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Today marks the 62nd anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It is a day to commemorate the victims and sacrifices of the insanity of war, regardless of nationality, religion, or ethnicity. May the memory of the fallen never be tainted by the exploitation of states and politics. May they live on in eternal memory of man.

Russia: Motives & Misperceptions

As relations between Russia and the West deteriorate, a growing tendency to misperceive Russian motives is discerned. Russia is not a monolithic power, but analysts increasingly tend to give prominence to factors that themselves cannot wholly explain Moscow's actions. A recent example is the Russian-Estonian crisis.

The current crisis between Moscow and Tallinn has its specific origins, and should come as no surprise to most observers. The basic preconditions for crisis were set already in the early 1990s, and both parties are since stuck in a mutually detrimental relationship. The difference this time though is that there currently are no countervailing forces in Moscow to keep the conflict in check, as has previously been the case. This is matched by poor judgement on the Estonian side. Also, the conclusion by western analysts that Russia is using its energy weapon against Estonia by imposing an export blockade seems flawed and an example of mental bandwagoning among people prone to single factor explanations.

Public opinion in Russia about the Baltic states was forged from the disappointment of their determination to abandon the ailing Soviet empire. The Balts were considered part of the liberal and reform oriented forces in soviet society, why Russians felt betrayed by the Balts as Moscow perceivably strived towards the same political goals as the Balts were identified with. The realisation that the Baltics now were abroad took a long time for most Russians to come to terms with. That Russians had become subjects of a non-Slavic state in which they had to seek citizenship to enjoy the full rights of society was incomprehensible. That states like Kazakhstan might treat Russians badly was only to be expected, as they did not share the liberal heritage Russians associated with the Balts. A measure of double standards was thus introduced in comparing the situation of Russians in former soviet republics. As for the Baltics, Russians felt scorned in their identity as imperial civilisation carriers. An inferiority complex was thus the nucleus of the dispute over the situation of Russian "minorities" in the Baltic states.

As things have evolved in Russian-Estonian relations over the last month, the image conjured up by Russian media is that of Russians being wronged and bereft of their rights and heritage. The difference this time is that there are no countervailing forces in Moscow to keep too overt nationalist sentiments in check. Still, most analysts limit themselves to describe the conflict in either bilateral or Estonian terms, whereas Russian domestic factors are left out. This limits reporting to developments of the same Russian-Estonian themes covered over the last 15 years, and old articles might be taken out of the drawer to be rewritten or updated, simply filling in the new facts. In essence, however, they lack the proper contextualisation to explain why the conflict has taken a new turn for the worse. Action is not enough - as the removal of the Bronze Soldier and its consequences. Context must be added to analysis in order for us to understand the full extent of the problem.

Next year, Russia faces presidential elections. By all appearances it seems to be a runoff between Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev. The power struggle in the Kremlin is however already underway, and who eventually will get the upper hand sways back and forth between the two main contenders. Half a year ago, Medvedev was in the lead, but now Ivanov has made a comeback and seems to be in the best position to become master of the Kremlin in 2008. In this context, Ivanov has used the Estonian crisis to gather his forces in front of a common foe. Opinions on Estonia are by now so deeply set that they may be used as a vehicle to gather the Russian masses. Previously, Russian leaders have known where to draw the line in using the "Baltic question" but now president Putin cannot put the foot down as too great interests are at stake, in who will rule Russian politics in coming years, to risk anything just to preserve a working relationship with Tallinn. As for relations with the European Union and Nato, Putin walks a thin line in risking a multilateralisation of the Estonian issue.

However, Medvedev is also not left out in gaining the dividends of the Estonian crisis. Last week, Sergei Ivanov, during a meeting with governors in Murmansk, declared that the Russian oil and coal previously exported by transit through Estonia will now instead go through the port of St. Petersburg. Russia annually ships around 25 million tonnes of fuel oil, gas oil and petrol through Estonian ports. Imposing a Russian energy blockade on Estonia is regarded by many analysts as a way for Moscow to use its energy weapon. Such a conclusion, however, seems flawed as Estonia is relatively spared of any major consequences for its energy supply. Instead, it may prove a way for major Russian oil exporters - mainly Rosneft - to curve export competition by other Russian oil companies.

