Ukraine: What Pascual Doesn't Tell

Chernobyl's lesson is that a state's lies threaten its people and its sovereignty. With this argument, former US ambassador to Kiev, Carlos Pascual, sets out on a frontal attack on Ukraine's leaders, in today's Washington Post. Using Chernobyl in a distasteful parallel, Pascual criticises Kiev for corrupting the security of Ukraine. However, what is not said is often more interesting than what is actually said. Thus, implicitly accusing Ukrainian leaders for lying, Pascual himself conceals crucial facts.

The immediate background to Pascual's vociferous accusations is the New Year's gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev was put to the test, when Russian gas company Gazprom turned off gas supplies to Ukraine in mid winter. Racing against time and "popular" hypothermia, the Ukrainian government struck the deal they could get given the circumstances. With a 47 million hostage, there was little choice but to give way to Moscow's blackmail, using the brokers and dealers at hand. The result was a construct typical to the situation - with the much criticised RosUkrEnergo. It was a slave contract on unequal terms with murky Russian-Ukrainian business interests. So, where was Washington when Moscow chose to turn the tap? The truth is that Ukraine was left to the wolves, with support more in words than in deeds.

It is true, as Pascual argues, that Ukraine has enormous problems with corruption, especially within the energy sector, but he fails to see that steps are taken to combat this evil. Getting at grips with this is a condition for reform. Thus, Ukraine is intent on fighting corruption, because there is simply no other way to develop the country. The sickness is set deep in the system - from ministers to milkmen. Everyone knows this, and the Orange Revolution expressed that it was time for a change. Corruption causes lies, but what is a lie if nobody believes in it? People knew the truth, and believed they could change. However, transforming a society is like achieving transparency. It is not just getting there. It is starting somewhere. Corruption is endemic to Ukraine, and here no other sector is easier to pick on than energy. As with any monopoly, corruption will flourish as long as one supplier, namely Russia, dominates.

However, corruption and Kiev's energy problem do not justify implicit accusations that Ukrainian politics is based on lies, by equating Soviet falsehood with current democratic rule. Nor does it warrant unjust parallels between the national trauma of Chernobyl and today's complex energy policies. Pascual claims that:

Unlike in 1986 when Soviet leaders tried to cover up Chernobyl's threat, Ukraine's leaders now have the opportunity to respond to alarm bells in the gas sector and forestall an impending danger to its own sovereignty and European energy security.

What Pascual does not tell, is that Ukraine's leaders seize any opportunity they can to safeguard energy supplies - for themselves and Europe. In doing so, Kiev is walking a thin line along the domestic-foreign frontier. Relations with Russia are tense, but there is little other alternative for now, than to rely on Moscow for energy supplies. That Ukraine is dependent "on imported gas and shady contracts" is simply an effect of this.

Still, Kiev is actively trying to find alternative solutions that could also benefit other nations. Against Russia's expressive will, Ukraine is turning the flow of oil in the Odessa-Brody pipeline towards Europe. Gas supplies from Turkmenistan are sought, admittedly though in cooperation with the infamous RosUkrEnergo. Last year, plans were announced to build a pipeline from the Caspian to Poland. Another scheme is a pipeline from Iran - and then also a pipeline to the Baltic. Finally, only last week, Georgia Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova formed a regional "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development," where one of the main purposes is to: "activize efforts to ensure energy security, including by means of diversifying routes of transportation of energy resources from Central Asia and Caspian regions to the European market."

Are these actions of a country that does not try to assume its responsibility? Obviously, Kiev is trying to find alternatives to dependence on Russian energy, and by doing so attempts to rid itself of the full-fledged corruption within the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. Therefore, seeking alternatives is breaking with the past - as much in terms of dependence as corruption. This is a fact that Pascual should acknowledge, not least because Ukraine - and not the US - is running the risk of failure.

So, are the leaders of Ukraine lying, and thereby threatening their people and the sovereignty of the nation? Judging from the actions that Pascual proposes in comparison to what Kiev actually does, such a presumption is mere nonsense. There is little doubt that the government and a majority of Ukrainians would wholeheartedly subscribe to most of the measures Pascual proposes, if they only had the power to do so. Furthermore, Kiev is already working in this direction. Pascual simply cannot be ignorant of this. The question is how great a responsibility Ukraine should assume. Kiev is already out on a limb in trying to please US and EU interests in confrontation with Russia.

Bismarck said that "Politics is the art of the possible." Galbraith begged to differ by arguing that "Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable." It is the latter type of choices Ukraine's leaders have been facing ever since the Orange Revolution. To belittle the difficulties of these choices is outright impudent. The West rightly assumes that democracies are stable. Seldom do we realise that democratisation is volatile. In the last two years, Ukraine has made giant leaps in democratisation. Its leaders must, however, be given the benefit of the doubt that they are able to avoid the pitfalls on the road to democracy. They are little served by being stabbed in the back for not reaching perfection at once. Instead of a reward for trying, Pascual scolds them.

