Creditors of conscience

What makes it all so hard to understand? That is the question that arises with authoritarian regimes and comprehension of basic political dynamics. On the surface, it seems they are rather daft, but perhaps it is the corrupt system, the brutality out of which they are born and bred, and the sense of no tomorrow that make them turn a blind eye to realities? So, does it take a child to point out that the emperor is naked or is he well aware of the fact and simply pretends being dressed?

For over a year now, Azeri bloggers and youth activists Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli have been jailed on fabricated charges in a travesty of justice that would rock most legal systems – but Azerbaijan’s.

On the eve of 8 July 2009, Hajizade and Milli were assaulted and beaten by two strange men in a Baku restaurant. Reporting the incident to the police, they were – instead of their assailants – detained on charges of hooliganism. After a prolonged legal process, Hajizade and Milli were sentenced to two and two and a half years’ prison respectively – severe convictions for such petty crime. That allegations were unreasonable must have dawned on the officers of the court. The two plaintiffs were former professional athletes trained in martial arts, and the accused two slender bloggers. What is the likelihood of Hajizade and Milli provoking a pub brawl with karate clones, except possibly for a severe death wish? No, their true crime is saying “The emperor is naked!”

Making a mockery out of a regime with no sense of humor may prove dangerous, which Hajizade and Milli experienced first-hand. As youth activists, they used comedy as means of opposition, and this was obviously regarded dangerous by the regime. In this respect, their destinies differ little from most similar cases worldwide. While peculiarities of each individual miscarriage of justice can never be underestimated, there is no need to go into further detail here. Suffice to say, for once, international reactions have been stern, by e.g. the UN, the EU, and the US. Amnesty International has declared Hajizade and Milli prisoners of conscience.

So, is that all there is to it? Perhaps not, for there is an aspect often overlooked in cases like these. Despite international pressure, most regimes do not budge to demands of releasing political prisoners with relatively short prison sentences. Getting amnesty for prisoners of conscience is a long-term commitment, and most regimes simply do not care if they get another smudge on an already smeared international image. Instead, an economic analogy may be in place to get the message through, in currencies and denominations comprehensible for a regime where power is a pyramid-scheme for personal enrichment. In such a system, the persecuted are creditors of conscience.

We have all seen this before – an authoritarian regime ruling a strategically situated country with natural resources in international demand. The result is most often a system where corruption is endemic al, government office distributed as fiefdoms for a limited élite, and a small degree of wealth distribution. The only things that trickle down to ordinary people are oppression and the sense of no future. Politics is economics and economics is politics.

Lessons learnt should be evident, but still the same mistakes are made repeatedly. For the outside world, Azerbaijan carries strategic importance, but there is little strategic about the country’s politico-economic system. Certainly, the going may be good in the short run, but in the long run, all stand to become losers. For states and companies alike, strategic investment in an unsustainable system is putting one’s capital at stake – whether a capital of confidence or of hard cash. In Azerbaijan, there is as little transparency to actual governance as there is to real oil reserves. Basically, you invest in junk bonds both politically and financially, and the only reason you stay on is because there is a line of people behind you willing to fill your place for short term gain. The hard question is when to opt out, but then quitting is not an option, although you know deep down that sooner or later the bubble will burst. Somewhere down the line, investors will have had enough and start asking hard questions needing good answers.

So where do two jailed bloggers fit into this scheme? What makes them creditors of conscience? Basically, people like these are like inconvenient auditors of a Lehman Brothers, a Freddie Mac or a Fannie Mae, threatening to shake the foundations of the system by posing fundamental questions. That the system is unsustainable is for all to see, but most people choose to turn a blind eye to realities. It is just the way it should be, as it always has been, and always will be. For the whistleblowers, there is a high price to pay, pointing to greater or minor absurdities, and in the process challenging the system and its persistence. Repression of critique and opposition only serves to demonstrate mounting regime deficiencies. This is the political equivalent of economic indicators. The greater need for repression the more the curves turn downward in terms of political – and indirectly economic – stability and development.

In essence, it is all like a great poker game with a cheating gambling addict trying to persuade you to be let in on the game: “Hey, Hilary! Tell them I’m good for it… I’ll even bring my own stack of marked cards.” And when reminded of old unpaid debts, there is always some rationalization like: “Just look at what happened in Iran last year! Is that what you want also here in Azerbaijan – the spread of Islamic fundamentalism?” That there is no reason or rationality in such flawed and faulty arguments seems irrelevant, as the main message is: “Don’t rock a sinking boat!” The Azeri government asks the world to bankroll it in terms of non-existent politico-economic legitimacy, with the empty threat of turning to another casino where moral debts are considered null and void. Perhaps it is time to call this bluff as gambling at “Casino Moskva” holds too great stakes with debts collected as “pounds of political flesh.” There simply is no fresh start with a regime burdened by moral debt and even if there were, old habits die hard – resulting in the same situation as before – in one form or another.

Eventually, the flow from the cornucopia of unchallenged credibility must end. The question is who will make the call – spectators of a naked emperor or players of a greater gamble. They all know that authoritarian Azerbaijan lives on borrowed time. The difference is pointing this out to the world, which obviously needs to be reminded that – as with any debt collection – it is often the small creditors, perceivably standing the least to lose – that are the first to call for bankruptcy making the fraud collapse like a house of cards. That is why creditors of conscience – whether a Hajizade, a Milli, or a Sakharov – provoke such fears with repressive regimes.

Orthodoxy or Death to Degenerate Art?

For Global Voices Online: "Orthodoxy or death!" are the war cries sounded in recent weeks as forces of religious reaction have entered into fierce battle with liberal arts, in an apparent Russian parallel to the Muhammad cartoon case. The casue of conflict is the trial and conviction of two art curators for a 2007 Moscow exhibition of contemporary art. Following the media spin, one may be led to believe the conviction was a resounding triumph of reactionary religious forces, but as so often is the case, appearances may be deceptive.

On 12 July, the Moscow Tagansky court found art curators Yuri Samodurov and Andrei Yerofeev guilty of "inciting ethnic and religious strife" by their exhibition "Forbidden art - 2006" -- in a case brought against them by the Russian right-wing organization Narodny Sobor -- and sentenced them to pay fines of 200.000 (6,500 USD) and 150.000 (4,900 USD) roubles respectively. The verdict was a disappointment for both reactionaries -- hoping for a three year jail sentence -- and liberals -- wanting an acquittal. Once again, concerns are raised where the limits on freedom of expression in Russia really are heading. Thus, yet another Russian case is likely to end up in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

So, is that all there is to it? Perhaps, but it may also serve as an example of how not only freedom of speech lies in the balance, but also how that balance itself becomes an art "happening" by treading the thin line between art and society -- as the debate surrounding "Forbidden art - 2006" illustrates.

