Pride & Prejudice

Gay rights are human rights. It is a paradox that the same rights, that served as the moral basis of liberation from the communist yoke in Eastern Europe, are now denied a group most in need of them. Still, today this is the case in large tracts of our continent, remaining a stain on the very same shield of liberty set to protect the right of the individual.

During the last few weeks, events related to LGBT-rights have given rise to both concerns and hopes about the situation of homosexuals in Central and Eastern Europe. Developments have clearly shown that homophobia is still rampant in the region, but all the same there are promising tendencies in some countries that at least some authorities have started to respond to international critique against official homophobia. Reviewing recent events, gives a somewhat more hetereogeneous picture than was the case only a year ago.

Lithuania

A few weeks ago, a celebrity homosexual was beaten beyond recognition in Lithuanian capital Vilnius. The only reason was that he was openly gay. He might as well have had a pink triangle stitchted to his chest. Homosexuality is simply not socially accepted in this deeply Catholic country, and people and parliamentarians alike do not hesitate to openly condemn this "pariah to society."

Last week, Amnesty criticised Lithuania for not respecting gay rights, actively hindering an EU-sponsored campaign "For Diversity - Against Discrimination" - in celebration of the Europan Year for Equal Opportunities for All. Now, the campaign has had to be delayed in anticipation of permission from Lithuanian authorities. Last week, the Vilnius Rainbow festival was denied the right to assembly in the capital. In response to the exposed situation for the Lithuanian LGBT-community, the European section of the International Gay and Lesbian Association (ILGA) has decided to arrange its annual conference in Vilnius this autumn.

Russia

Turning East to Moscow, a group of LGBT-activists - including several western parliamentarians - were brutally beaten by anti-gay groups, when trying to hand over a petition to mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Their simple plea was to argue for the permission to march through central Moscow during the 2007 Moscow Pride festival. While being beaten by skinheads, Russian police stood idly by watching the "spectacle" afar, only to afterwards arrest some thirty gay rights' activists, including two members of the European Parliament.

Latvia

However, what might be considered a slight improvement was yesterday's Pride march in Latvian capital Riga, organised by the Mozaika network. With the experiences from last year's violent anti-gay protests in fresh memory, authorities now allowed some 1,000 activists to march the streets under heavy police protection. Still, the march has created a deep rift in the Latvian LGBT-community, and ILGA-Latvia has publicly denounced organisers as provocateurs and profiteers, whose actions will only worsen the situation in the country.

Poland

Another partial success was the 19 May Warsaw Pride festival, where some 5,000 LGBT-activists were, for the first time, allowed to undertake the march. Despite massive anti-gay protests, the Pride parade went by without the extensive violence we have got used to see in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. However, Poland remains a fundamentally homophobic country, and the Kaczyński twins, ruling Poland as President and Prime Minister, are among the country's foremost opponents of gay rights. Polish homophobia is, to be quite frank, on the edge of the ludicrous. Thus, last week, Poland's Children's Ombudsman considered banning the kids' show Teletubbies. Why? The reason is laughable: Apparently, one of the "male" characters in the show carries a handbag. Such a role model might prove a negative influence on Polish children, the Polish Ombudsman argued, as it might indicate the small blue figure was - GAY! Lo and behold! It was only after widespread ridicule in international media, that the Ombudsman decided to reconsider her position.

Gay Rights are Human Rights

Protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has gradually become a self-evident part of international law over the decades. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has been judged applicable on sexual orientation, thus safeguarding the same political rights to the LGBT-community as any other social or political movement.

In a regional context, the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms nowadays covers protection against sexual orientation discrimination, and the European Social Charter safeguards the social and economic rights of homosexuals.

