Friday, March 10, 2006

On a personal note...

This evening, I was elected president of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. How it all came about, is still somewhat of an enigma to me, but apparently I was regarded a good enough candidate to fill the position, which - I must admit - is both flattering and a great honour. However, it was quite unexpected until only a few days ago.

The Society is an organisation of mainly analysts dedicated to "Eastern Europe". It has some 200-250 members and is the Swedish branch of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES). One of the main tasks for the Society over the coming four years will be preparations to host the VIII World Congress of ICCEES, which will take place in Stockholm in July 2010. Thus, great challenges lie ahead but also many interesting encounters and venues. Hopefully, I will learn something from it. If not, I rely on my fellow colleagues to knock me on the head every once in a while to remind me of my faults and shortomings. Either way, I am positive that it will be great fun.

Friday, March 03, 2006

Did the Soviet Union Try to Kill the Pope?

On Thursday, an Italian parliamentary investigation reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union was behind the assassination attempt on pope Paul John II, 13 May 1981, according to RFE/RL Newsline.

The investigation "believes, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the leadership of the Soviet Union took the initiative to eliminate Pope John Paul. They relayed this decision to the military secret services for them to take on all necessary operations to commit a crime of unique gravity, without parallel in modern times."

In a reply to the charges, Boris Labusov, spokesman of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), characterises the Italian allegations as "absurd". The Italian opposition also claims that the investigation forms part of an attempt by Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi to discredit the leftist parties in the run up to Italian general elections next month. Thus, the investigation report, due to be delivered to parliament only later this month, was leaked in advance to Reuters, the Guardian reports.

Allegations that the Soviet Union was behind the assassination attempt are not new. Already in 1986, Italian prosecutors failed to prove these charges due to lack of evidence. The Italian investigation, however, brings new attention to this line of inquiry, which adds to speculations on how hot the Cold War became in relations between soviet secret services and the Vatican. That soviet leaders saw pope John Paul II as a threat to stability in and soviet reign over Central and Eastern Europe is clear. The question remains if they would have risked even comtemplating a move as reckless and risky as killing the pope. Until proven elsewise, such speculations must therefore be considered a peculiar conspiracy theory.

Earlier this year, the would be assassin, Turkish citizen Mehmet Ali Agca, was temporarily released from jail, having served a 20-year sentence. This provoked widespread international protests, and Agca was again brought into police custody. Agca, a Turkish nationalist, was long considered insane and his attempt on the pope as an act of a madman. In his last book before he passed away last year, pope John Paul II, however, claimed that the attempt on his life was no madman's act and that "someone else masterminded it and someone else commissioned it". It thus looks as if the "pope murder conspiracy" will be a recurrent story also in the future.

Gorbachev Celebrates 75th Birthday by Attack on Yeltsin

Yesterday, former soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachec celebrated his 75th birthday in a circle of friends that could be described as the "Who’s Who" of Western and Soviet politicians bringing down the Iron Curtain, The Times reports.

In the moderate company of some 200 people, among whom were former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl as well as many old Politburo members, one person was lacking - Gorbachev's successor, Boris Yeltsin. As became painstakingly clear to the many guests, one reason was that Gorbachev used this opportunity for a gruesome attack on Yeltsin, blaming him for the demise of the Soviet Union.

That Yeltsin was not present is perhaps not very strange, as it appears that they have not met each other since they administered the dissolution of the union back in Christmas 1991. “I have never met him [since], and I don’t want to. He feels the same," The Times quotes. Regrettfully, the last remaining witness of these proceeding, Aleksandr Yakovlev, passed away in October (cf. my account of this).

By signing the agreement that dissolved the Soviet Union, Yeltsin "betrayed not only myself, but the nation," Gorbachev said. "It is an unforgivable act of treason."

It is apparent that Gorbachev now deems the moment ripe to rewrite history and his own role in it, by passing the blame on Yeltsin. As history revision has become a popular theme in the Kremlin, Gorbachev's standing in the political élite has improved as of lately - not least in comparison to Yeltsin. Thus, Gorbachev is trying to "set the record straight" e.g. by publishing his new book To Understand Restructuring . . . Why it is Vital Now.

As Gorbachev remains a widely popular figure in the West, his reputation in Russia is, however, tarred. Still, more than half the people blames him for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent crisis and chaos of the 1990's. His attempts at a return to politics have also ended ingloriously: In the 1996 presidential elections he got a mere 1% of the votes. Changing one's reputation is far from easy - especially if carrying such a heavy burden as Gorbachev is. Eventually, however, history might put him somewhere in between western and Russian perceptions, where he rightfully belongs: A great reformer but also a tremendous failure.

