Wednesday, March 01, 2006

What Prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

Over the past decade, regionalism has resurfaced on the international political agenda. The demise of bipolar division, globalisation, and rekindled cultural affiliation are but a few causes for such development. In a European context, there is reason to question whether the new regions will prove viable constructions, or if some are but transient phenomena in an overall evolution towards a Europe of the regions. Therefore, even advocates of Baltic Sea regionalism must ask –What are the prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

To prove cohesive, regions should be endowed with political dynamics of their own, driven by distinctive agendas, patterns of interaction and governed by regimes. They may be based on identification, institutionalism or functionalism, driven by subjective factors such as history, culture and identity, or by objective factors such as geography, geo-economics and geopolitics.

The rise of regional co-operation
The idea of Baltic co-operation arose in the late 1960’s out of concern for marine pollution in the Baltic Sea. Environmental protection proved an uncontroversial area for co-operation even for states divided by the Iron Curtain. In 1974 the Helsinki Commission was formed to monitor Baltic marine environment. All the same, it was not until the 1990 Ronneby Summit that environmental issues became a nucleus for extended co-operation. The Summit gathered regional heads of government, and for the first time the – then soviet – Baltic republics were allowed high level international representation. Ronneby led to the foundation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, forming the hub of regional co-operation for the decade since. The CBSS was perceived as ”an overall regional forum to focus on needs for intensified cooperation and coordination among the Baltic Sea States” and set as its goal to ”strengthen the cohesion among these countries, leading to greater political and economic stability as well as a regional identity.” The Council comprises the Nordic and Baltic States, Russia, Poland, Germany and the European Commission. The bulk of co-operation has taken place in the large network of issue-specific organisations that developed in the 1990’s. Success or failure for these organisations may determine if the region will gain a common political agenda or be subject to interaction between individual state interests.

A region in the making?
A region of some 70 million people, the Baltic Sea area comprises major population centres of Northern and Central Europe. It looks back on a long tradition of trade and migration dating to the origins of recorded history. Whether dealing with Viking relations with ancient Rus’ or medieval trade within the Hanseatic League, one may find factors of commonality transcending the shores of the Baltic. History may be used as a symbol of unity in the pursuit of a common cultural heritage. In modern times, the Nordic as well as the Baltic States have often been perceived as geographic entities by the outside world. Larger nations, such as Germany, Poland and Russia, have used the region as a gate to either east or west.

If today, a regional identity is to be constructed, substantial development is needed, beside common frameworks and measures facilitating interaction. This includes improving both material conditions for trade and economy, transport and communication, and conditions for social sustainability in fields such as environment and health, democracy and justice. In both areas, directions of overall European integration will prove decisive for further development.

In the early 1990’s, countries of the region fought to grasp the new reality evolving around them. A number of alternatives were considered: formation of a neutral bloc in Central Europe, Baltic States’ admission to the Nordic Council, to mention but a few. Russia’s October 1993 events – the shelling of the White House – combined with Swedish and Finnish 1994 EU accession turned focus towards NATO and EU rapprochement among former Eastern bloc countries. Enlargement became the dominant issue on the agenda. Thus, Baltic Sea co-operation increasingly turned towards the EU, manifested by the 1996 Baltic Sea region initiative. The 1997 Northern dimension emphasised this overall direction. Today, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all entered the European Union. As the map of Europe has once more been redrawn, how will it affect the Baltic Sea region?

Most Baltic Sea states are small countries, which individually have little leverage in an enlarged Union. Forming EU-policies on the basis of regional interests would offer greater influence on the development of the Union. Polish and Baltic membership in the EU has carried prospects for regional policy co-ordination, which - thus far - have been poorly exploited. However, to form a region, Baltic Sea states must realise that success is achieved as much out of common values as out of common interests. Progress towards this aim has gradually been made by regional co-operation, laying a material foundation for a social sense of regional commonality. To assure long-term regional concord, peoples of the Baltic must develop a feeling of shared destiny – a regional identity.