In the framework of the European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam enables the EU to fight sexual orientation discrimination as does the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The list is far from exhaustive, and serves only to illustrate how current international law protects the human rights of LGBT-individuals. Still, although many states of Central and Eastern Europe pride themselves with becoming part of Europe, prejudice prevails against homosexuals in large tracts of the region. It simply is not acceptable when politicians and people alike pursue a policy of public homophobia, as is the case in many of the abovementioned countries. Becoming part of Europe means becoming party to the humanistic social and cultural heritage of Europe. As long as this is not the case, the road to true integration remains long. The tragedy about sexual orientation discrimination in Central and Eastern Europe is however that it often is the same dissidents and democratisers who, during the soviet era, fought for human rights, that today deny one of the most exposed groups in society the very same rights they once held so dear. Obviously, the fruits of freedom are sown unequally.

Estonia-Russia: Maskirovka Demasked?

Strange rumours come out of Moscow these days. Indeed, would one believe in all gossip on the current power struggle in Russia, the world as we know it would be transformed. It is obvious that competing politico-financial interests are producing an increasingly incoherent and incomprehensive political landscape for the upcoming 2007-2008 elections. This is especially true when it comes to effects on foreign policy.

A recent rumour coming out of Moscow relates to the crisis between Russia and Estonia over the removal of the Bronze Soldier from central Tallinn. According to unofficial sources, some forces in Moscow were preparing a political initiative towards Estonia prior to the crisis to permanently defuse the explosive issue of this old soviet war monument. Thus, Moscow would actually have been preparing to offer Tallinn participation in moving the Bronze Soldier on the 9 May Soviet Victory day, provided that Russia would be allowed to play an active role in such a ceremony. Some people even claim that the Russian Ministry of Defence had ordered an honorary military guard company to train for such an event.

What an Estonian source claims happened - based on the same rumours - is that the Estonian government got wind of the Russian plans, and that Premier Andrus Ansip therefore opted for a quick removal of the Bronze Soldier. Ansip would thus have won over Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who had previously opposed removing the monument. As the argument allegedly ran, letting Russian troops once more march on Estonian soil, especially in connection with a Victory Day ceremony, would simply have been unacceptable to Estonian national sentiments. Still, actively refusing a Russian offer to - once and for all - defuse the Bronze Soldier issue between the two countries, might have proven even more difficult for Estonia in the European and international contexts. Tallinn might then have earnt a reputation as an unconciliatory state on the margin of Europe. Accordingly, these rumours hold that the Estonian government decided to remove the Bronze Soldier in good time before 9 May, in order to preempt a potential Russian initiative, as described above.

Well, rumours are not always to be believed, and this time they seem too fantastic to even consider being true. Still, the example serves to illustrate how hard it is to deliberate on current Russian policies to draw any credible conclusions. Also, the same or similar rumours are echoed both in Russia and abroad. Perhaps, the recipe should be to follow the example of the French satirical magazine Le Canard Enchainé, and start any discussion on current Russian politics with "Le Canard Enchainé ne dit pas, que..." - The Fettered Duck does not say that..." - thus safeguarding against being fooled by mere rumours. Then, at least one would be on the safe side in not believing all that comes out of Moscow these days, and at the same time not completely writing everything off as desinformation. The world is surely becoming an increasingly strange place, and hopefully rumours like these might amuse someone.

Note: The term "maskirovka" refers to the art of deception in soviet intelligence and military operations.

TV-Tower Ostankino on Fire

A fire has broken out in the Moscow Ostankino TV-tower, according to Moskovski Komsomolets. The famous tower, a scene of the 1993 shootout between president Yeltsin and parliament, was set ablaze in 2000, killing tree people and halting national broadcasts.

Ostankino was last set ablaze in 2005, and fire safety is apparently becoming an increasing problem for the 40-year old building. This time though, the fire is not considered very serious, and it is limited to a segment at a 30-40 meter height of the tower.

With its 540 meters, Ostankino is one of the tallest - if not the tallest - buildings in Europe. It was inaugurated in 1967, and has remained a well-known part of the Moscow skyline. Ostankino was constructed by famous Russian building-engineer Nikolai Nikitin - creator of inter alia the Moscow State University high-raise, the Warzaw palace of culture and science, and the Volgograd "Motherland Calls" giant statue.