The saying "A picture says more than a thousand words" is truer to Russia than to most other countries. Take a tormented Jesus with the head of Mickey Mouse or Christ with the face of Lenin, and then wait for reactions. The limits of art are constantly pushed further afield. The dictum of the century-old Russian futurist manifesto "A slap in the face of public taste" maintains as much a prominent role in Russian arts and culture today as it did in the early 1900s. But in our day and age, slaps are not always what they seem.

So, what is then the basic story behind it all? Well, back in March 2007 art curators Yuri Samodurov and Andrei Yerofeev organized an exhibition of artworks that had been rejected from mainstream Moscow museums and galleries during 2006 -- thus the title "Forbidden art - 2006." The purpose of the artshow was to shed light upon self-imposed censorship quelling the Russian artscene, turning the tide towards more traditional displays of art. The exhibition had a meagre total of 1,020 visitors. Still, it attracted the attention of a small reactionary religious movement, which took Samodurov and Yerofeev to court for offending their religious feelings. Thus, the show was on the road, ending with the very verdict against the art curators, that now has brought so much attention to the case both in Russian and international media. LJ user don_beaver indignantly summarizes [RUS] the case thus:

Not long ago, some artists organized an exhibition in a private gallery. People, who were not even at this gallery, declared that their religious feelings had been hurt by the exhibition and went to court. The judge agreed with them and fined exhibition organizers heavily. The only good [thing] about it was that they were not put in jail.

What was then the drama that turned media's attention towards the case -- beside its freedom of expression aspects? As the verdict was read out last week, a small crowd of bearded men in black uniforms had gathered outside Tagansky court, wearing T-shirts with the text "Orthodoxy or death." Behind these lines lies more than what meets the naked eye. "Orthodoxy or death" (gr. ορθοδοξία ή θάνατος) was originally a motto of the famous monastery of Esphigmenou on Mount Athos, Greece, in its struggle against the Patriarchy of Constantinople, but since the 1990s it has become a token of intolerance and extremism also in Orthodox countries like Serbia and Russia. This photo-op was what caught the eyes of media present outside the court, resulting in vivid pictures of crackpot nationalists setting the Russian civil liberties' agenda in newspaper articles throughout the world. The symbolic effect was so great, that rumours about an upcoming church-initiated proposal to addend the Criminal Code with the crime of "heresy" reached respectable newspapers such as Argumenty i Fakty. However, according to LJ user tristen2e [RUS], this was all a hoax:

Besides, everyone believed the sensational news, even though they sounded words, ascribed to father Vsevolod, about heresy "as any form of opposition to Orthodoxy." Obviously, such an unlearned expression in itself could hardly be uttered by such a skilled church diplomat and rhetoric as archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin [spokesman of the Russian Orthodox church]. However, as is often the case with a summer languishing with heat, journalist colleagues could have mixed it up -- everybody thought -- and thus the news started to travel the web.

For the liberal supporters of Samodurov and Yerofeev, the "Orthodoxy or death" emblem, obviously, was like raising a red rag, reminding them of battles fought during dissident days of a soviet past. This is perhaps also an important aspect that has largely been left out of reporting on the case. In fact, the art curator, Yuri Samodurov, springs from the same soviet dissident movement as Nobel Peace laureate Andrei Sakharov during the 1970-80s, and became one of the founding members of Memorial Human Rights' organization.

However, Samodurov regarded opposition to soviet power not as a political but a cultural act. This, arguably, not only set him apart from the mainstream dissident movement, but also enabled him to remain relevant in Russian debate as society at large increasingly deemed dissidentism obsolete. As director of the Sakharov museum, Samodurov, in February 2006, became an active participant in the debate over the Danish Muhammad cartoons controversy, by heralding a Moscow exhibition of these pictures. So, Samodurov's artistic career has been straddled with the constant cooptation of society as art and art as society. It would thus seem that Samodurov and his actions have become a work of postmodern art personified, in blurring boundaries between art and society.

What are then the effects of the "Forbidden art" case on societal debate? LJ user and poet Vitaly Kaplan, critically, tries to draw the larger picture [RUS] of how art has come to divulge greater tendencies of societal developments in present Russia:

To begin with, there is the "dry residue" that then moistens a multitude of flavours. Thus, the exhibition "Forbidden art - 2006" is really a mockery with the feelings of believers. Does it need society's condemnation? Yes, it does. Was it necessary to go to court? That is where I have my doubts. What do I think about the verdict? I am happy that they did not put Yerofeev and Samodurov in jail. What do I think about the polemics on the Internet? I would say it is a battle of banners with red dogs.

And now for the details. First concerning the mockery with religious sentiments. The problem is that most disputers, regardless of their positions, do not at all understand what it is all about. So, Yerofeev's and Samodurov's defenders indignantly sigh: Oh, these Orthodox people! Everything offends them! If they were to decide -- then every man would be forced to grow a beard, and the women wear scarves, they would raze the "McDonald's" and burn mosques and synagogues alike. Because everything that does not coincide with their Orthodox ideals hurts their delicate religious feelings. And the opponents of Yerofeev and Samodurov shed tears because the pictures of an exhibition offend the Russian people and contradict national traditions, due to their terrible testimony of lost ideals, as such normative decay prevents the revival of Greater Russia...

Consequently, the effect of the "Forbidden art" case is not only pitting perceptions of postmodern and medieval icons against each other, but also serves as a token of differences between imagery and reality of current Russian society. The original grievance of Orthodox believers was -- in religious terms -- that the "Forbidden art" pictures constituted a desecration of icons as carriers of divine messages, in accordance with an Orthodox tradition arguing that the words of God cannot be reduced to text, but must be represented in symbols. What lies at the heart of the matter is then the exhibition's iconization of images portraying a metamorphosis of the divine with the profane. Icons are turned into idolatry of symbols with a mixed message representing the complexities of current society.

What impact has then the conviction of Samodurov and Yerofeev had on perceptions of Russian society, and can it serve as an indicator of where freedom of expression is heading in the country? As much as easy answers would be welcome, reality probably has more in store for the greater picture. Possibly, by seizing the agenda with a question that transcends the borders of art and society, the core of the issue becomes obscured -- whether one of art or freedom of expression, of both or neither. However, society -- in the image of the state -- chooses to take a stand for or against freedom of expression in terms of artforms which purpose may actually be to exploit the interaction such a stand unavoidably involves.