Transferring exports to St. Petersburg will indirectly give Rosneft greater control over who will be able to export Russian oil. St. Petersburg port is already today gravely undersized - not to mention corrupt - and much effort has been made in recent years to construct new harbours in the Gulf of Finland - Primorsk for oil and Ust Luga for bulk. Opting for Petersburg therefore means that companies that previously have exported by way of Estonia now are at the mercy of Rosneft to meet their deliveries to western customers. In essence, the energy blockade against Estonia gives Medvedev's interests a way to hit at remaining independent competitors within the oil industry. Consequently, Ivanov reaps the political and Medvedev the economic rewards of the Estonian crisis.

So, should all explanations based on the actual situation in Estonia and relations with Russia be discarded? Of course not. However, it is equally important to analyse the conflict on its own merits as it is to contextualise it, striking a balance on the domestic-foreign frontier. An obvious example is the risk that the conflict may spread also to Latvia. Most observers would say that situations differ too much for something similar to happen in Riga, but still Latvian authorities are apprehensive. From both a political and economic perspective, Ivanov and Medvedev may gain from sparking a crisis also with Latvia for the very same reasons why they have let the crisis with Estonia get so much out of hand. There simply is too much to gain and too little to lose domestically at the moment, that a Russian-Latvian crisis should not be ruled out just because situations in Estonia and Latvia are not similar enough. Giving the crisis a Russian domestic political contextualisation shows this.

Still, is the Kremlin willing to risk its relations with the West - EU, Nato and the US - over such an insignificant issue as the Baltic question? Actually, such an assumption should not be ruled out. Already, Moscow is at loggerheads with Washington, and the US understands that it now has to be tough on Russia in order to have a working relationship. The European Union, however, takes a much weaker stand when it comes to Russia, and when it does confront Moscow it is on negotiation issues such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the European Energy Charter. Until now, Russia has never had anything to lose in real terms in relations with the EU, and the Union consistently avoids putting its foot down in relations with Moscow. That Poland and other member states, in this context, may hamper EU-Russia negotiations is officially treated with resignation in Bruxelles, while most unofficially sigh with relief. Thus, Russia rationally calculates that the EU will never truly make a stand in their relations, why Moscow really risks nothing by a confrontational policy.

Developments in Russia are met with growing concern in Europe, and there is an understanding that sooner or later the European Union will have to confront the issue, as many of its members are already experiencing the realities of a more assertive Russia on the world stage. Doing so, however, sets out from, on the one hand, foreign relations and, on the other hand, Russia's domestic political situation. The latter is mainly directed at the crisis for democracy and human rights and far too seldom at the factors that Russian rulers themselves would deem of political importance. Foreign and domestic factors are increasingly treated as monolithic and attempts at joint analysis are often superficial or aim at the wrong factors.

The result is that it is becoming all the more of a mystery in the West why Russia acts as it does. The West is once again allowing Russia to become "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" for the evident reason that Europeans are too subsumed by their own values, norms, perceptions, and prejudice to follow the simple logics of current Russian politics and society. Then it is much easier to produce an image of a state that once more might pose a threat to Europe - an alien entity accepted by its mere existence but doomed to remain foreign to Europe. Here, the Russian-Estonian crisis serves as a striking example of how the West fails to account for important factors in its perceptions of Russia. As European public opinion turns increasingly against Russia, the risk of misperceptions may become an even greater danger than a revived Russian threat in the eyes of Europe. Russian motives are not always what they seem.