Blog-Carnival Russian Media

Between 1 and 30 June this year, the Blog-Carnival Russian media will take place. Initiated by the Swiss blog Krusenstern, bloggers with an interest in Eastern Europe will write articles and op-eds on the development and situation of media in Russia.

The blog carnival concept is not a new phenomenon to the blogosphere. As Krusenstern writes: "The name 'Blog-Carnival' goes back to the 'stone age' of blogdom (September 2002!), when American bloggers organised an event called the 'Carnival of the Vanities' designed to bring together the widest possible range of opinion using the simplest of means."

He continues: "The aim of the Blog-Carnival is to gather together as many different viewpoints and pieces of information as possible on the subject of the 'Russian media'. Behind this initiative is the notion that the closer we get to the Russian parliamentary elections in October 2007 and the presidential elections in March 2008, the more the Putin government is clamping down on the media in Russia."

Registration for participation is between 11-31 May, and further instructions are available on Krusenstern's blog. During 1-30 June, individual bloggers then publish pieces on the topic of Russian media on their own blogs. Contributions in English and German will be accepted.

I would recommend anyone with the time and interest in this important topic to participate in the Blog-Carnival Russian Media. It is - as far as I know - the first blog carnival dealing with Russia or Eastern Europe, and thus an opportunity not to be passed over to strengthen both the regional blogosphere and your voice as a blogger.

Burton's Babylonic Blunder

We will cleanse Russia of all non-Russians! This was the message relayed in print on British Burton menswear store's new T-shirt, The Guardian reports. Had it not been for an attentive language student, Britons in the thousands might have gone around proclaiming Russian racist propaganda. Instead, Burton realised the blunder and quickly withdrew the shirts.

Language difficulties have caused a lot of misunderstandings throughout human history. The ancient Greek called people of foreign tongue barbarians, as they thought other languages sounded as a constant bar-bar. In biblical mythology, God prevents man from building the tower of Babel by introducing a variety of tongues among the hubristic constructors. Hence, the term Babylonic, to signify language confusion.

That language difficulties occasionally cause misunderstandings even today is far from uncommon. Usually, however, mistakes are rather harmless. This time, though, a major clothes retailer unknowingly distributed a grossly racist product. The grey Burton T-shirt in question centred the Russian double eagle with Orthodox cross surrounded by the text "Очистим Русь от всех нерусских!" (We will cleanse Russia from all non-Russians!). Wearing a T-shirt like this would be illegal in Russia and could possibly lead to police arrest. Let's but hope no poor ignorant British tourist in Moscow or St. Petersburg has ended up in such a predicament.

Though, as a Swede, one should perhaps not be so cocky about inappropriate brand or product names. Swedish furniture manufacturer IKEA is infamous for its stupid naming policy. Would anyone buy a desk called "Jerker", a workbench called "Fartfull", or a chair called "Beslut"? Actually, people do and IKEA somehow gets away with it as part of their clean an innocent Scandinavian image. However, this is not something Burton did with its racist T-shirt, and rightly so. Hopefully, Burton will now have the sense to hire a language expert for future deliveries.

Was M/S Estonia sunk by an explosion?

A new Swedish-German expert group on the 1994 M/S Estonia catastrophe does not exclude an explosion as cause of the shipwreck. Such a conclusion has so far been ruled out by all other investigations, but few explanations have been given for the fast course of events when the ship went down.

On the evening of 27 September 1994, the Estline ferry M/S Estonia left Tallinn heading for Stockholm, with 989 people on board. Around midnight, the ship came into difficulties and at 00:23 hours sent out a distress call to ships in the vicinity. Exactly what happened after M/S Estonia's mayday is still in dispute, but the ship went down within the ensuing 20 minutes, taking with it 852 lives. It was by far the biggest ferry catastrophe ever in the Baltic Sea during peacetime.