Belarus: Crackdown on Opposition

Two weeks before the 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, the Lukashenko regime is now orchestrating a heavy crackdown on the Belarusian opposition, RFE/RL Newsline reports.

On March 2, police clamped down on the largest opposition rally since 1999, gathering some 3,000 people in central Minsk, in support of united opposition presidential candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich. In a separate action the same day, police also beat and arrested another of the presidential candidates, Alyaksandr Kazulin.

It now seems that the only candidate that in reality will be allowed to run for the presidency will be the president himself, Alyaksandr Lukashenka. It thus seems correct that "This isn't an election. It's a sham," as BBC quoted Yaroslav Romanchuk of the United Civil Party saying.

At the same time, the regime is orchestrating its soviet-style party congress - the All-Belarusian People's Assembly - confirming a new five year plan for Belarus. Thus, GDP and industrial output are to grow by 50%, and farm production by 40%. Lukashenka, in his three-hour-speech, also took this opportunity to warn for a western conspiracy to bring down his rule. Calling his opponents "bastards", he claimed that the west is spending "hundreds of million" dollars to oust him from power, and that the Belarusian KGB had "busted 72 organizations" that were conspiring to overthrow him. "The opposition is planning a coup", Lukashenka concluded. As opposition candidate Kazulin said, it is becoming increasingly clear that Lukashenka "will do anything, even use force and weapons" to stay in power. In the meantime, a new symbol of opposition is appearing in the streets of Belarusian cities - jeans ribbons clad on lampposts and fences.

Western concern for developments in Belarus is also rising. The EU is following the situation in Belarus with extra attention and worries in Bruxelles are great that things will get out of hand and turn into violent clashes between regime and opposition. Yesterday, a Polish government spokesman also declared that Poland might not recognise Lukashenka as the legitimate ruler of Belarus, according to Polish daily Rzeczpospolita. Worries are also great that a recently adopted law - permitting police to open fire on illegal demonstrators - will be used, and that opposition protests thus will be met by lethal force.

The massive regime crackdown in combination with the fact that the opposition was able to rally that many people for a demonstration might indicate that Lukashenka's grip on power is not so absolute as was expected. Developments in Belarus are becoming very worrisome two weeks before the elections, and who knows to what lengths Lukashenka is willing to go to remain in power. Memories of the orange revolution in Ukraine are still fresh, and the regime seems intent to prevent any similar turn of events in Belarus - come what may. Hopefully, we will not witness blood in the streets of Minsk on March 19, but we cannot eliminate the possibility that this will be the case.

Berezovsky - Coup de Grâce for Coup d'État?

On Thursday, BBC reports that Russian authorities demand the extradition of exiled Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky on charges of an attempted coup d'état. How Berezovsky would overthrow the Putin regime is still obscure, but the affair adds to the already tense relations between Moscow and London. It may also be a Kremlin attempt to muzzle Berezovsky, who paradoxically has turned into a leading supporter of the Russian oppostition and pro-democracy movement.

Russian allegations might be prompted by an Ekho Moskvy interview with Berezovsky on 25 January. In the interview, the ex-oligarch said that Putin's "regime has lost all legitimacy" and that the president is "leading Russia into the abyss". Putin is "violating the constitution and, today, any forceful actions by the opposition will be justified". "That includes a forceful seizure of power, and that's what I've been working on," Berezovsky reportedly said.

In an attempt to mend UK-Russian relations, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declared that Berezovsky could lose his political asylum in Britain. Straw also declared that the government would "take action against those who use the UK as a base from which to foment violent disorder or terrorism in other countries". This adds to Berezovsky's already precarious position in Britain. Only a few years back, Russia demanded his extradiction on fraud charges - a demand not granted by the Britons.

There is little doubt that Berezovsky might orchester the overthrow of Putin, if he had the means and the opportunity to. However, as it is glaringly obvious that he lacks this, Russian allegations seem utterly ridiculous. The image of dark forces abroad has little similarity with reality. Reflecting on Berezovsky as the mastermind to oust Putin and gain power in the Kremlin, one comes to think of Trotsky. Exiled and isolated, Trotsky's mere existence posed a threat to the soviet regime and the - by then - faltered revolution. Is it the same with Berezovsky? Does he know too much about Putin's road to power and eventually must be silenced? It is a well-known fact in Moscow that Berezovsky was one of the people who put Putin in the Kremlin in the first place, which adds a certain flavour to current charges. That he also became one of the first oligarchs that Putin turned on once in power, might have come as a surprise, if not knowing the intricacies of Kremlin palace policies. As an effect, Berezovsky went into self-imposed exile in 2000. A malicious question might well be which coup d'état Berezovsky now is charged for: The successful that brought Putin into power or the current coup-cuckoo?