Still, at the end of the day, the question must be raised about the ramifications of that stand for the development of freedom of speech and expression in Russian society. Here, under the headline "Forbidden art gets more expensive," LJ user timur_nechaev77 offers an assessment [RUS]:

The sentence passed against the organizers of the exhibition "Forbidden art - 2006" shows that during the last few years, the price of criticizing the state ideology - Orthodoxy - has risen nearly twice. In 2005, Yuri Samodurov was fined 100 thousand roubles for the exhibition "Beware of religion" which provoked a pogrome from religious extremists of the Russian Orthodox Church. Now they sentenced Samodurov to pay 200 thousand, and Andrei Yerofeev 150 thousand roubles. Of course, the verdict will be appealed as high as Strasbourg and if the European Court will stand on the side of the pogromists and religious fanatics from the Russian Orthodox Church, then of course, Yerofeev and Samodurov will have to pay the fines.

As is often so poorly realized by contemporary society, art may cut to the core problems and developments of our times. The role of an artist increasingly becomes one of pushing the right button to ignite societal debate on issues that may actually be more profound than art itself. Art then merely becomes the symbol of greater tendencies, and thereby recreates itself sui generis by mechanisms greater than the specific work of art and its originator. In the "forbidden art" case, the verdict may serve as a conveyor -- a sign of premonition of either desirable or undesirable developments -- of what is ceasing the normative middle ground in Russian society. Is it right or wrong? Right or wrong is perhaps both not the issue here and still the issue in itself, as everything becomes part of the spectacle, a happening, or the (in)famous fifteen minutes of fame.

As the Romans used to say: “There is no accounting for taste” and art is well beyond the domain of things society may hold people accountable for. That is a matter of taste, and that taste is for each and all to decide on individually — including the right to support or protest against the views and beliefs that agree or conflict with one's own — without state interference. For who is to deem what is degenerate art?

Godfather of refused offers

For Global Voices Online: Is it a deliberate provocation, a government-engineered attack on a foreign head of state, a gas-giant's attempt to rock Russian foreign policy - or simply an example of good and critical journalism? Questions abound in the Russian-language blogosphere following Russian TV-channel NTV's 4 July screening of "The Godfather" - a documentary about Aleksandr Lukashenko, omnipotent president of neighbouring Belarus.

For long, Russia and Belarus have stood out as brothers in arms in the dysfunctional family of post-soviet states. Strings of harmony have even sounded a 1999 ouverture to formal unification of the two states. But as with any family, outward accord often hides domestic discord, and disturbances have been both frequent and harsh. However, up until now Moscow and Minsk have made efforts to keep up appearances. It is against this background that Sunday's screening of NTV's Lukashenko-critical documentary - beside overall sentiments of indignation - has sparked speculations that "The Godfather" of Belarus may have refused too many offers from the Russian Dons.

Then, what about the documentary in itself? As LJ user zmagarka notes [RUS], the Lukashenko documentary has little new to offer about government involvement in political repression, murders, and disappearances in Belarus over the last 16 years:

Thank you NTV for this documentary about the biggest Belarusian psychopath. For us, this was absolutely nothing new, not least because the greater part of the video was clippings from old films [---]. The theme of the "vanished" (disappeared political opponents) should never be forgotten and there is no forgiving the murderers, not even hoping so in their sweetest dreams. Still, over the last 10 years, matters have grown so much worse. About this there is hardly a word.

Gazprom

Returning to the major theme of discussion, it is no secret that relations between Moscow and Minsk have been tense in recent years, and it is likewise well-known that Russia's former President and now Premier, Vladimir Putin, has had to make little effort to restrain his enthusiasm, on both a political and personal level, in dealing with Aleksandr Lukashenko, President of Belarus. Consequently, many see the documentary as a political commission to NTV, although opinions differ on whether Russian state gas company, Gazprom, is behind it all or if sanction has come from the very top of Russian politics. That NTV is controlled by Gazprom, which until recently was engaged in a prolonged gas war with Belarus, may not be sufficient reason to simply point the finger at this company. As LJ user sergeland points out, also state owned Russia Today sounds critique towards Lukashenko:

At the same time, the multilingual international channel Russia Today ran a similar story about the last dictator of Europe. Formally, NTV is an independent TV-network, although it belongs to Gazprom, and Gazprom belongs to the state. However, Russia Today is a wholly state-owned company. Therefore, it is wrong to think that this action is merely a limited revenge against Lukashenko for the loss of the recent gas war. Without sanction from the very top, nothing would have happened.

Some Russian bloggers also believe that this is not simply a temporary squabble, but that the documentary marks a change in Russian dealings with Lukashenko, and even call for a straightout annexation of Belarus, arguing that Moscow anyway constantly has to pay Minsk's bill. Thus, LJ user elf_ociten, in a piece called "NTV tears the mask off the godfather" [RUS], writes:

At long last, the elite of the Russian Federation has made it clear that it is not heading down the same road as the bloody and thieving last dictator of Europe. It is time to disassociate ourselves from an independent Belarus and stop the farce of a union state, and thank God, Moscow has also put the question squarely to the Belarusian élite: Either Belarus becomes a North-Western territory (as an option) - without Lukashenko - as part of the Russian Federation, and with possible separation of ethnically Polish territories, or let's dump it together with Lukashenko and his free lunches to all four sides. As the saying goes, the cards have been called, and it's time to pay up.

However, such ideas are dismissed with ridicule in Minsk, and Belarusian bloggers are not late to underscore that also Russia is dependent on Belarus. As LJ user pan_andriy [RUS] is quick to point out:

On Belarusian forums, you can come across blunt suggestions to cut off transit of food to Russia. After all, Moscow sits with 90% imports of chow, of which a lot is rolled through Belarus. Within two days there would be full chaos in Moscow (remember the madhouse with salt because of rumours of a "war with Ukraine").

There are also voices in Belarus expecting its political leadership to pay back in kind, and according to LJ user Nagnibeda [RUS], there are even rumours that a documentary about Putin is in the making:

As a very initiated television source is saying, recruitment of staff has started for a film about Putin, in which the subject will be tougher than in the one reeled on NTV about Lukashenko. Putin will not merely be a murderer, but an outright serial killer of his own people.

Finally, as the saying goes: Why do you see the speck that is in your brothers eye, but do not notice the beam that is in your own eye? Consequently, LJ user varfolomeev_v draws some parallels [RUS] between politics in Belarus and Russia:

I wonder whether the executors of this political contract noticed that, telling about the horrors of political life in Belarus, they made a film about contemporary Russia? Only the names are different, but everything else - crackdowns, arrests, murders, and so on - wholly characterises also our own regime.

At the end of the day, and despite a recent customs union, it is becoming increasingly evident that Russia and Belarus do not head in bed again, and still they seem destined to more horsing about, not least if hiring media gunmen. Perhaps, both Slavic brothers should thus heed the advice of another godfather: "Never tell anybody outside the family what you're thinking again."