Dividing lines?
It is argued that international co-operation is best pursued among states of comparable size and power. When larger and smaller states interact, co-operation risks either dominance or neglect from the large. In the Baltic Sea region, Germany, Poland and Russia are giants in comparison to other CBSS-members. While German participation in regional co-operation has been stable, EU-membership has extended Poland’s choice of partners in Union affairs. A country of some 40 million, Poland may regard unilateral action, temporary alliance-building or issue-specific agreement with other actors more attractive than Baltic Sea co-operation. Sharing a common Union framework, the Baltic Sea region may still offer sufficient synergy for both Germany and Poland to find regionalism an attractive alternative. Instead, Russia remains the great outstanding issue.

Inclusion versus exclusion was at the top of the 1990’s European agenda. Among CBSS-states, all but Russia are members of either NATO or the EU. Neither is an option for Moscow. Instead, a socio-economic gap is widening between Russia and the rest of Europe. The old debate whether Russia is part of Europe has also resurfaced. Social and material exclusion of the country from European affairs is evolving. Having conceded to NATO enlargement, Moscow’s main concern is access to the European market. Russian WTO accession may prove a means in relations with Europe. If EU-enlargement to the Baltic Sea region excludes Russia from equal terms of trade with other CBSS-states, Moscow may co-operate only as far as it serves her own interests. This would hamper regional integration. The Baltic Sea region may become the major playground for Europe’s Russian dilemma. In all, if the larger CBSS-states start pulling in different directions, the Baltic Sea region will be a concern only for the small. Such development risks endangering long-term regional stability.

What prospects for a Baltic Sea region?
Hopes are as great as misgivings for a Baltic Sea region. What it all winds down to in the end is if the area actually makes for a region. Functionally, the area may form a region in geographic, economic and political terms. Institutionally, regional co-operation has a distinctive agenda and specific patterns of interaction governed by the CBSS-regime. Whether the region will carry its own political dynamics or simply has served as an antechamber to the EU is, however, too early to say. The future of Baltic Sea regionalism will largely depend on the evolution of a regional identity. It is especially encouraging that business and finance increasingly perceive a single Baltic Sea market. Thus, material conditions would form the social basis for regional development. For over a decade now, we have crossed old borders of political and economic division to interact in the pursuit of a common good. In review of some 15 years’ co-operative development, great progress has been made in the formation of a Baltic Sea region, but its realisation is still too early to predict.

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Luzhkov Bans Moscow's Pride

Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has decided to ban the city's first ever gay pride parade, despite vows to end discrimination, the website GayRussia reports. The Moscow Pride '06 festival was to take place 24-28 May, but now organisers are unsure whether they will be able to go through with the event.

The ban does not come as a surprise to the Russian gay movement. The situation for gays in Eastern Europe is generally poor. In June last year, the Polish gay movement ignored a ban on their Pride parade and marched through Warzaw. In July, the Pride parade in Riga, Latvia, was interrupted by protesters. Moscow is, therefore, not unique in its intolerance towards gay people.

All the same, western human rights' advocates have acted to lift the Moscow ban. Among others, Human Rights Watch, protests against the decision in a letter to mayor Luzhkov, and urges him to reconsider. It, however, seems unlikely that the golubye and rozovye will march the streets of Moscow in May.

I am perhaps naïve, but I simply cannot see what it is with homo-, bi- or transsexuality that provokes so deep reactions in Eastern Europe. This sort of bigotry, surely, does not belong to modern society, as it appears to me. I mean, what do they have to fear? An alternative way of life or general dissent from the social norm? OK, I surely do not understand everything that the HBT-movement is up to and generally take little interest in it. However, they have as much a right to freedom of speech and expression as I have. Thus, governments in Eastern Europe simply have to deal with the issue of equal rights to their citizens regardless of political affinity, religion, ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation. Then they will have something to pride themselves of.

Monday, February 27, 2006

Chechnya - Bloody Harvest

Sun was shining over the freshly harvested fields. Was this really Chechnya, the reign of terror that he had heard so much about? Thoughts of the idyllic picture before his eyes were interrupted by his Chechen companion's comment: "It's the new cluster bombs. Their razor-sharp projectiles shave the face of the earth clean."