Finally, has Putin simply invented this attempted coup d'état as a coup de grâce for Berezovsky? Does the Kremlin seriously consider the exiled and immensely impopular Berezovsky a threat to power? Or is it Berezovsky's mere existence that is unbearable for Putin? As for Berezovsky, whose name derives from the Russian national tree - the birch - might only have this left as a symbol of his lost homeland. To most Russians, he instead remains a hated symbol of the 1990's and Berezovsky would perhaps better suit the Kremlin as a "Satan Defiant" than behind bars. The regime's omnipotence must, however, be satisfied and then there is little choice but to cut down any "birches" in the way to resurrected Russia's road to glory.

Wednesday, March 01, 2006

What Prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

Over the past decade, regionalism has resurfaced on the international political agenda. The demise of bipolar division, globalisation, and rekindled cultural affiliation are but a few causes for such development. In a European context, there is reason to question whether the new regions will prove viable constructions, or if some are but transient phenomena in an overall evolution towards a Europe of the regions. Therefore, even advocates of Baltic Sea regionalism must ask –What are the prospects for a Baltic Sea region?

To prove cohesive, regions should be endowed with political dynamics of their own, driven by distinctive agendas, patterns of interaction and governed by regimes. They may be based on identification, institutionalism or functionalism, driven by subjective factors such as history, culture and identity, or by objective factors such as geography, geo-economics and geopolitics.

The rise of regional co-operation
The idea of Baltic co-operation arose in the late 1960’s out of concern for marine pollution in the Baltic Sea. Environmental protection proved an uncontroversial area for co-operation even for states divided by the Iron Curtain. In 1974 the Helsinki Commission was formed to monitor Baltic marine environment. All the same, it was not until the 1990 Ronneby Summit that environmental issues became a nucleus for extended co-operation. The Summit gathered regional heads of government, and for the first time the – then soviet – Baltic republics were allowed high level international representation. Ronneby led to the foundation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, forming the hub of regional co-operation for the decade since. The CBSS was perceived as ”an overall regional forum to focus on needs for intensified cooperation and coordination among the Baltic Sea States” and set as its goal to ”strengthen the cohesion among these countries, leading to greater political and economic stability as well as a regional identity.” The Council comprises the Nordic and Baltic States, Russia, Poland, Germany and the European Commission. The bulk of co-operation has taken place in the large network of issue-specific organisations that developed in the 1990’s. Success or failure for these organisations may determine if the region will gain a common political agenda or be subject to interaction between individual state interests.

A region in the making?
A region of some 70 million people, the Baltic Sea area comprises major population centres of Northern and Central Europe. It looks back on a long tradition of trade and migration dating to the origins of recorded history. Whether dealing with Viking relations with ancient Rus’ or medieval trade within the Hanseatic League, one may find factors of commonality transcending the shores of the Baltic. History may be used as a symbol of unity in the pursuit of a common cultural heritage. In modern times, the Nordic as well as the Baltic States have often been perceived as geographic entities by the outside world. Larger nations, such as Germany, Poland and Russia, have used the region as a gate to either east or west.

If today, a regional identity is to be constructed, substantial development is needed, beside common frameworks and measures facilitating interaction. This includes improving both material conditions for trade and economy, transport and communication, and conditions for social sustainability in fields such as environment and health, democracy and justice. In both areas, directions of overall European integration will prove decisive for further development.

In the early 1990’s, countries of the region fought to grasp the new reality evolving around them. A number of alternatives were considered: formation of a neutral bloc in Central Europe, Baltic States’ admission to the Nordic Council, to mention but a few. Russia’s October 1993 events – the shelling of the White House – combined with Swedish and Finnish 1994 EU accession turned focus towards NATO and EU rapprochement among former Eastern bloc countries. Enlargement became the dominant issue on the agenda. Thus, Baltic Sea co-operation increasingly turned towards the EU, manifested by the 1996 Baltic Sea region initiative. The 1997 Northern dimension emphasised this overall direction. Today, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all entered the European Union. As the map of Europe has once more been redrawn, how will it affect the Baltic Sea region?