The catastrophe occurred little over a month after the last Russian troops had left Estonian soil. It thus came at an inconvenient moment for Estonia, as the country had just regained full sovereignty over its territory. Consequently, the stage was set for widespread speculations and conspiracy theories. Despite the fact that numerous investigations, reports, and commissions of inquiry have concluded that there was no foul play, such theories still linger on. One of the most widespread speculations is that the Russian secret services would have placed a bomb on board, due to alleged smuggling of Russian military equipment by the Swedish military intelligence service. The Swedish military service has later admitted that it transported such equipment on M/S Estonia, but claims that so was not the case at this specific time.

Then, why did M/S Estonia sink? Most analysts agree that the main cause of the catastrophe was that the bow visor of Estonia was torn off by hard waves, causing also the front ramp of the ship to come loose. The immediate effect was that the sea flowed directly onto the car deck of the ferry, causing it to capsize within the course of less than half an hour.

What the new expert group, commissioned by the Swedish government, will do is to review various alternatives to explain why water penetrated the ship so quickly. The assumption remains that the main reason was the loss of the bow visor, but researchers will also scrutinise complementary explanations. One is that a hole would have been ripped open in the hull of the ship due to an explosion, which several survivors claim to have heard. However, no hole has so far been found to account for such a theory. Additional theories is that ventilation shafts would have facilitated the flow of water through the ship, and another that it came in by crushed windows. All in all, the research group will analyse eight additional or complementary scenarios causing the catastrophe.

So, should this news lead us to assume that there was foul play in the Estonia catastrophe? Most probably not. The only thing this research group will do, is really to go over all evidence again without prejudice and thereby include any possible hypothesis. It is not very likely that they will reach any other conclusion than has previously been made. Still, the Estonia catastrophe remains a national trauma in both Estonia and Sweden, so it is understandable that no stone will be left unturned in trying to wholly explain the shipwreck. An Estonian report was issued only in March this year, and the new Swedish-German expert group will probably not be the last to look into the matter.

What is perhaps the most tragic thing about continuously new reports about the Estonia catastrophe is that the families and relatives of the victims are never really allowed to put the issue at rest. After nearly 13 years, rumours are still at sway about what really happened, regardless of all inquiries and reports. Given the evidence produced so far, it is highly unlikely that M/S Estonia was sunk by an explosion. Still, also among the families there are many that will never learn to accept what happened and are trying to find explanations that simply might not exist. Paradoxically, not being able to put a thing like Estonia behind oneself is part and parcel of the tragedy itself, so the future will probably hold a stream of reports gradually turning into a trickle, as the people affected by Estonia gradually pass away. For today and the future, this is the greatest tragedy.

С Днем Победы

Today marks the 62nd anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It is a day to commemorate the victims and sacrifices of the insanity of war, regardless of nationality, religion, or ethnicity. May the memory of the fallen never be tainted by the exploitation of states and politics. May they live on in eternal memory of man.

Russia: Motives & Misperceptions

As relations between Russia and the West deteriorate, a growing tendency to misperceive Russian motives is discerned. Russia is not a monolithic power, but analysts increasingly tend to give prominence to factors that themselves cannot wholly explain Moscow's actions. A recent example is the Russian-Estonian crisis.

The current crisis between Moscow and Tallinn has its specific origins, and should come as no surprise to most observers. The basic preconditions for crisis were set already in the early 1990s, and both parties are since stuck in a mutually detrimental relationship. The difference this time though is that there currently are no countervailing forces in Moscow to keep the conflict in check, as has previously been the case. This is matched by poor judgement on the Estonian side. Also, the conclusion by western analysts that Russia is using its energy weapon against Estonia by imposing an export blockade seems flawed and an example of mental bandwagoning among people prone to single factor explanations.

