Medvedev and the "Belarusian Circus"

For Global Voices Online: A picture says more than a thousand words, the saying goes. An Instagram snapshot that the Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev tweeted as a tacit comment to his visit to Minsk sure does: the "Belarusian Circus." 

During Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Minsk on Wednesday, July 18, he tweeted [ru] an Instagram snapshot with the comment: "In the streets of Minsk." The problem with the picture is that it portrayed the Belarusian State Circus, which could be interpreted as a tacit comment on Medvedev's meeting with the Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and senior state officials. 

 Medvedev's visit to Minsk was no courtesy visit. A recent smuggling scandal has aroused much anger in Moscow, and Medvedev used the meeting to bring Lukashenko to account for the export of chemical solvents produced from the Russian supplies of duty-free oil. Another item on the agenda, according to RIA Novosti [ru], was the recent intrusion into Belarusian airspace by a Swedish plane dropping teddy bears with anti-Lukashenko slogans. The bear incident was a major embarrassment for Belarus in view of the two countries' joint air defence system. As a consequence, a student [ru] who published a photostory about the bears, and a 16-year-old girl [ru], who allegedly took a photo of one of the bears, got arrested by the KGB.  

Then, how did social media react to the "Belarusian circus"? Twitter user @minssk united [ru] the two themes of the circus and the teddies:

Медведев прилетел в Минск, сфоткал цирк. До этого прилетали медведи, тот ещё цирк был, но с фотографом там не хорошая история получилась.

Medvedev flew to Minsk and photographed a circus. Before this, bears flew in, which was quite a circus too, but the story with the [detained] photographer wasn't good.

Some, like @Dubovnik_Dmitry, turned to sarcasm [ru] when commenting:

Медведев отметил минский цирк твитом:-) видно для того чтобы подчекнуть куда он приехал.

Medvedev mentioned the Minsk circus in a tweet:-) obviously to underline what kind of place he had come to.

Twitter user @daphnis_nerii assumed [ru] a more ironic tone:

Информационные порталы страны разместили новость о том, что Медведев сфоткал цирк. Что было бы, если б он в Беларуси в туалет сходил?

Information portals spread the news that Medvedev photographed a circus. How would it have been if he had gone to the toilet in Belarus?

Still, as Twitter user @yurok1521 asked [ru], the question on everyone's lips is this:

Медведев намекнул на «цирк» в правительстве Беларуси?

Did Medvedev hint that there is "a circus" in the government of Belarus?

What Medvedev's intention with the tweet was, only he knows, but if it was a joke, it testifies to a certain sense of humour of the former Russian president with the nickname 'iPhonchik'.

A Disgruntled Middle Class May Cause Putin's Fall

For Newsmill.se: Putin's inability to deliver on his promises sows the seeds to the civil society thay may cause his downfall. It does not suffice anymore to throw out bones to the middle class.


Yesterday, Russia headed to the polls with no real choice. The winner was predetermined. Putin moves in to the Kremlin again, this time with a six year mandate and an option for another presidential term until 2024. A quarter of a century with Putin however appears increasingly unthinkable. The reason is not popular protest, but because Putin's policy is passé. The soviet structural legacy has caught up with Russia and plans to solve problems turned into idle talk. Russians want what Putin cannot do. Instead, people choose their own solutions. Personal interest is turned into societal interest, and the seeds of civil society are sown. 

Largely, Russian challenges reflect western, in terms of an aging population, deficient infrastructure, environmental problems, health and education, but on a much deeper level. Consequences of decades of lacking investment become all the more intrusive into Russian everyday life. Politics turns into an arena of what one must do, and not what one wants. When what one must is not possible, power turns irrelevant for the citizens.

Few things in Russian societal discourse has been discussed with such obsession in recent years as all the plana that necessarily must be realized to meet the challenges of the future. Plan succeeds plan, but results are lacking and the country is sliding deeper and deeper into stagnation. Plans have made politics a prisoner of its own rhetorics, and reality has overtaken Putin in his zeal to catch up. The result is threading on in the same old tracks until running in circles. In practise, there has been a single political priority - stability - that has crowded out all plans for change. Putin's political stability thus paradoxically leads to the opposite - political instability. 

Some events define a regime regardless of whether perceptions are real or not. For Putin, it was terrorism and coloured revolutions. Thus, the play of circumstances set preconditions for an entire political era. Thus, a pathological obsession with internal and external enemies has turned Russian politics insane. Thus, fears of a flawed perception of reality arise. Because when threat turns into norm, the desire for normality rises. The western threat appears as paranoia. Terror becomes all the more tragic when authorities fail - as in Beslan and at the Dubrovka theatre - to deal with it, with an increasing sense of powerlessness as a result. The power of habit is great and the mantra of threat makes realities unreal when rhetorics turn danger into myth. Everyday threats become more real than those of the world, when causes of accident, unhealth, and insecurity are found in the inactivity of a state that self-centredly reflects itself in its own greatness instead of creating a better society for its citizens. 

Because it is a state that grows and grows but is capable to do less and less. When urgency is growing, it is not the state that puts down the fire. This realization grew during the great wildfires that ravaged central Russia during summer 2010. The state not only stood idly by faced by catastrophe, but withheld information that in too many cases could determine life or death to the public. The silence from authorities in connection to major accidents and disasters previously experienced now assumed massive proportions. However, people refused to passively stand by and watch their homes burn to the ground, and instead voluntarily joined together to fight approaching danger, e.g. with the use of social media. Information about the fires was gathered, fire-fighting coordinated and fighting equipment purchased - all on the initiative of ordinary people. The inactivity and incapability of the state forced people to voluntarily help each other. Society turned out to be greater than the state. 

The 2010 fires have ignited a flame that glows brighter and brighter in Russian sosciety by various big and small efforts. Many small and inconspicuous initiatives have been made previously. It may e.g. be policemen and security servants, who informally try to fight corruption and flaws within their own professions. It may be motorists, who inform each other about the corruption of traffic-police. Examples are growing in numbers, and so far it is more a matter about disclosing than fix the flaws and failures of society. What is decisive is that this type of citizen initiatives are not fundamentally political, or at least not perceived as such by participants and surroundings. You simply wants to solve the concrete problems that sorrounds you in everyday life. However, the effect is political in a way are difficult to master by state and authorities, because how does one accuse peole who merely want to improve their country. Many are patriots and honest people. Many also support Putin and his regime.