Poland & Ukraine Win UEFA 2012 Bid

Poland and Ukraine today won the bid to host the UEFA EURO 2012 Soccer Championship. The decision by the UEFA Executive Committee came as a most welcome surprise for two nations currently mared by political crisis. Beating the odds against favourite contender Italy, UEFA in a seminal decision opted for development instead of profit. By this brave and strategic decision, UEFA clearly showed that soccer is a concern for all or Europe, and not merely a concern of mighty nations of the EU.

Sport is politics. This has been evident ever since the 1933 Berlin Olympics. Who gets to host a major international sports' event has enormous profits to gain economically and in terms of goodwill. However, it is also a big gamble, as the opposite is equally true if organisers fail to successfully go trough with the event. Then, it involves great losses in both profit and prestige for the states concerned.

Faced by such considerations, the UEFA Executive Committee still decided for the Poland-Ukraine joint candidacy. The main contender and favourite was Italy, which already has the necessary infrastructure in terms of arenas, airports, roads, etc. However, what in the end seems to have turned the tide against Italy, are the recent bribery scandals and hooligan riots that so has tarred the image of Italian soccer internationally. This was not the case with with Poland and Ukraine, but this positive image may also prove an unwelcome blessing for Warzaw and Kiev.

Without the necessary infrasctructure, Poland and Ukraine now face the gigantic task of forming the preconditions for a successful event, e.g. building eight new UEFA standard soccer arenas. The championship finals are intended to take place on the Kiev Olympic Stadium, which now has to undergo fundamental renovations in upcoming years. All these efforts will, of course, take enormous amounts of money, and it is exactly here the entire project may backfire on both Warzaw and Kiev. Without an extremely transparent tender process for the fat contracts to build arenas, develop infrastructure or sell Championship paraphernalia, organisers may face a constant media nightmare in founded or unfounded allegations of foul play and bribery in the process up till the 2012 UEFA Championships.

If this would become the case, two states with already politically tarred reputations, might end up with an irrepairable loss of status in European affairs. If, to the contrary, Ukraine and Poland would use the Championships as a vehicle to rid themselves of corruption and power abuse, they could both stand to win not only the laurels of sportmanship, but also the benefits of societal fair play. Consequently, the 2012 UEFA Championships may prove if Poland may fully assume its role as a major European power and if Ukraine will become a full-fledged member of the European Union family. Today, sport truly is politics, and who skilfully manages to exploit sports, will also win at politics.

Presidential Termination

In July 2010, some 2,000 researchers from all over the world will gather in Stockholm for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. For a week, issues related to Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia will be discussed at over 400 seminars and panels.

The International Council for East and Central European Studies (ICCEES) is the academic world organisation of analysts within this field. The ICCEES World Congress is a quintennial event, which last took place in Berlin in 2005. Since then, Germany and its national organisation - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde - hosts the ICCEES Information Centre, at University of Münster. Previous congresses have e.g. taken place in Helsinki in 2000, and in Warzaw in 1995.

The history of the organisation originates from 1974, when the International Committee for Soviet and East European Studies (ICSEES) was formed at a first congress in Banff, Canada. Due to the revolutionary political developments in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid 1980s, the name was altered in 1990 to International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) at its IV World Congress in Harrogate, England. Today, ICCEES consists of 20 national organisations, and an additional 4 associate members.

As ICCEES now has passed its third decade of existence, the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia is undertaking increasingly intense preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress in Stockholm in 2010. Reflecting an expanded regional scope, the congress theme will be “Eurasia: Prospects for Wider Cooperation”.

The decision to let Sweden and its CEE Society host the congress was made by the ICCEES Executive Committee at the 2005 Berlin Congress. However, since then, preparations have admittedly been complicated by a presidential change in the Swedish organisation briefly after the decision was made, a consequent loss of instutional belonging, and a protracted interim period.