Furthermore, when Pascual implies that the Ukrainian leadership is lying to the people, he is in blatant disrespect of the sovereign choice of the Ukrainian people. A majority has repeatedly voted for change. On March 26, the road to reform was reconfirmed in defiance of all the hardships it involves. The people steered off from an impending backlash, not necessarily because they believed in their leaders, but because they trusted this was the right way forward.

Politics in Ukraine is a sham since the elections, and the people is witnessing the daily charade of coalition negotiations to form a new government. Still, if the politicians fail, the people will hold them accountable for erring. It is a mutual relationship with few parallels in post-soviet space. The people has, once and for all, empowered itself, and will not accept that politicians make a mockery of its sacrifices for reform and democracy. Still, few believe in miracles and the understanding is growing that progress will take time. People are no fools. Their trust will be proportionate to the achievements. The people has had its choice, and has opted for further reforms with open eyes. This is a question of political direction - not political directors. To assume that the people is not competent to judge its leaders and to see through lies, when it has done so less than three months ago is a grave misperception.

Today, what people and politicians alike realise, is the basic political and economic paradigm of diversifying risks. This is not the time for pigheadedness in going full-out either way. There is a need for moderation, even if it may involve suboptimal solutions, for the simple reason that there is no power to reach the optimal. The alternatve for the people is failure, and nobody will be there to catch them if they fall, as demonstrated by the gas crisis.

Furthermore, when Pascual calls for state intervention in the energy sector, he ignores the importance of separating state from business - the lack of which has casused many of the problems from the outset. He thus disregards the delicate balance needed for gradually introducing necessary state regulation. On a wider European scale, Kiev needs all the backing it can get for the policy it is already pursuing. Substantially greater support is needed if anything more is to be done. Such support will most likely be lacking. Pascual himself states the obvious reason for this:

The United States hardly needs another crisis in the Russia relationship as we seek Russia's help in preventing a nuclear Iran. Russia needs neither an irate European customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Thereby, Pascual also fails to recognise the connection between Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. For all the domestic measures that he proposes are in direct contradiction with Russia's core interests in using energy to exert influence over its "near abroad." A situation where Moscow directly or indirectly controls Ukraine's energy sector is decidedly in the best interest of the Kremlin. The greater extent of corruption, the less degree of cohesion will Ukraine's energy policy have. As long as such a situation is maintained, Russia gets both the power and the profits from Ukraine's gas dependence. Therefore, Moscow will most likely oppose any reforms or clensing of this sector. Taking heed to Russia's interests is simply incompatible with ensuring Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies by supporting Ukraine. This should not conceal the fact that "the EU and the US should engage Ukraine and Russia before the crisis erupts and offer to facilitate negotitation of normal commercial arrangements." Here, Pascual is completely right.

All the same, it appears that the US cannot have it both ways: Urging Ukraine forward and at the same time serving Russian interests. If the Bush administration would seriously consider Pascuals proposals, Washington may have to "walk the walk and talk the talk," and that means directly confronting Russian interests. The other way around would, to the contrary, satisfy Moscow in the short run, but also potentially paralyze progress in safeguarding Ukraine's and Europe's gas supplies in the long run. There is, however, a middle way: Trusting the sound judgement of Ukraine's leaders, that they are competent to handle the issue themselves on a regional level, and with due support from the West. This would mean the continued long-term diversification of energy supplies that Ukraine and neighbouring countries have initiated, in combination with short-term EU and US arbitration between Kiev and Moscow. By lengthy engagement, US and EU companies may also get a stake in the profits by construction of pipelines and energy production. However, trusting Ukraine's leaders is obviously the last thing Pascual would do. What he does is to urge them to pull forward in response to the dangers to their own "sovereignty and European energy security." At the same time, he apparently refers to Ukraine when stating that "Russia needs neither an irate customer nor a fight with diplomatic partners seeking to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb." By urging Kiev forward, Pascual however creates the latter - an irate customer in the guise of Ukraine.

One cannot but agree that most of Pascual's proposals would be desirable both for Ukraine and Europe at large - including Russia. The contradiction they carry in incompatible positions for, on the one hand Russia, and on the other hand Ukraine, Europe and the US, makes them an impossible road to tread. After three years in Kiev, one would expect Pascual to understand these basic complexities when Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies converge. This is though the most important factor that Pascual doesn't tell. By concealing complex but crucial factors, he would appear to badly serve the interests of both Ukraine and US foreign policy.

To be quite blunt, Pascual needs to cut the crap. He does not tell a lie, but he is surely twisting the facts, although he should know better. What is the real political motive for this? Does he have an issue with the leaders of Ukraine, the Bush administration, or the fact that Kiev does not wholly comply with any brainchild that Bush & consortes may conjure up? Prescribing a policy in two seemingly incompatible directions is not an answer. So, what is his motive. This, only Pascual can tell.

Ukraine: Football to the People

On Monday, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov appealed to the country's business leaders to let employees watch World Cup football matches, Ukrayinska Pravda reports. After two near misses since independence, this is the first time Ukraine's national team has qualified for the World Cup.