Stalin's summer snowstorms

Some stories are too good - or bad - not to be retold. One of them is about Moscow's summer snowstorms that annually rage across the city at the beginning of June to the surprise and bewilderment of unsuspecting visitors. For Muscovites, they simply form a half a century old legacy of folly and megalomania.

As a guest to Russia's capital, waking up to to the sounds and sights of a bustling metropolis may also present a freak of nature in the form of an apparent summer snowstorm. For those not drawing the curtains again, going back to sleep as after a bad dream, curiousity drives the kind of questions that demand but do not await an answer. For most, though, they are simply met with a frown or a dejected shrud of the shoulders, possibly followed by a sighing sound exclaiming "pukh." If not mistaking this pooh sound for Russian rejection to an inquisitive foreigner, "pukh" is the first lead in a Moscow mystery waiting to be solved. Likewise, a subsequent "topol" should not be interpreted by prospective security specialists as some Russian trying to divulge secrets about the country's latest nuclear missile programme, coincidentally carrying that very same name. Instead, the true secret is - as many secrets are - common knowledge to any Muscovite.

So, "pukh" and "topol" - meaning tuft and poplar - are the first keys to a mystery waiting to be solved. Still, some visitors content themselves with learning that the white drifts amassing the streets of Moscow are simply poplar pollen that this time of the year terrorize the lives out of allergics and asthmatics. Looking at the mere mass of it, the question "why?" brings you back to an era when questions were dangerous and answers were deadly. It is the era of Stalinist folly and megalomania.

The year 1934 has come down in the historic annals for the Congress of the Victors, finalizing the success of the first five year plan. For 1,108 of the 1,996 delegates to this Communist Congress, it was to become the Congress of the Condemned. From this perspective, it is perhaps a historical irony that 1934 also serves as a constant reminder of how wrong things may come out when fulfilling the plan, and what punishment lies in wait for generations to come. So, what is the reason for this "Stalin's revenge" as an afflicted US ambassador once chose to call it?

Having in the 1930s razed Moscow of its pictoresque 19th century architecture to give way for his Empire style skyscrapers and stucco laden street buildings, Stalin was struck by the depressing sight of the urban stone desert he had set out to create. There simply had to be greenery to match the fearful façades with equally imposing trees to straddle soviet streets and avenues. Moreover, it had to be done fast, not merely fulfilling but over-fulfilling the plan. Whether dizzy with success or merely desperate, Stalin's city planners and gardeners made an unlucky choice, by settling for the poplar.

Surely, poplar is an imposing tree, reaching some 20 metres full-grown, giving ample shade during hot Moscow summer days, and - of crucial importance - grows faster than most trees accustomed to the dire Russian climate. For all reasons, it seems as a natural choice. That a quarter of Moscow trees would become poplars was not possibly perceived as any major problem. However, as a latter day potentate once put it: "We wanted the best, but it turned out as always."

In a freak turn of events, it so happened that the consequential mass tree plantation was exclusively of female poplars. So, each spring, as the poplars bloom, there are no male poplars to pollinate the abundant seeds of the females. The result is that the female poplars, let go of their seeds, as there are no males to fertilise them, producing clouds of white fluff floating through the air, in places creating ankle-deep drifts of pollen, and - with a gale - producing a virtual summer snowstorm. As usual, the soviet system could not let nature take its natural course, and now Muscovites have to pay the price for Stalin's megalomanic folly, presenting parades of poplar to the people.

If but one lesson is learnt from history, it is that victors often become the vanquished. Thus, turning from the victors of 1934 to those of 1945, a phrase from A.N. Vertinsky's triumphant song to Stalin comes to mind:

Slightly grey, as a silver poplar,
he stands to receive the parade.

What was not the price of Sevastopol,
not the price of Stalingrad!

And in those blind, cold nights,
when the front was swept by snowstorm.

These clear and penetrating eyes,
in the end looked through the enemy.

Perhaps, we - the people - should learn not to trust the vision of our leaders, whose sight may well be obscured by the vertigo of victory and absolute adoration. Perhaps, it is instead our task to penetrate the plans and programmes of populist power, or else have to suffer the summer snowstorms of natural condemnation. Perhaps, Moscow's Stalinist poplars could serve as a memento for us that politics of pure power may bring snowstorms in the summer and heatwaves in the winter.

BBC + Global Voices = True

As traditional media is increasingly turning attention to social media, the roles and cooperation of the two has become the focus of widespread discussion. Which form such interaction should assume is a question of intense interest for both parties. One attempt to interact is a recent and temporary cooperation betweeen the BBC and Global Voices.

As is generally known in social media, Global Voices is a community of more than 200 bloggers around the world who work together to bring you translations and reports from blogs and citizen media everywhere, with emphasis on voices that are not ordinarily heard in international mainstream media. Global Voices seeks to aggregate, curate, and amplify the global conversation online - shining light on places and people other media often ignore. We work to develop tools, institutions and relationships that will help all voices, everywhere, to be heard.

In a joint statement the two declare: "Global Voices [and the BBC] are working together for two weeks to see how online citizen media can complement some of the BBC's international reporting and vice versa." Thus, an assortment of pieces from Global Voices are published by the BBC as part of its SuperPower Season, with concurrent publication on Global Voices' special coverage page on BBC News and Global Voices cooperation. Please, stay tuned for what might become a start of a great friendship.

Time to rid the blinders about NordStream

The Swedish government's decision to accept the disputed gas pipeline NordStream has caused debate. Is the Russian-German gas pipeline a security policy threat to vital Swedish interests? Or is it a project that safeguards stability and development in Russia? In a recent interview by Andreas Henriksson from political web journal makthavare.se, I try to put some of these questions into perspective.

Vilhelm Konnander participated as one of the lecturers at the Fokus magazine conference "When technology changes politics" a few weeks ago, where he spoke at the Global outlook seminar. He is also one of the authors of the international blog gateway Global Voices, and has both professionally and privately followed developments in Russia for a long period of time. Makthavare.se asked him to give his views on the gas pipeline, and also account for the role that Russian gas and oil giant Gazprom plays in current Russia.

Q: How do you think that the Russian political leadership looks at the gas pipeline? Is it an important project for them from a strategic and geopolitical perspective, or is it a more downright economic project that carries its own merits and might have fallen had Swedish resistance been to great?

A: It is time to rid ourselves of blinders concerning the Nordstream issue. For Russia, NordStream and energy exports is a classical question of domestic foreign policy. It is about fattening a system that rests on a far-reaching political and economic symbiosis between competing political and economic élites, which seek to monopolize political and economic power. And the loyalty of élites is dependent on the incomes from oil, gas, and other raw materials, and how these profits are divided.