In March 2006, I was elected president of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central & Eastern Europe & Central Asia. The task set before the board was tremendous, with high demands on forming the financial and institutional basis for the 2010 ICCEES Congress. Thus, the ensuing work was very tough on the board, and many of us at times doubted that we would succeed. Still, at year's end, we had managed to get the backing of the Swedish government, key academic instititutions and major research foundations. This very satisfying result was due to the dedicated and determined voluntary work of the board and individual members of the Society. Now, I think that belief is strong among our members and the academic community that we will be able to carry through with the 2010 ICCEES World Congress with the quality such an event deserves. This is a very gratifying result indeed, even if it also has taken a tremendous amount of hard work and a deep toll on the commitment and time of those involved.

Concerning my own role, leadership is the art of making oneself obsolete. As president, I had set the task before me to form the financial and organisational basis of the ICCEES Congress. Having succeeded with this, I realised that the next stage in the process was to start filling the congress with relevant and solid academic content. Here, I was simply not the right man for the job, not because I could not successfully solve the task, but because I understood that other people could do it even better. As a consequence I made it very clear that the next step in the process needed professional academics, who could formulate the tasks from their experience and work with the dedication that their trade motivates. This requires the commitment and concerted efforts of the academic community. My decision was therefore to step aside to let other people in and find a solution that would better serve the interests of the Society and further preparations for the VIII ICCEES World Congress. Consequently, I recently left the presidency of the Society, confident that a very competent and professional new board will be successful in carrying on the work. So, with my mission completed, I can only say that it - despite all the hard work - has been a privilege and an honour to head the Swedish East European community and cooperate with the board and individual members in our joint efforts to further our interests and positions as an academic community nationally and internationally. I can now but wish the new board the best of luck in its further work.

Ukraine Right or Wrong

Was Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko right to call for parliamentary elections? This is a question that in recent days has been the subject of intense debate. Constitutionally, he seems to be on the slippery slope. Still, his argument that "it is not only my right, it is my obligation" might prove valid if he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron. The core question is though how advisable it is for state to have a constitution, which allows for such a situation to occur.

Imagine, for a moment, that the US Congress would act not only to impeach the president, but also actively prepare to abolish the office of the president itself.

For an American this would be absurd, as the fundamental idea of the founding fathers was a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judical powers, as inspired by Montesquieu. This separation of powers' system is also the foundation of most modern democracies, and usually there are elaborate mechanisms to avoid situations that risk jeopardising the stability provided by the checks and balances of independent centres of power. Paradoxically, this seems not to be the case in the Ukraine, as recent developments demonstrate.

The 8 December 2004 deal ending the Orange revolution involved changes to the Ukrainian constitution to limit the great powers of the presidential office, previously enjoyed by Leonid Kuchma. This was the price the leaders of the Orange revolution paid to get the fraudulent presidential 23 November elections invalidated. However, the changes did not enter into force until 1 January 2006.

As the Ukrainian constitution now works, the parliament has the right to override presidential vetoes if a qualified majority of 300 out of 450 deputies so decides. Such a majority also has the option to make constitutional changes, and even abolish the office of the president itself. Thus, article 155 of the Constitution reads:

Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted, if at the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have voted in favour thereof.

Still, the provision of decisions by two separate parliamentary sessions with elections in between, seems somewhat obscure, as the changes made in December 2004 appear to have entered into force before the March 2006 elections. It is therefore possible that the Verkhovna Rada may change the constitution by a single decision of a two-third's majority.

A further mechanism to counter quick and unpredictable changes between elections may be § 83 of the constitution, which can be interpreted as preventing deputies to change loyalties between parliamentary fractions, as a coalition is to be formed by fractions and not individual deputies. This reasoning seems both obscure and ambiguous, but has been a key argument for the president to protest against the fact that an increasing number of MPs from his party, Our Ukraine, have changed allegiances in favour of the Party of Regions. As votes were thus added to the anti-presidential coalition in parliament, the situation eventually became desperate, as Yushchenko's enemies were closing in on the 300 deputies margin. If this was allowed to happen, a qualified parliamentary majority could deal with the president as they saw fit, and eventually even depose of him.