Football fever has struck Ukraine with full force. To avoid a full-out epidemic, Yekhanurov now pleads with the country's chief industrialists, to let people watch the matches. Otherwise, he fears a considerable decrease in production. His recipe is to adjust working hours to avoid collisions with matches. Another viable alternative would be to put TV-sets at workplaces. Why? Yekhanurov explains: "We can expect an epidemic of various diseases. People will simply report sick in multitudes." Is the similarity between "support" and be "ill" in Russian a mere coincidence, one wonders.

Yekhanurov's appeal may seem peculiar. However, there is some precedence. When the American soap opera "Santa Barbara" hit Russia in the early 1990's, production is said to have halted in factories throughout the country. Being the first American TV-show broadcast after soviet demise, many Russians were spellbound by the wealth and careless life of a family presenting a would-be version of the American dream. However, Russians were far from the only Santa Barbara addicts. US president Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy is said to have been next-to fanatic viewers. So, Yekhanurov might not be so wrong after all. World Cup wins or visions of wealth - one has to let the people nurture some dreams.

Note: In Russian, support is болеть whereas ill is болен. However, in Ukrainian, supporter is прибічник, and ill is хворий.

Belarus: The Galina Rodionovna Mystery

On account of a recent dicussion at Tobias Ljungvall on Belarus, more questions must obviously be raised about Galina Rodionovna - wife of Belarus president Lukashenka. Who is she - this first lady of Belarus? Few seem to know, why the question all the more deserves an answer. Who can solve the mystery of Galina Rodionovna - Belarus' secretive presidential wife?

As previously discussed, Lukashenka's wife, Galina Rodionovna, has for long been out of public view in Belarus. She still lives in the rural town of Shklov, where Lukashenka once led a collective farm. Officially, she is regularly commuting to her husband in Minsk, but among others the BBC claims that the couple is separated. They have two sons together - Viktor and Dmitry.

On the few occasions, when Lukashenka has commented on Mrs. Rodionovna, he has been saying things like: "Wives have no business in the affairs of state officials." Lukashenka has also reportedly been negative to examples where wives and children of state leaders are put in the limelight. This would seem one of the few positive traits of Lukashenka. However, keeping his family out of power seems to be an ambition that he nowadays is not fulfilling, as his sons appear to exercise an increasing influence in state affairs.

The picture above, courteously provided by Tobias Ljungvall, depicts the couple's wedding. However, it is one of only two available photos of Mrs. Rodionovna. The other one depicts her milking a cow, which does not appear a common chore for a presidential wife. Ljungvall claims that "she is said to be a decent woman." Then, what more is to be said? Questions abound, but little is disclosed. For the time being, it seems that Galina Rodionovna will continue to be a mystery to the world.

Russia Opposes Rivals in Central Asia

Russia opposes the emergence of new organisations in Central Asia that could rival Russian influence in the region, Interfax reported on Tuesday. Instead, Moscow refers to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the sole instrument to combat terrorism in Central Asia.

This statement by Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian Duma, indicates Moscow's fears that the US might have a card up its sleeve for a new design to Central Asia. At an SCO parliamentary meeting on Tuesday, Gryzlov reportedly said:

We can tackle the tasks of resisting and fighting terrorism together in the framework of SCO and Russia does not support the establishment of organizations comparable to the SCO in Central Asia. --- The establishment of a parallel entity would be a barrier to cooperation. We don't need pressure or compulsion wherever they may come from.

When asked about the meaning of this, Gryzlov pointed at the US, which he accused of having plans to set up a parallel organisation to the SCO in Central Asia. Apparently, Moscow fears increased US interest in the region, whereas perhaps Washington would not see anything wrong in a little bit of sound competition. However, it is becoming painstakingly clear that the two old partners in the fight against terrorism are rapidly drifting apart in what is becoming a new Great Game in Central Asia.

Russian-Georgian Links Back on Track?

This is not exactly the news one might expect coming out of Moscow these days, but it is the impression that one may get by a passing glance at a recent Interfax telegramme. The story is that the railway link between Moscow and Tbilisi has been restored after a 13-year long disruption. However, with a little fantasy, it may also give a certain twist to current political relations between Russia and Georgia.

Evidently, trains will leave Tbilisi for Moscow three times a week, starting last Saturday, and passengers will have to go through the discomfort of a detour via Azerbaijan. This is so, because the direct line to Moscow has been out of service since the start of the Abkhaz conflict in 1992.

Even though the newly reopened Tbilisi-Moscow connection is not via Abkhazia, negotiations are underway between Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Abkhazia, to reopen also the line running through Abkhazia from Yerevan via Tbilisi to Moscow, possibly as soon as within two years time.

That the link between Moscow and Tbilisi now has to go by detour and not directly may be a mere coincidence, but can also serve to signify the general character of current political relations between Russia and Georgia.

Estonia: Stalemate in Russian Relations

In August 1991, Estonia regained its lost independence after nearly 50 years of soviet occupation. Some 15 years later, Estonia and Russia still lack regulated borders. Last year a border agreement was finally signed, but it did not take long before Russia withdrew from the treaty - something next to unprecedented in international relations. Since then, a stalemate persists between the two countries as relations thus reached a dead end. What will it take for Estonia and Russia to sort out their differences?