Public opinion in Russia about the Baltic states was forged from the disappointment of their determination to abandon the ailing Soviet empire. The Balts were considered part of the liberal and reform oriented forces in soviet society, why Russians felt betrayed by the Balts as Moscow perceivably strived towards the same political goals as the Balts were identified with. The realisation that the Baltics now were abroad took a long time for most Russians to come to terms with. That Russians had become subjects of a non-Slavic state in which they had to seek citizenship to enjoy the full rights of society was incomprehensible. That states like Kazakhstan might treat Russians badly was only to be expected, as they did not share the liberal heritage Russians associated with the Balts. A measure of double standards was thus introduced in comparing the situation of Russians in former soviet republics. As for the Baltics, Russians felt scorned in their identity as imperial civilisation carriers. An inferiority complex was thus the nucleus of the dispute over the situation of Russian "minorities" in the Baltic states.

As things have evolved in Russian-Estonian relations over the last month, the image conjured up by Russian media is that of Russians being wronged and bereft of their rights and heritage. The difference this time is that there are no countervailing forces in Moscow to keep too overt nationalist sentiments in check. Still, most analysts limit themselves to describe the conflict in either bilateral or Estonian terms, whereas Russian domestic factors are left out. This limits reporting to developments of the same Russian-Estonian themes covered over the last 15 years, and old articles might be taken out of the drawer to be rewritten or updated, simply filling in the new facts. In essence, however, they lack the proper contextualisation to explain why the conflict has taken a new turn for the worse. Action is not enough - as the removal of the Bronze Soldier and its consequences. Context must be added to analysis in order for us to understand the full extent of the problem.

Next year, Russia faces presidential elections. By all appearances it seems to be a runoff between Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev. The power struggle in the Kremlin is however already underway, and who eventually will get the upper hand sways back and forth between the two main contenders. Half a year ago, Medvedev was in the lead, but now Ivanov has made a comeback and seems to be in the best position to become master of the Kremlin in 2008. In this context, Ivanov has used the Estonian crisis to gather his forces in front of a common foe. Opinions on Estonia are by now so deeply set that they may be used as a vehicle to gather the Russian masses. Previously, Russian leaders have known where to draw the line in using the "Baltic question" but now president Putin cannot put the foot down as too great interests are at stake, in who will rule Russian politics in coming years, to risk anything just to preserve a working relationship with Tallinn. As for relations with the European Union and Nato, Putin walks a thin line in risking a multilateralisation of the Estonian issue.

However, Medvedev is also not left out in gaining the dividends of the Estonian crisis. Last week, Sergei Ivanov, during a meeting with governors in Murmansk, declared that the Russian oil and coal previously exported by transit through Estonia will now instead go through the port of St. Petersburg. Russia annually ships around 25 million tonnes of fuel oil, gas oil and petrol through Estonian ports. Imposing a Russian energy blockade on Estonia is regarded by many analysts as a way for Moscow to use its energy weapon. Such a conclusion, however, seems flawed as Estonia is relatively spared of any major consequences for its energy supply. Instead, it may prove a way for major Russian oil exporters - mainly Rosneft - to curve export competition by other Russian oil companies.

Transferring exports to St. Petersburg will indirectly give Rosneft greater control over who will be able to export Russian oil. St. Petersburg port is already today gravely undersized - not to mention corrupt - and much effort has been made in recent years to construct new harbours in the Gulf of Finland - Primorsk for oil and Ust Luga for bulk. Opting for Petersburg therefore means that companies that previously have exported by way of Estonia now are at the mercy of Rosneft to meet their deliveries to western customers. In essence, the energy blockade against Estonia gives Medvedev's interests a way to hit at remaining independent competitors within the oil industry. Consequently, Ivanov reaps the political and Medvedev the economic rewards of the Estonian crisis.

So, should all explanations based on the actual situation in Estonia and relations with Russia be discarded? Of course not. However, it is equally important to analyse the conflict on its own merits as it is to contextualise it, striking a balance on the domestic-foreign frontier. An obvious example is the risk that the conflict may spread also to Latvia. Most observers would say that situations differ too much for something similar to happen in Riga, but still Latvian authorities are apprehensive. From both a political and economic perspective, Ivanov and Medvedev may gain from sparking a crisis also with Latvia for the very same reasons why they have let the crisis with Estonia get so much out of hand. There simply is too much to gain and too little to lose domestically at the moment, that a Russian-Latvian crisis should not be ruled out just because situations in Estonia and Latvia are not similar enough. Giving the crisis a Russian domestic political contextualisation shows this.