Then, in which situations is the President actually allowed to call for new parliamentary elections? The answer given by constitutional article 90 set three provisions:

1. If the parliament cannot reach a majority (coalition) to form a government within thirty days after the first meeting of a newly elected parliament.
2. If a coalition cannot reach a majority to form a new government within 60 days after the resignation of a prior government.
3. If parliament during session has not met for a period of 30 days.

It is quite obvious that Yushchenko did not fulfill any of the above criteria when signing the decree to disband parliament and call for new elections. Consequently, if reading the Constitution to its letter, Yushchenko had no right to do this. So, does that mean that he was completely off his rocker when he decided to make this move? Not necessarily. The argument that he acted in the spirit of the constitution as its supreme patron is certainly valid. As president, Yushchenko may perceivably have "the right and the obligation" to act if a situtation occurs, which threatens the constitutional order.

When such a case is applicable is however unclear. One prerequisite might be if parliament had a clear and expressed intent to jeopardise the constitutional order. The requirements to be fulfilled in meeting the prerequisite of intent is however very obscure. Thus, the matter has been referred by parliament to the Constitutional Court for a ruling.

Until recently, it was very uncertain whether the Constitutional Court would choose to address the matter. According to its statutes, it has 15 days to decide whether it at all will deliberate on an issue raised by parliament. Then it was declared that the Court would make its ruling on Wednesday this week. However, today five of the 18 judges said that they considered resigning due to public threats against them, and asked for police protection. Now, the court ruling has been delayed until 17 April.

Reviewing the composition of the Court, it consists of eigtheen members: 6 judges, 6 parliamentarians and 6 presidential appointees. The five now concerned represent all three groups. Still, the Court could also choose to make a ruling even without the participation of the five members, as it only needs 10 of its members to make a ruling. That the Court could get a majority decision in this way is still very unlikely. Essentially, the question is whether the Court will make a ruling at all. That is highly questionable, as the developing crisis may render its opinion obsolete even if it could finally reach a verdict.

All in all, President Yushchenko seems to stand on weak ground as for his decision to disband parliament and call for new elections. However, this does not mean that he may not stand his ground in the battle over its legitimacy. As events are evolving, new elections on 27 May seem to be the only sensible option to end the current conflict democratically. Consequently, the question whether his decision was right or wrong may never really be legally addressed. In terms of politics, his choice was a "catch 22" and whatever choice he made - be deposed by parliament or call for new elections - it was to come out bad for himself. The political verdict on Yushchenko may therefore be hard, as he for too long walked an increasingly thin line in exercisising his presidential duties. Still, whether Yushchenko was right or wrong is not the core issue. The important thing is whether his decision will eventually turn out to be right or wrong for Ukraine and its people. After all, that was what the Orange revolution was originally about - giving a voice to the people.

Update: According to the BBC, Yushchenko would now be "willing to suspend his decree dissolving parliament and ordering an early 27 May election." This would constitute a postponement of parliamentary elections, so that parties can prepare for an election campaign, and not a change of opinion in that elections should be held. Thus, it is a signal that Yushchenko might be willing to compromise on the date for elections, but still carry through with the process. How it all ends up is very uncertain and it remains to be seen how Yanukovich supporters and other parties will react to this feeler.

Chicken Kiev Race

Chicken race was a perilous game among youngsters in the US during the 1950s, said to originate from East European immigrants. The game models two car drivers, both headed towards each other at high speed. The first to swerve away yields to the other. If neither player swerves, the result is a potentially fatal head-on collision.

Chicken race is an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while each player prefers not to yield to the opponent, the outcome where neither player yields is the worst possible one for both players.

Chicken Kiev is a dish of boneless chicken breast pounded and rolled around cold unsalted butter, then breaded and fried.