Here, the Internet has become both a tool to find likeminded people and to build platforms for information and action. It is this type of ideas and initiatives that the famous oppositional blogger Navalny has collected and built his fame on. Thereby, he has made the apolitical political, and turned apathy into sympathy for a spontaneous movement, first with the aim to achieve free and just elections, and then to depose of Putin. The same type of Internet platforms that previously were used to report fires are now used to coordinate voluntary election observation and to report irregularities and fraud at the ballots of Sunday's presidential elections. 

This is a development, which is hard to curb. To crack down on the opposition in the aftermath of elections is one thing. To crack down on those who only wants to do good is a completely different matter. As logics and mechanisms of citizen initiatives are the same, it is next to impossible for the regime to distinguish friend from foe. Already the protests planned for Monday may put the loyalty of police and security service to its test. Opposition demonstrations have gradually turned into festivals. To meet people with violence and brutality is something one for good reason hesitates to do, and it is probably seen as a last way out, both because of the message it would send and for fear of losing control over developments. Even if the opposition gathers masses in the tens or hundreds of thousands, demonstrations only affects relatively few. Many simply do not understand or care what it is all about.

Sunday's elections may not change Russia on the surface, but at its dephts it is a society that gradually is changing at its core. We are witnessing the growth of Russian civil society. Its significance should not be exaggerated, but neither should it be underestimated as both the plan and the rules of the game are changing. The discontent of a growing middle class must be taken seriously and the forms and contents of politics change when people organize. It does not suffice to throw bones around every now and then. Citizens want to sit at the tables of power in a way Russian politics do not understand. It is a question of power over everyday life, about close and concrete problems. Who is in the Kremlin is less important, but power must understand that the needs of the people must be reckoned with. The people deserves to be taken seriously and the needs of society cannot constantly come last in turn. 

Are we then witnessing the end of the Putin era? The truth is that there are no good answers. Still, the Kremlin's communicative disaster in relation to a discontent and protesting middle class cannot go on, as it is now increasingly assuming the forms of political schizophrenia. The middle class mania of power is a constant theme of societal discourse. Now, the middle class is regarded as preservers of society and a self-interested guarantee for continued stability. Now, it is seen as movers of society and a source of Russian reform policies. Now, it is portrayed as subverters of society and traitors, when it demonstratively makes reasonable and righteous demands on politics. At length, the effect is that power turns the middle class away from itself, adds to uncertainty and insecurity, and makes the unthinkable thinkable - a Russia without Putin. Because the more the Kremlin fear propaganda adds to the image that Putin is the only alternative to chaos, crisis, and war, the less serious and credible will he appear as a politician. Propaganda risks turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the personalization of Putin into an icon of a Russia in decay.

The rifts in Putin's coulisses grow and it becomes increasingly difficult just to patch up. Through the growing holes nothing and no-one is seen. The future scenery is dark and gloomy, against a towering warfare backdrop. Many also remember how Putin once sprung out of nothing onto the scene to play the lead role in more than a decade's Russian politics. A new cast for the play may by extension not be excluded, even if it is improbable that the curtain will drop for Putin. Still, it is a changed country that now emerges. We may not trust Russia, but does that mean that we do not trust the Russians when people now rely on their own abilities instead of state stagnation. When Russians are not given any choice, they make their own choices.

State is Greatest Enemy to Russian Economy

For Veckans Affärer: In 2010, business paper Euromoney Magazine awarded Russia's Alexei Kudrin finance minister of the year in the world. Less than a year later, he was sacked by president Medvedev and joined a fragmented Russian opposition. This is just one example of how state and politics become Russian economy's greatest enemies. Growing political unrest in the runup to Sunday's presidential elections emanates from middle class discontent with failing governance, corruption, and political parasitism. "Stability, stagnation, and then what?" is what an increasing number of Russians ask themselves. Uncertainty about the future has suddenly increased the political risks with Russian economy.

Russian economy is in good shape. With a budget in balance, one of the lowest state debts among major countries, just over 4% growth and 5% inflation in 2011, the country's prospects seem bright. Threats are the usual: Falling oil prices and turbulence in the financial markets. Despite positive signs, we now see a lapse in recent years' dynamic developments. A temporary "wait and see" in the runup to Sunday's elections may lead to a more permanent economic slow-down because of political inability to cater for long-term economic needs.

January witnessed the greatest financial outflow from Russia since the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Growth was at zero and inflation is expected to rise during 2012. Where political analysts are silent, the market speaks out clearly. Trust in state and politics plummets, as the failed December parliamentary elections have dislodged the power and interest balance within United Russia - the country's ruling politico-economic cartel.

Even if fears prove exaggerated, it will take much time before the system reaches equilibrium again. The effects of prominent politicians' resignations become increasingly clear. Above all, Kudrin's sound financial policy has been replaced by overbid policies and pork-barrelling. Increased state expenditures is like throwing money into a black hole, believing it is a wishing-well. The flow of money instead runs from the oil wells, where energy constitutes a third of state income. Outside the energy sector, only middle class consumption drives the economy.

Putinism's political strategy - to promote the middle class in exchange for power - has failed. Instead, they have to bear the burden of a bureaucracy, which has grown by 40% since 2000. State efficiency has constantly fallen since 2003, with a corruption that affects everyday life of an increasing number of Russians. Only during 2011, the level of bribes tripled, accordning to the Interior Ministry. Bureaucracy and corruption are poisoning the flexible and dynamic business climate, where everything was forbidden, but everything also possible. Opportunities have decreased and hopes for the future changed to skepticism and discontent. Recent popular protests have thus greater depth than ordinary political opposition, as the state obstructs basic preconditions to earn money and make a decent living.

Except for the country's dependence on oil prices, Russian society is confronting fundamental structural challenges, which demand an increase in economic diversity. Declining demography reduces the number of Russians of productive age. Mounting flaws in infrastructure, health, environment, and education threaten to shrink productivity. Politics has not only failed to address these flaws. It has also reduced the economic incentives of the middle classes to contribute to diversification. 

What worries most, is the increase in political polarization that Putin now propels. The protesting middle class, with reasonable demands on those in power, is portrayed as traitors. This is a dangerous message and illustrates a contempt for those, who until recently were seen as Russia's future. As derision turns into threats against protesters, Putin alienates and provokes the very groups that have greatest potential to contribute to the country's further development and shows that material more than human resources are seen as the source of Russian growth. The economy may be sound, but as long as political malaise is spreading in the social body, risks will grow for Russian economy as people now have had enough of Putin.