Extenstive regulations, taxation, and charges on the domestic market, has put the Russian energy industry in a position where the largest profits are made on foreign markets. For example, the internal Russian price on gas has, at times, been as low as a mere 3 percent of the export price. In the course of time, Gazprom's export incomes have varied between 50 and 70 percent of the business conglomerate's total revenues, despite the fact that substantially lower gas volumes have been delivered to Europe than to the domestic market. The Russian élites have thus enveloped itself into a so great dependency to divide the spoils of energy export revenues that it has become an integrated part of the country's informal system of government.

Q: And what would be the consequences of that?

Today, Russia's political stability is dependent on stable energy export revenues. In the event that this money flow is stopped - especially in times of economic crisis - it may subvert or threaten the political stability of the country.

The link between falling energy prices and Russian systemic collapse is obvious, regardless of whether one speaks of the fall of the Soviet Union or the financial crisis in the wake of which Putin came to power. Therefore, the effects of the international financial crisis is now all becoming resemblant of a fight for life or death to get hold of a piece of an ever diminishing cake. The consequences of Russian domestic political instability are still unclear, but increasing Russian desperation might cause greater uncertainties in the foreign and security policy area - in contrast to the clarity and predictability of recent years.

Q: What then might we expect from or great Eastern neighbour in the future?

A: In this perspectve, NordStream is, of course, important, but a basic mistake from the Swedish horizon is to constantly depart from very obscure geopolitical perspecitve, at the same time as the fundamental Russian domestic motives behind the project either are put in the background or regarded as purely economic.

In the interplay between politics and business, NordStream and similar projects are strategically vital for Russia, and here the domestic driving forces marginalise any potential foreign policy considerations - especially concerning a country like Sweden, which is hardly visible on the Russian political map. Continued Swedish resistance to NordStream would therefore be regarded as a ridiculous source of irritation from a Lilliputian country in the European periphery.

Q: In Sweden, NordStream has been thoroughly discussed, mostly from a critical perspective, by representatives of both the political blocs. Do you think that the NordStream management - and consequently the heavy political actors behind i in Russia and Germany - have paid any attention to Swedish critique, or would they have built the pipeline no matter what the Swedish government would have thought and said?

A: That Russia and Germany would have shown any greater consideration of Swedish critique is not very probable. Some considerations may well be made as for the stretch and makeup of the gas pipeline, and Sweden may surely also grumble and protract the issue if desired, but eventually both Moscow and Berlin counts on the Swedish government coming around. It is one thing if Sweden throws gravel into the Russian machinery, but to oppose both Russia and - above all - Germany will prove difficult in the long run.

Q: How important is NordStream, in your opinion, to Germany?

A: All since Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was launched in the 1970s, Berlin and Moscow have enveloped into a mutual dependency according to the formula "change by rapproachment," where gas deliveries to Germany has become the basic ingredient in the political concepts of both continental powers.

Even if Angela Merkel's (the German Chancellor) enthusiasm towards the project is more controlled than her predecessor's , Gerhard Schröder, who by the way is on Gazprom's payroll, the realization of the gas pipeline is central to future German-Russian cooperation. That Germany, in current times of economic crisis, would terminate a project, which ensures long-term, secure, and cheap gas deliveries, would be very surprising - both from a political and a financial perspective.

Q: How politically directed is the Russian gas and oil giant Gazprom?

A: The question should perhaps rather be how economically directed the Kremlin is by Gazprom. That both Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, and on of the country's previous Prime Ministers, Victor Chernomyrdin, have been chairmen of Gazprom should be a clear indicator. Despite privatization attempts during the 1990s, Gazprom has remained a state gas monopoly with great influence on political power. With increasing political control over so called strategic resources, Gazprom has served as a tool for quasi nationalizations of remaining private gas and oil companies, why its position has been all the more strengthened. The question about Gazprom and the Kremlin is like tha classical question about the hen and the egg: Which one came first?

Q: To what extent would you say that Russia is using its great oil and gas resources as an instrument of foreign policy power?

A: Rhetorics about Russa as an energy superpower have, in recent years, almost become a mantra for Russian leaders, as a way of strengthening national self-images and confidence. However, judging from results, it is hard to show that Moscow is using energy as a direct foreign policy tool. Seen frlom an economic and domestic political viewpoint, the energy issue is, however, currently part and parcel of almost all Russia's conflicts with its neighbours in recent years - Estonia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia.

What is interesting is, however, to look at how Moscow indirectly uses energy as a means of strategic manipulation. With the help of energy, foreign policy advantages and concessions are simply achieved in other areas than exactly the one that each conflict focuses on. Energy is used indirectly rather than directly as a foreign policy tool, where domestic politico-economic considerations often determine foreign policy action.

Q: What do you think about the Swedish debate about NordStream? Is it substantially mostly correct or is it mared by antiquated Swedish fears of the Russians?

A: When Nordstream is addressed in Swedish debate, it is not hard to make up an image of a security policys establishment, where old realist political views are mutually confirmed and reinforced - no matter whether it is about security policy reservations or pretexts for the very same kind of perspectives. The interesting thing is not what is actually said, but what is not said.

Fundamentally, Sweden is faced by a catch 22 concerning the gas pipeline. Should one seek to undermine Russia's political stability by torpedoing the NordStream project, with increased Russian security policy unpredictability as a consequence, or should one indirectly contribute to support the continuation of a corrupt and authoritarian regime, of which one at least knows what to expect? That is a question that gets little or no attention.

Q: As you see it, is there something we in Sweden have misconstrued in the security policy and geopolitical judgement of NordStream?

A: We, basically, pose the wrong questions about NordStream, and consequently get all the wrong answers. As long as the Swedish political and security policy establishment is dedicated to self-binding about the question of our relations to Russia - regardless of whether it concerns NordStream or general approaches - we risk ending up with the wrong conclusions. As 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin wall, it is possible that we as little now as then might predict fundamental changes in Russia. Still, the invasion threat from the East returns in various forms. From military threat to criminality, from criminality to refugee invasion, from refugee invastion to epidemics, from epidemics to energy. The list is long, but what has become reality?

Translation published by permission of Andreas Henriksson, makthavare.se

Building Babylon

The simplest things in life pass with so little notice that they have to jump up and bite you in order to be understood. Evidently, so is also the case with social media and the political particularities and mechanisms of about any country. As once the tower of Babel was wrought by confusion of language, social media risk becoming a mere edifice of a failed attempt to combine politics and technology.