Chicken Kiev is also the label used by the media for a speech made in Kiev in 1991 by then U.S. President George H.W. Bush. It was drafted by Condoleezza Rice and cautioned Ukrainians against "suicidal nationalism". A few months later, Ukrainians voted to withdraw from the Soviet Union.

Source: Wikipedia

As Ukraine's "Easter Crisis" continues, further comments seem superfluous. Instead, I wish all friends, colleagues, and readers out there a Happy Easter.

Shootout at the Ukraine Corral?

Will Viktor Yushchenko remain president of Ukraine? This is what is currently in the balance in the ongoing political crisis in Kiev. In what seems as a final showdown between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych, the president on Monday dissolved parliament and called for new elections on 27 May. By doing so, Yushchenko may well have signed his own political death warrant. There is little chance that his Our Ukraine will survive elections as a leading player in Ukrainian politics, making the president a lame duck for the remainder of his term.

The current shootout revolves around a battle over life and death for the presidency. Since last year, Yanukovych has won over an increasing number of parliament deputies to the point where he threatened to blow Yushchenko's position to smithereens. Yanukovych was quickly approaching the 300 out of 450 votes in parliament - Verkhovna Rada - necessary to change the constitution and override presidential vetoes. This might also have included abolishing the very office of the president.

Yushchenko's move now forces Yanukovych to take the fight to the high-street, instead of the back alleys where he until now has battled for parliamentary votes. The showdown has been underway since Saturday, when nearly 100,000 people demonstrated in central Kiev in support of the two combattants. As usual in Kiev, the orange forces took centre stage, gathering some 70,000 demonstrators calling for dissolving parliament and new parliamentary elections. Nearby, about 20,000 of Yanukovych's followers met in support of the current government. The stage was thus set for the country's biggest political duel since the 2004 Orange revolution.

Proclaiming elections by a televised speech on Monday evening, Yushchenko said: "My actions are dictated by the strict necessity to save the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not only my right, it is my obligation." Parliamentary elections would thus curve the "Deliberate efforts [that] are being made in parliament to worsen the political crisis, posing a threat to our country and people."

Crisis has become the hallmark of Ukrainian politics since last year's March parliamentary elections. Even though Yanukovych and his Party of Regions stood as the clear election victors, the Orange forces of Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko Bloc did their utmost to form a coalition government barring Yanukovych from power. After months of negotiations and under the threat of new elections, the Orange coalition was proclaimed dead and Yanukovych became Prime Minister. Ever since, President Yushchenko has fought a losing battle to balance an increasingly powerful Yanukovych government.

The question now is who will form the biggest posse for power in the upcoming 27 May fight between orange and blue forces in Ukraine. Yanukovych's power base is solid, with massive financial backing from several mighty oligarchs. In contrast, Yushchenko is badly armed for elections, with a party deemed to become the first victim of this political duel. In essence, Yulia Timoshenko will stand the most to gain from an election campaign, establishing her role as the undisputed leader of the orange forces and the only real alternative to Yanukovych.

For Yushchenko, the choice was between being removed as president or calling for new elections, where he is bound to become the first victim. His choice was to accept the challenge as he was called out into the street by the orange forces on Saturday. Thereby, the only thing left for Yushchenko is to witness his own political death struggle for the remainder of his presidency. Still, calling for new elections was not only his right - it was his obligation. This is perhaps also what will be written on his political tombstone: "He had the right and - finally - rose to his obligations."

Update: In response to Yushchenko's decree for parliamentary elections, Yanukovych's supporters have now called for presidential instead of parliamentary elections. They refer to Yushchenko's decision as an attempted coup d'état and have declared that parliament will not grant the financial means necessary to go through with parliamentary elections. It is not unlikely that Yushchenko's decision to dissolve parliament will serve Yanukovych's interests in winning over the remaining votes necessary to gain the qualified 300 out of 450 qualified majority to make constitutional changes and eventually depose the president. A parliament dissolved by the president would thus decide to remove Yushchenko from his office or abolish the presidency as a whole. The complications this would cause are immense, and it is diffcult to foresee what further ramifications it would involve. Furthermore, the conflict has been referred to the Constitutional Court, consisting of 18 members: 6 presidential representatives, 6 parliamentary, and 6 judicial. What will happen if the Court does not reach a decision within the stipulated five days is hard to determine at this point. It is also said that the Election Commission, which was so hated during the Orange revolution, will be reconvened.