Still, is the Kremlin willing to risk its relations with the West - EU, Nato and the US - over such an insignificant issue as the Baltic question? Actually, such an assumption should not be ruled out. Already, Moscow is at loggerheads with Washington, and the US understands that it now has to be tough on Russia in order to have a working relationship. The European Union, however, takes a much weaker stand when it comes to Russia, and when it does confront Moscow it is on negotiation issues such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the European Energy Charter. Until now, Russia has never had anything to lose in real terms in relations with the EU, and the Union consistently avoids putting its foot down in relations with Moscow. That Poland and other member states, in this context, may hamper EU-Russia negotiations is officially treated with resignation in Bruxelles, while most unofficially sigh with relief. Thus, Russia rationally calculates that the EU will never truly make a stand in their relations, why Moscow really risks nothing by a confrontational policy.

Developments in Russia are met with growing concern in Europe, and there is an understanding that sooner or later the European Union will have to confront the issue, as many of its members are already experiencing the realities of a more assertive Russia on the world stage. Doing so, however, sets out from, on the one hand, foreign relations and, on the other hand, Russia's domestic political situation. The latter is mainly directed at the crisis for democracy and human rights and far too seldom at the factors that Russian rulers themselves would deem of political importance. Foreign and domestic factors are increasingly treated as monolithic and attempts at joint analysis are often superficial or aim at the wrong factors.

The result is that it is becoming all the more of a mystery in the West why Russia acts as it does. The West is once again allowing Russia to become "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" for the evident reason that Europeans are too subsumed by their own values, norms, perceptions, and prejudice to follow the simple logics of current Russian politics and society. Then it is much easier to produce an image of a state that once more might pose a threat to Europe - an alien entity accepted by its mere existence but doomed to remain foreign to Europe. Here, the Russian-Estonian crisis serves as a striking example of how the West fails to account for important factors in its perceptions of Russia. As European public opinion turns increasingly against Russia, the risk of misperceptions may become an even greater danger than a revived Russian threat in the eyes of Europe. Russian motives are not always what they seem.

Poland & Ukraine Win UEFA 2012 Bid

Poland and Ukraine today won the bid to host the UEFA EURO 2012 Soccer Championship. The decision by the UEFA Executive Committee came as a most welcome surprise for two nations currently mared by political crisis. Beating the odds against favourite contender Italy, UEFA in a seminal decision opted for development instead of profit. By this brave and strategic decision, UEFA clearly showed that soccer is a concern for all or Europe, and not merely a concern of mighty nations of the EU.

Sport is politics. This has been evident ever since the 1933 Berlin Olympics. Who gets to host a major international sports' event has enormous profits to gain economically and in terms of goodwill. However, it is also a big gamble, as the opposite is equally true if organisers fail to successfully go trough with the event. Then, it involves great losses in both profit and prestige for the states concerned.

Faced by such considerations, the UEFA Executive Committee still decided for the Poland-Ukraine joint candidacy. The main contender and favourite was Italy, which already has the necessary infrastructure in terms of arenas, airports, roads, etc. However, what in the end seems to have turned the tide against Italy, are the recent bribery scandals and hooligan riots that so has tarred the image of Italian soccer internationally. This was not the case with with Poland and Ukraine, but this positive image may also prove an unwelcome blessing for Warzaw and Kiev.