Saturday May Show the Way for Russia's Spring

For Newsmill.se: The political landscape is characterized by an uncertainty without comparison during the Putin era. How the Russian leaders will handle continued mass protests, they probably do not know themselves. We are heading towards an uncertain spring.   


It was said about Hilding Hagberg, the Swedish 1950s communist leader, that he used to unfold his umbrella when it was raining in Moscow. Kremlin interest in the powers of weather has seldom been as great as now, for the Saturday 4 February opposition protests. Weather might decide the size of demonstrations and thereby the power in demands for Putin's dismissal. On Christmas eve, 100,000 gathered for the largest protests since the fall of the Soviet Union - an unwelcome reminder for the country's leadership that power is not a given.

A prognosis for continued developments up until the 4 March presidential elections is something few want to make today. The political landscape is still characterized by an uncertainty without comparison during the Putin era. How the Russian leaders will handle continued mass protests, they probably do not know themselves. We are heading towards an uncertain spring.

The Russian "tandemocracy" - with Putin at the handlebar and Medvedev as navigator - is swaying precariously when the map does not match reality. The roadmap has been thwarted and where things are heading, nobody knows. No wonder the passengers protest.

Russia during Putin may be read as a success story for a country in chaos and disarray after the collapse of the Soviet empire. A political mess and economic crisis turned into stability and growth, with the emergence of a thriwing middle class - although under increasing authoritarian rule. However, the Russian power paradox remains: The more formal state power, the less ability to exercise it. With the exception of political stability and some recent improvements in the rule of law, state governance capabilities have deteriorated since 2004. In Russian everyday life, this means constant encounters with corruption and wrongs without limitations or end. With falling energy incomes, power may no longer compensatre for discontent, at the same time as an increasingly affluent people demands more from those in power. Stagnation is seen in a system and confidence crisis.

When Putin's presidential candidacy became clear last year, to many it was a sloping road without end. With twelve years in the rear mirror, six year terms and two terms, the perspective of Putin as president was 2024 - half a lifetime for many Russians. The temperature in public opinion - the state of the nation - fell under zero in late summer, with some mild weather during autumn, to turn to new winter cold  after the botched December parliamentary elections, with Putin's support for "the party of crooks and thieves" - United Russia. The voter barometets of the polling institutes are uncertain and at times inflated. Still, approval ratings for Putin have been halved over the last year from 60% to 27%. All the same, he would - lacking alternatives - get half the votes. 

It is thus the lack of alternatives that Putin now attacks. He puts stability, prosperity and national unity against the opposition's chaos, crisis, nationalism and disarray. Is that enough for a victory or must he rely on the system - aimed at fighting "coloured revolutions" - that he has built? The answer is uncertain. On the other hand, crisis is not Putin's greatest talent, with a record of bad judgement, bad information processing, hasty decisions, and sometimes ruthless brutality. Caution and apprehension thus signify regime reactions in the hope of improved sentiments. At the same time, the threat of confrontation is in the air. The question is if the system trusts itself anymore.

For many, an end of the Putin era would be dangerous and unrealistic wishful thinking. However, the power of wishful thinking should not be underestimated, when feelings replace the rationality Putin appeals to. The opposition is no realistic alternative, but the Putinist regime's lack of openness, new thinking, and perspective, carries as little allure. Eventually, one may simply rely on the gut-feeling, as Russians have always done - putting trust in yourself instead of those in power, who only offer more of the same.

Feelings are like weather. No one controls them, not even in a managed democracy. Dark clouds are piling up, but perhaps a ray of hope glimmers out of the dark skies of Russian democracy. Are we heading towards a Russian spring, or will there be a new front of Russian cold? The answer will be given after the 4 March presidential elections, but perhaps we will get an advance glimpse already on Saturday 4 February, as people gather in protest against corruption and misrule in Russian streets and squares. The Kremlin can no longer simply unfold its umbrella and pretend it is raining. Can we?

Why Putin Receives Popular Support

For Newsmill.se: If not Putin - then who? The bitter truth is that twelve years with Putin have eradicated next to all viable alternatives in Russian politics.

"Resign Putin!" has been the primary popular demand of the protests that have shaken Russia ever since the country's farsical parliamentary elections at the beginning of December. An increasingly clear dividing line is now drawn between constructive and destructive interests in Russian politics, where the power's mudslinging of the opposition is a double-edged sword in the political battle that is now underway before open curtain in Moscow, but where the question also is whether the opposition can and wants to shoulder the responsibility that a revolution would involve. Here an open letter from Boris Berezovsky - an exiled oligarch - risks setting the tune to portray the opposition as irresponsible western lackeys with the single aim of causing chaos and set fire to Russia.

When one of Russia's most hated men, Boris Berezovsky, in an open letter to Putin appeals to him that he should resign, the question is whether the purpose is that he should meet popular demands or if the oligarch simply wants to throw a torch at the powder keg that Russian politics have evolved into over the last one and a half month.

Abandoned by both friends and enemies, Putin soon has only the Russian Orthodox left to turn to for protection, as Berezovsky portrays it, and the oligarch turns to the Russian leader in a prayer that he will save the country from a bloody revolution. The reply from the Moscow patriarchate was swift: "All the previous doings of this man prompts a single thought. Listen attentively to this gentleman and do exactly the opposite of what he proposes."

As is so often the case in Russian politics, it is at the same time a both skilled and primitive game that is played out and, of course, this may be viewed merely as yet another cynical ouverture from an exiled oligarch, who seizes every opportunity to sow conflict among the Russian elite from which he himself has become an outcast and now has no influence over.

Berezovsky's ouverture puts the finger on a crucial point in the pre-election debate: "If not Putin, then who?" The bitter truth is that 12 years with Putin have eradicated next to all alternatives in Russian politics. Both history and the present show that opposition leaders either are those who have not been able to get along with Putin or they are marginalised and compromised politicians from both left and right, who have long been thought obsolete.