In May last year, everything seemed set for a go-ahead on a final Russian-Estonian border treaty. The last hurdles had been cleared, as the two foreign ministers decided to sign the treaty in Moscow on May 18, instead of the infamous 9 May Soviet victory day. The latter was not possible, while 9 May 1945 signified the seal of Estonia's soviet occupation. The treaty was signed and the only thing that remained was to have it ratified by parliaments in the two countries. Both were eager to remove the matter from the agenda once and for all, and hastened to have ratification bills passed by parliaments. Just weeks earlier, president Putin had declared that:

Russia is ready to sign formal border treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. I hope this will not be accompanied by some idiotic territorial demands. In today’s Europe, in the 21st century, one country making territorial demands against another, at the same time wanting to ratify a border treaty - this is complete nonsense.

However, this is more or less what happened, at least according to Moscow's version of events. Whereas the Russian parliament - the State Duma - was hesitant to ratify the border treaty, anticipating trouble, Tallinn moved on. Eager to get the question off the agenda before vacations, the Estonian government also put the treaty before parliament - the Riigkogu. Reactions to this were negative from the very outset, as many parliamentarians held that the government thereby tried to force through the treaty without proper discussion and debate. To be passed, the bill had to get a 2/3 majority. Such majority suddenly seemed unable to reach, why the government preferred to enter negotiations instead of facing certain defeat. These negotiations resulted in a separate preamble or declaration to the border treaty, referring to the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, by which Soviet Russia recognised Estonia's independence within the pre-WWII borders. However, current borders have been revised during soviet reign, which makes Tartu references unacceptable for Russia. With this preamble, the Estonian parliament passed the ratification.

Moscow's reaction
Moscow's reaction was predictable to say the least. On June 21, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would not put the treaty before the Duma for ratification. Then, during a visit to Helsinki at the end of June, foreign minister Lavrov declared that Russia had decided to revoke its signature from the border treaty. This is also what happened, and on 1 September president Putin formally withdrew Russia from the treaty. The move to withdraw from an already ratified treaty is next to unprecedented in international relations, and must be considered a very stern reaction. The scandal, a few years back, when president Bush revoked the US signature from the treaty on the International War Crimes Tribunal has reverberated in the international community ever since. Examples are scarce, because the international outcry for doing so is expected too great, and one has to pay too high a price for it to be worthwhile. Still, this was exactly what Moscow chose to do.

Estonian explanations
Why did the Estonians act in this way, if they clearly understood what the reactions from Moscow were to become? What were they to gain from this? Some suggestions have been made, although they fail to explain for - even in combination - Tallinn's action.

One factor is that Estonia in April 2005 went through a government crisis and that the sacked prime minister and leader of the Res Publica party, Juhan Parts, quickly needed to profile himself with some cause, not least after a failed unification of Estonia's two right-wing parties - Res Publica and the Reform Party. Thus, demands connected to the border treaty seemed as a convenient opportunity for Res Publica.

Another reason is that the foreign minister of Ansip's new Reform Party government - 31-year-old Urmas Paet, simply was too new and unexperienced on his post, why he could not manage to deal with Moscow and domestic political intrigues at once.

A third explanation, is that government coalition partners - not least the Social Democrats with their grey eminence Thomas Hendrik Ilves at a safe distance in Bruxelles - stood to gain from a squabble between the two right-wing parties.

Then, there is Estonian politics' black horse of Edgar Savisaar and his Centre Party. Being the new minister of finance, Savisaar was arguably the one pulling the real strings in cabinet affairs. Savisaar is a political survivor with a murky soviet past, who has been constantly scandalised over the years but always gets away without a stain on his popularity, especially among poor and rural population, including the Russians. Also, Estonian conservatives are usually quick to point out that the Centre Party is in union with president Putin's United Russia, thereby casting suspicion on him for being on Kremlin's leash or even - at times - payroll.

Finally, it must have been hard to put off Russian interests, though not necessarily Russia itself, from the temptation of exploiting Estonia's domestic difficulties in this situation. Whether the Russian factor could hold on to itself in not giving in to such an urge will however remain unclear. The effect was though in Russia's interest. Thus, Estonia stood to gain nothing, but to once again be portrayed by Russia to the great powers of Europe as an amateur in international relations in disrupting the treaty. Still, blaming Moscow is simply too much of going through the motions to be taken seriously. Perhaps, Russia in reality simply had to stand idly by while the Estonians themselves fumbled about in torpedoing the treaty.

So, is there any way out of this mess for Estonia? At an OSCE-meeting earlier this spring, foreign ministers Lavrov and Paet discussed the need for resumed negotiations to settle the border issue once and for all. Some discussions have also been held since, but both parties seem to agree that a ratified treaty will not come into force in the foreseeable future. The issue is simply politically dead at the moment, while so much prestige was put in on both sides to finalise the border settlement. Once this was lost, little room was left for future talks. Estonia thus seems to have little choice but to let the issue at rest for the time being.