Addressing a Fokus magazine conference on "How technology changes politics" last week, I was struck by a feeling that I spoke a different language than most other participants. This was peculiar to me, as I am well-versed in Swedish political and media culture, and knew many of the other participants. At first, I could not get a grip on why such was the case, before realizing that the combination of politics and social media was at the core of the problem. I simply did not relate to the use of social media in politics in the same way as most other participants did.

Why was it so? The simplest explanation is that dealing with social media on an international level - mainly with Central and Eastern Europe - the way political topics and issues are addressed there has little similarity with how things are dealt with in a Swedish context. The social media culture is totally different, as well as the mechanics of political and social media interaction. Despite knowing the language and context of Swedish politics, I had no way of understanding the mechanisms of how social media are used in a Swedish context. Giving a global outlook, I got the impression that portraying realities of politics-social media interaction internationally - in striking accordance with the political landscape in countries concerned - was received almost as cynical by parts of the audience. But hey, this is normal. If the security services in e.g. Uzbekistan boil political dissidents alive, then it is destined to leave an imprint on politics and the social media landscape in that country. This is not acting the devil's advocate. It is addressing the issues at hand without either malice or idealism.

A paradox is perhaps that I felt I had a lot more in common in terms of social media with the conference keynote speaker, Alan Rosenblatt of the Center for American Progress, than I had with my fellow countrymen, of whom I had known several for decades. A relevant question is, of course, if lessons learnt from a US context are applicable to that of another country or culture. This is usually not a problem, but the mere dynamics of social media and consequent development causes difficulties when regarding both politics and social media, because they evolve interactively and must therefore by nature be different to each particular context. Or else they would be to no use. Besides the cultural caveat, disabling copycat application of social media in political campaigning, there is also the issue of repetition. Techniques are largely applicable only to limited scopes and spans of political action, as social media as a means of communication is dynamic and sui generis.

For me, web activism and the use of social media is still a matter of simple political logics. You have a political content and then you use social media as an instrument for interaction and exchange of ideas with an open mind and willingness to argue your case. What struck me as odd was however that despite knowing the particular "language" or context, the social media culture was so different from the one I am used to relating to, that I had difficulties understanding how Swedish political activists could have any use of them in campaigning or communication. Still, that is hardly for me to say, as my main point is a lack of understanding, of course, provided I do not do that too well, which I lay no claim to.

One great exception to the lack of lingua franca was the enfant terrible of the show, Pirate Party leader Rickard Falkvinge. Using social media in political communication seemed as natural to him as it is to me. So, are Swedish politicians losing out on something important here? Possibly, but not necessarily. It all depends on what kind of political and party culture that exists. If you have an open mind and are ready for equally open-ended communication, then social media might become an invaluable instrument of mutual communication between people and candidates during political campaigning. If so is not the case, it may well be both money down the drain, and serve as a political liability, as not knowing how to use social media may well expose greater flaws of your policy.

All in all, it was a very worthwhile experience to attend the Fokus seminar, as it raised my awareness to matters that should really be self-evident, but I have previously not been wholly aware of. I also got an oppportunity for self-reflection and a portion of humility, which will be very useful when reflected against a more international social media context. Last but not least, it was great meeting so many bright and initiated people, who did not think of matters the way I did, thus providing an element of intellectual enrichment. However, judging from my impressions of the seminar, the one advice I might venture to give Swedish politicians as for social media is to either go full in if you have a massive message to convey, or else keep it on a low or moderate scale in proportion to what party culture, modus operandi, and campaign programme may allow. Or else you may be in for a lot of unwarranted trouble. After all, building a Babylonic tower needs finding a language in common even if you speak in different tongues. That is perhaps the greatest challenge for political establishment to overcome.

Baku Blues

"Shut up! Parliament is not for debate!" Make no mistake: These are the words of authoritarian statehood, words of utter arrogance to an open society of freedom and democracy. These are no heady opinions fired off in the heat of debate. They are the words of a speaker of parliament - the key guardian to freedom of speech in any nation that lays claim to democracy. The country is Azerbaijan, the situation a travesty of all values dear to the Western world.

Some 100 days have passed since Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli were arrested by police in an apparent case of regime provocation. Their true crime was exercising their constitutional right to freedom of expression and conscience, with social media and the web as their venue. Freedom for freedom - its exercise in exchange for its loss - was the price the two young bloggers and student activists had to pay for something taken for granted as norms of civilized society. Despite fraudulent and fabricated criminal allegations, their true "crime" was making fun of realities known to all but raised by few. Did they speak the unspeakable, call for chaos and upheaval? No, Hajizade and Milli simply posted a parody of politics on the web, coming too close to realities of government in current Azerbaijan: A video of a mock press conference with a donkey commenting on the country's repressive NGO-legislation.

However, comedy turned tragedy, as government decided to set an example to deter others from even the most harmless forms of regime critique. With a unique display of foolhardedness, the Azeri police and legislature staged a travesty of justice, by prosecuting Hajizade and Milli for a crime they had been victims of, adding allegation to allegation, charge to charge. In the dark gulfs of government conscience, fears inspired by the role of social media during the green revolution in nearby Iran, may have been one reason why Azeri officials all of a sudden reacted so sternly against the bloggers. Any more concrete reasons are obscure, but for the normal workings of an authoritarian system.

In its 2009 "Freedom in the World" report, Freedom House ranks Azerbaijan as "not free" and provides the following analysis on the development up till 2008:

Azerbaijan received a downward trend arrow due to the increasing monopolization of power by President Ilham Aliyev and the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, as reflected in a flawed presidential election in October and measures to eliminate presidential term limits. [---] President Ilham Aliyev and the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party further marginalized the political opposition and other institutions of democratic accountability in 2008. The government’s fierce suppression of media freedom was integral to Aliyev’s victory in a controlled presidential election in October. In December, the parliament approved a constitutional change that would eliminate presidential term limits, clearing the way for a referendum on the issue. Meanwhile, the country’s energy wealth continued to swell state coffers, stunting other sectors of the economy and permitting the government to postpone meaningful institutional reforms.

In its 2008 "Press Freedom Barometer" Reporters Without Borders ranks Azerbaijan as number 150 out of 173 countries worldwide, and points to the "difficult situation" of media in the country:

Ilham Aliyev’s relations with the very few independent media in Azerbaijan are tinged with authoritarianism and terror. Journalists who dare to speak out about the evils of the regime including corruption and high unemployment expose themselves to real danger. [---] And exposing crime in the country can be as dangerous as exposing corruption. [---] Several journalists are currently in prison in the country. [---] This hounding of the press also extends beyond the country’s borders as far as foreign media. [---] The BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America can no longer be picked up [in] Azerbaijan. There is a lack of pluralism in the country’s media landscape. Energy policy has taken precedence over democratisation as Aliyev prefers to boast of his country’s oil and gas riches. Moreover the president secured the constitutional right in a March 2009 referendum to unlimited runs at the presidency.