On two points, Berezovsky is right. The first is that the party in power, United Russia, stands on the brink of disaster. Several of the party's most prominent representatives have been forced to resign and the internal conflicts of interest, that Putin for so long has either skilfully balanced or swept under the carpet, are now out into the open. The second is how the Orthodox church is a power that stands above politics. If the United Russia power coalition collapses under internal and external pressure, then it is possible that the church will stand out as the single unifying force, which may act with sufficient moral weight to avoid chaotic and potentially violent developments.

With the December protests, bottled up discontent has been unscrewed and the spirit has been let out. The current critical media coverage - even on television - would not have been possible or even conceivable a mere month ago. There is discussion about a second glasnost - openness. People in common welcome a lustration and weathering of the stale smell of power, which for so long has lain like a wet blanket of corruption over Russian everyday life. At the same time, Putin and his forces have begun to mobilize a counterattack. The further course of the battle and its final outcome remain uncertain.

When Berezovsky from his western exile pleads with Putin to save Russia by sacrificing himself, he does not only play with a Putinist system on an increasingly loose foundation, but he also plays into the hands of the Russian leader's attempts at blackening the opposition. The motive for an otherwise impotent Berezovsky wants to add to the confrontation of Russian society in order for it to collapse under its own weight.

That the fallen oligarch's, Berezovsky, letter to Putin has been published by the independent radio station Echo of Moscow, has opened the watergates for a crackdown on this leading alternative news outlet. Recently, Putin accused the radio station for "pouring diarrhoea on him all day long" and to b on a western leash. Also other opposition leaders have come in for their shares after a meeting with the new US ambassador to Russia. A picture of the well-known blogger and opposition activist with the (Jewish-born) Berezovsky was also recently published later to be found photoshopped with. The theme is familiar and alludes to the foundations of the Putinist system, namely that oligachs in association with western interests want to plunder and weaken Russia by usurping state power. From the oligarch rule of the Yeltsin era to the coloured revolutions of Eastern Europe, the western threat - often with an anti-semitic undertone - has been drummed into public consciousness in order to legitimize an increasingly corrupt regime. When the backwash of the Arab spring and popular protests in other parts of the world now rolls in over Russian shores, it is a short step to pull off some old tricks.

The system to exercise power that Putin constructed during his presidential reign departed from the role of the office as guarantor of the constitutional order in a very thwarted interpretation. To safeguard the internal and external sovereignty, the constitution was interpreted in a way that gave the president a constant and pragmatic right to declare a state of emergency in both small and big matters. This interpretation was accompanied by systematic legislative work, where basic civic rights and freedoms were limited to the point that they were under constant threat of being repealed in practical legal application. The motive was to prevent illegitimate interests from usurping state power, because without sovereignty - the capacity to self-rule - there could be no talk of civic rights and freedoms. This meant centralization of power and intolerance towards dissent. The result is evident today in a system with both the right and resources to repression, ready to nip any negative manifestation of views in the bud.

What recent events have illustrated is a disorientation and a faltering will to exercise this power. When police and security services stand idle in front of mass protests the fears and apprehensions of repression and retaliation have faltered. It is an inner struggle of popular conscience, filled with undecisiveness to stability or change, where questions of courage, morale, and conviction are put to the test not only among those in power or in opposition, but also to a greater extent among ordinary people. It is simply difficult to picture a future without Putin - to thread into the unknown. One knows what one does not want, but not what one wants. This uncertainty is now used by Putin by urging, in his recently published electoral platform, for reform instead of a repetition of the mistakes committed in the wake of the country's previous revolutionary convulsions. How successful this tested formula will be this time is yet to be determined, as an increasing number of people associate continued stability with increasing stagnation.

Putin's credibility as a reformer is limited, as twelve years in power have shown little result despite recurrent plans and persistent attempts at reform. The division of powers between an executive Prime Minister and a reformatory President, which would have driven change, has moreover led to an increasingly marginalised Medvedev, despite the latter's attempts at forming a higher profile and greater independence during the last four years' "tandemocracy".

With the December events, Putin's popularity figures have reached a low. From a persistent support of some 70% of Russians, figures now oscillate around 50%. Additionally, in the latest opinion poll - from a state-directed institute - a quarter of respondents state that they have lost confidence in him. Much thus indicates that the results of the 4 March presidential vote will determine whether Russians will consider the elections as legitimate or not. If Putin receives more than 50% of votes and the election is decided by a single ballot, people are likely to question its validity. Being forced to a second round might however also be construed as a sign of weakness, which could strengthen the opposition in the runup to the final ballot. The temptation to tamper with the vote to gain a appropriate result may therefore increase in the eyes of power.

Putin's leadership will be put to a hard test in the coming months. Previous experiences have shown that he has difficulties in coping with crisis situations, which either have caused passivity or rash decisions. There is good ground to assume that Putin under such circumstances has trouble to reconsider and act in changing and unclear situations. The Russian leadership currently appears fumbling to grasp various ways of handling popular protests, with both concession and confrontation. The overarching tendency though seems to be to tighten the screws on the opposition. Several representatives of the opposition and their relatives have become subject to direct or indirect threats and reprisals. The great protest manifestation planned for February 4 has also been banned by Moscow authorities.

As Russia now is likely to meet with continued popular protest, it constitutes a balance act for Putin and his power apparatus. If he chooses to be too tough in quelling the opposition, the popular reaction may lead to greater protest to the extent that it threatens the regime. The risk is then that loyalty to power will collapse like a house of cards. At the same time, it is hard for Putin to allow continued public critique of how Russia is ruled, as it may lead to the same result in an avalanche of discontent over social evils disclosed. The question is if he will be capable of balancing between confrontation and tolerance.

That most people seem to take it for granted that Russia's next president will be called Vladimir Putin is also rather a curse than a blessing, as it creates unclarities as to which voter groups will be activated or become passive - regime supporters or opponents. The question here is if the mere threat of instability may drive the people to the ballots in support of the prevailing order. Will Putin be able to portray his policies as constructive and that of the opposition as destructive, there is still a chance that he may conquer a positive agenda in relation to the electorate. Here, it appears that the letter of the widely hated Berezovsky comes as a godsend, but at the same time sows a seed for a dirty election campaign, which may eventually be a curse to Putin.

What the outcome will be may be indicated at the 4 February opposition protests - already the next weekend.The final say will however be made only by the 4 March presidential elections. The question then is if fears for a white revolution and instability or the wish for free and fair elections will emerge victorious. Because, regardless of how one judges the Russian regime's ability to weather the storm, the recent protests mean that Russia stands at a crossroads between repression, revolution, or reforms.