This story of a western journalist, travelling through Chechnya a few years back, serves to illustrate how difficult it is to comprehend the infathomable realities of daily life in this war-ridden country.

Only today, Sveriges Radio (Swedish State Radio) reports on a mysterious illness that has struck the population - mostly children - of Chelkovskaya, a village some 70 kilometres from Grozny. Symptoms with difficulties breathing and stomach-pains have led the local population to assume that the illness is caused by Russian troops dumping nerve gas or some other poison near the village. Russian authorities, however, claim that symptoms are wholly psychosomatic, and that there is no ground for the dumping allegations.

Last Friday, UN Human Rights Commissioner, Louise Arbour, said that there is "a climate of fear" in Chechnya, caused by the "very serious shortcomings of the law enforcement system," BBC reports. The area "has still not been able to move away from a society ruled by force to one governed by the rule of law," according to Arbour. Having finished a week-long trip to Russia and the Northern Caucasus, Arbour met with president Putin to discuss human rights issues. It is not hard to imagine that the two - despite diplomatic decorum - had difficulties sharing a common view on the situation.

Needless to say, regular talks on and visits to Chechnya, by representatives of the international community, are important to highlight the situation in the republic. The question is to what extent they help to lay the foundations of peaceful conflict resolution and reconstruction of Chechen society. Not even the Russian government seems able to grasp the situation in full - blinded by their "war on terror" and society's rampant racist sentiments towards Chechens. Also, it seems unlikely that the West will grasp realities and act on them for a true change of the situation. Regrettably, it is safe to assume that - also this year - the only harvesting the Chechen people will see, is that of the great reaper.

EU Funds Broadcasting to Belarus

On Friday, RFE/RL reports that the European Union will be funding independent broadcasting to Belarus in the amount of 2 million Euro over at two year period. Radio transmissions begin on February 26 and will mainly emanate from Poland and Lithuania. Despite the source of funding, radio stations are to be independent from the EU. This is less than a month before the 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, and Lukashenka's regime will be sure to see it as an EU provocation.

Targeting a youthful audience, European Radio for Belarus and Radio Baltic Wave are to give Belarusians alternative access to information in the same manner that RFE/RL did during the Cold War. Programmes will be in both Belarusian and Russian, and be broadcast on the FM band and via the Internet.

Already in January, EU Commission spokeswoman, Emma Udwin, declared that "There will be specific TV and radio programs dedicated to the elections broadcast ahead of the election date," EU Business reports.

The new radio stations are, however, not the only independent foreign media targeting Belarus. For long, Radio Racja had regular transmissions to Belarus, but in the end had to stop sending due to lack of funding. By this project, however, Radio Racyja seems to have been adopted by the new European Radio for Belarus. Also, Deutsche Welle, has been targeting programmes at a Belarusian audience.

Rumour also has it that president Lukashenka, during a recent visit to China, took great interest in Chinese authorities' methods to control the Internet by banning and screening information. Although this may be too late for the upcoming 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, we will be sure to hear more about such measures by Lukashenka during his third term in office.

Sunday, February 26, 2006

Global Voices Review

Following up on my survey of the Swedish Blogosphere on "Eastern Europe," Global Voices yesterday included a reference to the piece in their Global Roundups.

It is not the first time that they have reviewed my blog over its three months' existence. Earlier this week, their ever so diligent Nathan Hamm - also known for his Registan.net - referred to my critical comment on ICG's recent report on Uzbekistan.

I am the first to admit that there is a narcissist element in getting referred to for what you write. The greater good, however, is that the volunteers of Global Voices do the same for a multitude of other blogs. This is perhaps not news to most of you, but an éloge must be made to all the young men and women who take the time to review various aspects of the blogosphere. Without them, we would be at a loss to find our way on the global blog scene. Now, instead, bloggers around the world can be in touch with what others write and comment about, and ultimately enter into dialogue. For me, that is what it is all about. Writing for the fun of it and having fun seeing what others write, and - perhaps - to find people with common interests with whom one might exchange views and ideas.