Most Baltic Sea states are small countries, which individually have little leverage in an enlarged Union. Forming EU-policies on the basis of regional interests would offer greater influence on the development of the Union. Polish and Baltic membership in the EU has carried prospects for regional policy co-ordination, which - thus far - have been poorly exploited. However, to form a region, Baltic Sea states must realise that success is achieved as much out of common values as out of common interests. Progress towards this aim has gradually been made by regional co-operation, laying a material foundation for a social sense of regional commonality. To assure long-term regional concord, peoples of the Baltic must develop a feeling of shared destiny – a regional identity.

Dividing lines?
It is argued that international co-operation is best pursued among states of comparable size and power. When larger and smaller states interact, co-operation risks either dominance or neglect from the large. In the Baltic Sea region, Germany, Poland and Russia are giants in comparison to other CBSS-members. While German participation in regional co-operation has been stable, EU-membership has extended Poland’s choice of partners in Union affairs. A country of some 40 million, Poland may regard unilateral action, temporary alliance-building or issue-specific agreement with other actors more attractive than Baltic Sea co-operation. Sharing a common Union framework, the Baltic Sea region may still offer sufficient synergy for both Germany and Poland to find regionalism an attractive alternative. Instead, Russia remains the great outstanding issue.

Inclusion versus exclusion was at the top of the 1990’s European agenda. Among CBSS-states, all but Russia are members of either NATO or the EU. Neither is an option for Moscow. Instead, a socio-economic gap is widening between Russia and the rest of Europe. The old debate whether Russia is part of Europe has also resurfaced. Social and material exclusion of the country from European affairs is evolving. Having conceded to NATO enlargement, Moscow’s main concern is access to the European market. Russian WTO accession may prove a means in relations with Europe. If EU-enlargement to the Baltic Sea region excludes Russia from equal terms of trade with other CBSS-states, Moscow may co-operate only as far as it serves her own interests. This would hamper regional integration. The Baltic Sea region may become the major playground for Europe’s Russian dilemma. In all, if the larger CBSS-states start pulling in different directions, the Baltic Sea region will be a concern only for the small. Such development risks endangering long-term regional stability.

What prospects for a Baltic Sea region?
Hopes are as great as misgivings for a Baltic Sea region. What it all winds down to in the end is if the area actually makes for a region. Functionally, the area may form a region in geographic, economic and political terms. Institutionally, regional co-operation has a distinctive agenda and specific patterns of interaction governed by the CBSS-regime. Whether the region will carry its own political dynamics or simply has served as an antechamber to the EU is, however, too early to say. The future of Baltic Sea regionalism will largely depend on the evolution of a regional identity. It is especially encouraging that business and finance increasingly perceive a single Baltic Sea market. Thus, material conditions would form the social basis for regional development. For over a decade now, we have crossed old borders of political and economic division to interact in the pursuit of a common good. In review of some 15 years’ co-operative development, great progress has been made in the formation of a Baltic Sea region, but its realisation is still too early to predict.

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Luzhkov Bans Moscow's Pride

Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has decided to ban the city's first ever gay pride parade, despite vows to end discrimination, the website GayRussia reports. The Moscow Pride '06 festival was to take place 24-28 May, but now organisers are unsure whether they will be able to go through with the event.

The ban does not come as a surprise to the Russian gay movement. The situation for gays in Eastern Europe is generally poor. In June last year, the Polish gay movement ignored a ban on their Pride parade and marched through Warzaw. In July, the Pride parade in Riga, Latvia, was interrupted by protesters. Moscow is, therefore, not unique in its intolerance towards gay people.

All the same, western human rights' advocates have acted to lift the Moscow ban. Among others, Human Rights Watch, protests against the decision in a letter to mayor Luzhkov, and urges him to reconsider. It, however, seems unlikely that the golubye and rozovye will march the streets of Moscow in May.

I am perhaps naïve, but I simply cannot see what it is with homo-, bi- or transsexuality that provokes so deep reactions in Eastern Europe. This sort of bigotry, surely, does not belong to modern society, as it appears to me. I mean, what do they have to fear? An alternative way of life or general dissent from the social norm? OK, I surely do not understand everything that the HBT-movement is up to and generally take little interest in it. However, they have as much a right to freedom of speech and expression as I have. Thus, governments in Eastern Europe simply have to deal with the issue of equal rights to their citizens regardless of political affinity, religion, ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation. Then they will have something to pride themselves of.