Is Also Russia Finally Awakening?

For Newsmill.se: As tens of thousands gather in Moscow and other Russian cities, it is in protest against a corrupt regime, which no longer can provide its people with a belief in the future that might legitimize its further possession of power. The feeling of "we cannot live like this anymore" that became the hallmark of the last days of the soviet empire has reawakened, but the question is only how decisive this feeling will be for the further development of the country.

Russia is currently undergoing one of the most interesting and crucial phases since the Russian revolution. In contrast to the chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union, these are developments that are met with open eyes. Fundamentally, it is a question of whether the political system that has been created may assume the great structural challenges, which the country will meet with over the next decade. In short, all the problems and deficiencies that have been ignored since 1991 will peak around 2020: Demography, infrastructure, economy, environment, health and medical care, education, etc. The list goes on in what seems like eternity, but it essentially means that the people will meet with an increasingly tougher everyday life at the same time as people in power either do not want to or are unable to do anything about it.

The comparison with the dramatic fall of the Soviet Union however risks leading thoughts astray, as the challenges Russia currently is facing are of another character and dignity than was the case 20 years ago. The country instead is sick with a slow but fatal disease if not proper medication is administered. Here, the question is whether Putin and Medvedev are the right doctors.

That we now see people take to the streets and squares on a scale not witnessed since the soviet demise in 1991 is on the surface a consequence of the farcical fraud that took place at the 4 December parliamentary elections. To an even higher degree, it bears witness of a growing popular realization of a profound systemic crisis and that the current regime is uncapable of assuming rising challenges. Power is not even capable of arranging election fraud without it becoming embarrassingly obvious how badly organizsed even the fraud is. For Russians in general it thereby stands beyond doubt that elections are primarily intended for the division of power within the reigning United Russia party and not even represents an approximate popular will. That is an arrogance of power that fewer and fewer Russians are willing to accept.

That a Google search under the Russian term of "party of crooks and thieves" ends up with United Russia as first result is as good an evidence as any of how corrupt the regime is considered. People are simply not prepared to go on along a road chosen that seems to go over the cliffs. The question is how strong and wide the public wrath is and if it is sufficient for continued and increased outdoor protests in sub-zero degrees when the Russian New Year approaches with party and leisure. Disconent with the system still remains and handling it may become a hard task for both Putin and Medvedev for the upcoming 4 March presidential elections. A lot may still happen before then.

What kind of a system is it then that has been constructed during the Putin era and now is questioned by an increasing number of people? Simplified, it is a classic trade-off between power and people. Political power is handed over to an elite in exchange for economic prosperity. From an ideological perspective, Russia's political system is very alarming in combination with a failure of power to deliver on its economic promises.

That civil rights and freedoms have been heavily limited over the last decade has probably been observed by most. These limitations are however not only systematic but depart from an interpretation of the constitution with very reactionary roots. The role ascribed to presidential power under Putin departed from the ideology of the reigning party United Russia, which then was called "sovereign democracy". 

The fundament is a system where the president - or sovereign - always has the final say. In its pure form, the president has the constant right to proclaim a state of emergency without democratic accountability.What constitutes a rule of exception, only the president is privy to determine. In essence, it is from this constitutional interpretation that the country's systematic limitations of civil rights and freedom should be perceived. In current Russia the Damocletian sword is constantly hanging over the heads of each and everyone who expresses a divergent view and opposition is considered extremism and an attempt to usurp state power.

Despite president Medvedev's skepticism towards this constitutional interpretation and a high measure of pragmatism in its implementation, it remains a political system practically applied. The practical reason is that supreme political power in Russia has been transformed into a role of arbiter between conflicting political and economic interests, which lack democratic legitimacy and mandate. It is in light of this that the reigning United Russia party should be considered a representation of disparate interests, where primarily Putin but also Medvedev have had to act as arbiters to preserve domestic peace among cynical actors only looking out for their own egotistical interests. As parliamentary elections were carried through, the main purpose was to divide power and positions between different interests within United Russia and not to allow for any expression of real public will.

Why then protest now, in connection to elections to an apparently powerless parliament, when elections for the mighty presidential office awaits in just a few months time? As the Russian electoral system has been designed, it constitutes a two-stage rocket, where parliamentary elections in December determines the division of power within United Russia and presidential elections in March decides who will act as arbiter during the coming six years. That an increasing number of Russians now rise against this system is thus not that strange, as the parliament by way of United Russia symbolizes the corrupt exercise of power felt in everyday life. Protests emanate more from the effects of the system than from its contents.

That the economic component of the trade-off between elite and people has failed is obvious. United Russia's urging the Russians to "enrich yourselves" has not been accompanied by such economic liberalizations that would allow for a wider popular enrichment. Against the background of growing corruption and bribery, today's Russian youth do not consider enterprise and entrepreneurship as a method to reach a reasonable living standard. Instead, the youth is encouraged to seek their livelihood by serving the state within the public sphere. That the future of the young generation would lie within the public sector however rests on the cynical perspective that the more people are corrupted the less will be the interest to upset the fundaments of the system. What stands out is a reality where on the one hand every public office may be purchased at a determined price and on the other hand that the citizens' price list to access public services is decided by the cost of appropriating a public office. As bureaucracy grows, corruption feeds itself and becomes sui generis in a way that lies beyond the bounds of any political exercise of power. In this context, the December parliamentary elections have become a symbol of the corruption and lawlessness, which means that many Russians have lost their fate in the future.

Considering the fragmented opposition and an almost total lack of political alternative, the political failure of Putin and Medvedev becomes evident. Basically, this failure consists of increasing differences between political vision and reality. Despite the image in the West of great limitations on societal discourse, the discussion of the great challenges Russia is confronting has been both extensive and nuanced, and pointed to both acute and necessary measures from area to area. Most Russians thus know what awaits during the coming years if not drastic and extensive measures are imposed. Putin, Medvedev, and United Russia, have also presented plan after plan, which though have fallen apart when confronted by realities. Plans may be great, but without the capability to implement them, they eventually just end up the object of ridicule. The system's principle for a divsion of power has simply left Russia without a competent and powerful leadership.