One may easily conjure up predisposed images of Oriental despotism - of "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet", but reality is starker than cultural prejudice. A country couched at the shores of the Caspian, Azerbaijan with its cosmopolitan metropolis Baku, has always been at the crossroads of cultures, trade and human encounters - whether conflict or cooperation. After soviet demise, Baku has looked westward, profited from its oil resources, and been embraced by the West, if for no other reasons than its still large energy reserves. Western sponsorship is however not unconditional. Despite projects such as the BTC oil pipeline and plans for the Nabucco gas pipeline, there is a limit to European and US indulgence with human rights' violations, which no dependency on oil may compensate for. Patience and tolerance is one thing, but even the greatest realist would realize that this kind of negative domestic developments eventually may amplify tendencies towards the entire region turning completely into a geopolitical and geoeconomic hotchpotch. That even the usually so market-conscious BP has reacted against the jailing of Hajizade and Milli shows that there is no turning a blind eye to Azeri human rights' violations anymore, especially if put in a larger context.

As the sun sets over the capital on the Caspian, the dusk of democratic disability descends on the people of Azerbaijan. Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli have now been jailed for a hundred days. It is a hundred days too many. Enough is enough. Free Adnan and Emin!

Direct democracy or digital mob?

A spectre is haunting Eurasia - the spectre of activism. As cyberage sets in, the mentality of old Eurasia grapples to grasp the power of the people when politics enters a new age and arena. Is this truly the case or are we but suffering from the same delusions as we tend to when lured by novelties, choosing the complex over simplicity, iPhone and 3G over pencil and paper?

Paraphrasing the 1848 Communist Manifesto may seem out of place addressing the dramatic changes that our Eurasian continent has undergone over the last decades. In essence though, it illustrates the difficulties of the old political and economic establishment to come to terms with new rules of the game, where citizens enjoy and use ever expanding tools of empowerment, where the Great Communicator is not necessarily the President, but the People. It is a transformation from "we are the people" to "who are the people?".

What this people is, still remains to be determined. Is it a demos - people - without krateion - rule? An unruly crowd with its own heterogeneous interests that only seldom forms into a concrete political agenda, but still looms large influencing and potentially discapacitating policy goals and implementation of elected officials? Is it an anonymous and shrouded rule that manages both people and politicians with no saying who is in charge?

198 methods of nonviolent action is a "dummies' guide to revolution," applied to all popular uprisings forming a tattered trace of coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last decade: Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine... Today, such approaches for achieving peaceful change are so integrated in our mindset of popular action, that we seldom stop to reflect upon if they are righteous or represent the will of the people. Furthermore, the very same mechanisms have found their way into Internet activism, as Gandhi goes web 2.0, as the Mandelas and Sakharovs of our age increasingly turn up from out of cyberspace.

We take these thruths to be self-evident and hail the principles and mechanisms of coloured revolution as singularly in the service of democracy. However, if we think revolution, we must also think reaction. Confronted by external change, Russia by no means was or could be ignorant of this, as stability was the name of the game both to preserve power and protect people from a return to the upheavals and chaos of the 1990s. Nashi became the recipe for reaction, to support and not subvert an authoritarian regime. As also Gargantua went web 2.0, we witnessed cyberwars waged against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. This Russian experiment has now come to an end, and Nashi put in mothballs, as Kremlin seeks new venues of state-directed instead of state-inspired web activism.

Why? What have the Russians realized that the west fails to understand? The answer may be the difficulty of controlling the digital mob. As each and everyone can turn a cyberwarrior or warmonger on one's own, such spontaneity is destined to conflict with the interests of authoritarian government. Directing the webcrowds in the spirit of Gustave Le Bon has proven an overwhelming task in the 21st century, as rulers realize the risk of spiralling into new nights of broken glass. Whereas methods may work in concrete operative and tactical contexts - by blogs, twitter, and other social media - it has proven much more complex and difficult to achieve any strategic and tenuous goals.

The Georgian example also illustrates a paradox if regarded from the perspective of information operations, viz. info warfare. Whereas aerial superiority is deemed the key to victory in modern warfare, the winner may quickly turn loser in the information battlefield. The cyberattacks on Georgia in 2008 gave Russia near total dominance in the information field. However, it also raised the temperature of the Russian information flow for it to boil over into increasingly unreasonable and uncorroborated accusations of Georgian war crimes and even genocide on South Ossetians. In one blow, Russia lost its credibility. At the same time, it gave the Georgian government an information monopoly to send its message, its truth, and its propaganda, as most alternative information sources had been taken out. The exception was bloggers, acting eyewitnesses directly from the hotbeds of battle.

So, have all the powers of old media and politics entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre? Realising its potential, will social media be seen as a friend or foe by forces of traditional society? What it takes to turn the tide and surf the waves of Internet activism is a combination of factors: Understanding of areas, countries, or regions of concern with comprehension of mechanisms such as Gandhi goes web 2.0 and the digital mob. A growing but still too small number of journalists and politicians are getting the message and have started developing such competence, but in the heat of battle, during drastic developments, the question is if this competence may be applied to account for what goes on in the online political arena - with direct or indirect influence on the flow of events - and act or report accordingly.

As trivial a statement as it may seem, the Internet is what you make of it. Friend or foe dichotomies lead nowhere, and seeing Internet as a threat by repetitious rantings about cybercrime and pornography degrade the very thought of human interaction - whether on the web or in real life. Statements saying cybercrime exceeds international drugs' trade, or that a majority of Internet usage relates to pornography (in reality 10-25%), just bring out hysteria about something that for most people has no connection whatsoever to either crime or sex, but for whom interaction by social media has become a part of everyday life, including the potential to actively influence one's life and society by the use of the web.

For people, raising their voices and exerting influence, is not essentially a matter of being online or not. It is true, that social media facilitate social and political interaction, when applied to that purpose. Still, it is the same logics and tactics that are seen IRL political and societal interaction. Age-old methods of political action - whether Gandhi's application of ahimsa to non-violent change or Hitlerite seduction of the crowd inspired by Le Bon - are as integrated into web activism as they are into general political action. The choice - as always with phenomena rightly or wrongly deemed as new - stands between embracing or vilifying web activism. Is standing apart, studiously neutral, the road ahead when cyberspace - for good or evil - becomes but another arena for government of the people, by the people, for the people? Is it a choice between greater direct democracy or the digital mob, or will we simply have to live with both?