Dealing with Russia
In view of the current situation, how should Estonia handle its relations with Russia? Professor Andres Kasekamp, director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, believes that Estonia now will opt for an EU-solution. According to Kasekamp, Estonia should take the CFSP/ESDP more seriously. This is also currently the sentiment among many politicians in Estonia. The country seems intent on playing out the EU-card, despite the Union's demonstrated inability to stand firm on Russia. Such a policy thus seems to have a weak foundation in current realities. That Sweden and Finland were the only other EU-states in support of the Estonian position concerning the border treaty, is a telling example of how little the EU cares about Estonia's relations with Russia. EU politicians are simply fed up with the whole affair of Estonia not being able to conclude a border treaty with Russia for the last 15 years. EU-support thus seems destined to fail, and EU's European Neighbourhood Policy appears to offer little use to Estonia, as it does not comprise relations with Russia.

The alternative of handling relations with Russia through Nato should, in this perspective, seem all the more tempting to Tallinn. Such a method would, in reality, mean using the US and the Transatlantic link to influence NATO-policy. In May 2005, president Bush visited Riga, and among other things discussed subjects such as democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe. This kind of US high-level discussions is in the best interest of Estonia, while statements to this fact facilitate setting the Nato-agenda in Tallinn's favour. US vice president Cheney's speech at the May 2006 Vilnius Conference also signalled a change towards a more critical stance in US policy towards Russia. In November this year, Riga will host the annual Nato Summit, offering an opportunity to further Estonian interests in relations to Russia by proxy of Nato. Estonian chances to bandwagon with the US to deal with Russia through Nato are therefore greater than ever. Still, Tallinn strangely enough seems to prefer the EU option - perhaps reflecting the post 2001 change in Nato's geographical focus. What Estonia fails to recognise is the fact that also within Nato, the tide is changing in relations with Russia. Tallinn should clearly not miss out on this opportunity to use a change in US and Nato policy towards Moscow in its own favour.

Finally, a joint approach in coordinating Estonian interests on Russia to concurrently influence both Nato and the EU in the same direction might be a recipe for success, but this is simply too complex a task for a small country to pull off.

Domestic difficulties
In the meantime, the Russian question in Estonia continues to drag on as an annually recurrent tradition. The drama has been played out by more or less the same actors over the last 15 years with little variation. This year's incident was the 20 May desecration of the Bronze Soldier Monument (Pronkssõdur) by Estonian nationalists. For Russians, it is a memorial to Soviet soldiers who died fighting in World War II. For Estonians, it is a symbol of the Soviet occupation.

Therefore, in connection to Russia's victory day each year, soviet veteran ceremonies at the monument are ritually followed by protests from Estonian nationalists. This year, events have been especially serious with a string of demonstrations. Among Estonian nationalist demonstrators were crackpot professional dissidents such as Holocaust-denier Tiit Madisson, but also more respected people such as former commander-in-chief Aleksander Einseln. Their objective is the removal of the Bronze Soldier from central Tallinn, and little consideration is taken to reasoning in view of their unwavering demands.

The situation has been exploited by extremists on both sides. Last week, the headline of the leading Russian newspaper in Estonia, Vesti Dnia (fmr. Sovetskaya Estonia), read: "On the Brink of Civil War." Also, rumours about Russian vandalisation of Estonian monuments, e.g. in Tartu, are spreading, and the resurfacing of old Interfront activists has been quite unexpected. Probably, protests will peter out in a few weeks, but it is worrisome that extremists repeatedly are allowed to set the political agenda for almost a month each year. This is simply not a sound political tradition for a small country like Estonia. Protests and demonstrations may well be overlooked by the majority of Estonians as an annual freak event, but each year extremists are allowed to set the public agenda through media.

Narva and the Russian-speaking population
When one refers to the situation of Russians in Estonia or Latvia, one should be aware of the fact that this does not necessarily mean Russians as such. Migration to Estonia in the post-war era came from all over the Soviet Union, why it might be as natural to come across a Tajik, a Ukrainian or a Lithuanian in Tallinn as it is with a Russian. Today, they all meet the same conditions and requirements for residence permit and citizenship no matter what their place of origin might once have been. That Russians are in a majority should not serve to hide this fact.

Estonia's Russian-speaking population is concentrated partly to Tallinn and neighbouring cities, and partly to Eastern Estonia. However, it is in the East that the Russian dominance is especially compact - in cities like Narva and Kohtlajärvi. For long, crisis has coincided with ethnicity in this part of the country, which incidentally also neighbours on the disputed border areas with Russia. Unemployment and social malaise have been a constant feature in Eastern Estonia during the last 15 years. A destitute population with little hope for the future has presented a great problem for Estonian authorities. The city of Narva, right on the border to Russia, facing Russian Ivangorod on the other side of the river, is a telling example.

In reality, the few Estonians living in Narva are state representatives in some capacity, and they associate little with the local Russian-speaking population. In Narva, it is perhaps no coincidence that the well-held offices of the Russian Consulate are located only a few hundred metres from the headquarters of KaPo - the Estonian security service.