Here, primarily Putin has eroded the ground he himself is standing on by allowing for a leader cult of himself. In the official image, Putin is portrayed as the potent, enlightened and determined leader, while Medvedev represents the reform, development, and innovation that will lead Russia towards the future. The image of Putin as the strong-man has though gone so far that he as a person and politician increasingly stands out as almost ridiculous in confrontation with reality.

The people of Russia is today met with a political leadership characterized by impotence and incapability - hopelessly dug down in attempts to balance the internal struggles of the elite over political and economic power. The power's message to the people seems to be: "Stay put in the sinking vessel!" That the people now asks "Can we live like this anymore?" - despite the absence of political alternatives - bears witness to the deep crisis of the system. The question is still if the Russians have concluded that "We cannot live like this anymore." Is it really the case that Russia is awakening out of its torpor by the realization that an authoritarian system cannot solve the challenges of the future?

Free the imprisoned Egyptian bloggers!

This call is being circulated by Swedish bloggers, and in Swedish Social Media, today. Please join in, repost or sign the petition!

In times when freedom of the press is suppressed and media controlled by government or other interests, the responsibility of pointing out wrong-doings, falls to the citizens. The civil journalism found on the internet form an integral engine for developing democracy in many countries. With blogs and other social media as their tools, they expose injustice and misconduct in the society, even when the media landscape is being completely controlled.

As the Arab Spring's historical events have shown, bloggers are not only citizen-journalists. With them they carry the hope of democracy, freedom and dignity to all. Freedom of speech on the internet, has become one of the most important dividing lines between dictatorship and democracy. Here you lift injustice and wrong-doings in the every-day life, and with the might of the pen you work towards change.

In many places the situation, for those that are engaged in democratic change, has become increasingly difficult. Several countries imprison or persecute people that criticize their governments openly in social media. One example of this is the faith of the Egyptian bloggers Alaa Abd El Fattah and Maikel Nabil.

Alaa Abd El Fattah is one of the main activists in the large and lively Egyptian blogosphere. In 2006 he was arrested, by the Mubarak regime, to set an example to other bloggers. Bloggers that critically discussed the things that happened in Egypt were regarded as a threat. Unfortunately nothing has changed and today the process of democratization is endangered by this.

About a month ago, Alaa was imprisoned again. This time it was the ruling Military Council of Egypt. His time in captivity is prolonged by two weeks at a time, which causes his family great concern, and especially his pregnant wife. The process against him shows that the aim is to silence an important node in the movement for democracy in Egypt, before the election. Earlier this year this movement toppled the dictator Mubarak, and it is once again taking the protests out to the streets.

Yet another civil rights activist, Maikel Nabil, has been in prison since the end of March this year, accused of distortion of the slogan of the Egyptian Military Council, 'the army and the people are one hand', at his blog. He discussed and criticized the development after the fall of Mubarak, under the heading "The army and the people are never one hand". This was interpreted by the regime as an attack on the system, and Maikel is now serving a three-year sentence for high treason.

Alaa and Maikel are far from alone. In addition, they are used as warning examples to intimidate others not to challenge and criticize injustice, or speak in situations where others remains silent. In a democracy-under-construction, this is a sign of a dangerous development that the surrounding world ought to react on.

We, the undersigned, have all, just as Alaa and Maikel, chosen to participate in the public conversation through blogs and other social media. We hope that more people wants to raise the issue of the importance of free speech, and show the surrounding world that we take notice and that we care. Freedom of speech and thought must be respected, and all bloggers that are being imprisoned because of their opinions must be freed immediately!

Our message is clear: Free the champions of free speech!

Belarus: East and West and Nothing in Between?

For Global Voices Online: "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." This chronically misused Kipling phrase seems to catch realities for an increasing number of Belarusians, as recent protests and crises have become a rude awakening from the torpor of the last Soviet "sleeping beauty." Waking to a wild and hostile world, many people now start asking: "Who cares about Belarus?"

Coverage found in the Western media of the recent developments in Belarus largely follows the general pattern of repression, with a few opposition activists highlighted, but still with little added to the familiar story. It is true that the economic crisis that has recently hit the country and Russia's gradual takeover of Belarus' economy have added spice to the stew, whilst the ultimate news would be the ousting of President Lukashenko.

Until that day, though, Belarus seems deemed to remain in limbo between East and West. Or would Lukashenko or no Lukashenko really make a difference? An increasing number of voices in Belarus say that the limbo will linger on, and Belarus is bound to remain in a grey zone between East and West.

Thus, LiveJournal user by_volunteer complains [ru] that the country's economy is sold out to Russia, whereas Europe has enough problems of her own to trouble to care:

Беларусь пошла с молотка и это очевидный конец. Руководство Беларуси заключило сделку и тихонько распродаёт страну, в расчёте на политическое убежище, все наши ура-патриоты спокойно на это смотрят. Основные предприятия страны переходят в собственность к России, это российские капиталовложения в нашу собственность. Как можно это допустить и как может ЕС так спокойно упускать свои перспективы на будущее в Беларуси?! Это же полный провал европейской политики, тем более в ЕС нарастает огромный финансовый кризис, европейский бизнес девать просто некуда. Это немощный инфантилизм и позор, нельзя допускать завершения сделки с Россией, это огромная ошибка, нужно срочно принимать меры!

Belarus went under [the auctioneer's] hammer and it was a foregone conclusion. The leaders of Belarus made a deal and are quietly selling off the country, counting on political asylum, and all our hooray-patriots calmly look at it. The main enterprises of the country are becoming Russian property. It is a Russian investment in our property. How can this be allowed, and how can the EU so calmly give up on its views on Belarus?! It is simply a total collapse of European policy, especially as an enourmous financial crisis is brewing in the EU, and European business simply has nowhere to turn. It is powerless infantilism and a shame. Оne cannot allow dealing with Russia. It's a big mistake, and urgent action is needed!

