with his theory that the US is behind the bird flu. Apparently, the spread of bird flu is to be an effect of American biological warfare. Zyuganov's own comment says it all: "Isn't it strange that not a single duck has died in America." Now I only wonder what other diseases Zyuganov might have blamed the US for. AIDS is an obivous candidate, but what more?

Russia, bird flu, Zyuganov, US, biological warfare

Lennart Meri dead

Lennart Meri, former president of Estonia, passed away silently this morning at the age of 76. Having suffered from a brain tumor, Meri was operated on last August and has since not fully recuperated. Therefore, his death came as no surprise to Estonians.

Meri was elected the first president of resurrected Estonia in 1992 and was twice reelected before leaving office in 2001. As president, he brought Estonia closer to Nato and the EU, and could a few years back see his dream of membership in both organisations realised, thus anchoring Estonia firmly to western Europe and forging a transatlantic link also for his country.

Besides his role as president, Meri will go down in history as one of the leaders in Estonia's fight to regain independence by the "singing revolution" and thereby ridding the country of the soviet yoke. As for myself, I will most remember him for the time leading up to the dramatic events of August 1991, when independence was gained. As things were then still quite shaky, Meri took upon himself to organise a government in exile in Helsinki, and over a few hectic weeks he and his young associates prepared for this option in case worse would come to worst. Given his central position for Estonia's freedom, his election as president in 1992 came as no surprise.

Prior to his political engagement, Meri was a well-known author and dramatist. As many others of his generation, he and his family were deported to Siberia by the soviet occupation power during WWII. In contrast to all those lost in Gulag, Meri's family came back to Estonia, without which Estonia and the world would have lost an interesting political leader of these tumultuous times, when witnessing the rebirth of freedom in Eastern Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union.

Estonia, president, Meri, obituary