Medvedev Murder Mystery

For Global Voices Online: Anna Politkovskaya... The mere name evokes images of Moscow's worst public relations nightmare in years - an ongoing ordeal for Russia's international reputation in the realm of rule of law. Still, the murderers have not been brought to justice, and Politkovskaya turned into a martyr for world voices critical of Russia - for them epitomising everything that is wrong and wretched with the country. So, should President Medvedev's quick reaction to this week's murder of Human Rights' acitivists Natalya Estemirova merely be regarded as lessons learnt from the Politkovskaya assassination? The answer might be more complicated, as voices from the Russian blogosphere have their say.

As news broke of Wednesday's murder of Russian Human Rights's activist Natalya Estemirova, it did not take long for President Dmitry Medvedev to offer his condolences to her family and appoint a committee to investigate a crime widely covered by international media. But was this merely a reaction to avoid repetition of the Politkovskaya PR-fiasco? In the domestic media arena, there was no comparison in coverage, provoking anger, resignation, and accusations of hypocrisy among Russia's liberal bloggers. However, looking at the wider picture, others see the Estemirova case as yet another herald of troubles ahead for the Putin-Medvedev tandemocracy, and believe that Medvedev reacted to the murder out of honest concern and worry.

The first, and obvious, question for all touched by the murder of one of Russia's foremost human rights' defenders is: Who could commit such a heineous act?

Fingers have been pointed at both Putin and Kadyrov, resulting in the Chechen President threatening to sue Estemirova's organization, Memorial, for libel. Still, the question remains, who were the murderers, and who stood behind them?

LJ user Andrei Naliotov is wondrous about [RUS] the character of the murderer, as opposed to that of Estemirova:

I cannot understand what kind of person one has to be, to shoot at a doctor, hurrying to save the sick or the wounded, at a priest praying to save souls, at a human rights defender, pulling people out of misery? I knew Natalya Estemirova. When I first spoke to her, I was surprised by her courage: To challenge power in today's totalitarian Chechnya, doing so living in Grozny - takes the highest of courage. But to stand on the side of truth and save people was superior to all for her. "No village without one righteous." Natalya was the righteous of Chechnya. Let her memory live eternally.

Whereas Medvedev's statement on the murder, may have averted international repercussions, reactions in Russian media were sparse, and LJ user tupikin accounts for [RUS] his own feelings and others' neglect to cover the issue:

Almost the entire day was spent in a realm of black colour. At first, the press conference about yesterday's kidnapping and murder of Grozny Human Rights defender Natalya Estemirova (judging from comments on my post - a single one - one might think that it is only of interest for anti-Kremlin websites, whereas none of my best friends showed any interest whatsoever). Tell me, honestly, do you think that Human Rights' defenders are crazy? Or rather, predestined to die? OK, the press conference gathered 60 journalists, including ten TV-cameras. When Ludmila Alexeyeva, chairman of the Moscow Helsinki group, asked national [i.e. Russian] journalists to raise their hands, it turned out to be no more than 15 people. The news, which has circled world media, is received, here in our country, with amazing stoicism, as if that simply is the way it has to be. Really, not 60, but 160 journalists should have come... Well, that is not some other country, but it is all ours. [---] and then Ludmila Alexeyeva added that two people were guilty - Ramzan Kadyrov and Vladimir Putin. [---] I don't know whether the tacit readers of my LiveJournal understand, that this is a sensation of all-Russian proportions [---] that two of the most high-ranking state officials in Russia were named as accomplices to a political murder in front of TV-cameras and tens of journalists. The ground did not shake, only silence followed. As I wrote these words on the keyboard of my old notebook, it was as if the finger-touches forming letters were like the strikes from the Tsar Bell...

Turning to the political ramifications of the murder, there are bloggers who underline how problematic and untimely the Estemirova case is for Medvedev, possibly adding to an alleged domestic political campaign to undermine the president's power and legitimacy. Consequently, LJ user anaitiss writes [RUS]:

It is the second political murder during Medvedev's presidential term. What's more, straight after Obama's visit. Moreover, just as the provocation with "the drunk Medvedev" at the G8 [summit] failed. And then, if we are to be honest, in a region where the guilty are nowhere to be found, even if we all know who everyone is thinking of. And also, exactly when America, personified by Obama, has deserted the local revolutionaries (they even write about this themselves). And boy, how they were abandoned! And this, having formed the joint McFaul-Surkov commission [US-Russian working group on human rights]. They simply have to portray Medvedev as "a bloody tyrant, trampling justice", they really have to. To make matters such, that any dialogue between ourselves and the West becomes impossible. "The second Politkovskaya" is an ideal scenario, one must admit that much. And moreover, in the Caucasus.

Human Rights and the disrespect for law is a matter of great concern for the Russian president - a lawyer by profession. With little over a year in office, turning the tide on rule of law seems a precondition for Medvedev to efficiently exercise power at a time when Russia experiences an economic downturn not seen since the 1998 financial crisis. Although trusitic, it suffices to point out that Putin back in 2001 - a year and a half into his first presidential term - was not the uncontested source of power and authority that marked the last years of his reign. So, that could barely be expected from Medvedev. At a recent discussion on the rule of law and Human Rights, published on his blog [RUS], Medvedev characterised the problem of Russian lawlessness accordingly:

MEDVEDEV: You were speaking about massive lawlessness. As a matter of fact, we live in a country with a very complicated relationship to law [---] and a very relaxed and tolerant [attitude] to lawlessness. But it is not a secret that one has to be able to fight for justice. We have no culture of fighting for justice, we simply don't. [---] How do we handle this? At first, we turn to some bureaucrat - once, twice, and still no result whatsoever. Then we turn to the media, as an alternative source of power, but if there is no result, to whom do we write letters?
REPLY: To you.
MEDVEDEV: To me. That is totally correct. So that is the hierarchy for defending human rights.
REPLY: Then one turns to Strasbourg [the European Court of Human Rights].

The last remark is illustrative of Medvedev's dilemma, when confronted with Estemirova's murder, and the general lawlessness of current Russia. In matters of human rights and the rule of law, the President of the Russian Federation appears not to be the supreme authority and guarantor of the constitution. It is to Strasbourg the Russian citizens turn as a last resort when their own judicial system fails to deliver on their constitutional rights.

Consequently, reinstating law and order stands out as a crucial credibility issue for Medvedev, and moreover as a make or break for his own capacity to exercise the power invested in him. Judging from Medvedev's views, and those of some bloggers, the law is also one of the major problems of today's Russia, as it touches the very fine line of political statecraft - the balance-act between continuity and change, stability and progress. Whereas the murder may not be a mystery to most, for Medvedev it is a mystery how to solve it, as part and parcel of general Russian disrespect for law.