But where is Europe, and where is justice? Feelings of abandonment and, for all appearances, being treated unfairly are obviously spreading, adding to a sense of general disappointment and hopelessness in everyday life and in hopes for the future. Writing about a denial of an EU-Schengen visa for her son, a mother laments [ru] over how she feels people from Belarus are regarded:

Нет правды в Беларуси. Десятки лет мы получаем лживую информацию, слышим безответственные обещания, видим потемкинские деревни. Наелись. Все цивилизованные страны единодушны в оценке и называют такое поведение властей издевательством над народом. Но как оценить издевательство над многострадальными гражданами посольств этих цивилизованных стран, когда после заявлений о смягчении визовых режимов для белорусов, отказывают в визе даже тем белорусам, которые по всем критериям очень даже выездные. [---] Мой сын закончил третий курс университета. Хотел съездить во Францию по частному приглашению. Получил отказ. Поскольку ничего плохого за ним никогда не водилось, единственной причиной отказа считаю административный арест 19 декабря на 15 суток. Он проходит по спискам и, скорее всего, поэтому посольство Франции ответило: «У нас нет уверенности, что вы покинете страну по истечению срока визы». Интересно получается. Два списка фигурируют для запрета въезда в Евросоюз: официальный - список чиновников и неофициальный список задержанных. [---] И стало, знаете, очень обидно. И очень одиноко. И за демократию бьют по голове, и демократия бьет по голове. И никому мы не нужны. Ладно бы не нужны – и на порог не пускают. А главное, никакими демократическими процедурами это решение не оспорить. Где справедливость, где права человека, какие гаагские суды рассматривают отказы в выдаче визы? Какие правозащитные организации защищают таких людей? А главное, отличается ли белорусская судья, превентивно выносящая приговор за несовершенное правонарушение, от французского чиновника, отказывающего в визе за несостоявшийся невозврат?

There is no truth in Belarus. For decades, we have been getting a pack of lies, listening to irresponsible promises, seeing the Potemkin villages. We are fed up with it. All civilized countries unite in their judgment and name such conduct of power a mockery with the people. But how is such mockery with the long-suffering citizens valued by embassies of these civilized countries, when - after declarations of a softened visa regime for Belarusians - visas are denied even to those Belarusans who really by all criteria are liable for them. [---] My son finished his third year at university, and wanted to go to France on a private invitation. He got a rejection [to his visa application]. As he has never been up to anything bad, the only reason for rejection, I think, is the administrative [post-election protest-related] arrest on December 19 for 15 days. He is on the lists, and therefore, supposedly, the French Embassy replied: «We don't know if you leave the country after your visa expires». It all becomes interesting. There appears to be two lists for denial of entry to the European Union: An official - the bureaucrats' list - and an unofficial list of those who had been arrested. [---] And then, you know, it becomes really hurtful. And very lonely. Getting hit on the head for democracy, and then getting hit on the head by democracy. Nobody needs us. It's okay if we are not needed, and not let over the threshold. But the main thing is that there are no democratic procedures by which to appeal this decision. Where is justice, where are human rights, which Hague courts review the denials of visas? What civil rights organizations defend these people? And above all, does a Belarusian judge, who preventively passes verdict for a crime not committed, differ from a French bureaucrat, who denies a visa for a non-return that has not taken place?

Touching on the classical Tolstoian question of the evil inside us all and the need to come to terms with it, LJ user dolka777 asks [ru] how people allowed the Lukashenko regime to develop:

Как мы вскормили диктатора. Это вопрос, который я себе задаю постоянно. Мучительно вспоминаю, как и когда я сама впустила в себя эту диктатуру. Свято верю, что в каждой судьбе должен быть такой момент, когда ты соглашаешься со злом только потому, что твой двоюродный брат работает в КГБ и он – клевый парень, а тебе не хочется его обижать. Или хвастаешься другом, который парится в парилке с личным сантехником Его Величества. Шугаешься коллег или сокурсников, которые связаны с оппозицией. Думаю, что здесь, в бай-политикс собрались те, которые, возможно, ничего такого не делали. Но все же. [---] И теперь вопрос каждому: что ты лично сделал для того, чтобы в Беларуси воцарился диктатор?

How did we nourish a dictator? It's a question I ask myself all the time. It is painful to remember how and when I, myself, let this dictatorship in. I sincerely believe that in every destiny there has to be such a moment when you consent to evil only because your cousin works for the KGB, and he is a cool guy and you don't want to hurt his feelings. Or you boast about a friend who has steamed in the same sauna as His Highness. You vilify those colleagues or classmates who are connected with the opposition. I believe that here, in the .by-politics, those have gathered who perhaps did nothing like this. But still. And now a question to each and everyone: What have you personally done so that a dictator could reign in Belarus?

So, as the shrill voices of Lukashenko loyalists and opposition activists reach crescendo, perhaps there are weaker voices wondering why they cannot simply be allowed to be here, "tuteishi", and lead a normal life between Russia and Europe.

Kipling's famous poem on East and West has a less-known ending: "But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!"

So, even if Russia and Europe, as two strong men, would learn to respect each other, where would that leave Belarus but in a grey zone? Perhaps, for many Belarusians, East is East and West is West, and there is no place for the rest, living in between.

Russia: Cruiser Catastrophe Causes Questions

For Global Voice Online: As casualty numbers rise from Sundays' ferry catastrophe on the river Volga, Russians have come to the bitter realization of yet another tragedy, with a death-toll of well over a hundred people. As usual, news of deplorable conditions are brought to public attention, causing popular anger and indignation, but this time these feelings almost seem to outdo those of sympathy with the victims and their relatives, as the Russian blogosphere reacts to the tragedy.

On Sunday afternoon, July 10, 2011, the "Bulgariya" cruise-ship capsized on the Kuibyshev dam of the Volga river. According to official figures [ru], 129 passengers are still missing and have supposedly perished in the waves.

How people react to disaster and catastrophe is often quite telling of the times and circumstances they live in, and what they expect from the future. In disaster-ridden Russia, such tragic events are often an opportunity to display national unity in commemoration of the victims, which people usually show great respect and reverence to. Thus, President Dmitry Medvedev declared [ru] 12 July, 2011, a national day of mourning.

Still, reading Russia's blogosphere, the sense of national foreboding seems to overshadow that of mourning, as - for many bloggers - the sunk vessel comes to symbolize the future fate of Russia.

At first though, the deplorable state of the ship was a subject of intense discussion, both in mainstream media and on blogs. Whereas information is diverse and varies, the overall impression is that of a floating coffin. The relatively moderate - and changing - data on the Bulgariya on Russian Wikipedia [ru] is quite telling: Built in 1955, no waterproof bulkheads, no major overhauls, name-change last year, low lateral stability, leaving port with a 5 percent starboard list, left engine out of order, 208 people on board instead of the assigned 140 maximum; all in all led it to sink in merely three minutes.