However, things are now looking brighter for Narva. The situation is still such that everyone who knows how to, tries to move away from the city. Many of the top students at Estonian universities originate from Eastern Estonia, strongly motivated from knowing that the alternative is poverty. This may not be the case in the future though. In recent years, things have begun to turn around for Narva. Unemployment has decreased and many industries are moving production to this area due to dramatically rising costs and a deficit of qualified labour in Tallinn and the densely populated areas of Western Estonia. The opposite to high costs and unskilled labour is exactly what Narva has to offer. Adding to this, the lower wages in this region attract a rising number of investors. Whereas activities still are far from bustling, the tendency towards a rather rapid development within the next decade is clear.

Until now, Narva's economy has largely depended on border trade with Russia. With much lower prices on petrol, alcohol, and tobacco in Russia, shuttle traders cross the border back and forth on a daily basis, bringing merchandise for illegal distribution and sale on Estonian and Western markets. There are few figures on the full extent of this trade, but Russian customs' estimates say, that it accounts to some 20-30% of Northwestern Russia's foreign trade. There is no wonder then that transit-trade is Estonia's most profitable business, the proceeds of which have made great fortunes for the people who control it. Today, a majority of Estonia's richest businessmen are ethnic Russians. The paradox is that the population of Narva and Eastern Estonia has had little to gain from the shuttle-trade. Most of the money has ended up in the pockets of a few fellow compatriots that could not care less about the situation of their Russian kin. Therefore, the future of Narva rests on the opportunities to enter other economic areas.

That a rising number of businesses in Estonia are now moving production to Narva is thus very promising. Too long, the level of costs has not been sufficiently geographically diversified to make it profitable moving industry to the East. Now, this has changed, why companies will seek to increase their dividends by lowering costs by relocation. In the meantime, however, a generation of workers has been lost to Eastern Estonia due to unemployment destitution. The old generation may be lost, but the new generation faces a much more promising future, which might allow them to stay on in their hometowns in the East.

The Choice of a New Generation
Things are changing in Estonia with 15 years passed since regained independence. A second new generation is entering the public and business spheres. This generation has little to remember from soviet times. The situation applies to Estonians and Russians alike. The arguments from nationalists and pro-Russia groups are increasingly perceived as artificial constructs with little relation to everyday reality. Both groups are themselves becoming as antiquated as oblivious. With economic development, also social and economic differences between Estonians and Russians will narrow, and so will consequently also the potential for extremists to exploit such friction. The focus of a new generation in Estonia is set on Europe and not on Russia. Relations with Russia are increasingly becoming irrelevant for most people in Estonia. Once this is realised, Moscow will have difficulties to exploit the situation of the "Russian minority" in Estonia in relations with Tallinn. It will also become harder for Russia to raise support in Estonia per se by appealing to fellow Russians. Perhaps then, Moscow will definitely let go of its lost empire and plainly put borders and other issues at rest with Tallinn without further ado. However, also in Estonia it will take a new generation to sort out the country's differences with Russia, but in the end, Tallinn and Moscow will budge to the new realities.

Leif Kihlsten in memoriam

Yesterday, news broke that the popular Swedish Russia expert and lieutenant colonel Leif Kihlsten has passed away at the age of 66 after a period of illness. Kihlsten was an officer true to his profession, and for long served within Swedish military intelligence. He was also a frequent commentator on Russia and the CIS in Swedish media.

The news of Leif's death has struck the Swedish East European analytical community with sorrow. It is no exaggeration to say that he was very well-liked within the community. Combining humour and wit with deep knowledge about and enthusiasm for his subject, many of us have been inspired by him throughout the years. He was a true story-teller who could fascinate his audience by the most unexpected and still ingeneous parallels on phenomena within our field of study. Leif will be truly missed and his memory cherished by those of us who had the privilege of knowing him as a friend or colleague within our community.

Moscow Has Lost Its Pride

Yesterday, thirteen years had passed since the law prohibiting homosexuality was abolished in Russia. Yesterday, Russia's first pride parade was crushed by police. The event was carried through, despite an official ban on a LGBT-demonstration in the streets of Moscow. However, it seems that this opportunity to advance homosexual rights in Russia was lost by the Pride organisers.

The Moscow Pride parade was preceded by a prolonged legal battle with authorities for the basic right of assembly and demonstration. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was among those that at an early stage tried to prevent Moscow Pride. This comes as no surprise, as the LGBT-movement has all the more become a target of populist politicians. Less than a month ago, right-wing demonstrators prevented a gay party in Moscow.

So, what happened in Moscow on Saturday? In short, organisers decided to carry through the Moscow Pride march, despite a Friday court decision to prohibit it. In view of the legal battle and anticipated violent right-wing protests, the turnout was small - 50-100 people at the most. As expected, they were confronted by a much larger right-wing anti-demonstration of skinheads, Orthodox clergy, and general reactionaries. Also, more than 1,000 riot policemen oversaw the parade. Thus, it was the general setup for running the gauntlet for gay rights in Central and Eastern Europe, as witnessed over the last year with gay events in e.g. Warzaw and Kiev. The few brave LGBT-rights demonstrators started out facing the general bigot scorn and phsyical abuse expected in these parts of the world. All things alike, this is however where similarities ended.