Monday, February 27, 2006

Chechnya - Bloody Harvest

Sun was shining over the freshly harvested fields. Was this really Chechnya, the reign of terror that he had heard so much about? Thoughts of the idyllic picture before his eyes were interrupted by his Chechen companion's comment: "It's the new cluster bombs. Their razor-sharp projectiles shave the face of the earth clean."

This story of a western journalist, travelling through Chechnya a few years back, serves to illustrate how difficult it is to comprehend the infathomable realities of daily life in this war-ridden country.

Only today, Sveriges Radio (Swedish State Radio) reports on a mysterious illness that has struck the population - mostly children - of Chelkovskaya, a village some 70 kilometres from Grozny. Symptoms with difficulties breathing and stomach-pains have led the local population to assume that the illness is caused by Russian troops dumping nerve gas or some other poison near the village. Russian authorities, however, claim that symptoms are wholly psychosomatic, and that there is no ground for the dumping allegations.

Last Friday, UN Human Rights Commissioner, Louise Arbour, said that there is "a climate of fear" in Chechnya, caused by the "very serious shortcomings of the law enforcement system," BBC reports. The area "has still not been able to move away from a society ruled by force to one governed by the rule of law," according to Arbour. Having finished a week-long trip to Russia and the Northern Caucasus, Arbour met with president Putin to discuss human rights issues. It is not hard to imagine that the two - despite diplomatic decorum - had difficulties sharing a common view on the situation.

Needless to say, regular talks on and visits to Chechnya, by representatives of the international community, are important to highlight the situation in the republic. The question is to what extent they help to lay the foundations of peaceful conflict resolution and reconstruction of Chechen society. Not even the Russian government seems able to grasp the situation in full - blinded by their "war on terror" and society's rampant racist sentiments towards Chechens. Also, it seems unlikely that the West will grasp realities and act on them for a true change of the situation. Regrettably, it is safe to assume that - also this year - the only harvesting the Chechen people will see, is that of the great reaper.

EU Funds Broadcasting to Belarus

On Friday, RFE/RL reports that the European Union will be funding independent broadcasting to Belarus in the amount of 2 million Euro over at two year period. Radio transmissions begin on February 26 and will mainly emanate from Poland and Lithuania. Despite the source of funding, radio stations are to be independent from the EU. This is less than a month before the 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, and Lukashenka's regime will be sure to see it as an EU provocation.

Targeting a youthful audience, European Radio for Belarus and Radio Baltic Wave are to give Belarusians alternative access to information in the same manner that RFE/RL did during the Cold War. Programmes will be in both Belarusian and Russian, and be broadcast on the FM band and via the Internet.

Already in January, EU Commission spokeswoman, Emma Udwin, declared that "There will be specific TV and radio programs dedicated to the elections broadcast ahead of the election date," EU Business reports.

The new radio stations are, however, not the only independent foreign media targeting Belarus. For long, Radio Racja had regular transmissions to Belarus, but in the end had to stop sending due to lack of funding. By this project, however, Radio Racyja seems to have been adopted by the new European Radio for Belarus. Also, Deutsche Welle, has been targeting programmes at a Belarusian audience.

Rumour also has it that president Lukashenka, during a recent visit to China, took great interest in Chinese authorities' methods to control the Internet by banning and screening information. Although this may be too late for the upcoming 19 March presidential elections in Belarus, we will be sure to hear more about such measures by Lukashenka during his third term in office.

Sunday, February 26, 2006

Global Voices Review

Following up on my survey of the Swedish Blogosphere on "Eastern Europe," Global Voices yesterday included a reference to the piece in their Global Roundups.

It is not the first time that they have reviewed my blog over its three months' existence. Earlier this week, their ever so diligent Nathan Hamm - also known for his Registan.net - referred to my critical comment on ICG's recent report on Uzbekistan.

I am the first to admit that there is a narcissist element in getting referred to for what you write. The greater good, however, is that the volunteers of Global Voices do the same for a multitude of other blogs. This is perhaps not news to most of you, but an éloge must be made to all the young men and women who take the time to review various aspects of the blogosphere. Without them, we would be at a loss to find our way on the global blog scene. Now, instead, bloggers around the world can be in touch with what others write and comment about, and ultimately enter into dialogue. For me, that is what it is all about. Writing for the fun of it and having fun seeing what others write, and - perhaps - to find people with common interests with whom one might exchange views and ideas.