One does not have to be a sailor to see that "Bulgariya" was not seaworthy, and one can only imagine the number of hurdles the people running it must have jumped to get it past naval safety inspection and other controls.

Feelings of anger and wrath are also raging among bloggers. Voices from Russia expresses the many demands for vengeance, but also exploits the tragedy in calling for a more authoritarian Russia:

Suffice it to say, heads are gonna roll as a result of this. The responsible parties are gonna get learned, kiddies… they’re going to absorb the full meaning and implications of каторга (katorga: forced labour) in Correctional Colony 1313 in the Sakha Republic… or, they’ll have the pleasure of the multifarious joys of Correctional Colony 3131 on Cape Anadyr. They fought the law and the law won! It ain’t nice to fool around with Papa VVP… things tend to happen (like bustin’ rocks under the Arctic sun). It’s not like the Republican Wonderland of Texas… where Kenneth Lay of Enron fame (pal of GWB and loudmouthed Born-again “Christian”) didn’t serve a day in prison. You can have an attitude like Russia’s, where miscreant businessmen go to jail… or, you can have an attitude like Texas, where buccaneer businessmen are coddled. In 2012, you can choose… choose well… for you’ll not get a “second chance”.

Contrary to this, a great number of bloggers show distrust towards government authority, pointing to its recorded pattern of bad information management even when confronted by obvious crises and disasters. Thus, initial official information of the Bulgariya catastrophe spoke of an accident but no casualties.

An early comment, by LJ user 999allan999 responds to this simply by presenting [ru] a number of assorted news items on the accident with the suggestive title:

Как обычно. Сначала официально-бодрое «жертв нет»…

As usual. At first the officially cheerful «no victims»...

LiveJournal user shri_boomer - a naval officer himself - relates [ru] to this, but also voices his loathing of the people on passing ships who filmed the Bulgaria's drowning passengers:

Во время этой трагедии, поразила не только неспособность государства, дать какую-то вразумительную информацию обществу, но и то, что мимо тонущего судна спокойно проходили другие теплоходы, а люди стоявшие на палубе снимали трагедию на видеокамеры и телефоны. Эта дикость, от которой мурашки бегут по коже, свидетельствует только об одном: люди настолько зачерствели, что перестали быть людьми.

During this tragedy, I was struck not only by the state's incapacity of providing society with some sort of intelligible information, but also that other ships silently passed by the sinking ship, and people stood on deck filming the tragedy with video cameras and [mobile] phones. This is a savagery that makes one feel like ants are running across one's skin, and only testifies to one thing: People have become so petrified, that they have ceased to be human.

Recollecting merely the most recent disasters, shri_boomer goes on [ru] criticizing the government's tendency to write off everything that does not work and increase control of that which still seems to work, although nobody will obey:

Налицо все признаки того, что питерская ОПГ, теряет контроль в управлении страной [---]. Каждый день государственная власть поражает нас новшествами по усилению безопасности граждан и обустройству России.

Взорвалась бомба в Домодедово – досмотр пассажиров ужесточить, Домодедово отобрать. [---]

Списать самолеты «Ан», списать вертолеты Ми-8, списать речной флот. Да, что там, списать устаревшего девяносто процентов трамвайно-тролейбусного парка страны, десятки тысяч автобусов, миллионы километров водопроводных труб и линий передач, сотни ТЭЦ и ГЭС. Все это нужно списать, а досмотр пользователей ужесточить. [---]

После всего этого можно будет списать население. И тогда наступит настоящий День Траура. Жаль только, что соблюдать его будет некому, ибо придет Время Троглодитов.

There is every evidence of the St. Petersburg gang losing control of managment over the country [---]. Each day state power introduces new measures to strengthen the security of its citizens and to upgrade Russia.

A bomb exploded at Domodedovo [airport] - stricter passenger control, and closing Domodedovo.

Writing off «An» aircraft, writing off Mi-8 helicopters, writing off the river fleet. Yes, and in addition, to write off the obsolete 90 per cent of the tram and trolley-bus fleet of the country, tens of thousands of buses, millions of kilometres of water pipes and transmission lines, hundreds of power stations and hydro-electric plants. All this needs to be written off, and control of users tightened. [---]

After all this, one might as well write off the population. And then we will have a real Day of Mourning. It's a pity only, that no-one will observe this, or [if they will] then comes the time of the Troglodytes.

Drawing on similar sentiments, LiveJournal user dr_lunikoff compares [ru] the era of the Soviet demise with today's situation:

В связи с этим вспомнился стишок 1989 года, который ходил тогда у нас по рукам и из-за которого нас чуть из школы не выгнали. Стишок был выучен наизусть (чтоб не быть пойманным с крамолой на руках), потому и запомнился. Он описывал самые заметные ужасы катастройки (в частности, гибель теплохода "Адмирал Нахимов" в 1986 году) и до ужаса был похож на сегодняшние реалии:

Утопили пароход,

Пропустили самолет,

Наркоманов развели,

СПИД в Россию завезли

И какая-то пи..да

С рельсов валит поезда...

Relating to this, I came to think of a small poem from 1989, which then passed from hand to hand and almost got us thrown out of school. The poem was learnt by heart (so that they could not catch us with sedition on our palms), and therefore I remember it. It described the most notable horrors of katastroika [combined catastrophy and perestroika], (especially the loss of the ship "Admiral Nakhimov" in 1986) and is terrifyingly similar to today's realities. 

A ship sank,

A plane was lost,

Addicts spread,

AIDS was brought to Russia,

And whatever f...ing else

And the trains are sliding off the rails...

Finally, Viktor Perfilov of Kazanskie vedomosti sums up [ru] the feelings:

Я невольно вспоминаю ту известную фразу Путина о АПЛ "Курск", хотя в то время мне и 10 лет не было

- Что случилось с Вашей лодкой?

- Она утонула

А Медведев пока не нашел, что сказать на сей счёт. Системный кризис [---] проявляется всё больше, а положение лучше не становится. И лучше при нынешней ситуации вряд ли станет...

I cannot help recalling Putin's famous phrase about the submarine "Kursk", even if I wasn't even ten at the time:

- What happened with your boat?

- It sank.

And Mededev has still not found out what to say about this. The systemic crisis is increasingly evident, and the situation is not getting any better. And under current circumstances, it is not likely to.