Approaching the Red Square, Pride organisers decided to go along with plans of laying down flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, thus equating the fight for gay rights with the victims of the fight against fascism in WWII - Russia's Great Patriotic War. This was a provocation that Russian authorities could not accept, and the tumultuous reactions to this attempt led to the arrest of some 40 gay activists as well as 30 anti-demonstrators. Thus, the Moscow Pride parade was dispersed by riot police, under the close supervision of international media. Organisers must have been aware of the effect this was destined to provoke. Controversial actions at this national memorial next to always lead to stern police reaction.

Having stated the facts, there is reason to question whether the Pride manifestation at the Tomb was in the best interest of the Russian LGBT-movement. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is Russia's most revered national shrine to the approximately 20 million soviet citizens who perished in WWII. Its fundamental significance to the relatives of victims of fascist oppression is something that goes far beyond politics. Therefore, any attempts at exploiting the monument for purposes other than commemorating the victims are regarded a grave sacrilege by most Russians.

However, it is everyone's right to commerorate the victims of fascism at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. This right is even more important for homosexuals to be allowed exercising, not least while gay and lesbian rights are human rights. Fascist crimes against gay people during WWII were especially heinous, why LGBT-victims should be rightly revered. Commemorating gay victims of fascism deserves greater attention, and the issue has until recently largely been overlooked by historians and society alike.

So, what was the purpose of laying down flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier? Was it "a symbolic protest to equate the struggle for gay rights with the struggle against fascism in World War II," as BBC reports, or was it to commemorate LGBT-victims of fascist aggression? Little evidence to support the latter is regrettably found. Being aware of walking a thin line concerning a discussion on the confines of exercising one's rigths, the question still deserves to be put, what the motive for this action was.

Whereas there is no doubt whatsoever of the right of access for all to a national monument like the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, exercising this right may prove disastrous to gay rights in Russia. If the intent of Moscow Pride organisers were to commemorate gay victims of WWII fascist oppression, this might well have aroused public sympathy. The right of commemoration is cherished among Russians, and focussing on gay victims could have brought a long overdue Russian moral self-scrutiny on equal rights in this regard to the public agenda.

The alternative of instead equating the struggle for gay rights with the struggle against fascism, may to the contrary well have played into the hands of anti-gay forces in Russia. As long as the media version of events is the equation of struggling for gay rights with struggling against fascism, Russia's LGBT-movement stands to lose from this action. That there is little difference between the two, regrettably does not much matter, as the pedagogical task of explaining this is too great in comparison to the possibilities of actually doing so.

The overall effect for the Russian LGBT-movement thus seems to be in the negative. Thus, already before the parade, gay.ru reports that it is a very controversial issue also within the Russian LGBT-movement. One gay activist's statement is telling: "This gay parade is actually making our life much tougher." Leading Russian liberal, Grigori Yavlinsky, has also turned his back on LGBT-rights in view of recent debate.

Desperation brings desperate measures, and from this perspective, Moscow Pride's action may be understandable. The situation of gay people in Russia is close to desperate. Russia is a fundamentally homophobic society. A recent opinion poll shows that an overwhelming 73% of Russians are opposed to homosexual relations. Some 43% think that homosexuality should not only be criminalised but also penalised. Another poll showed that some 80% of Muscovites were opposed to the 2006 Moscow Pride festival. These are indeed harrowing figures on the situation for Russian gays.

Thirteen years ago, homosexuality was decriminalised in Russia. Still, every year the homophobic lobby in the Russian parliament proposes that it should be criminalised again. Until now, a small majority has voted against such proposals, but the margin has narrowed in recent years. Historically, homosexuality was outlawed in Tsarist Russia. After the revolution, the communists legalised LGBT-relations, regarding the opposite "bourgeois prejudice." However, as early as in 1933, Stalin reimposed the ban, by introducing the infamous article 121 in the soviet penal code. Thus, homosexual relations could be punished by up to five years imprisonment.

Since article 121 was abolished by president Yeltsin in 1993, liberalisation has regrettably come to a halt. Homosexuality and LGBT-rights are rarely discussed in public, and these issues are in practice suppressed by the tacit norms of Russian society. It is an alarming fact that gays are still regarded as perverts or psychically ill by most ordinary Russians. The 73% opposition against gay relations tells a lot about the situation.

In this perspective, it was a brave and wise decision by organisers to go through with the Pride festival. They knew what to expect in words and violence, and still they did it. Giving in at this point would have meant that authorities and society never would have respected the equal rights of homosexuals. The long and arduous struggle for LGBT-rights in Russia has come to be epitomised by the 2006 Moscow Pride. International support has been massive and extensive.

This was a pride moment that was too precious to be lost for Russia's LGBT-movement. It was a moment when Russian authorities should have looked down in shame for denying the people their constitutional and instrinsic rights. It was also a moment when Russian gays should have looked up in pride for trying to uphold the very same rights. Instead, the opportunity to exploit international support and improve public sympathy domestically was lost. The action at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was simply carrying the argument too far. The result was a tremendous anticlimax, which may negatively reverberate for Russian gays for years to come. Moscow lost its pride, but so it seems did also the Russian LGBT-movement. It is unlikely that Russian authorities will allow Moscow Pride parades in the foreseeable future. In 2010, the Russian LGBT-movement will host the XXV conference of the International Lesbian & Gay Association (ILGA). This is a great success for the movement, but the question is if there will be much progress for Russian gays until then. Conditions truly seem discouraging.