Without the necessary infrasctructure, Poland and Ukraine now face the gigantic task of forming the preconditions for a successful event, e.g. building eight new UEFA standard soccer arenas. The championship finals are intended to take place on the Kiev Olympic Stadium, which now has to undergo fundamental renovations in upcoming years. All these efforts will, of course, take enormous amounts of money, and it is exactly here the entire project may backfire on both Warzaw and Kiev. Without an extremely transparent tender process for the fat contracts to build arenas, develop infrastructure or sell Championship paraphernalia, organisers may face a constant media nightmare in founded or unfounded allegations of foul play and bribery in the process up till the 2012 UEFA Championships.

If this would become the case, two states with already politically tarred reputations, might end up with an irrepairable loss of status in European affairs. If, to the contrary, Ukraine and Poland would use the Championships as a vehicle to rid themselves of corruption and power abuse, they could both stand to win not only the laurels of sportmanship, but also the benefits of societal fair play. Consequently, the 2012 UEFA Championships may prove if Poland may fully assume its role as a major European power and if Ukraine will become a full-fledged member of the European Union family. Today, sport truly is politics, and who skilfully manages to exploit sports, will also win at politics.

Presidential Termination

In July 2010, some 2,000 researchers from all over the world will gather in Stockholm for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. For a week, issues related to Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia will be discussed at over 400 seminars and panels.

The International Council for East and Central European Studies (ICCEES) is the academic world organisation of analysts within this field. The ICCEES World Congress is a quintennial event, which last took place in Berlin in 2005. Since then, Germany and its national organisation - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde - hosts the ICCEES Information Centre, at University of Münster. Previous congresses have e.g. taken place in Helsinki in 2000, and in Warzaw in 1995.

The history of the organisation originates from 1974, when the International Committee for Soviet and East European Studies (ICSEES) was formed at a first congress in Banff, Canada. Due to the revolutionary political developments in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid 1980s, the name was altered in 1990 to International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) at its IV World Congress in Harrogate, England. Today, ICCEES consists of 20 national organisations, and an additional 4 associate members.

As ICCEES now has passed its third decade of existence, the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia is undertaking increasingly intense preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress in Stockholm in 2010. Reflecting an expanded regional scope, the congress theme will be “Eurasia: Prospects for Wider Cooperation”.

The decision to let Sweden and its CEE Society host the congress was made by the ICCEES Executive Committee at the 2005 Berlin Congress. However, since then, preparations have admittedly been complicated by a presidential change in the Swedish organisation briefly after the decision was made, a consequent loss of instutional belonging, and a protracted interim period.

In March 2006, I was elected president of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia. The task set before the board was tremendous, with high demands on forming the financial and institutional basis for the 2010 ICCEES Congress. Thus, the ensuing work was very tough on the board, and many of us at times doubted that we would succeed. Still, at year's end, we had managed to get the backing of the Swedish government, key academic instititutions and major research foundations. This very satisfying result was due to the dedicated and determined voluntary work of the board and individual members of the Society. Now, I think that belief is strong among our members and the academic community that we will be able to carry through with the 2010 ICCEES World Congress with the quality such an event deserves. This is a very gratifying result indeed, even if it also has taken a tremendous amount of hard work and a deep toll on the commitment and time of those involved.

Concerning my own role, leadership is the art of making oneself obsolete. As president, I had set the task before me to form the financial and organisational basis of the ICCEES Congress. Having succeeded with this, I realised that the next stage in the process was to start filling the congress with relevant and solid academic content. Here, I was simply not the right man for the job, not because I could not successfully solve the task, but because I understood that other people could do it even better. As a consequence I made it very clear that the next step in the process needed professional academics, who could formulate the tasks from their experience and work with the dedication that their trade motivates. This requires the commitment and concerted efforts of the academic community. My decision was therefore to step aside to let other people in and find a solution that would better serve the interests of the Society and further preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. Consequently, I recently left the presidency of the Society, confident that a very competent and professional new board will be successful in carrying on the work. So, with my mission completed, I can only say that it - despite all the hard work - has been a privilege and an honour to head the Swedish East European community and cooperate with the board and individual members in our joint efforts to further our interests and positions as an academic community nationally and internationally. I can now but wish the new board the best of luck in its further work.