Estonia's New Coalition Government

After weeks of negotiations, an agreement on a new coalition government in Estonia was today finally reached. Thus, for the next four years, Estonia will be ruled by a government of Reformists, the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL), and the Social Democrats. That is, if the coalition partners will be able to see eye to eye in the long run.

Until now, the track record for Estonian governments has for most part been less than a year in office. Still, the 4 March election results proved an exception from this rule, as the Prime Minister, Andrus Ansip, retained support for staying in office for the first time since Estonia regained independence in 1991. Consequently, the main goal of coalition talks seems to have been to maintain the political stability that the elections formed a basis for.

Still, as previously reported, next to everything seemed up for grabs after the 4 March parliamentary elections. The only clear thing was that Prime Minister Ansip's Reform Party would take the lead in government formation talks. Who the other government coalition partners would be was however unclear. How great an importance that in the end would be given to a broader and more stable government was the great question in Tallinn. Speculations on a grand coalition have been frequent and for long there were many indications in this direction. One obvious result of the coalition now formed is that the Reformists have left out both their old coalition partners in the previous government, namely the Centre Party and the People's Union.

That Edgar Savisaar's Centre Party would not form part of a new government came as no surprise, as Reformists and Centrists had been the main contenders for power during the election campaign. However, also the Estonian People's Union was left out, which may be attributed to its losing almost half its votes in the elections.

Still, this was not a foregone conclusion as also the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL), which forms part of the new government coalition, suffered a similar fate. The conservative IRL was previously the biggest opposition party in parliament - the Riigikogu - but what perhaps was decisive for including the IRL was that its election loss was expected in contrast to that of the People's Union. It was also quite clear at an early stage that Reformist coalition-builder Ansip would opt for including the IRL in the new government.

One potential partner that particpated in the race for government power was the Green Party, which entered parliament for the first time by the elections. That this did not become the case was probably due to the same reasons motivating its inclusion: It might have proven quite gullible for the other coalition parties once in government. Consequently, Green Party leader Marek Strandberg characterised the reasons for leaving coalition talks thus: "The current situation reminds us of a school excursion to the Tallinn meat factory, after which the temptation to test the sausage considerably diminishes."

As the Green Party abandoned coalition talks, Prime Minister Ansip was left to broker a deal with the Social Democrats. In the end, it turned out that the Reformists and the IRL would have to pay a high price for winning over the Social Democrats. All in all, the coalition package will be a staggering 47 billion kroons - the equivalent of 3 billion euros - for covering the reforms of the three government partners. Such state expenditures will only add to Estonia's problems of an already precariously overheated economy.

The costly coalition deal has led to massive critique from Centre Party leader Edgar Savisaar. The Centrists themselves were heavily criticised during the election campaign for making irresponsible and populist promises of expensive reforms that might topple the Estonian economy. For the Centrists, this might have proven a decisive factor for losing the elections. Thus, Savisaar now argues that "Ansip has chosen the road to Golgotha for the new government." This might well be true, but such a statement also raises the question whether the Centre Party may reach resurrection in the next elections. It is true that Savisaar will only be 61 years old in 2011, but considering his health problems, he might well exit the political stage much earlier. Thus, rumours of his political immortality may be greatly exaggerated. Without Savisaar's dominant and all-exclusive leadership of the Centrists, the party would probably fall apart within weeks, as there is no clear successor, and nobody could shoulder Savisaar's role of constant fighter. Perhaps, there is no wonder that his wife, Vilja Savisaar, takes an increasingly active part in the party's top-level decision-making.