GUAM leaves CIS for ODED

Among this plethora of abbreviations, leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM), met in Kiyev earlier this week to agree on forming the regional Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM, Ukrainian Journal reports. In effect, this means that the four countries are about to pull out of the CIS, as previously speculated upon.

Formation of a new organisation is perhaps an overstatement of the results actually reached at the Kiyev summit. In essence, it simply establishes the final metamorhosis of the old GUUAM into a new GUAM, this time definitely closing the door to renegade member Uzbekistan. Thus, the GUAM-states will now proceed in cooperation within economy and free trade to form a bloc of peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the region. The Kiyev Declaration on Establishment of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM, states as its aim "the enhancement of democracy, adherence to the rule of law, respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, economic development of States and assuring of security and stability." Great emphasis is also put on the importance to safeguard "sustainable supply of energy resources."

The headquarters of ODED-GUAM will be in Kiyev. Its rival regional organisation - the CIS - leads a fading existence from its offices in Belarus capital Minsk. As the GUAM-states now seem destined to withdraw from the CIS, the Commonwealth may however gain a renaissance. With less internal opposition, Russia may want to use the CIS more as a tool in its policy towards the near abroad than was previously the case due to CIS-membership of the GUAM-states. Whether Moscow opts for such a solution is however far from clear, while Russia may prefer a unilateral policy towards its lost empire. What is becoming strikingly clear however is that reform-oriented nations of the former Soviet Union are forming a cordon sanitaire against Russia to curve Moscow's influence over its near abroad.

Belarus Bans Helsinki Committee

Yesterday, a voice of freedom, justice, and democracy was silenced in Belarus. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee was finally banned by the Lukashenka regime, having fought a long and uneven struggle in defence of Human Rights. This leaves the people of Belarus without a champion for the individual rights and freedoms enjoyed by the bulk of European citizens.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court decision to illegalise the Helsinki Committe was announced by Belarusian Ministry of Justice. Supreme Court judges are appointed by the president, why the decision to ban the Committee must be seen in this context. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee has fought a consistent and continuous battle for the observance of Human Rights in Belarus. Since last autumn, its activities have however gradually petered out in view of the regime's increasingly oppressive measures against it, drastically curtailing conditions for its mere existence. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Lukashenka regime now has taken the final step of closing down the committee by outlawing it.

The pretext for the ban are accusations of Committee irregularities during the 2004 parliamentary elections, and breach of laws regulating NGO activities in Belarus. Last autumn, the Helsinki Committe was fined some 75,000 USD for tax evasion. Needless to say, most of the charges brought against the Committee have been fabricated by the regime. The ban testifies to Lukashenka's fear of the power of human rights and individual freedoms. He is probably right in this fear, as norms and values have previously proven a mighty power to change the minds of people in Central and Eastern Europe. The struggle for human rights was a contributing factor to the demise of the communist East bloc. Creating awareness of these issues led people to realise that: "We can no longer live like this - we have rights."

Little did Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev realise that values and not weapons would become the crucial issue, when he in 1975 approved the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its third basket, dealing with individual freedoms, laid the foundation of a rights movement that was to contribute to the downfall of the Soviet Union and put an end to political oppression in the Eastern bloc. In 1976, the Moscow Helsinki Group was formed to make the Soviet Union observe its commitments from Helsinki, inspiring dissidents throughout the East bloc to follow in Czechoslovakia - Charta 77 - and in Poland in 1977. The inspiration from Helsinki initiated a movement today associated with names such as Nobel laureates Andrei Sakharov and Vaclav Havel, and fellow dissidents like Yelena Bonner, Adam Michnik, and Jacek Kuron.

The Helsinki Final Act to this day stands out as a beacon for freedom and enlightenment in the eyes of the oppressed throughout the Eurasian hemisphere. By linking peace and security with the respect for human rights, soft security in the 1980s made the difference for change whereas hard security spiralled into an arms race threatening our very existence. Instead, by the recognition of universal rights, humanity became the salvation for mankind. Today, peace is secured but the Helsinki rights live on - as self-evident and inalienable as those of the American bill of rights.

When Lukashenka now bans the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, it is because he understands that it is a threat to his power. What he does not realise is that ideas, norms, and values can neither be suppressed nor banned, while they rest in the minds of people. Lukashenka may deprive the people of their rights, but he cannot silence the voices of the people calling for freedom and justice. Instead, robbing the people of their rights only leaves them with a feeling that they are bereaved of what is intrinsically theirs. It only serves to further spur them to better know and act upon their rights and duties, and by exercising them bring about change. It is with this in mind, one realises that the ban of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee is yet another step towards a level of repression that in the end will produce a counter-reaction. Sooner or later the people will rise to the challenge of reinstating freedom and democracy in Belarus. That day, come when it may, will inevitably mean the downfall of Lukashenka and his dictatorial accomplices.

Belarus, human rights, Helsinki Committee, ban