Still, regardless of Savisaar's future, the Centre Party is on the retreat. The Estonian people decisively opted for political stability and continued reform and modernisation to fully integrate with the European Union. Here, the Centrists have little to offer. The great challenge now for the new government is to realise the people's hopes. Regrettably, the costly coalition deal fares ill for the new government's prospects to fulfill the hopes for the brighter future the Estonians so much desire.

Update: Mart Laar on Thursday declared that he will himself not seek inclusion in the new Estonian cabinet. Instead, he will concentrate on developing the new Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) to seek leadership of the unified party. Stepping aside of government duties also gives Laar the opportunity to lead IRL in the 2011 elections without the political burden a cabinet post might have involved.

A surprise in the new cabinet is the inclusion of Jüri Pihl as Minister of the Interior. Pihl has previously headed the Estonian security police (KAPO), and also been Prosecutor General. Until now, Pihl has been unpolitical, but will now represent the Social Democrats in cabinet, which further strengthens the impression of a coming SDE stronghold on Estonian politics. Pihl is widely believed to have close relations with Western structures and has also been close to Aleksander Einseln, former Commander in Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces.

Minsk Opposition Rally Gathers 15,000

This Sunday saw the biggest opposition demonstrations in Minsk since the April protests against the presidential elections last year, prolonging Lukashenka's rule over Belarus. An estimated 15,000 demonstrators gathered in front of the Academy of Sciences to listen to Alyaksandr Milinkevich and other opposition leaders, in commemoration of the first shortlived Belarusian National Republic of 1918.

This time, authorities used milder methods to thwart the demonstrations than the violence seen last year. Thus, some 50 opposition activists throughout Belarus had been arrested prior to the rally, in order to complicate its organisation. The march was also led away from the city centre, and police repeatedly urged people to dissolve the "illegal demonstration." Furthermore, the Lukashenka regime had staged a number of concerts to draw attention away from the opposition rally.

Demonstrations must be seen as a test of oppositional strength and resilience. The opposition has for long been torn by internal struggles and conflicts, which has been skilfully exploited by the Lukashenka regime. With increasingly strained relations to Moscow, Lukashenka has recently signalled rapprochement and dialogue with the West, and here the predominantly western-oriented opposition is once again seen as an obstacle to the president's plans.

Speaking at the rally, former presidential candidate, Alyaksandr Milinkevich, called for political freedom and for the long-term inclusion of Belarus into the European Union. Referring to the international isolation of the Lukashenka regime, Milinkevich said: "We should understand that we are not alone. The democratic world and Europe stand together with us."

As a token of oppositional unity, the demonstration must be seen as a great success. Still, the opposition coalition remains fundamentally divided, and Alyaksandr Kozulin, who came second in last year's presidential elections, is currently serving a 5 1/2 year prision sentence for his political activities. So, as Milinkevich called out to the masses that "We are the majority! We will win!" it is questionable if this is enough to overthrow the Lukashenka regime. As long as the opposition remains divided, majority is not the issue - unity is.

Politkovskaya's Heritage Lives On

Today, public readings of texts by Anna Politkovskaya will be held in 20 countries and 80 places worldwide. With half a year passed since the heinous murder of Russian journalist and regime critic Politkovskaya, she now stands out as an international symbol for the freedom of speech.

This is the second year that the German Peter Weiss Foundation organises international public readings disclosing political lies, and it is intended that 20 March will henceforth serve as an "Anniversary of the Political Lie." Last year's event was dedicated to the lies surrounding the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Weiss Foundation initiative is supported by a number of prominent organisations worldwide, among which are International PEN and Reporters Without Borders. That this year's event is dedicated to the memory of Anna Politkovskaya and the exposed position of journalists in Russia, is a worthy tribute to Politkovskaya's commitment to reveal the truth and expose the abuse of power. Today, her voice is heard worldwide, advocating freedom of speech and an open society.